Centre of Air Power published a book titled “Air Power & Emerging Technologies”.
This article is one of the chapter in the book.
It may be said that warfare has acquired a new phase – technological war. The kind and quality of systems that a nation develops can decide the battle in advance and make the final conflict a mere formality or can bypass conflict altogether.
– Gen Bernard Schriever
Introduction
The origin of warfare is coincident with the origin of living beings. Human beings have made it into a specialised art by applying the knowledge of science to it. The nature of warfare is constantly changing with advancements in technology. Warfare essentially has two facets, offensive and defensive. Offensive action is aimed at causing damage to the enemy and defensive action is to save oneself from the enemy offensive action. In the olden days of fighting with handheld weapons, swords were used as an offensive weapon and shields were used to protect oneself.
Airpower appeared on the warfare scene quite recently as compared to other domains of warfare. Aviation itself started about 120 years back however, within a very short time it made forays into warfare giving birth to a new service. Warfare since then has gone through a rapid change with the use of the third dimension of air and space. Air warfare also has two facets of offensive application of airpower and defensive actions to mitigate the enemy’s offensive air actions. In air warfare, the division between the offensive and defensive campaigns is not as simple as it seems. The two campaigns are intrinsically interconnected.
In the last decade, the Air Defence (AD) operations have undergone an extensive change with new technologies being employed. Research is already in progress on new technologies like Quantum computing, Artificial Intelligence, Hypersonic, Nano Technologies and unmanned systems etc. These new technologies will have a transformational impact on the AD as well. It is worthwhile to trace the historical evolution of AD operations over the years, take stock of the present situation and crystal gaze into the future.
AD perspective
Understanding AD. The term Air Defence (AD), simplistically means defence of a nation’s assets from an enemy’s air attacks. However, AD today means much more than that. It means ensuring the sovereignty of Indian air space in peace and additionally in war, ensuring freedom of all friendly air and surface operations. It involves a wider responsibility which includes networked and integrated surveillance, command, control and decision-making system and kinetic/non-kinetic, defensive and offensive protective measures. Various facets of AD operations are as follows:-
- During peace and war, the basic task of the AD is to monitor round the clock, the entire airspace of interest. AD operations are no longer restricted in volume to own continental or maritime air space. Entire national air space along the land borders, the EEZ and beyond, both the seaboards and looking deep even into the enemy territory is required. Further, with the use of space for warfare the envelope has expanded and Air Defence is being renamed as Aerospace Defence.
- AD is the first line of defence and it is the first activity to be raised to a higher level of readiness and alertness during heating up of the situation.
- Air Space Management and control is one of the tasks of AD activities. The intensely busy and dense volume of airspace, needs close monitoring and control, to ensure timely detection, identification and engagement of hostile air threats while permitting full freedom of operations to own users. In peacetime, this no easy task is primarily to avoid accidents and fratricide. During hostilities, the aim is to maximize the effectiveness of combat operations without adding undue restrictions to the users. This role is generally misconstrued as an exclusive claim of use of airspace by the Air Force.
- AD protection is required not only to the vital areas and vital points (VAs/VPs) but also to own airborne platforms like AWACS, AEW&C, and Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA), combat support aircraft, helicopters, ground-attack aircraft and unmanned aerial platforms.
- Even offensive air missions are closely integrated with the AD elements located on the ground as well as airborne in the air. AD forms a protective bubble around these offensive packages.
- Air defence is the raison d’être of the Air Force. AD activities are an integral and vital element of every air operation and cannot be executed as a separate campaign.
AD Activities. AD activity has four subsets – Detection, Identification, Interception and Destruction (DIID).
- Surveillance plays a key role in effective AD. A coordinated gap-free, multi-tiered and layered coverage of air space is required for the detection of air threats as far away as possible. Detection of a likely threat is with the help of radars, electronic sensors and observers. The radars could be long or short-range, static or mobile on the ground or mounted on an airborne platform (aircraft, balloons or drones).
- Identification and classification of air tracks as hostile or friendly is carried out based on electronic means and systems (IFF- Identification Friend or Foe), track behaviour and correlation with known plans.
- Interception and destruction of the hostile track are carried out by interceptor aircraft, the surface to air missiles (SAM) of various ranges and close-in weapon systems (AD Guns).
- For the protection of ground VAs/VPs, a multi-tiered, layered defence concept is used. Various sensors and weapon systems of different capabilities are employed to detect and destroy hostile tracks at different ranges, forming four to five protective layers in the ‘AD Kill Chain’.
- With the advancement of technology, the entire gamut of AD operations and activities have got integrated into a network. All the AD elements are interconnected by high speed integrated and secure networks and fused with advanced command and control systems. The advantage is that the AD kill chain has become swift and efficient by reducing the sensor to shooter cycle.
- AD flying missions involve both defensive and offensive missions. Defensive Counter Air (DCA) include Combat Air Patrol missions over their high-value assets on the ground. On the other hand, Offensive Counter Air (OCA) missions include AD fighters tasked to go into hostile enemy airspace to draw out and shoot down enemy aircraft.
- Own attack packages going across into enemy airspace are provided full AD cover. The package includes dedicated AD escorts and aircraft for suppression/destruction of enemy AD systems (using electronic warfare jammers and anti-radiation missiles). These missions are executed under the AD surveillance and control provided by the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEWC) aircraft which provide AD cover deep inside enemy territory.
- Passive AD (PAD) measures are another facet of AD protection. These include measures to prevent detection by enemy sensors and protection from enemy attacks. Camouflage, concealment, decoying, dispersion, protective shelters and runway rehabilitation schemes etc. would fall under this category of activities.
AD needs of Army and Navy. Both the Army and the Navy have sizeable AD assets for defending their combat assets against enemy aerial attacks.
- Protection of friendly surface forces in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) comes under the classification of defensive AD. Air Force provides a big and wider AD umbrella over the entire area of interest. Army’s defensive formations, automatically and adequately, get covered by the multi-tiered AF AD umbrella and they only need terminal defences. The offensive formations need highly mobile, quick reaction systems for their terminal AD. The army needs radar systems and surface to air guided weapons that are mobile and quick to deploy for terminal defence. Even these need to be integrated into the network to avoid fratricide.
- Navy. Needs to protect their fleets and carrier battle groups. The naval ships are equipped with radars, surface to air missiles and close-in weapon systems. Carrier borne fighter aircraft provide an air AD umbrella. The flotilla AD gets augmented by the shore-based aircraft when within their reach. The naval AD weapons and systems work independently of the continental AD network when sailing on high seas. However, they need to get integrated into the overall AD network when in harbour or close to shore.
Cost-Benefit Debate. Frequently the cost-benefit debate takes place, wherein, a simplistic comparison is made between the incoming cheaper hostile projectiles versus costly AD systems and missiles used to counter them. The classic case is the recent Rocket attack on Israel and the use of the Iron Dome system for protection. The cost of VA / VP and the extent of damage caused to them by hostile projectiles also needs to be considered in this comparison. As far as cost offset is considered other options of punitive actions and destruction of enemy launch sites and equipment need to be exercised. Even an increase in deterrence value and display of resolve to retaliate would dissuade enemy attacks.
Concept of AD Command. In the last four decades, the AD capability has increased manifold. From point defence it has become fully networked, covering the entire landmass (including island territories) following the strategy of Active Defence. For the Active Defence strategy to work the AD operations have to be enmeshed with overall air plans. AD as a separate function cannot be isolated from Air warfare. The multi-role, swing-role and now Omni role platforms can achieve much more – even in the same mission. Separating them as role wise platforms would be gross underutilisation of their capability. A limited number of Strategic assets like AWACS and AEW&C are required for other tasks besides AD operations. None of the major powers has a separate AD Command, because it is unviable and the serious operational disadvantages far outweighed the limited gains.
Evolution of AD Concepts
The first use of aerial platforms in the war was for aerial reconnaissance. Thereafter, aerial bombing originated with the throwing of handheld grenades from the aircraft. For these aerial threats, passive AD measures like camouflage and concealment were sufficient.
Air warfare and AD operations have come a long way since then and evolved into an intricate facet of warfare. The evolution of air defence and its concepts have been possible with the advancement of technology and improvement in capabilities of terminal weapons, the surface to air missiles, ground-based and airborne radars, air to air missiles, fighter aircraft performance, combat support aircraft and networked command and control systems. AD concepts have evolved and expanded over the years.
- Point defence. During the World wars, the ground assets were protected by anti-aircraft guns. These provided a limited AD umbrella, with the biggest disadvantage being that they did not prevent the enemy from carrying out an attack. The AD umbrella got slightly bigger with limited range surface to air missiles and fighter aircraft equipped with Airborne Interception (AI) Radar and Air to Air Missiles (AA).
- Limited Area Defence. With improvement in the performance of ground-based radars, and fighter AD aircraft (AI Radar and AA missiles) the limited areas defence concept came into being. The concept was to integrate some of the sensors and weapon systems to form bigger AD umbrellas. The biggest advantage of this concept was that attempt was made to intercept the enemy attack package before it reached the target, reducing the weight of the attack. The attack aircraft were engaged by terminal weapons over the target area and once again interception was attempted in the egress mode to cause maximum attrition. This concept had the limitation of the existence of large gaps, which could be exploited by the enemy by resorting to tactical routing to avoid the defences.
- Area Defence. The next step in the evolution of the AD concept was obviously to remove the gaps and expand the coverage to provide an even bigger AD umbrella covering the entire airspace. This was possible not only by increasing the number of AD assets but also due to further improvement in platforms, sensors and weapons. Long-range sensors mounted on AWACs, AEW&C aircraft, fighters with long-range AI radars armed with Beyond Visual Range AA Missiles and increased range of SAMs enabled this concept. This concept allowed shooting down the enemy aircraft before they could reach the target. Even the AD bubble being provided by fighter escorts to own attack packages got bigger.
- Integrated Area Defence (Net Worked). An IAD system comprises a network of all the AD systems including sensors, platforms, weapons and command & control centres. The Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) of IAF is an ideal example of such a network. It enables the entire air and AD activity to be closely monitored and controlled. The network effectively links all sensors to provide an ‘Integrated Air Situation Picture (IASP)’. Such an integrated system essentially has a three-tiered network i.e. network of ground elements, a network of aerial platforms through operational Data Link (ODL) and a network linking the ground and air elements. The networked concept provides lots of advantages like clarity, quick decision making, flexibility of operations and reduction of the sensor to shooter cycle.
- Offensive Defence. The concept of AD is no longer defensive. It has become proactive and offensive. It is no longer limited to own friendly air space but takes the fight into the enemy territory and airspace.
Effect of Technology
Air Force is a technology-intensive service. Air Force in general and AD operations, in particular, have been influenced by advancements in technology. AD operations have changed over the years mainly due to advancements in terminal weapons, surface air missiles, ground-based and airborne radars, air to air missiles, fighter aircraft performance, combat support aircraft and networked command and control systems. Existing technology features in AD platforms and systems are as follows:-
- Fighter aircraft. The fighter aircraft remains the main instrument of prosecuting air war and air defence. Advancements in fighters include agility, supercruise, stealth, multi-function AESA radars, network-centric systems, integrated glass cockpits, fibre-optics data-transmission, multi-spectral sensors, fused situational picture, helmet-mounted sights, and Precision Guided Weapons (PGM).
- Airborne AD Sensors. Airborne radars enhance the look range much beyond the visual ranges. Most of the airborne platforms now have Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars. These radars allow simultaneous surveillance, tracking and attack on multiple targets. Ultra-long-range UAV radar systems are useful in early detection and weapon slewing and designation for the fighters. Passive infra-red search and tracking (IRST) sensors also form an important part the of aircraft suite. These can prove a good situational awareness.
- AWACS and AEW&C Aircraft. These aircraft can detect aircraft and even projectiles at long ranges. They can simultaneously perform command and control and battle management functions. These aircraft are packed with electronics and numerous active and passive systems.
- Aerial AD Weapons. Air-to-Air Missiles (AAM) typically have kill ranges of as far as 200 km. Long-range anti-radiation missiles have been developed as an AWACS killer. The range of these weapons goes up to about 400 km. Electro-optical sensor missiles are being used against low-heat targets such as UAVs and cruise missiles.
- Ground-based radars. High and medium powered surveillance radars, tethered aerostat radar balloons, missile acquisition and guidance radars and tactical battlefield mobile radars are part of the ground sensor network. The ground-based radars have features that could include detection capability of low, medium and high altitude threats, transportability, 3-dimensional air search, long-range surveillance and over-the-horizon look capability. The development of systems to beat stealth technology are also in progress.
- Ground-Based AD Weapons. For conventional threats, Surface-to-Air missiles (SAM) cover the middle AD layers with the inner ring being covered by close-in weapons (CIWS) i.e. short-range quick-reaction SAMs and anti-aircraft guns. On the other hand, Ballistic missile defence requires very long-range interceptor missiles. Now the trend is of integration of multiple missiles with a range from 40 to 400km into one system itself (e.g. S-400).
- CIWS. The Anti-Aircraft guns have improved with features like ballistic and high explosive high-calibre shells, optical or radar control systems, and high rates of fire. However, Man-portable missiles (MANPADS) and Quick Reaction short-range Missiles (QRM) are being preferred over the AA guns. The trend is towards smaller and faster missiles with guidance for mid-flight course correction. Hybrid systems with guns and missiles are also in existence.
Future Technologies. New technologies are emerging at a fast pace. These technologies are impacting the nature of warfare (especially air warfare) like never before. Some of the important ones are:-
- Quantum computing.
- Hypersonic weapon systems.
- Artificial Intelligence.
- Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology.
- Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems.
- Sensors and Seekers.
AD Specific Technology Advancement. Over the years, the number of threats from drones, other platforms and projectiles have resulted in the development of counter AD systems that can either reduce the effectiveness of such attacks or can completely nullify them. Trends include multiple-object kill vehicles, electromagnetic rail guns, space-based sensors, space-based interceptors, and hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensors (HBTSS). Other AD specific technologies that are advancing are as follows.
- 4D Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar. The 4D Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar is the latest innovation in radar technology. It is designed for close to long-range ground to air surveillance and identification.
- Counter Hypersonic Weapon System. Rapid advancements in the field of hypersonic weapon technology and the resultant strategic threat have made the development of counter hypersonic weapon systems a necessity.
- Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). These systems are at various stages of testing and development. They will give a much higher magnitude of precision. Very narrow beams of Lasers, microwave radiation, particle beams would destroy or damage guidance systems or trigger warheads of incoming projectiles.
- Laser-Based Missile Interception System. High energy laser weapons are being developed to intercept and destroy threats from missiles, mortars, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other aerial threats.
- High Power Microwave Weapon. A high-power microwave (HPM) weapon signifies a class of non-lethal weapons designed to disable the electronic systems of enemy drones with jolts of powerful electrical energy.
- Boost Phase Laser-Based Missile Defence System. The boost phase missile defence system is involved in the obliteration of a hostile missile during the earliest stages of its flight while it remains within the earth’s atmosphere. Slower and easier tracking of missiles is possible during the midcourse or terminal stage, thus making them vulnerable toward interception. Boost phase laser-based missile defence systems are designed in such a way that they can eliminate missiles during this phase.
- Neutral Particle Beam Weapons. Neutral particle beam weapon is a technology based on the propagation of neutron particles without an electric charge at a speed of light and directing them toward the target. Particle beams can be more effective than lasers because they can penetrate beyond the surface of the enemy’s missile, igniting its fuel supply, melting its mechanical components, and damaging its electronic system.
Harnessing Emergent Technologies. Technology superiority needs to be a cornerstone of national military strategy. A comprehensive defence science and technology strategy need to be defined. It should contain the plan to harness technology and convert it into decisive military capability. It would provide strategic focus by making a long term and medium-term technology plan for guidance with periodic review. A top-down approach, guided by a policy document and supported by adequate monetary allotment would ensure success. A suitable Ecosystem needs to be developed to bring users (defence in this case), Academia, R&D (DRDO) and Industry (DPSU and Private) to work in unison. Some of the existing projects that need impetus are:-
- Hypersonic weapons systems.
- Integrated Ballistic and Cruise Missile System.
- Aviation programmes
- Fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
- Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements).
- Development of gas turbines and engines.
- AI-enabled autonomous systems (Land, Air and Sea)
- Unmanned platforms
- Development of sensors and seekers for multiple users.
- Metallurgy and composites.
Challenges Ahead
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.
– Giulio Douhet
Widening of AD Spectrum. In the past AD had to provide protection from the conventional threat i.e. weapons launched from conventional platforms and short-range surface to surface missiles. With the proliferation of unmanned and other smaller platforms the sub-conventional threats, have been added to the list of AD threats. The vital areas and vital installations need to be protected against these threats. Appropriate detection systems and weapons (like CIWS – Close-in weapon systems) are required to deal with them. On the other end of the spectrum, the ballistic missile threat has increased over the years. Ballistic missile Defence (BMD) systems with the ability to look and intercept very far are required. AD threat spectrum has widened on both sides.
Sub conventional threat. The latest challenge faced by the world, due to grey zone operations in the aerial domain is the sub-conventional threat posed by aerial platforms like unmanned platforms, drones, swarms, hang gliders and powered gliders etc. These platforms besides being used for direct targeting are also being utilised in roles like ISR, smuggling and arms trafficking etc. In the last few years world over, concerted efforts are being made to deal with this threat. These threats need to be dealt by the development and employment of detection systems, anti-drone weapons/systems, engagement procedures and licensing and controlling regulations. AD operations, assets and systems are an essential component in the entire response for mitigation of these threats. A mix of manned-unmanned operations, including unmanned swarms, will be a big challenge in future.
Hybrid Multi-Sensor systems. For a clear, accurate, real-time Air Situation Picture, myriad numbers and types of sensors will be required to be integrated. In the domain of sub-conventional platforms, the detection and tracking are difficult because the radar, heat, visual, audio, electro-magnetic and noise signature of these platforms is low. Hybrid systems with multiple sensors would be required. These systems would need AI to analyse and compile together the piecemeal information obtained from various sensors.
Grey Zone warfare effects. Grey zone warfare would not be restricted to wartime. Even in peacetime, these hostile activities may create frequent tense situations. AD being the first responder will be put on alert frequently and maybe for extended periods. This challenge will have to be managed without any dilution in alertness and at the same time avoiding burnout.
Network Centric Warfare. AD operations would be highly networking centric. The real-time flow of information to numerous stakeholders would be very important. Integrated networks with good architecture, supported by suitable applications will assist in building situational awareness, planning, communicating and monitoring the situations in real-time. The information flow would have to need to know basis to avoid paralysis due to information overload. The networks would have to have redundancies and protection measures in terms of firewalls and anti-virus systems. Alternate standby nodes will have to be built in with plug and play or power up and play options.
AI Necessity. In the networked environment with the integration of thousands of systems the volume of data would be very large. Further duplicity of data will exist. AI will become a necessity to analyse the data and make it available on a need to know basis to avoid information overload. AI assistance would also be required for the decision support feature and what if options.
Cyber Security. The cyber domain has the maximum potential for grey zone operations and cyber-attacks even in peacetime. Unlike a physical attack, a cyber-attack can be launched instantaneously from anywhere, anytime with little evidence, it is hard to trace and has a high level of deniability. These characteristics make it an ideal and most favoured tool for grey zone operations. Cyber-attacks would be launched by the enemy on military networks (including the AD networks). Denial of these networks could prove to be catastrophic and these need to be protected adequately. The information-rich environment will require integrity and security of data. Procedural back-ups will have to be in place.
Space Defence. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of military and civil life. Space has become an important domain and warfare has proliferated in this domain. The term airpower has changed to aerospace power with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the domain of space. The term Air Defence has also changed to Aerospace Defence. Defence of own space assets would be a challenge in future.
Recommendations
New conditions require new solutions new weapons and imaginative methods for maximum application. New Wars are never won in the past.
– Douglas MacArthur
In the game of warfare, one has to keep pace with the latest developments. Some of the recommendations from an AD perspective are as follows:-
- We need to invest in new technology research and development. All the major military powers are researching the military use of new technologies.
- All technologies are dual-use i.e. for civil as well as military use. Research for the military use of new dual-use technologies should progress ab initio and in parallel.
- Unmanned platforms and drones of different types with a variety of capabilities are performing numerous tasks in the domain of warfare. They have a large potential for AD operations including surveillance, reconnaissance, detection, suppression of enemy AD by soft as well as hard kill etc. These platforms need to be used judicially along with other platforms and systems.
- The threat posed by unmanned platforms and drones has widened the spectrum of AD Threats. The threat from sub-conventional platforms needs to be tackled with multi-sensor, multi-weapon Anti-Drone Systems. There is an urgent need for the development and large scale manufacture of these systems.
- On the other extreme of the spectrum is the threat from long-range ballistic missiles. Multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defence needs to be developed and deployed for the protection of national capital and other strategic locations. These extended-range systems with appropriate adaptations will also be useful against hypersonic weapons in future.
- Artificial Intelligence has lots of potential for use in AD systems. AI-enabled decision support systems with what-if options are the need of the hour.
- The vast area to be monitored for gap-free coverage multiple sensors are required in adequate numbers. A mix of both high power static and mobile AD systems is required.
- AD systems need to cater for all types of terrains. Most difficult is the hilly terrain, where even the airborne platforms have limitations. Mountain radars are required for these areas along with other systems.
- AWACS and AEW&C aircraft are force multipliers and game-changers. Adequate numbers are required to cover the entire area round the clock if required.
- Organisational adaptation is an essential part of the transformation. However, change should not be made for change sake. A Separate AD command is not operationally viable and is not recommended.
- Grey zone warfare would warrant a situation of frequent and prolonged alerts in future. These extended periods of high alert status and operational readiness take a toll on man and machine. Adequate numbers and time-sharing are required to avoid burnout.
- Protective infrastructure is an essential part of the defensive AD. Adequate numbers are required to safeguard aerial platforms and other systems on the ground. Besides quantity, the protective infrastructure should be capable of providing protection against current and future weapons. Going underground provides enhanced protection.
- Passive Air Defence helps in damage control and speedy recovery from damage caused by aerial attacks. New technology equipment and systems need to be introduced in the PAD inventory.
- Knowledge of enemy AD orbat is essential for mission planning. Investment in Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) platforms & equipment and carrying out a well-planned ISR campaign would pay high dividends.
- Electronic warfare has become an important domain for warfare. The AD platforms and systems are prone to EW warfare and need appropriate countermeasure. EW systems and systems for increasing survivability are required to deal with EW threats.
- The entire gamut of AD operations and campaigns has become very complex. Integrated (live and simulated) training solutions are required. AI-enabled systems with what if the option would be preferable.
- Most important of all is self-reliance. All major military powers in the world have a well-established defence industry. Besides cost saving, it ensures assured availability.
Conclusion
Air warfare including Air Defence operations is highly technology sensitive and dependent. AD has been in a state of transformation for most of its existence. Recently the high pace of technological advancements has led to its rapid transformation. Over the years, AD has gone well beyond the point defence concept. It is no longer restricted to being defensive. Its employment philosophy and operational concepts have undergone immense changes from the past. AD now provides a vast, gap-free, multi-layered national security umbrella round the clock. Multi-agency NCW integration of all civil and military AD assets ensures clarity, quicker reaction and a synergetic approach.
The advancement of technology and changing nature of security challenges are the two drivers of the transformation of warfare. Growing employment of grey zone warfare would increase the burden on first responder AD in future. The spectrum of threats has widened manifold. It spreads from Sub conventional threats from small platforms, on one end, to long-range vectors (Ballistic Missiles) on the other end of the spectrum. The sub-conventional threats, conventional threats and threats from long-range projectiles need dissimilar solutions. The offensive and defensive operation being deeply enmeshed intrinsically cannot be segregated and compartmentalised under a separate AD command.
New technologies are making inroads into warfare at a rapid pace. Being an extremely dynamic facet of air airpower, AD will continue to evolve with the advances in technology. Induction of new platforms, radars, and networking equipment with appropriate changes in concepts, strategy and tactics would make AD operations more efficient and effective in future.
Bottom Line
Air defence is much more than radars and surface to air weapons.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.
References
- https://www.d8.synergiafoundation.org/insights/analyses-assessments/future-conflict-scenarios
Very exhaustive and full of information. Needs to be vigilant at all times.
Have to keep the guard up all the time.