843: RUSSIA’S INNOVATION: CONVERTING AIR DEFENCE ASSETS INTO OFFENSIVE FIREPOWER

 

Russia is increasingly finding new ways to expand its ballistic-missile arsenal without relying entirely on purpose-built systems such as the Iskander-M. According to Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Directorate (DIU), Russia has modified up to 17 S-400 launchers to fire RM-48U missiles against ground targets.

The modified launchers have reportedly been organised into five specialised missile groups deployed in Russia’s Bryansk and Rostov regions. Their emergence highlights a broader Russian effort to turn existing air-defence hardware and missile stocks into additional offensive capabilities.

At first glance, 17 launchers may seem relatively small. But their significance lies less in the number than in what they represent: Russia is creating another layer of ballistic strike capacity by repurposing weapons and equipment originally intended for air defence.

 

From Interceptor to Strike Missile

The RM-48U is essentially a ground-attack adaptation of missiles from the 48N6 family associated with the S-300 and S-400 air-defence systems. Instead of intercepting aircraft or other aerial targets, these missiles can now hit ground targets.

The conversion gives Russia a way to extract additional military value from an existing inventory. Older air-defence missiles that might otherwise remain in storage, require expensive maintenance or reach the end of their service life can potentially be refurbished and adapted for a different role.

The concept itself is not entirely new. Russia has previously used S-300 and S-400 air-defence missiles in ground-attack roles. What matters about the RM-48U development is the apparent effort to institutionalise that conversion rather than rely on improvised battlefield use. Ukrainian officials have confirmed the existence of specially modified S-400 launchers intended for these missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence assesses that the RM-48U is substantially cheaper than the purpose-built 9M723 ballistic missiles used by the Iskander-M system. Russia is also reported to hold a stockpile of roughly 400 RM-48U missiles.

 

A Cost-Effective Advantage

The most obvious advantage is cost, which makes the RM-48U attractive for sustained missile campaigns. Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence says Russia is using RM-48U missiles partly because they are significantly cheaper than the 9M723 ballistic missiles employed by the Iskander-M system. Ukrainian intelligence estimates Russia held around 400 RM-48Us in mid-2026, while production reportedly continued at roughly 50 missiles per month, with more than 480 planned for production during 2026.

A country conducting large-scale strikes does not need to attack every target with its most expensive or scarce missile. Purpose-built ballistic missiles such as the Iskander’s 9M723 are valuable assets, and using them against every target would place greater pressure on Russia’s stockpile and production capacity.

The RM-48U provides another option. Russia can therefore use a mixed arsenal: more capable or expensive missiles for some targets while employing converted air-defence missiles for others. The result is a larger pool of weapons that can contribute to a ballistic strike campaign.

 

Seventeen Launchers

The figure of 17 does not mean that the number of missiles is limited to 17. A launcher can fire, reload, and fire again. The real limitations are more likely to be missile availability, reload procedures, logistics, supply chain, and operational tempo rather than the headline figure of 17 launchers.

Russia reportedly possesses around 400 RM-48U missiles, making the size and replenishment of the missile stockpile more important for understanding the programme’s potential scale than the number of launchers.

If production and employment rates continue to rise, the missile stockpile becomes the key factor. Russia is simultaneously working to replenish that stockpile, meaning the conversion programme is not necessarily limited to older missiles already sitting in warehouses.

The modified launchers have reportedly been grouped into five specialised missile units positioned in Bryansk and Rostov oblasts, locations that provide practical reach toward Ukrainian territory.

 

Scalability with Existing Ecosystem

Another advantage is the existing launcher architecture. Russia already operates the S-400 system at scale. Its military-industrial sector can manufacture new launchers and modernise existing equipment. Ukrainian intelligence has identified Almaz-Antey and MKB Fakel among the principal companies associated with the S-400 system. In contrast, the Avangard Moscow Machine-Building Plant and AviaTek in Vyatka are identified as manufacturers of RM-48U missiles.

This means Moscow does not have to create an entirely new missile-launching ecosystem. The basic architecture already exists: launch vehicles, transport and handling equipment, personnel, logistics and command structures associated with the S-400 family. Modifying selected launchers to support the ground-attack mission can therefore be considerably more straightforward than developing a completely new operational missile system.

This is an important feature of Russia’s wartime adaptation. Rather than treating its enormous legacy inventory as obsolete, Moscow is looking for ways to turn existing stocks into new capabilities.

 

Augmentation of Missile Capability and Capacity

The RM-48U should not be viewed as a replacement for the Iskander-M. Russia still prioritises production of 9M723 missiles for Iskander-M, and Ukrainian Defence Intelligence has reported that Russia can produce more than 200 cruise and ballistic missiles of various types per month. Its estimates put monthly 9M723 production at around 60 missiles, with July production reportedly reaching 65.

The more logical interpretation is that Russia is attempting to expand the depth of its ballistic arsenal. A military does not necessarily need one weapon system to perform every task. It can be more effective to create several overlapping categories of missiles, each with different costs, capabilities and levels of availability.

The RM-48U fits neatly into that strategy. Instead of allowing older 48N6-family missiles to remain stranded in storage, Russia can convert them into offensive weapons. Instead of consuming an Iskander missile for every ballistic-strike requirement, Russian forces can draw on a second pool of missiles. And instead of developing an entirely new launcher, they can modify part of an existing S-400 infrastructure. The result is additional capacity without requiring every element of the system to be newly developed.

 

A Broader Look at the Russian Adaptation

The conversion of S-400 launchers illustrates a broader feature of Russia’s war effort: the attempt to squeeze additional combat value from existing inventories while expanding new production. The strategic importance of the RM-48U programme is therefore not simply that Russia has 17 modified launchers. It is that Russia appears to be building a second echelon of ballistic strike capability.

The missiles may be cheaper than Iskanders, the launchers are derived from an existing system, the missile stockpile is substantial, and production is continuing. The same basic concept could potentially be applied to large inventories of older air-defence weapons.

For Ukraine, this complicates defence against Russian missile attacks. The more diverse Russia’s strike arsenal becomes, the harder it is to predict which missile types will be used in a particular attack and how rapidly Russia can replenish weapons after a major strike.

 

Concluding Thought

The RM-48U programme should be seen not as Russia giving up on the Iskander, but as an attempt to expand its ballistic-missile stock. Instead of keeping the air-defence systems, Moscow is turning them into an offensive reserve. Although the 17 altered launchers are the obvious aspect of this initiative, the more significant point is the fundamental principle that when missiles already in existence can be refurbished and then combined with the modified launchers and used against ground targets, weapons which were originally intended to defend Russia’s airspace can be made into a further source of offensive capability.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References: –

1. Defence Express, “Russia has up to 17 S-400 launchers adapted to fire RM-48U missiles at Ukraine”, 27 Aug 26.

2.Center for Strategic and International Studies, “S-400 Triumf. Missile Threat” 06 Jul 26.

3.Dotsenko, A, “Kyiv under S-400 fire: How Russia has turned air defence missiles into a weapon of terror and why they keep coming”, Ukrainska Pravda, 09 Aug 26.

4.Ukrainska Pravda, “Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence provides Ukrainska Pravda with data on Russia’s missile stockpiles and production rates”, 20 Aug 26.

5.Critical Threats Project, “Russian offensive campaign assessment”, American Enterprise Institute, 20 Aug 26.

6.Bronk, J, “Analysis of Russia’s use of converted surface-to-air missiles as an additional ballistic-strike capability”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2026.

829: Podcast with Abhinay

Had an interesting chat with Abhinay of Prabhasakshi News Channel.

We talked about: –

  1. New balance of air power in the world today.
  2. Drones and Fighter aircraft.
  3. Different philosophies of Russia’s Su-57 and the U.S.’s F-35.
  4. Future of air warfare
  5. Timelines of indigenous fifth-generation aircraft. (AMCA).
  6. Role of AI in air warfare.
  7. Loyal Wingman drones.
  8. F-35 / Su-57 / AMCA.
  9. Aircraft engine technology development and production.
  10. Export of fighter jets as a geopolitical tool and a source of dependency.
  11. India’s greatest achievements and biggest challenges in terms of defence self-reliance.
  12. Indian Air Force of 2040.
  13. One trend in air warfare over the next 20 years.
  14. Balakot Operations.

 

Value additions are most welcome.

 

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823: Wings of Dominance: The Future of Air Warfare

 

Q1.  What is the new balance of air power in the world today? Are fighter jets still the focus of warfare, or are drones beginning to take their place?

Fighter jets remain the backbone of air power, and that is not about to change. What has changed fundamentally is the ecosystem around them. A modern fighter operates in a networked environment comprising long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, and space-based ISR.

Drones are taking over the missions that are too risky, too repetitive, or too economically unjustifiable to warrant a manned sortie. They are not replacing the manned aircraft.

The prevailing trend favours a combination of manned and unmanned systems. Manned aircraft are focusing on contested, high-end missions that require judgment, adaptability, and versatile payloads. Concurrently, unmanned systems are being employed in persistent, attritable, and mass-effect roles.

The adaptation to this hybrid model is no longer merely a tactical requirement; it has become a strategic necessity.

 

Q2.  Russia’s Su-57 and the US F-35 embody different philosophies — one emphasises air combat, the other network-centric warfare. Whose future will it be?

The Su-57 seems to reflect the traditional Russian emphasis on kinematic performance and super-manoeuvrability.

The F-35 is claimed to be built around sensor fusion and battlespace awareness. It is advertised as capable of detecting, classifying, and engaging the threat at beyond-visual-range distances through a data architecture spanning an entire networked force.

Future aerial combat is progressing towards a network-centric model. Contemporary air engagements are increasingly determined by the priority of achieving information and decision dominance, rather than by performance alone.

Compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline is now as critical as speed or manoeuvrability. This is fundamentally a problem of decision architecture, not merely of technology.

The sixth-generation programmes are pushing emerging platforms toward multi-domain integration.  Fusion of air, space, cyber, and electronic warfare into a single operational architecture will make the network-centric model more definitive.

 

Q3.  China already has the J-20. Has India delayed the AMCA too long, or is it still possible to turn the situation around?

It is a fact that India’s timeline has slipped. The J-20 has been operational for nearly a decade. China is already iterating toward a sixth-generation capability, as evidenced by the prototypes that emerged publicly in late 2024.

AMCA is still working through prototype development. The gap is significant and widening. Reversal of the trend is a realistic necessity.

India can recover lost ground in fighter development if the programme is properly resourced, executed and politically backed.

A significant structural shift is also underway with the Ministry of Defence opening AMCA prototype development to private consortia rather than relying exclusively on the public-sector model.

The window to close the capability gap exists. It will not remain open indefinitely, and the margin for complacency on programme management is close to zero.

 

Q4.  In the wars to come, will Artificial Intelligence and Loyal Wingman drones be more important than pilots?

The pilot does not become less important. His job changes, and in some respects becomes more demanding, not less.

Manned-unmanned combat air teams would have one crewed aircraft effectively commanding a tactical formation of attritable unmanned assets, absorbing risk that would otherwise fall on the manned platform, carrying missiles, jammers, decoys, or forward reconnaissance payloads.

What AI is changing is the speed and volume of decision-making below the human threshold.

AI-enabled satellites and sensors, capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets, can push that picture directly to the shooter over tactical data links, rather than routing it back through a ground station first. That is what compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. However, human intervention cannot be removed from the kill chain.

As of now, the human crew retains authority over decisions that carry lethal and political consequences, while AI absorbs the burden of processing, prioritising, and routing information faster than any human can.

So, AI and unmanned teaming will unquestionably become more important than they are today. But the human crew would remain relevant and in control.

The pilot of 2040 will be managing a far more complex battle picture, commanding a digital wolfpack rather than flying a single aircraft.

 

Q5.  If India has the opportunity to purchase the F-35 or the Su-57, should we go ahead and purchase them, or stick to developing our own aircraft?

These are not competing choices, and treating them as such leads to a false dilemma.

The IAF’s squadron strength shortfall is real, immediate, and strategically significant. The Rafale has helped close that numerical gap, but has not closed it.

Further, there is a case for qualitative enhancement by the induction of fifth-generation aircraft.

The F-35 carries substantial geopolitical weight, end-use restrictions, and software dependency. Cost, delivery timelines, extended supply chains, Transfer of technology and trust deficit are other factors to be taken into account.

Russia has been a trusted partner, willing to share its technology to a certain extent and accepting Make in India. The Su-57 also raises several concerns besides the factors listed above. India had earlier walked out of the co-development program mainly due to concerns related to cost and technology sharing.

Neither platform offers a clean, dependency-free solution. The importance of self-reliance in defence production is a common lesson emerging from recent wars. The Indigenous program (AMCA) is some time away and urgently needs a technology infusion.

The logical answer is to plug the gap pragmatically by expanding the Rafale order and carefully reassessing the induction of fifth-generation aircraft, while protecting AMCA’s funding and schedule as a non-negotiable national priority.

The near-term interim acquisition and the long-term indigenous programme must be advanced concurrently. The contract should be negotiated in a manner that boosts the indigenous programme rather than undermining it.

 

Q6.  Is engine technology still India’s biggest weakness today?

The answer is YES. The Tejas Mark 1A flies on the American GE F404. AMCA’s initial squadrons will likely depend on an imported engine in the ninety-kilonewton class. The latest news is that negotiations for the GE 414 engine for AMCA have hit rough weather due to a 300 per cent cost increase.

India still does not have a proven indigenous engine anywhere near the ninety to one hundred ten kilonewton range required for a credible fifth or sixth-generation fighter. The Kaveri programme, running since the mid-1980s, is the most visible illustration of how difficult this problem is. High-performance turbofan technology demands a combination of high-temperature metallurgy, single-crystal turbine blade manufacturing, precision tolerances, and decades of iterative test data that very few nations have accumulated.

Urgent need of the hour is a deal that includes a degree of co-production and technology transfer for engine manufacturing in India. Co-production extends the supply chain into India, but it does not give India the ability to independently design, test, and certify a clean-sheet high-thrust engine. Engine independence remains the single weakest link in the self-reliance story.

 

Q7.  Will the export of fighter jets become an increasingly important geopolitical tool?

Fighter exports are already an important geopolitical tool, and their leverage is intensifying rather than diminishing.

Fighter exports create decades of dependency for the buyer. The seller retains influence over the buyer’s operational readiness (by supplying spares, software updates, weapons integration, training pipelines, and maintenance protocols). This dependency lasts for the life of the platform (often 30 to 40 years after the sale).

India’s own indigenous push is a deliberate effort to reduce exposure to precisely this kind of dependency.  India’s active promotion of the Tejas and its indigenous missile systems in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Gulf reflects a clear understanding that defence exports are as much an instrument of foreign policy as of industrial economics. Future fighter sales will be negotiated as much on reliability of supply and strategic alignment as on cost or raw capability.

 

Q8.  What are India’s greatest achievements and biggest challenges in defence self-reliance?

Tejas moving from a deeply troubled programme to a credible inducted fighter is, to a certain extent, an achievement.  The development of indigenous rotary-wing platforms (Dhruv, Rudra, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand) demonstrates that the industrial capacity extends beyond fast jets. The Astra beyond-visual-range missile and the continued maturation of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile represent genuine capability in the weapons domain. The missile and space programs are doing comparatively well.

Perhaps most significantly, India’s defence production turnover has grown substantially over the past decade. The country has moved from being almost exclusively an arms importer to a growing exporter, which is a structural shift that would have seemed improbable fifteen years ago.

The challenges are equally tangible. Squadron strength remains well below the sanctioned forty-two. Force multipliers, tankers, airborne early warning and control platforms are inadequate in numbers for a force that needs to project across two frontiers simultaneously. Engine technology remains unresolved.

The achievements prove India can build technically demanding systems. What remains unproven is whether it can build them at the pace and scale that the threat environment now demands.

 

Q9.  How will the Indian Air Force look in 2040, compared to today?

By 2040, assuming the squadron strength target is met or even meaningfully mitigated, the IAF should be a genuinely different force, operating on a different conceptual basis.

AMCA should be in serial production, forming the high-end backbone alongside an upgraded Rafale fleet and a substantially modernised Su-30MKI. The Tejas Mark 2 and the twin-engine deck-based fighter should round out the order of battle, bringing the indigenous content of the combat fleet to a level inconceivable at the beginning of this decade.

Loyal Wingman and unmanned systems would be standard formation elements rather than experimental adjuncts.

AI-assisted Space-based ISR would be integrated into the network.

The UCAV and other Unmanned platforms will significantly enhance airpower capabilities.

If the present trajectory and pace are sustained, by 2040 the IAF should be more networked, more integrated with the space and cyber domains, and far less dependent on foreign supply chains than anything currently in service.

 

Q10.  If you had to identify one defining trend in air warfare over the next twenty years, what would it be?

The shift from platform-centric to weapon-centric airpower operating in a networked environment. The idea that the decisive factor in air combat is increasingly not which aircraft you fly, but how fast you can sense, decide, and act across a distributed force. Ada result:

The sensor-to-shooter timeline will get shortened further.

Space-based satellites with onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing the targets will push that picture directly to the shooter.

Manned and unmanned systems will operate as a single collaborative entity rather than parallel fleets.

Mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum, with digital and cognitive dimensions layered on top, would become essential.

Stealth, hypersonics, manoeuvrability, drone swarms, and directed energy technologies/capabilities would follow this shift.

The air forces that adapt to it early will hold the operational advantage in 2040 and beyond. The ones that keep procuring better individual platforms while neglecting the architecture around them (i.e. modern equipment running on an outdated decision framework) will find themselves technologically current but operationally lagging.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

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