News. Russia successfully test-launched the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk region) on 12 May 26. The missile followed its planned profile and struck its designated target (at Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula) approximately thirty minutes after launch. Strategic Missile Forces commander Sergei Karakayev reported that all specified technical characteristics had been validated. Putin described the test as a “major event and unconditional success” and congratulated the defence ministry, scientists, engineers, and the thousands of workers whose collaborative effort brought the programme to this milestone.
Missile. The Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau produces the RS-28 Sarmat. It is a silo-launched, three-stage, liquid-fuelled super-heavy ICBM (35.3 metres in length and approximately 208 tonnes in launch weight). It is claimed to be the largest ballistic missile ever constructed. Its payload capacity is ten tonnes, and it can carry a variety of warheads (including multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and, reportedly, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Its operational flexibility significantly exceeds that of its predecessor.
Capability. Among the Sarmat’s most strategically significant attributes is its capacity to approach targets via non-standard flight trajectories. Unlike conventional ICBMs that follow northern polar arcs, the Sarmat is capable of fractional orbital bombardment, i.e. flying a depressed, sub-orbital trajectory over the South Pole to reach targets in North America. This gives it the ability to approach from directions that existing American missile defence interceptor networks, positioned primarily in Alaska and California and oriented toward northern approach corridors, are not designed to engage. Putin has noted that the missile can travel on both ballistic and suborbital trajectories, with a maximum range reportedly exceeding 35,000 kilometres.
Feature Enhancement. The missile has a shorter boost phase than its predecessor. This reduces the window for tracking by the space-based infrared sensors. It is a meaningful enhancement for the missile’s survivability. The Sarmat is also claimed to be more accurate than the Voyevoda. Putin has stated that the Sarmat’s destructive potential substantially exceeds that of any comparable Western system.
Strategic Implication. The successful launch carries significant strategic implications. The R-36M2 Voyevoda, a Soviet-era heavy ICBM, had been the backbone of Russia’s silo-based deterrent for decades. The Sarmat is intended to replace it, and it represents the most consequential upgrade to Russia’s nuclear triad in the post-Cold War period. Putin announced that Russia would deploy the first Sarmat-equipped regiment for combat duty before the end of 2026. It is claimed to be designed to penetrate both existing and prospective ballistic missile defences. This capability is important for Russia to maintain credible second-strike deterrence.
Race. The Sarmat is one of six next-generation strategic weapons that Putin unveiled in March 2018, presenting them as Russia’s response to the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the subsequent development of American missile defence infrastructure. From Moscow’s perspective, a credible and penetrating nuclear second-strike capability is the foundation of strategic stability. The assurance that no adversary can neutralise Russia’s deterrent through a disarming first strike and expect to intercept the surviving response. The Sarmat is engineered specifically to preserve that assurance against all foreseeable developments in missile defence technology.
Timing. The test comes at a time of considerable significance in the current global landscape. The New START treaty (the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms limitation agreement between Russia and the United States) expired in February 2026. Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, citing what it described as the fundamentally changed strategic environment resulting from Western military support for Ukraine. The absence of any active treaty framework means that both sides are now free to expand and modernise their arsenals without the notification and inspection. The Sarmat’s development and operational deployment will proceed in this unconstrained environment.
Domestic Significance. Domestically, the test carries political weight as well as military significance. It arrives days after Russia’s Victory Day commemorations. It demonstrates the continued vitality of Russia’s defence industrial and scientific base under sustained international sanctions and economic pressure. It affirms the country’s standing as a nuclear superpower capable of fielding world-leading weapons systems.
Global Interest. Internationally, the Sarmat’s deployment will be watched closely in capitals around the world (from Washington to Beijing and from New Delhi to Brussels). For NATO’s strategic planners, it represents a genuine generational upgrade to Russia’s land-based deterrent. It will force them to recalibrate their threat assessments and defence postures. For countries in the Global South, it is a reminder that the nuclear dimension of great-power competition remains very much alive and is, if anything, intensifying.
Concluding Thought. Russia’s strategic modernisation programme has always been driven by the conviction that a strong nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The Sarmat’s successful test and approaching operational debut confirm that this conviction remains the organising principle of Russian defence policy. It also proves that Russia retains both the industrial capacity and the scientific expertise to give it material form.
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Article published on the “Chakra Dialogues Foundation” website on 02 May 26.
In the lexicon of contemporary statecraft, few concepts have generated as much analytical attention and strategic utility as Comprehensive National Power (CNP). As the twenty-first century has complicated the relationship between coercion and cooperation, between hard and soft instruments of statecraft, CNP has become the preferred analytical lens of strategic planners. CNP offers a multidimensional framework for assessing a state’s capacity to pursue its interests, shape its environment, and sustain its influence over time.
India today is navigating an increasingly uncertain global environment. The real challenge lies in building a broad and balanced base of national power that matches its ambitions and security needs. Doing so calls for a fresh, all-encompassing look at how the country approaches Comprehensive National Power (CNP).
Comprehensive National Power: Concept
Evolution. The intellectual genealogy of CNP stretches back through the classical traditions of strategic thought. Kautilya’s Arthashastra enumerated the elements of state power as territory, treasury, army, and allies. Over the years, several theorists have tried to codify the components of CNP. Some of these components included geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, and diplomacy. Chinese scholars and strategic planners in the 1980s developed systematic models for calculating CNP. They assigned numerical weightage to economic output, military capability, technological advancement, educational level, and international influence. The concept also gained currency in Western strategic studies in the late 1980s. Joseph Nye introduced the distinction between hard power and soft power.
Methodologies of Measuring CNP. Multiple methodologies have been developed to numerically measure the CNP. Each has its own assumptions and limitations. Chinese academic models (a formula developed by Huang Shuofeng) assign weightage to components such as economic strength, military capability, scientific and technological capacity, education, and resource endowments. The RAND Corporation, the IISS, and various academic institutions have developed variant frameworks that emphasise different components or measurement approaches. There are several challenges associated with measuring CNP. Many dimensions are difficult to quantify numerically. Soft power and cultural influence are difficult to measure quantitatively. Even harder components, such as military power, are not straightforwardly comparable.
Components of Comprehensive National Power
Economic Power. The economic dimension has a direct bearing on the national power. Economic power is not defined by the state’s GDP alone. It also includes factors such as economic structure, fiscal depth, trade relationships, and financial system resilience. These factors collectively determine a nation’s ability to invest in modernising its military, maintain diplomatic relations, support technological advancements, and withstand external shocks.
Military Power. Military capability remains the ultimate instrument of statecraft. It includes the capacity for power projection beyond borders and a deterrent capacity to prevent conflicts. Nuclear deterrence is also part of military power and the CNP.
Technological Power. In the modern era, technology has become the most dynamic component of national power. The contest for technological primacy is part of the great-power competition of the present century. Those who lead in modern technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, space, and advanced manufacturing will shape the strategic landscape of the coming decades.
Diplomatic Power. Diplomatic power is the capacity to shape the international environment through persuasion, coalition-building, and norm-setting. It encompasses factors such as the reach and depth of its relationships, standing in multilateral institutions, and say in global governance. States with high diplomatic power can often achieve their strategic objectives without using their instruments of hard power. Diplomatic power is closely related to, but distinct from, soft power. While soft power operates through attraction, diplomatic power operates through strategic engagements. The two are mutually reinforcing. A state with high soft power finds diplomatic engagement easier.
Cultural Power. Of all the components of national power, cultural power is the most underestimated. Military strength can be matched. Economic advantages can be eroded. But the influence of the country’s values, arts, language, and way of life cannot be neutralised. Cultural power works quietly, across generations, shaping how a country is perceived.
Hard-Soft-Smart Power Triad. The synthesis of these components into an effective strategy requires smart power. Smart power is the ability to choose the right mix of hard and soft instruments for a given strategic context. It also involves their coherent integration and precise deployment. Smart power recognises that hard and soft instruments are not substitutes but complements. Military credibility enhances diplomatic leverage. Cultural attractiveness amplifies economic ties. Technological leadership feeds back into all other domains. States that achieve this integration multiply their effective power well beyond the sum of its components.
Cross-Cutting Themes and Dimensions
Energy Security and Resource Control. Control over energy resources and critical minerals is a basic element of national power. Energy-secure states enjoy freedom of strategic action. The weaponisation of energy supply in the Iran war and China’s consolidation of rare earth mineral supply chains demonstrate how control of these resources translates directly into geopolitical leverage. India’s dependence on hydrocarbons from the Gulf is a significant CNP vulnerability. Addressing it is a strategic priority.
Demographics and Human Capital. Population size and structure are fundamental parameters of national power, but their relationship is not linear. A large, young, educated, and healthy population is a CNP asset of the first order, providing the labour force for economic growth, the military manpower for national defence, and the talent base for technological innovation. A large but poorly educated, unhealthy, or rapidly ageing population can instead be a drag on national resources. India’s demographic dividend (the largest working-age population on the planet through the 2040s) is simultaneously its greatest potential national power asset and, if insufficiently invested in, its most consequential risk. The quality of education, healthcare, and employment opportunities available to this population will determine whether the dividend is realised or squandered.
Media, Information Warfare, and Narrative Control. The information domain has emerged as a new battleground. In this domain, the capability is measured by the capacity to shape narratives, manage perceptions, and counter adversarial propaganda. Information warfare involves both offensive and defensive operations. The offensive operations comprise disinformation campaigns, cyber-enabled influence operations, and strategic communication. The defensive operations include media literacy, information resilience and credible public communication. States with sophisticated information management systems can shape how their actions are perceived internationally.
Non-State Actors and Their Impact. The assumption that national power is exclusively a property of states has been progressively eroded. Non-state actors include transnational corporations, international NGOs, terrorist and insurgent organisations, diaspora communities, and global media platforms. They can amplify, constrain, or subvert national power in many ways. A state’s ability to harness the power of its non-state actors while managing or countering hostile non-state forces is itself a dimension of CNP. Pakistan’s use of non-state militant proxies as instruments of state policy, and the Indian diaspora’s contribution to India’s soft power and economic connectivity, are both illustrations of this dynamic.
India’s Trajectory in Building Comprehensive National Power
India’s CNP trajectory is one of the most consequential stories in contemporary international relations. Its democratic political system, however imperfect, confers legitimacy in a global environment. Its constitutional pluralism (the capacity of a state with dozens of languages, hundreds of communities, and multiple religions to function as a coherent democracy) is itself a form of soft power. India has demonstrated that development and diversity are compatible.
Strengths and Structural Assets. India’s strategic geography is a substantial asset. Its peninsular position at the centre of the Indian Ocean, flanked by the Arabian Sea to the west and the Bay of Bengal to the east, gives it a natural role as the dominant maritime power of the world’s most commercially important ocean. The Indo-Pacific strategic construct is one in which India occupies a structural position of centrality that no amount of diplomatic effort could manufacture. Geography has delivered a strategic endowment that India must now develop the naval and air power, the port infrastructure, and the diplomatic networks to exploit fully.
Weaknesses and Structural Constraints. India’s CNP has structural weaknesses that are as significant as its assets. The quality of public institutions (in education, healthcare, and justice delivery) has improved but remains below the desired level. Poverty and malnutrition, although declining, continue to limit human capital development. Urban infrastructure is lagging behind the pace of urbanisation. It is causing congestion, pollution, and productivity losses.
Strategic Autonomy. India’s traditional policy preference for freedom from binding alliances has been a source of diplomatic flexibility but also of strategic ambiguity. In a world where great-power competition is sharpening the demand for alignment, India’s insistence on engaging multiple power centers simultaneously is increasingly difficult to sustain without incurring costs.
Make in India and the Industrial Power Imperative. The Make in India initiative is India’s most ambitious attempt to address the structural dependency that has historically constrained its national power. A nation that cannot manufacture its own aircraft engines, semiconductors, precision munitions, or advanced electronics is perpetually dependent on the strategic choices of foreign suppliers. The encouragement of Make in India in the defence sector is as much a CNP investment as an industrial one. Self-reliance in defence production does not merely save foreign exchange. It removes a class of strategic vulnerabilities and creates an indigenous capability. Beyond defence, Make in India’s ambition to develop world-class manufacturing in electronics, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, and semiconductors directly addresses the economic dimension of CNP. India’s Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes have begun to shift economic structures in a favourable direction.
India’s Soft Power: Diaspora, Culture, and Democracy. India’s soft power resources are among the richest in the world, though their strategic mobilisation has been uneven. The Indian diaspora is over thirty million strong and distributed across every major economy, with particular concentrations of extraordinary influence in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Gulf. It is a soft power asset without parallel. This diaspora creates interpersonal networks, economic investment flows, and cultural bridges. It, in turn, multiplies India’s global presence far beyond what its diplomatic budget could achieve. Culturally, India’s reach is extraordinary. Indian cinema has an enormous audience across Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
The Way Ahead
Developing India’s CNP requires deliberate action across every domain. Economically, India needs to expand its manufacturing base, reduce critical import dependencies, and become a vital player in global supply chains. Militarily, the focus must be on modernisation backed by indigenisation. Technologically, investments in AI, quantum computing, and space should be seen as essential national security priorities. Diplomatically, India can draw on its credibility as a democracy that resonates with both the Global South and developed nations. India’s demographic advantage will only deliver results if it is backed by serious social reforms. None of these priorities can be tackled in isolation; they need to be addressed holistically.
Concluding Thoughts
Comprehensive National Power is not a possession but a process. It has to be continuously built, maintained, and adapted to a changing strategic environment. The states that have wielded the greatest influence in international affairs have not been those with the largest armies or the most abundant resources. Greatest Influencers are those who successfully integrated their economic, military, technological, diplomatic, and cultural assets into coherent strategies sustained over time.
India stands at a strategic inflexion point. It has all the ingredients (geography, demography, democratic legitimacy, and civilisational depth) for great-power status. Converting these endowments into an effective national power is the central challenge for India. It requires industrial transformation, military modernisation, institutional reform, and above all, strategic imagination. The measure of success is not a country’s rank on any index. It is measured by its ability to influence the international environment in a favourable way to its security, prosperity, and values. That, ultimately, is what Comprehensive National Power is really about.
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References:
Huang Shuofeng, “Comprehensive National Power Theory”, China Social Sciences Press, 1992.
Cline, Ray S, “World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift”, Washington DC: Georgetown University/CSIS, 1975.
Singh, P.K., Gera, Y.K., and Dewan, Sandeep, “Comprehensive National Power: A Model for India”, New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2013.
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004.
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009.
Klare, Michael T. “Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict”, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001.
Singer, P.W. and Brooking, Emerson T. “LikeWar: The Weaponisation of Social Media”, New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin, 2018.
Bloom, David E. and Williamson, Jeffrey G. “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998.
Government of India, “Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme Reports”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, various years.
(Facts and figures are from open sources. These could have been inflated or repressed as part of the propaganda/Information warfare. A clearer picture would emerge with the passage of time)
900 strikes in 12 hours. Supreme Leader eliminated on Day 1. 15,000 targets struck by Day 14. Six weeks and Iran is still fighting.
Tactical dominance does not mean a strategic outcome.
The Opening Salvo
US and Israel launched (on 28 Feb) the most intensive air campaign since Iraq 2003.
Israel flew about 200 fighters, including F-35I Adirs. The IAF’s largest combat sortie in history.
US committed B-2 Spirits, B-1Bs, B-52s, carrier aircraft, F-15Es, and hundreds of Tomahawks.
Approximately 200 Iranian air defence systems were struck in the opening hours. Air control over western Iran to central Tehran was established within 24 hours.
John Warden’s five-ring model was applied in planning and execution.
Theory was sound, Execution was technically flawless, but the strategic outcomes did not match the expectations.
Air power can destroy (punish). It cannot always compel.
Coalition Air Campaign
The scale was extraordinary. 60% of mission-capable B-1s flew from RAF Fairford. Two carriers operated in the theatre. Some relevant aspects for consideration are: –
Munitions Scalability. After Day 10, JDAM-class munitions were used instead of the standoff weapons. Precision munitions deplete faster than assumed during planning. Numbers matter as much as quality. Ukraine taught the lesson, and Iran has confirmed it. Indigenous production capacity must match operational tempo.
Basing Vulnerability. Iran struck Prince Sultan Air Base — destroying an E-3G AWACS and multiple KC-135 tankers. Forward bases are lucrative targets. Depth, dispersion, and resilience are important. (The Indian Air Force’s own 2022 dispersal doctrine has been validated — in someone else’s war).
Losses. Reportedly, 4 F-15Es were lost (3 in a friendly fire incident, a coalition coordination). 1 F-35A damaged. 1 A-10C shot down. 17 MQ-9s downed by Iranian air defences. Poorly integrated air defence networks with limited combat experience cost lives.
Inter-service jointness failures are not unique to any one military. Jointness failures are doctrinal and training failures, not technical ones.
The F-35 being tracked is the campaign’s most significant disclosure. Stealth does not mean invisibility. The margin is further narrowing as detection technology proliferates. Air warfare is gradually shifting from platform-centric to weapon-centric. Any air plan built around the stealthy penetration capability of new-generation platforms requires reassessment.
Iran’s IADS
Iran’s IADS is a hybrid, layered network. It consists of the S-300 (long-range), Bavar-373, Khordad-15 (medium-range), and point-defence platforms (short-range).
Three traits made it resilient. layered architecture, mobility, and redundancy.
Air superiority is not binary in nature; there are shades.It exists on a spectrum. The prevailing conditions across the spectrum determine the operational options. An honest assessment of that position is vital for planners.
Mosaic Defence (Reason for Decapitation Failure)
The strategic shock was not that Iran’s air defences survived. It was that Iran’s will and capacity to fight survived the killing of its supreme leader.
Mosaic Defence was formalised under Gen Mohammad Jafari in 2005. It was stress-tested for the first time.
IRGC restructured into 31 autonomous provincial commands. Each with independent weapons, intelligence, and command systems.
Successors were already named three ranks deep for every position. Decapitation activated resilience mechanisms specifically engineered for exactly this contingency.
Iran’s Foreign Minister stated it directly on 1 Mar: “Bombings in our capital have no impact on our ability to conduct war. Decentralised Mosaic Defence enables us to decide when and how war will end.”
China’s systems destruction warfare operates on precisely the same logic. It has designed its offensive capability to execute decapitation (at numerous levels). For India, planning against both adversaries simultaneously makes this aspect the defining operational challenge.
Iran’s Air Campaign (Asymmetry Counter Air)
Iran’s conventional air force could not survive in contested airspace. Most were destroyed on the ground.
Ballistic missiles and Shahed-style drones ensured strategic achievement. Multi-speed attacks, i.e., slow drones first to saturate the radar network, followed by ballistic missiles.
Coalition claimed an interception rate of 80–90% by networked Patriot, THAAD, Arrow, and Aegis.
The ballistic missile launches declined by approximately 90% by mid-March. But drone attacks persisted. Drones can be manufactured in civilian facilities from commercially available components faster than they can be expended or suppressed. Quantity is a quality of its own.
The exchange economics: –
Shahed drone: Approx cost $20,000,
Patriot interceptor: $4 million
Arrow 3 interceptor: significantly more
Exchange ratio: decisively favourable to the attacker
It reiterates the need for destroying the launch capability besides neutralising the incoming projectiles.
This is the democratisation of warfare made operational. It is an era of low-cost systems as the primary weapons of air warfare. The drone swarms and loitering munitions in adequate numbers are a must. Counter-drone capabilities that do not rely on expensive interceptors as the primary response are equally urgent. Project Kusha points in the right direction. The counter-drone dimension needs equivalent investment.
Strait Of Hormuz
20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait. Closure is creating a global energy crisis.
Iran is still dominating the Strait despite the destruction of its Navy. Thousands of airstrikes on Iranian territory have not reopened 20 miles of water.
Geographic chokepoints confer an asymmetric defensive advantage.
India’s energy security depends substantially on hydrocarbons from the Gulf. Closure of the Strait has direct and severe economic consequences for India. It is a wake-up call. Energy security requires a holistic review (sources, supply routes, alternative energy, and indigenous capabilities).
Some Tactical Aspects
In all the contemporary air campaigns, non-kinetic offensive action has preceded the kinetic attacks. The cyber and EW warfare offensives create chaos by disabling enemy sensors and C2 centres.
AI-driven battle management systems enable coordination among multiple stakeholders at speeds beyond human-led cycles.
ISR dominance (SIGINT, HUMINT, real-time intelligence) is the key to an effective air campaign.
Underground and Hardened Assets are essential for survival. Iran stored its missiles in dispersed underground storage facilities. The tunnel entrances to these storage facilities can be targeted, but deeply buried assets remain safe.
What the Campaign Could Achieve: –
Destruction of Infrastructure on a large scale.
Suppression of conventional IADS.
Elimination of Leadership with precision.
Establishment and holding of Air superiority.
What the Campaign Couldn’t Achieve: –
Translation of dominance into collapse (Regime change).
Complete elimination of dispersed, mobile, production-capable war-fighting capabilities.
Reopening of a maritime chokepoint.
Forcing a political outcome against a prepared adversary
The Bottom Line
Iran apparently spent 20 years studying American air power and designing a system specifically to absorb its most devastating application.
India must study this campaign (along with other contemporary ones) with rigour.
The lessons are glaring. Institutional will is required to learn and implement them rather than relearning the hard way.
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