Military Capability – Air Marshal's Perspective

September 11, 2026September 10, 2026

852:INDIA’S AIR POWER AMID RISING GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of the “Blue Print” Magazine

Air power has become a crucial instrument of national security. Possessing credible, technologically advanced air power is no longer a luxury but a strategic imperative. India occupies a unique geopolitical position. It shares borders with two nuclear-armed neighbours. Both of whom present distinct and collusive security challenges. The increasing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region is further altering India’s security calculus. Newer technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), hypersonic missiles, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and space-based military capabilities have expanded the dimensions of aerial warfare.

Air power is essential to India’s security. As geopolitical tensions grow and military technology advances, India’s aerial capabilities will become a vital means of deterrence, power projection, and safeguarding national security. The extent to which the country modernises and integrates its aerial forces will significantly affect its ability to cope with the complicated geopolitical situation of the coming decades.

The Strategic Importance of Air Power. Air power constitutes a highly adaptable and lethal instrument of statecraft. It is characterised by its extensive reach, swift responsiveness, and ability to impose shock and influence through precise, non-contact means of applying force. Its effects can be activated or deactivated more easily than other instruments of national power. Although it provides a broad array of offensive capabilities, its utility extends beyond mere offensive operations. It also plays a vital role in deterrence, strategic positioning, and coercion, whether in wartime or peacetime. Unlike ground forces, air power can be deployed over great distances in just a short time and is therefore essential in times of crisis. In natural disasters, air power can provide rapid humanitarian assistance. It supports both military security and national resilience.

Geopolitical Challenges and Emerging Threats

India’s air power today sits at the centre of a far more complex security environment than at any point in the past two decades. The challenge is not only the classic two-front problem with China and Pakistan, but also the need to modernise fast enough to preserve deterrence. At the same time, air warfare is being transformed by drones, missiles, cyber, space, and networked targeting.

The China Challenge. China is India’s most significant long-term strategic challenge. The military standoff in eastern Ladakh since 2020 demonstrated that border tensions can escalate rapidly and require sustained military preparedness. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone extensive modernisation over the past two decades. China has also developed extensive military infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang. These include upgraded airbases, hardened aircraft shelters, extended runways, and logistics facilities that can support sustained air operations near the Indian border.

Pakistan and the Persistent Security Challenge. Pakistan relies on non-state actors funded and trained on its own soil to keep India in a state of unrest through disinformation, incitement and terrorism. It remains a security threat across the nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional dimensions simultaneously. The 2019 Balakot air strike and the recent Op Sindoor highlighted the growing role of air power in India’s strategy of punitive deterrence. India’s ability to conduct precision strikes deep inside hostile territory demonstrated a willingness to employ air power. However, the subsequent aerial engagement also emphasised the importance of superior situational awareness, electronic warfare, and beyond-visual-range combat capabilities.

The Rise of Drones and Autonomous Warfare. The rise of autonomous drones is one of the most significant developments in contemporary air warfare. Drones have moved from mere surveillance vehicles to versatile weapons. They can deliver precise strikes, conduct electronic warfare, and carry out reconnaissance and intelligence collection. In recent conflicts, it has been shown that relatively cheap drones can cause disproportionate damage to advanced military equipment. Swarm drone technology in particular poses considerable challenges for traditional air defence systems because it is hard to track and destroy multiple low-cost aerial targets at the same time. India is now encountering increasing drone-related threats on both its western and northern borders, and reports of drone-enabled smuggling, surveillance, and cross-border infiltration highlight the importance of having strong counter-drone capabilities.

Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare. Air operations now rely heavily on secure communication networks, satellite navigation, and data links. As aerial warfare platforms become more interconnected, they also become more susceptible to cyberattacks and electronic interference. Enemies could disrupt air operations by attacking communication systems, navigation networks, or mission-critical software. Electronic warfare can greatly reduce the effectiveness of the most advanced aircraft. Protection of digital infrastructure has become as important as protecting airbases. India must invest in secure communications, encrypted data links, and cyber defence capabilities.

Space as a Strategic Domain. Space has emerged as a critical component of air power. The term airpower has evolved into aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding into the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. They are providing capabilities including navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches, and space-based surveillance. The integration of space-based systems with air assets is expected to increase further. This will create opportunities for both offensive and defensive operations. However, increasing dependence on satellite-based systems also creates vulnerabilities. Anti-satellite warfare spans kinetic weapons such as missiles as well as non-kinetic systems including jammers, laser dazzlers and spoofing equipment. Denial of space-based systems directly affects air warfare.

The Indo-Pacific and Maritime Air Power. India’s strategic interests extend beyond its borders. The Indo-Pacific area is now the centre of global economic activity and strategic competition. It is seeing rising naval deployments, disputes over maritime routes, and a growing number of military cooperation agreements. Air power plays a vital role in protecting maritime interests by enabling long-range surveillance, conducting anti-submarine warfare, conducting maritime reconnaissance, and allowing rapid force deployment. The ability to monitor key sea lanes, respond effectively to humanitarian crises, and support naval operations confirms India’s status as a major security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.

Strengthening India’s Air Power

India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action. As the nature of warfare evolves, India’s approach to air power must keep pace. The future lies in building an integrated, technology-driven, and self-reliant aerospace ecosystem that can address conventional, asymmetric, and multidomain threats. Sustained investment in modernisation, indigenous innovation, joint military operations, and human capital will be essential for maintaining India’s strategic advantage.

Capability and Capacity Balance for Credible Deterrence. Warfighting capability and the capacity to sustain operations are both essential, combining quality and quantity. While India’s air power capabilities (in terms of reach, high-altitude operations, precision, standoff, and all-weather performance) have advanced significantly, it must also increase the numerical strength of fighter aircraft, combat enablers, long-range vectors, and drones. One of the Indian Air Force’s foremost priorities is to restore its fighter squadron strength. Bridging this gap requires the timely induction of new-generation aircraft (fighters and combat support aircraft), while ensuring modernisation plans are financially sustainable.

Enhancing Indigenous Defence Manufacturing. Self-reliance has become a strategic necessity. Relying on imported defence equipment creates vulnerabilities. India should develop its own technological abilities and increase its defence manufacturing capacity. It will reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. Indigenous development of radars, electronic warfare systems, missiles, drones, and aircraft components will strengthen India’s technological base, create jobs, and boost exports. As part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat effort in defence manufacturing, the aim is to enhance self-reliance by encouraging the domestic production of these systems. The initiative has sped up domestic defence production by involving more public sector enterprises, private industries, start-ups, and research institutions. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), academic institutions, and the private sector must work together to shorten development timelines and promote innovation.

Embracing Emerging Technologies. The adoption of emerging technologies. Technological advances are further reshaping the nature of air warfare. Precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, network-centric operations, satellite-enabled communications, artificial intelligence, and autonomous drones are all altering the battlefield. Autonomous drones and the idea of loyal wingmen are expected to transform aerial combat. India should also make investments in directed-energy weapons, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber-resilient command-and-control networks. These technologies can greatly increase operational effectiveness while reducing personnel risk. Air power assets depend heavily on technology. Turning technology into capability takes a long time. To stay ahead of the challenges, we need to invest in emerging technologies and think through their use in warfare. Impetus is also required for existing aviation-related programs such as fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers, stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and long-range vectors.

Airpower Utilisation in Grey Zone Scenario. Grey zone operations occur in a contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare. These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both of India’s adversaries resort to these operations regularly. Airpower can reinforce the nation’s course of action against grey zone warfare, with involvement in several direct and supporting roles. Besides offensive use, it can also be effectively utilised in many ways in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Applying airpower in these grey zone situations requires some reorientation, supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

Conclusion

India’s air Power is at a crucial stage. Competing regional interests, technological progress, and changes in warfare have increased the strategic value of air power. As India faces challenges from both China and Pakistan and the Indo-Pacific region grows more important, it needs constant modernisation and strategic adjustment. India can ensure its air power remains capable of protecting its national interests in this increasingly uncertain and contested geopolitical environment by promoting innovation, supporting domestic research, and adopting multidomain warfare.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References: –

Fontanellaz A, “Operation Sindoor: The India-Pakistan air war”, Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaires (2026).

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Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2025, February). Make in India powers defence growth [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

September 4, 2026

847: DETERRENCE IN THE AUTONOMOUS WARFARE SCENARIO

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of “News Analytics” magazine

The character of warfare evolves alongside technological innovation. Today, another transformative revolution is reshaping global security. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous weapons systems, and human-machine teaming into military operations is underway.

Deterrence has traditionally depended on a human adversary believing that the costs of aggression will outweigh its expected benefits. Nuclear weapons made this logic especially powerful by creating the prospect of unacceptable retaliation.

Autonomous warfare, however, is altering the speed, visibility and psychology of military competition. Artificial intelligence-enabled systems can detect, classify, track and engage targets with limited human intervention. In contrast, autonomous drones, loitering munitions, cyber tools, underwater vehicles and defensive systems may operate across several domains simultaneously. The central question is whether autonomous systems will replace conventional or nuclear deterrence or alter its dynamics.

The Transformative Effects on Deterrence

At the core of this transformation is the integration of AI across the full spectrum of military functions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, command and control, logistics, and, increasingly, the application of force. Autonomous platforms (ranging from loitering munitions and drone swarms to AI-enabled decision-support systems) operate with varying degrees of independence once activated. Human-machine teaming seeks to combine the strengths of both.

Autonomous systems are particularly suited to denial because they can support persistent sensing, distributed defence, and rapid disruption. Unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor approaches to military installations; autonomous underwater systems can observe maritime activity; ground robots can support border surveillance; and AI-enabled command systems can fuse information from multiple sensors. A networked force may complicate an adversary’s effort to achieve surprise, suppress defences or destroy high-value targets.

Autonomy can enhance capability by allowing military systems to process enormous quantities of data and act faster than human operators. An AI-enabled surveillance network may identify changes in an adversary’s deployment patterns before traditional intelligence systems do. Autonomous platforms can then maintain continuous patrols, coordinate with one another and respond to selected threats without waiting for detailed instructions. Such capabilities may strengthen deterrence by denial.

The importance of denial will increase as military forces become more dispersed. Instead of protecting a small number of vulnerable platforms, states may deploy large numbers of mobile, concealed and networked systems. An adversary would then face a difficult targeting problem: destroying some autonomous platforms would not necessarily turn off the entire force. This resilience can reduce the attractiveness of a first strike.

Autonomy can influence credibility. A state with resilient, dispersed, and relatively inexpensive autonomous systems may be able to respond to aggression even after suffering damage to its command centres, air bases, or naval facilities. Swarms and unmanned systems can generate operational effects without exposing large numbers of personnel to danger. This may make retaliation more politically acceptable and therefore more credible.

Autonomy can also impose operational costs. Defensive systems may use algorithms to detect incoming missiles, drones or aircraft and recommend or initiate responses. If these systems are reliable and their employment conditions are clearly defined, they can reduce the prospect that an adversary will achieve a quick victory. The strategic message becomes: aggression will encounter a persistent, adaptive and difficult-to-suppress defence.

Escalation Dynamics

The most serious challenge is compressed decision time. Autonomous systems can identify and respond to threats faster than human institutions can verify information, consult political leaders or establish whether an incident was deliberate. In a crisis, this may generate a “use-or-lose” mentality. Commanders may fear that delaying action will allow an adversary’s autonomous systems to destroy their own sensors, communications or retaliatory forces.

Machine-speed operations can therefore create pressure for pre-delegation. Political and military leaders may authorise automated responses in advance because human approval would be too slow. Yet pre-delegation carries significant risks. An algorithm may misinterpret a civilian aircraft, a training exercise or a cyber intrusion as an attack. A technical malfunction could trigger a chain of responses that neither side intended.

Autonomous warfare also creates the possibility of machine-to-machine interaction. One state’s defensive algorithm may classify the activation of another state’s autonomous system as hostile. The second state may then respond automatically, producing reciprocal escalation. Unlike human decision-makers, algorithms do not possess political intuition, historical memory or an inherent preference for restraint. They optimise according to programmed objectives and available data. If the data are incomplete or manipulated, the resulting decision may be technically rational but strategically disastrous.

Strategic Stability

Autonomous warfare will have its most consequential impact on strategic stability when it interacts with nuclear forces. AI-enabled systems may improve early warning, intelligence analysis and the protection of nuclear assets. They could help identify suspicious activity and strengthen command-and-control resilience. In this respect, autonomy may reduce uncertainty and support more informed decisions.

The opposite is also possible. AI-enabled surveillance and autonomous strike systems could threaten mobile missiles, submarines, command centres and communications networks. If one state believes that its nuclear deterrent is becoming vulnerable, it may adopt more aggressive readiness postures or delegate greater authority to military commanders. The combination of improved detection, persistent tracking and rapid attack could generate fears of a disarming first strike.

This danger is not limited to actual technical capability. Perception also does matter. A state may respond to what it believes an adversary can do, even if the adversary’s systems are not as effective as assumed. Strategic competition could consequently become unstable through exaggerated assessments of AI-enabled counterforce capabilities. The combination of advanced intelligence, strike systems and missile defence may challenge the traditional assumption that retaliation remains assured after a first strike.

Autonomous systems may also blur the boundary between conventional and nuclear operations. An attack on dual-use command-and-control infrastructure by conventional autonomous weapons could be interpreted as preparation for a nuclear attack. If a state cannot distinguish between an anti-conventional operation and an anti-nuclear operation, it may escalate rapidly. Maintaining clear separation between nuclear and conventional assets, preserving human decision authority and establishing crisis communication channels will therefore become increasingly important.

Implications for India and Regional Security

For India, autonomous warfare is directly relevant to a security environment characterised by contested borders, maritime competition, terrorism, cyber threats, and the possibility of simultaneous pressure from multiple directions. Autonomous systems can enhance surveillance along difficult terrain, improve maritime domain awareness and support the protection of critical infrastructure. They can also strengthen deterrence by denial by making surprise incursions, drone attacks and limited aggression more difficult to execute successfully.

However, technology alone cannot provide deterrence. India would require an integrated architecture combining sensors, secure communications, electronic warfare, cyber resilience, air defence, space-based support and trained human operators. Autonomous platforms must remain connected to a wider command-and-control system that can function even when communications are degraded, or networks are attacked.

Concluding Thoughts

The transition to algorithm-assisted autonomous warfare will not change the basic concept of strategic deterrence. It will mandate a more controlled version of it. One that accounts for machine-speed decision cycles and distributed, ambiguous chains of responsibility. It will also have to cater for an adversary whose calculations are also based on software architectures. Autonomy will create an additional layer of deterrence, one based on persistent surveillance, rapid response, distributed force structures, denial of objectives and the ability to impose costs at machine speed.

As autonomous capabilities continue to grow, policymakers will have the important task of adapting and finding balance during this transition. In autonomous warfare, deterrence will depend not just on cutting-edge technologies but also on ensuring these systems operate within clear, transparent guidelines, robust command structures, well-rounded legal frameworks, and internationally accepted norms. The goal isn’t to slow technological progress, but to ensure that humans, who are ultimately responsible for warfare, still have the power to choose peace.

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References: –

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (2019). Artificial intelligence and national security: Indian perspectives. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Rajaraman, V. (2014). Robot soldiers: Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare. Resonance, 19(11), 1037–1048.

Horowitz, M. C. (2016). The ethics & morality of robotic warfare: Assessing the debate over autonomous weapons. Political Science Quarterly, 131(2), 331–351.

Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Peldán Carlsson, M. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Su, F., Wan, W., Saalman, L., & Chernavskikh, V. (2025). Pragmatic approaches to governance at the artificial intelligence–nuclear nexus. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Peldán Carlsson, M. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Johnson, J. (2020). Artificial intelligence, drone swarming and deterrence. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(5), 1–24.
Horowitz, M. C. (2019). When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapons, deterrence, and stability. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(5), 764–788.

September 2, 2026September 1, 2026

845: BANGLADESH’S STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Taken together, Bangladesh’s move toward acquiring Chinese J-10CE fighters and its stated willingness to consider joining the Mecca Pact are strategically significant for India. However, neither development alone means Bangladesh has become a Chinese or Pakistani military ally. The more important issue is the direction of Bangladesh’s strategic relationships and whether these moves eventually develop into a broader China-Pakistan-Bangladesh security architecture.

China’s Push for the J-10CE to Bangladesh

China is not simply “giving” Bangladesh fighter jets. Dhaka is moving toward purchasing Chinese J-10CE multirole fighters, with reports of a draft arrangement for roughly 20 aircraft, though earlier reports mentioned up to 24. The overall package has been reported at around $2.2–2.3 billion, including aircraft, weapons, training, infrastructure, spares and support. The agreement is not yet a completed, delivered contract, so final numbers, price and delivery schedules remain subject to approval. The deal serves both Bangladeshi and Chinese interests.

Bangladesh’s Motivations.

Fleet Modernisation: Bangladesh needs to replace or augment an ageing fighter fleet, particularly its F-7s and other legacy aircraft.

Capability at a Manageable Cost: The J-10CE offers a substantial jump in capability, including AESA radar, modern beyond-visual-range (BVR) weapons, networked avionics and electronic-warfare capabilities, at a lower acquisition and operating cost than many Western alternatives.

Existing Chinese Ecosystem: China is already Bangladesh’s dominant defence supplier, with Chinese-origin aircraft, ships, tanks, missiles and other systems in service. A new Chinese fighter therefore fits relatively easily into an existing logistics, training and maintenance ecosystem.

Strategic Diversification: The acquisition also fits Dhaka’s broader “Bangladesh First” approach, in which it seeks to maximise strategic autonomy by maintaining relationships with China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, the Gulf and Western markets rather than relying exclusively on one partner.

China’s Motivations

For Beijing, the deal is about more than selling airframes.

Long-term Strategic Dependence: A fighter fleet creates a relationship that can last decades. Aircraft, missiles, spare parts, simulators, training, maintenance, upgrades and technical support can progressively tie Bangladesh’s air force to Chinese systems and standards.

Expansion of China’s Defence Footprint: Bangladesh would become another important Chinese defence customer in South Asia, strengthening Beijing’s military-industrial presence around the Bay of Bengal and along India’s eastern periphery.

Export-Market Validation: Pakistan is currently the principal established foreign operator of the J-10 family. A Bangladeshi purchase would provide China with another reference customer and strengthen its pitch to other prospective buyers.

Strategic Gains: A friendly state operating Chinese equipment near India can complicate Indian planning and give Beijing greater influence.

The key point is therefore that the strategic value of the J-10CE deal lies not only in the aircraft’s combat capability but in the long-term Chinese military ecosystem that could develop around it.

Bangladesh and the Mecca Pact

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, establishes a collective-defence framework under which an armed attack on one member is treated as an attack on all. It has consequently been compared with NATO-style collective defence, although publicly available information on its precise command structure, accession procedures and operational obligations remains limited.

Bangladeshi officials have said Dhaka would consider joining if formally invited. Politically and diplomatically, it appears possible, but it is not yet an imminent or settled decision. Bangladesh has expressed openness to the idea, but it has not committed to accession.

The Mecca Pact has greater potential political significance because it would move Bangladesh beyond defence procurement into a formal security relationship involving Pakistan. For Dhaka, potential benefits of joining the pact could include:

- Stronger defence and security relationships with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey.
- Possible access to Turkish defence technology and training.
- Deeper Gulf economic and energy relationships.
- Additional diplomatic leverage through strategic diversification.

However, membership would also create complications. Bangladesh has traditionally pursued a non-aligned or balancing foreign policy and depends simultaneously on India for geography, connectivity and trade; China for defence and investment; Gulf countries for employment and remittances; and Western markets for exports.

Joining a mutual-defence framework that includes Pakistan would therefore represent a much more consequential foreign-policy decision than purchasing Chinese aircraft.

Most importantly, the Mecca Pact should not automatically be interpreted as a Bangladesh-Pakistan military alliance directed against India. Dhaka would retain its own interests, and actual obligations would depend on the final terms of membership and the circumstances of any future conflict.

India’s Concerns

The J-10CE would give the Bangladesh Air Force a modern BVR air-combat capability, including AESA radar and advanced air-to-air missiles. This would narrow the qualitative gap between Bangladesh and India in specific areas, particularly along India’s eastern approaches.

The J-10CE purchase alone does not fundamentally change the India-Bangladesh military balance. A fleet of roughly 20–24 aircraft would still leave Bangladesh’s overall air power considerably smaller than India’s, and combat effectiveness depends on much more than the aircraft themselves: pilot training, sortie generation, airborne early-warning and control, air defence, tankers, C4ISR and supporting infrastructure all matter.

The concern grows when the fighter purchase is considered alongside Bangladesh’s potential political alignment with a Pakistan-inclusive defence framework, and China’s growing hold on Bangladesh through the supply of defence equipment. The combination, not any single development, matters.

However, the more important issue is Bangladesh’s dependence on China. A future combination of J-10CE, Chinese missiles, Chinese radars, UAVs, air-defence systems, naval systems, training, and maintenance would increase China’s institutional and technological influence over the Bangladesh Armed Forces.

Operating the same aircraft family as Pakistan could also make future technical cooperation, training or interoperability easier. However, this should not be assumed to mean that Bangladesh and Pakistan will automatically operate as a unified military force.

Bangladesh occupies a strategically important position between much of India’s mainland and the Northeast. Joining the Mecca Pact could be more consequential for India. This could represent an evolution from the traditional China-Pakistan strategic axis toward a looser, more complicated regional network, with Bangladesh as an additional node.

The consequence to the Bay of Bengal and India’s Northeast would be particularly relevant. Such an arrangement could complicate India’s eastern security environment. Deep defence relationships, technical dependence, intelligence cooperation, infrastructure access and military interoperability can themselves create strategic leverage for China.

India: Watch and Act

Several indicators will reveal whether these developments remain limited to procurement and diplomatic diversification or become strategically more serious. India should keep a close watch on: –

- Final J-10CE contract, number of aircraft, delivery schedule, weapons package, sensors, data links, training arrangements and financing.
- Expansion of the Chinese ecosystem with particular attention to Chinese AWACS, SAMs, ISR systems, UAVs, radar networks and other supporting capabilities. These could matter more strategically than the fighters themselves.
- Chinese access to Bangladeshi infrastructure. Any future arrangements involving airbases, ports, logistics facilities, intelligence installations or sustained Chinese military access would represent a substantially more serious development.
- Pakistan-Bangladesh military cooperation. Joint exercises, intelligence sharing, training arrangements or institutional defence agreements would indicate whether the political relationship is translating into operational cooperation.
- Mecca Pact negotiations, accession process or a formal memorandum.

India’s response matters because excessive pressure on Dhaka could become counterproductive. A better approach would be to compete without confrontation. India should focus on: –

- Stronger mutually acceptable defence-industrial cooperation.
- Maritime cooperation.
- Border-management mechanisms.
- Economic and transport connectivity.
- Energy cooperation.
- Disaster-relief mechanisms.
- Continued military-to-military engagement;
- Sustained political dialogue.

At the same time, India should strengthen its own eastern capabilities rather than assume Bangladesh will remain strategically neutral indefinitely. This means continued attention to the Eastern sector.

Concluding Thoughts

The strategic concern is not whether Bangladesh acquires Chinese fighter aircraft. It is whether the agreement sets the stage for greater Chinese involvement. The situation grows more complicated if Bangladesh joins a security agreement that also includes Pakistan. If both happen, the consequences for India would be much more serious.

These developments should be seen as part of a strategic trend, not as an urgent military crisis. The right course of action is neither complacency nor panic. New Delhi should strengthen its military position in the east, watch how China and Pakistan cooperate on defence matters, and remain politically and economically engaged with Bangladesh.

Shared these thoughts with Kartikeya Sharma on News 9.

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References: –

Ahmed, I. (2026, July 23). Recalibrating foreign policy: Implications of Tarique Rahman’s China visit. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

(2026, August 7). Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan pledge mutual defence. Reuters.

com, Draft deal takes shape for Bangladesh’s potential purchase of Chinese J-10CE jets. bdnews24.com. (2026).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Message to the nation by the Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister on the signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. (2026b, August 10).

Rehman, I. (2021). China’s influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and resilience in four countries. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

(2026a, August 7). Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan pledge mutual defence. Reuters.

(2026b, August 25). Bangladesh could consider joining Mecca pact, testing foreign ties. Reuters.

(2026c, August 25). Bangladesh in talks to buy Chinese J-10CE fighter jets. Reuters.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). SIPRI arms transfers database.

10. The Business Standard. (2026). Bangladesh set to buy 20 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets for $2.3b—The Business Standard.