842: OPERATION SINDOOR REVISITED

 

Operation Sindoor was a multi-domain, mostly non-contact military operation India carried out in the early hours of 7 May 2025. In the first phase, India carried out attacks on nine terrorist facilities associated with groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan and in illegal Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. When the situation escalated, phase two was carried out with strikes being launched at military targets in Pakistan. Hostilities continued for about 88 hours before a ceasefire agreement was reached on 10 May.

 

Former CDS Gen Anil Chauhan (retired) delivered a talk on “Operation Sindoor and its Aftermath” on 25 August 2026.  This talk is significant from an analytical perspective.

 

Analytical Perspective and Takeaways

  • Military power serves as an instrument of political policy; the armed forces set their own military objectives based on the political aim. The military plans accordingly. This matters because it shows that Sindoor was designed as a limited, controlled operation rather than an open-ended war.
  • Political direction and freedom of action. The clear political directive was to send an unambiguous message that India will not tolerate cross-border terrorism. Therefore, the directive was that the action should be unthinkable, with no political pressure for immediate action, and carried out without failure and with suitable evidence. Clear intent and operational autonomy are ideal for the military.
  • Tactical Shift and evolution of India’s retaliatory doctrines (to preserve surprise and prevent operational predictability). Unlike the land route used post-Uri (2016) or the high-altitude/large-force air engagements used post-Pulwama/Balakot (2019), Operation Sindoor employed a “third option”: leveraging the lower airspace. Low-altitude operations kept the conflict threshold controlled, maximised surprise, and delivered high mission assurance without triggering immediate full-scale escalation. It was not about what weapons India possessed. It was about how those weapons were employed against the adversary’s surveillance and air-defence architecture. In military terms, this illustrates the importance of operational creativity over simply having superior hardware.
  • Redefining the area below the nuclear threshold. The operation has shown that India is capable of carrying out precise conventional strikes at targeted terrorist infrastructure within a carefully controlled time frame which remains below the nuclear escalation threshold, thus countering the ‘stability-instability paradox’ which adversaries rely upon.
  • The fact that the strike hit the Kirana Hills has important strategic implications since it was not intended to target Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure; if an intentional strike had been made on a nuclear-related facility, it might have been seen as an attempt to attack Pakistan’s strategic deterrent and would therefore have led to a very different escalation scenario. 
  • Skardu as a possible target. Skardu was a possible target but had to be changed to Bholari due to weather constraints. This shows India had multiple military options, rather than a single predetermined strike package. It also demonstrates the resilience and flexibility of IAF capability and planning.
  • On 10 May 2025, Pakistan pleaded for a ceasefire. India responded in its own time. This indicates that the aim was not merely to retaliate and jump at the first diplomatic opportunity. Instead, India chose to achieve its military objectives before agreeing to end the operations. This is an ideal example of aligning the military end-state with the political objectives.

 

  • Preparedness creates political choices. Peacetime shapes the options available during a crisis. If a military lacks long-range precision weapons, drones, ISR, electronic warfare, air defence and integration, political leaders have fewer options when a crisis occurs. Therefore, Sindoor resulted from years of military modernisation and capability development.
  • Multi-Domain Operation. It was India’s genuine multi-domain operation, involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with cyber and information-warfare elements. The integration achieved during the operation validated the direction India had taken toward jointness.
  • Operation Sindoor was a controlled demonstration of India’s ability to calibrate force and capability to punish aggression without necessarily allowing every confrontation to become a full-scale war. The major lesson is that modern warfare is increasingly about precision, information, speed, networking and decision superiority rather than simply manpower or territorial capture.
  • Pakistan’s post-operation adjustments include reorganising its military command (by setting up a new CDF post) and seeking security agreements (the Mecca joint defence agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), showing it is changing its approach.

 

Strategic Implications

The above analysis underscores a permanent shift in India’s strategic doctrine.  It indicates a pairing of firm political intent with evolving, technologically driven military execution. By adapting tactics every time (i.e. from ground raids to high-altitude strikes and now low-altitude/loitering assets), India maintains operational unpredictability while establishing clear redlines against cross-border terrorism.

Operation Sindoor is still going on. Although the official line since 10 May 2025 has been that a ceasefire or pause was agreed upon after Pakistan asked for it, the operation has not officially ended. By keeping it going in this way, India indicates that it sees its position following the Pahalgam incident (the “new red line”, the change from a policy of deterrence to one of declaring a willingness to take direct action) as a continuing stance, not as a single, one-off punitive operation which has now finished.

 

Discussed these aspects with Vishnu Som of NDTV on the Program “Left Right and Centre”.

Link to the discussion:-

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References and credits

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841: Indegenous Jet Engine: Single Most Technical Vulnerability

 

Inputs to the journalists on the subject

 

Q1. Has dependence on foreign engines been a major constraint in building more fighter jets?

Yes, the trend is becoming more pronounced. The Tejas program exemplifies this clearly. India has undertaken the design and manufacturing of the aircraft; however, its domestically developed Kaveri engine failed to meet the necessary performance standards, resulting in dependence on GE’s F404 engine. More recently, delays in F404 deliveries have delayed the handover of completed Tejas Mk1A aircraft.

The problem is therefore not just cost or foreign exchange. It creates a bottleneck in the production chain. The dependence also extends into future programmes. Tejas Mk2 is planned around the GE F414, while the initial AMCA configuration is also expected to rely on a foreign engine.

India has displayed the capability to design and build airframes, integrate avionics and weapons, and increase its manufacturing capacity. However, the most important component (the engine) continues to be a bottleneck. The reliance on foreign engines has become a major constraint and a strategic weakness.

 

Q2. Is it critical for India to end this dependence?

It is strategically important for long-term military autonomy, operational readiness, and industrial self-reliance. Foreign dependence brings about several risks, such as vulnerability to interruptions or delays in supply (as was the case with the F404 engines), the possibility of the supplier country exercising leverage, greater lifecycle costs for spares and upgrades and for maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO), export restrictions (since engine OEM approvals are usually required), and a restricted capacity to fully optimise or upgrade the aircraft on one’s own.

 However, India cannot realistically wait for a completely indigenous engine before expanding its fighter fleet. The IAF needs aircraft now, so foreign engines remain necessary for programmes such as Tejas Mk1A and Mk2.

The more important objective is to ensure that future Indian fighters cannot be held hostage by the availability, pricing or export-control decisions of another country. This matters particularly because India expects a very large requirement for fighter engines.  GTRE estimated a need for roughly 1,100 engines through 2035. For AMCA and subsequent programmes, India therefore needs access to the underlying technology, not merely an Indian factory assembling a foreign-designed engine.

 

Q3. What are the advantages of securing access to engine technology possessed by only a handful of countries?

The list of nations that can genuinely design a modern high-thrust military jet engine remains limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, with China having made still-contested progress. India has been exploring major partnerships with companies such as Safran and Rolls-Royce for high-thrust fighter propulsion. In August 2026, Reliance Industries and Rolls-Royce also announced a partnership to explore co-developing and manufacturing an engine for the AMCA programme.

Modern fighter engines involve high-temperature materials, turbine blades, coatings, cooling systems, compressors, combustion processes, digital controls, and precision manufacturing. Only a small number of countries have the full range of technological knowledge needed for such engines, and accessing these technologies through a co-development programme would be advantageous.

Strategic Autonomy. India would have much greater control over the availability, modification and upgrading of its fighters. It reduces the risk of export restrictions, supply interruptions, political pressure, unexpected price increases, and dependence on foreign approval for upgrades. It would give India the freedom to design future fighters. The engine constrains an aircraft designer. If you control the propulsion system, you can optimise the aircraft around your own requirements rather than designing around what a foreign engine supplier offers.

Faster Technological Learning. This may actually be more valuable than the first indigenous engine itself. India needs to learn how to design and manufacture the core technologies of an advanced turbofan. Once that knowledge exists domestically, subsequent engines can evolve rather than start from scratch. The Kaveri programme generated valuable expertise but did not achieve the required fighter performance. A genuine technology partnership could help India bridge precisely those gaps.

Aerospace Ecosystem. A successful engine programme would build capabilities in Superalloys, single-crystal blades, coatings, precision manufacturing, sensors, FADEC, testing, metallurgy, and additive manufacturing. Those technologies have applications beyond fighter engines, including UAVs, missiles, helicopters and civil aerospace.

Export Potential. If India eventually owns sufficient intellectual property and manufacturing capability, it could export engines or aircraft without needing permission from a foreign engine designer for every major modification. That would transform India from primarily an aircraft buyer/manufacturer into an aerospace technology power.

Bottom Line

India’s dependence on foreign suppliers is perhaps the single biggest technological vulnerability in its aerospace ecosystem, and developing an indigenous engine is a non-negotiable priority. As India considers these offers, the question is whether these companies will share the deepest layers of their process knowledge.

 

Link to the quoted article on the subject

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2026/08/27/rolls-royce-safran-vie-for-indias-next-generation-fighter-engine/

 

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839: EXPLAINED: WHY LEASE WHEN YOU ARE BUYING THEM

 

Inputs to questionnaire from journalists

 

India has operated leased SeaGuardians since 2020. India leased them because the Navy needed persistent ISR capability while the much larger procurement moved through the system. The Indian Navy has found them useful and has flown them for thousands of hours.

The new lease contract has reportedly been signed on17 August 2026. It includes a 30-month lease for two MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. The contract is valued at approximately ₹1,943 crore. 

On the face of it, ₹1,943 crore for two MQ-9B SeaGuardians for only 30 months looks extremely expensive. The ₹1,943 crore price tag is not a basic rental fee for two airframes. It represents a Company-Owned, Company-Operated (COCO) capability package. The value proposition includes sensors, communications, ground-control infrastructure, technical support, maintenance, operators/support personnel, availability, etc.

    • Complete Operational Burden. General Atomics (GA-ASI) provides the entire ecosystem (possibly including Ground Control Stations (GCS), satellite communication bandwidth, continuous payload integration, spare parts, and on-site engineering support).
    • Assured Flight-Hours. The cost includes availability of a guaranteed number of operational flight hours. The manufacturer would bear the cost associated with airframe degradation, maintenance cycles, component failures, and logistics overhead.
    • Specialised Payload Rent. The lease includes high-end, mission-specific sensor suites (360-degree maritime surface search radars, synthetic aperture radars (SAR), electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) balls, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) packages).

The lease would buy time and capability.  India entered into the agreement in October 2024 for 31 MQ-9Bs (specifically 15 SeaGuardians and 16 SkyGuardians). India’s acquisition of 31 aircraft does not mean they will become operational right away; reports indicate the first deliveries will not take place until late 2028 or early 2029. Since we need the capability right now, there will be a gap of several years. To sum up, the purchase is the long-term solution, while the lease is a short-term remedy.

There’s another way of looking at it. The lease would be a training and transition bridge. The new lease could allow personnel, maintenance teams, operators and mission planners to continue building experience while the larger fleet is inducted. It would allow operational availability, training, experience, maintenance support, sensors, contractor support, insurance/replacement risk, and immediate access. Rather than a redundant expense, the lease would serve as a high-readiness bridge. It would provide immediate maritime surveillance capacity while laying the tactical groundwork for the larger fleet’s arrival.

In short, the two newly leased Sea Guardians are not a standalone act but a deliberate interim measure that keeps the Navy’s IOR surveillance posture strong and operationally continuous while the larger, permanent 31-aircraft tri-service fleet is manufactured and delivered.

The bigger picture

The drones complement, rather than replace, the P-8I fleet. India’s surveillance architecture is increasingly layered:

    • MQ-9B SeaGuardian: long-endurance unmanned surveillance, able to remain on station for extended periods.
    • P-8I Poseidon: manned long-range maritime patrol aircraft with sophisticated radar and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
    • Satellites: wide-area, space-based observation.
    • Coastal and island-based sensors/radars: persistent monitoring closer to shore and around strategic maritime chokepoints.
    • Other naval assets: ships, submarines and aircraft that can investigate or act on information generated by the surveillance network.

A layered network:

Satellites → see broadly

MQ-9Bs → stay over an area for a long time.

P-8Is → investigate and conduct sophisticated maritime/ASW missions.

Ships/submarines → physically respond.

The MQ-9B lease fits into that picture as the tactical, tasking-responsive layer of a system whose outer layers are space-based sensing and coastal radar, and whose command layer is the fusion-centre network.

 

Link to the report on Wion TV:-

 

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