Afghanistan – Air Marshal's Perspective

May 6, 2026

810: PAKISTAN’S WAR OF ITS OWN MAKING: AFGHAN POLICY COMES FULL CIRCLE

In the early hours of February 27, 2026, explosions shook the Afghan capital Kabul. Pakistani jets streaked across the night sky, striking Taliban government defence facilities, ammunition depots, and military sites in Kabul, Kandahar, and the southeastern province of Paktia. Pakistan had done something almost unthinkable just a few years ago. It bombed the capital of a neighbouring country and declared that it was now in a state of “open war.” This was not an impulsive act but the result of years of deteriorating relations. The situation had been building since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021.

A Historical Overview of The Broken Brotherhood

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a relationship that defies easy description. The South Asian neighbours are both Muslim-majority states and share a 2,611-kilometer border. For decades, Pakistan was among the most important backers of the Afghan Taliban, supporting the movement ideologically, financially, and logistically through its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. When the Taliban swept back into Kabul in August 2021 following the withdrawal of American and NATO forces, Pakistan initially welcomed the development as a strategic gain. Pakistan thought a friendly government in Kabul might counter Indian influence and give Islamabad so-called “strategic depth.”

That calculation unravelled almost immediately. The Taliban government in Kabul was not interested in being a client state of Islamabad. Far from reining in anti-Pakistan militant groups operating from Afghan soil, the Taliban appeared unwilling to do so. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) started using Afghan territory as a base from which to launch increasingly devastating attacks on Pakistan. Pakistan’s frontier provinces bordering Afghanistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) bore the brunt. Suicide bombings, ambushes on security forces, and targeted assassinations increased. A particularly devastating attack struck a Shia Mosque in Islamabad, killing at least 40 people and claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), adding another militant dimension to Pakistan’s security nightmare.

At the same time, the Durand Line (the colonial-era boundary drawn by the British in 1893) remained a festering point of contention. Afghanistan has never formally recognised this border as legitimate, viewing it as an arbitrary demarcation that divides the Pashtun ethnic group between two states. The Taliban government maintained that position firmly, resisting Pakistan’s attempts to fence the border and frequently allowing its fighters to interfere with construction efforts. It is estimated that there had been at least 75 recorded clashes between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the Durand Line between 2021 and 2026, a frequency that made some form of major escalation almost inevitable.

The Military Balance

The difference in military strength between Pakistan and Afghanistan is stark. Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country, has a considerable military force with 660,000 active personnel (560,000 soldiers in the army, 70,000 in the air force, and 30,000 in the navy). Pakistan also boasts of 465 combat aircraft, over 260 helicopters, more than 6,000 armoured fighting vehicles, and over 4,600 artillery pieces.

The Afghan Taliban, by contrast, commands approximately 172,000 active military personnel. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, it inherited a substantial inventory of US-supplied military equipment left behind by the former Afghan National Army, including armoured vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. But without international recognition, without access to spare parts, and without functioning military training institutions, much of that equipment became unusable. Afghanistan has no functioning air force to speak of: at most six aircraft, some of Soviet vintage, and 23 helicopters, the airworthiness of an unknown number of which remained in doubt.

On paper, Pakistan could crush the Taliban’s conventional military capacity with relative ease. Yet history has shown repeatedly that wars in Afghanistan are not won on paper. It is called the “Graveyard of Empires” for a reason. The Taliban’s fighters are combat-hardened veterans of a 20-year insurgency against the most powerful military alliance in history. They know their terrain intimately. And Islamabad should know better than most that guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Khost and Kunar can render any conventional military advantage irrelevant.

Collapse of the October 2025 Ceasefire

The crisis did not erupt without prior warning. In October 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan had already fought a week of fierce and deadly clashes along their contested frontier. More than 70 people were killed on both sides in what at the time represented the worst bout of open fighting between the two neighbours in recent memory. The violence was enough to prompt international intervention. Qatar and Turkey brokered an emergency ceasefire in Doha, and for a few months, the shooting largely stopped.

But the ceasefire was always fragile. Sporadic violations continued, and none of the underlying causes had been addressed. Pakistan still wanted the Taliban to crack down on the TTP. The Taliban still refused to recognise the Durand Line. Militant attacks inside Pakistan continued. Border crossings, including the key Torkham and Chaman crossings, remained largely shut, causing severe economic strain on both sides and enormous suffering for Afghan refugees and returnees caught between two hostile states. Several rounds of negotiations followed the October ceasefire, reportedly involving Qatar and Turkey as mediators, but no lasting agreement emerged.

The February 2026 Skirmish

Pakistan launched airstrikes targeting what it described as militant camps belonging to the TTP and ISKP in Afghan provinces (Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost). Islamabad claimed that the strikes had killed at least 70 terrorists. The Taliban government and independent observers had a different story. The UN mission in Afghanistan reported that at least 13 civilians had been killed in those initial Pakistani strikes. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the attacks had “killed and wounded dozens, including women and children.” A provincial director of the Afghan Red Crescent Society said 18 people were killed and many more wounded in Nangarhar alone. These were not terrorists on a training ground, but residents of border villages.

Afghanistan issued a stern warning, which Pakistan dismissed. On the night of February 26, Afghan forces launched a large-scale offensive operation against Pakistan. They targeted Pakistani military installations along the Durand Line.

Pakistan responded by launching Operation Ghazab lil Haq (Righteous Fury) on 27 Feb 26. It involved combined air and ground strikes against Taliban posts, headquarters, and ammunition depots.

According to Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, the operation killed at least 133 Afghan Taliban fighters and wounded more than 200. Pakistan also claimed that 27 Taliban posts had been destroyed and nine captured, along with over 80 tanks, artillery pieces, and armoured personnel carriers. The Taliban gave a starkly different account: eight of its fighters killed and eleven wounded, and 55 Pakistani soldiers killed, with 19 posts seized. Neither set of figures could be independently verified by the time news organisations were reporting from the ground.

The conflict quickly introduced new dimensions of warfare. Afghanistan claimed its forces had “successfully conducted” drone strikes hitting military targets inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s Information Minister said the drone attempts had been intercepted by anti-drone systems in the cities of Abbottabad, Swabi, and Nowshera, with no damage to life.

The Torkham crossing remained one of the most dangerous and symbolically loaded flashpoints. It had been kept partially open for Afghans returning en masse from Pakistan. Now those returnees found themselves trapped between two armies.

Regional and Global Reactions

The international response to the outbreak of open war was swift and almost uniformly alarmed. The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was among the first to respond. He called for both parties to de-escalate immediately and continue to seek to resolve the differences through diplomacy.

India condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes. It described the strikes as “another attempt by Pakistan to externalise its internal failures”. It also affirmed India’s support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Pakistan’s Foreign Office rejected India’s comments and alleged that the Taliban had become a proxy for India.

Iran has borders with both countries and has long positioned itself as a bridge between them. It called on both governments to resolve their differences within the framework of good neighbourliness. Iran also offered mediation and readiness to assist in facilitating dialogue.

China maintains close ties with both Pakistan and the Taliban government in Kabul. It expressed deep concern and conveyed Beijing’s willingness to play a constructive role in cooling the situation. Russia called on both parties to immediately halt cross-border attacks and offered to mediate if requested by both sides. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held separate calls with his counterparts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to coordinate diplomatic pressure. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan spoke with Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar to discuss “ways to reduce tensions.”

Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, though holding no official position, issued a public statement. Pakistan cannot free itself from the self-created problems of violence and bombings. Still, it must change its own policy and choose the path of good neighbourliness, respect, and civilised relations with Afghanistan.

What Drives This War

The hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the product of an irreconcilable contradiction. Pakistan created, supported, and enabled the Taliban as a strategic instrument for more than two decades. It sheltered the Taliban’s senior leadership during the years of US occupation. It allowed recruitment and fundraising on Pakistani soil. It lobbied internationally for international recognition of Taliban governance. Pakistan expected gratitude and compliance from the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.

What it got instead was a sovereign government that pursued its own interests. It refused to recognise the Durand Line, declined to crack down on the TTP, and increasingly viewed Islamabad as a threat rather than a patron. The Pakistani analyst Mariam Solaimankhil, a member of Afghanistan’s Parliament in Exile, framed it bluntly in a television interview during the crisis: “Pakistan is fighting the monster it helped create.” She argued that the TTP’s roots, the Afghan Taliban’s ideology, and the networks of militant groups were all products of Pakistani state policy over decades, and that the civilians now dying in Pashtun villages on both sides of the border, in Balochistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, were paying the price for choices made in Rawalpindi’s military headquarters.

Where It Might Lead

Where the conflict goes from here remains deeply uncertain. The military balance favours Pakistan overwhelmingly in conventional terms, but history suggests that Afghanistan defeats its invaders not by winning battles but by outlasting occupiers. Pakistan has no stated intention of occupying Afghanistan. Still, each round of airstrikes radicalises new fighters, destroys what little infrastructure the Taliban government has, and strengthens the hand of hardliners on both sides.

The international community (China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the UN) has called for de-escalation, but none of these actors has the leverage or the will to impose a solution. The United States, which spent 20 years and trillions of dollars trying to stabilise Afghanistan and failed, is unlikely to re-engage substantively. Qatar and Turkey, who brokered the October 2025 ceasefire that lasted barely four months, again tried to mediate, but without addressing the root causes. In this scenario, any ceasefire will be temporary.

The Durand Line was drawn by a British diplomat in 1893 to serve imperial interests. More than 130 years later, it remains a wound that neither side can agree to close. Until it is resolved, the cycle of violence that has defined this relationship will continue to grind on—one airstrike, one ceasefire, and one broken promise at a time.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:

Ahmed, R. (2000). “Taliban: Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia”. Yale University Press.

Bijan Omrani, B. (2009). “The Durand Line: History and problems of the Afghan-Pakistan border”. Asian Affairs, 40(2), 177–195.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2021–2026). “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and regional militancy reports”. https://www.csis.org

Chatham House. (2021–2026). “Afghanistan post-2021 political and security analysis”. https://www.chathamhouse.org

Council on Foreign Relations. (2021–2026). “Backgrounders on Afghanistan, Taliban, and regional geopolitics”. https://www.cfr.org

International Crisis Group. (2021–2026). “Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions and militancy reports”. https://www.crisisgroup.org

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025). “The military balance 2025”. Routledge.

Reuters. (2025–2026). “Coverage of Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict and regional tensions”. https://www.reuters.com

Rubin, B. R. (2002). “The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system” (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.

December 6, 2025

773: ASIA’S FLASHPOINTS: RISING TENSIONS FROM THE GULF TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Article published in the December edition of the

News Analytics Journal.

Asia is the world’s biggest and most dynamic continent, but it is also the most unstable. Stretching from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to the stormy Pacific, it is home to several of the planet’s most dangerous flashpoints. On the continent, ancient rivalries clash with modern weapons, great powers vie for control, and every small skirmish carries the risk of global repercussions. The region’s hotspots include the Strait of Hormuz, the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula, and the Himalayan region. Any miscalculation in one of these areas could spark a major conflict.

Flash Points

The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean: Asia’s Energy Lifeline. In this region, the narrow Strait of Hormuz (only about 40 kilometres wide) is one of the most crucial shipping lanes. Around one-fifth of all the oil traded globally passes through this chokepoint every day. The tankers moving through it feed factories, power plants, and cars all over the world. If the Strait were to close for some reason, the impact would be felt worldwide. The oil prices would skyrocket immediately. Iran sits at the centre of this area and often threatens to block the Strait. The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen continue to target Saudi, UAE, and commercial shipping interests in the Red Sea. These attacks cause significant disruptions to global trade. Asian countries are diversifying their supply chain routes to prepare for future crises. The Gulf remains a reminder that Asia’s security problems exist on its energy routes.

The South China Sea: The Maritime Powder Keg. In the east are the world’s busiest and most dangerous seas. The South China Sea carries roughly one-third of all global maritime trade. Beneath its waters lie rich fisheries and untapped gas reserves. Six governments (China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) claim overlapping parts of it. China claims almost the entire area of the South China Sea as its own. The international tribunal ruled in 2016 that the Chinese claim had no legal basis. However, Beijing has disagreed with the ruling. China is further militarising the artificial islands created by it on the shoals and reefs. These islands have become permanent military outposts of China, extending its reach deep into Southeast Asia. Every day, ships and planes from different nations cross paths here. Chinese coast guard vessels and civilian fishing boats (controlled by its maritime militia) swarm the contested areas and try to assert control. Other countries are upgrading their navies and pushing back by carrying out exercises and patrols. The result is a “grey-zone” conflict (neither war nor peace) where any confrontation could spiral into crisis. The South China Sea is a testing ground for the future of maritime law and regional order. If rules fail here, they could fail anywhere.

The Taiwan Strait: The Most Dangerous Flashpoint. The 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait separates China from the island of Taiwan. In Asia, it carries the greatest risk of major war. China considers Taiwan its “breakaway province.” China’s leaders have vowed to reunify Taiwan, peacefully or by force if required. Taiwan is a thriving democracy with its own government and military. With its growing sense of national identity, Taiwan rejects Beijing’s claim. The U.S. helps Taiwan arm itself, but maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding its direct intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion. Chinese military pressure has increased lately. Fighter jets and bombers cross into Taiwan’s air defence zone almost every day. Warships circle the island during drills simulating blockades and amphibious assaults. Beyond the military danger, the strait is an economic fault line. Over 60 per cent of the world’s semiconductors are made in Taiwan. This includes the most advanced chips that power smartphones, AI systems, and fighter jets. A war or blockade here would disrupt the global supply chains, devastating the industries worldwide. Every year, the rising tension here increases the likelihood of a misstep that could cause a global crisis.

The Korean Peninsula: Frozen Conflict, Nuclear Threats. The Korean Peninsula is one of the world’s most militarised and tense places. The Korean War never officially ended; it only paused with an armistice. Since then, North Korea has built a considerable nuclear arsenal. It continues to test missiles that can reach all of Asia and beyond. South Korea, maintains a strong defence posture with the assistance from the U.S. Japan is also strengthening its defences and increasing military cooperation with its allies. China and Russia support North Korea and protect it from international sanctions. South Korea is concerned about its long-term security. A deliberate hostile act or a miscalculation can disrupt the fragile peace in the region.

The Himalayas: India–China-Pakistan Triangle. Another tense front runs along the world’s highest mountains. India and China share a 3,400-kilometer Line of Actual Control that is not clearly defined. In 2020, troops from both sides engaged in a deadly hand-to-hand battle in the Galwan Valley. Since then, both have deployed troops and heavy weapons all along the LAC. The border is heavily militarised, increasing the chances of a confrontation. Hostility between India and Pakistan also keeps the region simmering. Pakistan-sponsored proxy attacks and frequent cross-border military exchanges occur at frequent intervals. Collusion between China and Pakistan further exacerbates the matter.

Iran-Israel proxy warfare. The long-standing rivalry between Iran and Israel has escalated through a series of direct and proxy attacks. Iran’s support for non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah continues to destabilise the region. The recent Israel-Hamas war has ravaged the region for two years. These regional ripples heighten fears of a broader conflagration.

Analytical Perspective

Hybrid Warfare: Conflict without Battlefields. Modern conflict rarely begins with conventional weapons. Instead, it creeps in through cyberattacks, fake news, trade pressure, and legal manipulation. This is hybrid warfare—where military, economic, and informational tools blend together. China uses its maritime militia in the South China Sea. It is a type of hybrid warfare that utilises a civilian organisation for military objectives. Iran uses drones for kinetic attacks along with non-kinetic cyber attacks against its rivals across the Gulf. North Korea uses cryptocurrency to fund its weapons programs. Infrastructure projects (like China’s Belt and Road Initiative) are being used for both economic outreach and strategic leverage. Even data is being used as a weapon. Control over semiconductors, undersea cables, and 5G networks shapes who holds power in the digital age. The battle for influence now runs through screens, supply chains, and satellite networks as much as through militaries. This invisible fight makes managing conflict harder.

Shifting Alliances. Asia’s security map is like a chessboard. The United States remains a key power and player. It has a military presence all over the region. It supports alliances and partnerships in the area. These groupings are mainly to counter China’s expanding influence. China, the other major power, is investing heavily in military modernisation. It is deepening ties with Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. Caught between these two rivals, many Asian countries struggle to remain neutral and navigate the regional geopolitics. The result is not a simple Cold War divide, but a tangled web of overlapping alliances.

Regional Skirmishes with Global Consequences. These tensions are not local problems, but have global repercussions. A missile attack in the Gulf can double fuel prices in Europe. A clash in the South China Sea can block the shipping routes that carry goods to Africa and America. A war over Taiwan could destroy the global semiconductor industry. A crisis in the Himalayas could pit two nuclear powers against each other, putting the entire world at risk. Asia is also home to more nuclear-armed states than any other region and has the fastest-growing defence budgets. As military and cyber capabilities proliferate, the risk of military miscalculation multiplies. Yet Asia’s deep economic interdependence also encourages restraint: no one wants to destroy the markets that make them rich.

Path toward Stability. Avoiding catastrophe will require both deterrence and dialogue. Countries need to maintain open lines of communication with each other. A well-defined code of conduct can prevent incidents from blowing into larger conflicts. Regional organisations should develop mutually acceptable frameworks for conflict prevention and resolution. Hybrid threats need to be countered by building resilience in the digital and information domains. Above all, International laws need to be followed in letter and spirit by all countries. Resolving disputes through rules rather than force would be beneficial for all parties involved.

Conclusion: Asia’s Century

Asia is standing at a crossroads. The region offers both the danger of destruction and the opportunity for growth. It holds immense promise, with a young population and booming economies. But it also carries deep risks of major conflicts. If managed wisely, competition and cooperation could coexist within workable frameworks for peace. If mismanaged, a spark in any one of these zones could ignite a fire that engulfs the globe. Asia is already shaping the 21st century. Whether it becomes a century of prosperity or peril depends on how its leaders handle these flashpoints.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

Cordesman, Anthony H. Iran, the Gulf, and Strategic Competition: The Challenges of Deterrence and Escalation. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020.

Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran’s Threats to the Strait of Hormuz: Background and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service, 2023.

Mallick, Samir. “Maritime Security and Energy Transit Vulnerabilities in the Western Indian Ocean.” Journal of Indian Ocean Studies 29, no. 1 (2023): 45–62.

Hayton, Bill. The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. Revised ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022.

Cole, J. Michael. Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The Illusion of Peace? London: Routledge, 2023.

Panda, Ankit. Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea. London: Hurst & Company, 2020.

Joshi, Manoj. Understanding the India–China Border: The Line of Actual Control and the Future of Sino-Indian Relations. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2023.

Eisenstadt, Michael, and Charles Thepaut. “The Iran-Israel Shadow War.” Policy Focus 164, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2024.

Lin, Bonny, & Gross, David C. Taiwan’s Semiconductor Dominance and Global Supply-Chain Risk. RAND, 2024.

Small, Andrew. The China–Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. Oxford UP, 2021 (updated 2024).

Ostovar, Afshon. Iran, Israel, and the United States: The Shadow War. Georgetown UP, 2025.

November 7, 2025

770: BAGRAM AIRBASE: REIGNITED GEOPOLITICAL FLASHPOINT

Bagram airbase is situated about 50 kilometers north of Kabul in Afghanistan’s Parwan Province. The fortified base has two runways and a vast support infrastructure. It has been a nerve center for every significant foreign military power to occupy the country since the Cold War. It was constructed in the 1950s and expanded significantly during the Soviet era. It became the main hub for Soviet military operations in Afghanistan during their 1979–1989 occupation.

Following the events of 9/11, the airfield was transformed into the centerpiece of the U.S.-led coalition’s operations in Afghanistan. At its peak, the facility featured runways capable of handling large transport and bomber aircraft, more than one hundred revetments, massive logistical and support infrastructures, and housed thousands of troops and aircraft. It was the launchpad for drone strikes, intelligence missions, and air support operations.

On 2 July 2021, after almost twenty years of continuous U.S. control of Bagram Airfield, the control was handed over to the Afghan authorities, marking a key moment in the coalition’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Bagram became a symbol of the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Four years later, the airbase has again attracted global attention. But this time, the debate isn’t about counterterrorism. It’s about geopolitical competition, regional sovereignty, and a changing balance of power in Asia.

A Strategic Asset. Bagram’s strategic appeal is noticeable. Located less than an hour’s flight from China’s western Xinjiang province and within reach of Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia, it offers unparalleled access to some of the most contested airspace in the world. The base has two runways capable of hosting heavy bombers and long-range reconnaissance aircraft, along with hardened hangars, and infrastructure enough to house thousands of personnel. For the United States, regaining access to such a facility could restore a foothold in Central Asia. The region is now dominated by Chinese and Russian influence. For the Taliban, retaining control over it is both a matter of pride and sovereignty. For neighbouring countries, Bagram represents a potential spark that could reignite competition and instability.

Bagram’s Symbolic Power. Besides military significance, Bagram airbase has become a symbolic battlefield in the narrative wars. For the Taliban, it is a monument to victory. It symbolises foreign retreat and the restoration of national control. Military parades featuring captured U.S. hardware have been staged there annually since 2022, turning the base into both a propaganda tool and a training hub. For Western observers, Bagram remains a haunting reminder of how two decades of war ended with little enduring infrastructure or political legacy.

Renewed US Interest. In September 2025, former U.S. President Donald Trump reignited the debate over Bagram by declaring that the U.S. is “trying to get it back.” Trump, while speaking at a joint press conference (with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer), contended that the vital airbase was “given up for nothing”. His subsequent post on his social media escalated the rhetoric. He claimed that the base needs to be reclaimed. Otherwise, the “enemies of freedom” would consolidate power across the region. The Taliban called these comments delusional. Afghanistan spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that Bagram belongs to Afghanistan and not a meter of our land will return to foreign occupation.” However, the US president’s statement rekindled speculation about Washington’s interest in regaining influence in Afghanistan. Analysts feel that any U.S. attempt to retake the base would be an undertaking politically and strategically implausible in the current climate.

The Regional Chessboard. Bagram’s fate is not just a bilateral issue between Washington and Kabul. It sits at the intersection of larger geopolitical currents.

- China views any U.S. return as a potential surveillance threat to its Belt and Road investments and its sensitive Xinjiang region.
- Russia, seeking to expand its influence across Central Asia, has made clear that it will not tolerate new Western military outposts in the region.
- Iran shares similar concerns and has strengthened its ties with the Taliban, providing limited economic and diplomatic backing.
- Pakistan is caught between its complex relationship with the Taliban and with Washington.
- For India, interest in the airbase is governed by factors such as location & connectivity, regional competition, and Afghanistan’s sovereignty & stability.

Regional Powers Push Back. The strongest rebuke came from Afghanistan’s neighbours. On October 7–8, 2025 (at the 7^th Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan), Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics issued a joint declaration. They collectively rejected the idea of any foreign military presence on Afghan soil. The statement was obviously directed at Trump’s remarks and potential U.S. ambitions. The declaration reflected a fear about upsetting the stability in Afghanistan. Moscow and Beijing view any American return as a strategic encroachment. Islamabad is concerned about the growing influence of domestic insurgents. India publicly supported Afghanistan’s sovereignty and rejected the idea of foreign bases. Indian officials emphasised the need for “regional solutions” over external interventions.

Disinformation Drive. Rumours of U.S. (even Indian) control of Bagram airbase are circulating online. A social media post purported that the Taliban had transferred limited control of Bagram to US Special Forces. The report was debunked by both Taliban and U.S. officials. Similar speculation suggested that India might be using the base. The Afghan Foreign Ministry dismissed the rumours as a disinformation campaign and reaffirmed that there is no foreign presence.

Firm Taliban Control. All official reports indicate that Bagram Airbase is firmly under Taliban control. No confirmed signs of U.S., Indian, or any other foreign presence have emerged. In official statements, Taliban leaders have pledged to maintain the base for Afghanistan’s defence forces and reject “any form of shared control.” This stance enjoys regional support, even among nations that remain wary of Taliban governance.

Spotlight Remains. The Bagram issue captures the Afghan post-war era dilemma. It is a clash between its sovereignty and strategic interest. The airbase has become a measuring stick for regional order. As of now, no U.S. re-involvement appears imminent. But the rhetoric surrounding Bagram indicates how Afghanistan continues to serve as both a symbol and a stage in the contest for influence between the world powers (Washington, Beijing, and Moscow). For Afghans, it also serves as a reminder that even during a supposed state of peace, the fight for control in Afghanistan is not yet over.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

Grau, Lester W, and Michael A, “The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost”, University Press of Kansas, 2002.

Jones, Seth G, “In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan”, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.

Department of Defence. “Bagram Airfield Infrastructure Overview”, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010.

Gul, Imran, “The Fall of Bagram: Symbol of a Chaotic Exit”, Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2021.

Wilder, Andrew, and Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love: US Aid to Afghanistan and Its Unintended Consequences”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2021.

Trump, Donald J, “Remarks on Afghanistan and Regional Security”, Joint Press Conference (with UK Prime Minister), Sep 2025.

Cordesman, and Anthony H, “Reassessing US Options in Afghanistan: The Bagram Enigma”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Brief, Oct 2025.

Pant, Harsh V, “India’s Stake in Afghan Stability: Bagram as a Regional Litmus Test”, The Diplomat, Nov 2025.

Moscow Format Consultations, “Joint Declaration on Afghanistan: Rejecting Foreign Military Presence”, Official Communiqué, Oct 2025.

Fair, C Christine, “Pakistan’s Taliban Dilemma: Balancing Washington and Kabul Over Bagram”, Global Politics and Strategy 67, no. 5 (2025): 123–145.

Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Debunking Rumours of Foreign Control at Bagram Airfield”, Official Statement, Oct 2025.