war and warfare – Air Marshal's Perspective

May 14, 2026

815: BOOK REVIEW: WE TOO WERE THERE: INDIANS AT GALLIPOLI

Book Review published in the May 26 edition of “The Book Review Literary Trust” Publication.

WE TOO WERE THERE: INDIANS AT GALLIPOLI

Written by : (By Col Tejinder Hundal)

Reviewed by: Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, VM

The Gallipoli campaign (also called the Dardanelles campaign, the Defence of Gallipoli, or the Battle of Gallipoli) was a military operation during the First World War on the Gallipoli Peninsula (now Gelibolu) from 19 February 1915 to 9 January 1916. The Allied powers, Britain, France, and the Russian Empire, aimed to capture the Ottoman Empire, one of the Central Powers, by gaining control of the Turkish straits. This would have exposed the Ottoman capital at Constantinople to bombardment by Allied warships and cut it off from the Asian part of the empire. With the Ottoman Empire defeated, the Suez Canal would be protected, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits would be open to Allied supplies to the Black Sea and Russian warm-water ports.

In February 1915, the Allied fleet failed to force a passage through the Dardanelles. An amphibious landing on the Gallipoli peninsula began in April 1915. Gallipoli was the first major amphibious operation in modern warfare. British (including troops from the British Empire) and French troops landed on the Ottoman-held peninsula in the Dardanelles Straits. In January 1916, after eight months’ fighting, with approximately 250,000 casualties on each side, the campaign was abandoned, and the invasion force was withdrawn. It was a costly campaign for both the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire.

Indian troops played crucial roles in several key battles during the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign, suffering heavy casualties while supporting Allied efforts against Ottoman defences. On 12 May 1915, the 29th Indian Brigade, including the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, captured a coastal hill feature west of Krithia, named Gurkha Bluff for their effective action; this marked their first significant engagement in the Helles area. In the third Battle of Krithia, fought on 4 June 1915, the 14th Sikhs (Jat Sikhs) from the 29th Indian Brigade charged Turkish positions at Gully Ravine amid intense machine-gun fire and barbed wire, suffering 82% casualties as nearly the entire battalion was wiped out in close-quarters fighting. Indian units repelled Turkish assaults on 3 and 5 July 1915 near Gully Spur and Gurkha Bluff, with Gurkha battalions pushing back the enemy by 1,000 yards over eight days of counterattacks, while sustaining 40% casualties. In the August 1915 offensive, the 29th Indian Brigade landed at ANZAC Cove on 5-6 August and assaulted Sari Bair Ridge; on 9 August, the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles briefly crested the summit before artillery and counterattacks forced a retreat.

The histories of Gallipoli have traditionally focused on the ANZACs (Australia and New Zealand) and British forces. The book “We Too Were There: Indians at Gallipoli” by Col Tejinder Hundal is a detailed military history that focuses on the Indian Army’s role (over 16,000 Indian troops) in the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. Hundal’s book seeks to restore the Indian soldiers’ service, sacrifices, and experiences to the narrative. Hundal argues that the “spirit of Gallipoli” wasn’t just an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. It was a multicultural crucible where Indian soldiers earned the respect of their peers through sheer grit and professionalism. The book follows the 13th Frontier Force Rifles, the Indian Mountain Artillery, and the thousands of mule drivers and medical personnel who served on the rugged Turkish peninsula. Hundal doesn’t just provide a dry military report; he reconstructs the campaign through a lens of shared sacrifice.

Author Col. Tejinder Hundal is a serving Indian Army officer with a PhD in Defence and Strategic Studies. He has a keen interest in the participation of Indian Army troops in the two World Wars. At over 600 pages, his book is comprehensive and deeply researched. The book is built from extensive research into primary sources, including war diaries, personal letters, and regimental records. These sources document the deployment of Indian infantrymen, artillery units, mule transport and logistic corps, and the hardships they endured on the Dardanelles peninsula from April to December 1915. The book includes maps and sketches that help visualise the Dardanelles’ impossible terrain. It doesn’t just recount battles; it delves into mobilisation, logistics, adaptation to harsh conditions, and the administrative challenges of war from an Indian perspective. These topics are rarely covered in mainstream histories of Gallipoli.

Hundal highlights how Indian mountain batteries provided the only effective artillery support for the Anzacs in the early days of the landing. A significant portion is dedicated to the 6th Gurkha Rifles and their legendary capture of “Sari Bair,” the highest point reached by Allied troops. Beyond the frontline, the book also emphasises the Indian mule corps, who navigated treacherous terrain under constant fire to deliver water and ammunition.

The first Chapter of the book “The Activation” unravels the decisions and strategies of the belligerents (mainly Britain and Turkey) in their efforts to capture and defend the peninsula, respectively. The chapter also discusses the origins of the various Indian Expeditionary Forces and their deployments in the various theatres of war. It finally covers the operations of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade’s troops in the peninsula.

The second chapter of the book “The Arrangements” provides a detailed analysis of the recruitment system, patterns, Incentives, and the state of the Indian Army (Infantry, Artillery, and the Imperial Service Troops) in 1914. It also briefly includes the oft-neglected component of the Burma Military Police, which was part of the Indian Brigade at Gallipoli. The third chapter of the book “The Affirmation” is dedicated to the participation and contributions of the Indian Troops in the various battles fought in the peninsula.

The penultimate chapter of the book “The Administration” discusses the personal arms and ammunition, food, water, medical supplies, and the pay and allowances of the Indian Troops at Gallipoli. The chapter also deals with the issues of reinforcements and reporting of casualties of the Indian forces. The last chapter of the book, “The Acknowledgement”, is dedicated to the memories of the soldiers who sacrificed their lives at Gallipoli. The chapter delves into the trials and tribulations of the Indian soldiers. Stories of three sikh soldiers who participated in the campaign are also painstakingly developed.

Hundal’s central aim is to acknowledge and honour the Indian troops whose contributions have been historically overlooked. The narrative draws attention to the courage, discipline, and heavy casualties suffered by formations like the Sikh infantry and support units. Hundal’s work also serves as a corrective to colonial-era histories that minimised the Indian role in favour of Western front perspectives. This makes the book not just historical but also commemorative, appealing to readers interested in hidden or marginalised war narratives.

Hundal’s writing is deeply researched, striking a balance between military strategy and human emotion. It is a vital read for anyone interested in how the Indian Army became a world-class fighting force. The book is most useful for military historians, defence professionals, students of World Wars, and readers interested in the overlooked role of Indian soldiers in global wars.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

May 13, 2026

814: RUSSIA’S RS-28 SARMAT ADDS A NEW CHAPTER IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNISATION

News. Russia successfully test-launched the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk region) on 12 May 26. The missile followed its planned profile and struck its designated target (at Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula) approximately thirty minutes after launch. Strategic Missile Forces commander Sergei Karakayev reported that all specified technical characteristics had been validated. Putin described the test as a “major event and unconditional success” and congratulated the defence ministry, scientists, engineers, and the thousands of workers whose collaborative effort brought the programme to this milestone.

Missile. The Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau produces the RS-28 Sarmat. It is a silo-launched, three-stage, liquid-fuelled super-heavy ICBM (35.3 metres in length and approximately 208 tonnes in launch weight). It is claimed to be the largest ballistic missile ever constructed. Its payload capacity is ten tonnes, and it can carry a variety of warheads (including multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and, reportedly, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Its operational flexibility significantly exceeds that of its predecessor.

Capability. Among the Sarmat’s most strategically significant attributes is its capacity to approach targets via non-standard flight trajectories. Unlike conventional ICBMs that follow northern polar arcs, the Sarmat is capable of fractional orbital bombardment, i.e. flying a depressed, sub-orbital trajectory over the South Pole to reach targets in North America. This gives it the ability to approach from directions that existing American missile defence interceptor networks, positioned primarily in Alaska and California and oriented toward northern approach corridors, are not designed to engage. Putin has noted that the missile can travel on both ballistic and suborbital trajectories, with a maximum range reportedly exceeding 35,000 kilometres.

Feature Enhancement. The missile has a shorter boost phase than its predecessor. This reduces the window for tracking by the space-based infrared sensors. It is a meaningful enhancement for the missile’s survivability. The Sarmat is also claimed to be more accurate than the Voyevoda. Putin has stated that the Sarmat’s destructive potential substantially exceeds that of any comparable Western system.

Strategic Implication. The successful launch carries significant strategic implications. The R-36M2 Voyevoda, a Soviet-era heavy ICBM, had been the backbone of Russia’s silo-based deterrent for decades. The Sarmat is intended to replace it, and it represents the most consequential upgrade to Russia’s nuclear triad in the post-Cold War period. Putin announced that Russia would deploy the first Sarmat-equipped regiment for combat duty before the end of 2026. It is claimed to be designed to penetrate both existing and prospective ballistic missile defences. This capability is important for Russia to maintain credible second-strike deterrence.

Race. The Sarmat is one of six next-generation strategic weapons that Putin unveiled in March 2018, presenting them as Russia’s response to the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the subsequent development of American missile defence infrastructure. From Moscow’s perspective, a credible and penetrating nuclear second-strike capability is the foundation of strategic stability. The assurance that no adversary can neutralise Russia’s deterrent through a disarming first strike and expect to intercept the surviving response. The Sarmat is engineered specifically to preserve that assurance against all foreseeable developments in missile defence technology.

Timing. The test comes at a time of considerable significance in the current global landscape. The New START treaty (the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms limitation agreement between Russia and the United States) expired in February 2026. Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, citing what it described as the fundamentally changed strategic environment resulting from Western military support for Ukraine. The absence of any active treaty framework means that both sides are now free to expand and modernise their arsenals without the notification and inspection. The Sarmat’s development and operational deployment will proceed in this unconstrained environment.

Domestic Significance. Domestically, the test carries political weight as well as military significance. It arrives days after Russia’s Victory Day commemorations. It demonstrates the continued vitality of Russia’s defence industrial and scientific base under sustained international sanctions and economic pressure. It affirms the country’s standing as a nuclear superpower capable of fielding world-leading weapons systems.

Global Interest. Internationally, the Sarmat’s deployment will be watched closely in capitals around the world (from Washington to Beijing and from New Delhi to Brussels). For NATO’s strategic planners, it represents a genuine generational upgrade to Russia’s land-based deterrent. It will force them to recalibrate their threat assessments and defence postures. For countries in the Global South, it is a reminder that the nuclear dimension of great-power competition remains very much alive and is, if anything, intensifying.

Concluding Thought. Russia’s strategic modernisation programme has always been driven by the conviction that a strong nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The Sarmat’s successful test and approaching operational debut confirm that this conviction remains the organising principle of Russian defence policy. It also proves that Russia retains both the industrial capacity and the scientific expertise to give it material form.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

May 6, 2026

810: PAKISTAN’S WAR OF ITS OWN MAKING: AFGHAN POLICY COMES FULL CIRCLE

In the early hours of February 27, 2026, explosions shook the Afghan capital Kabul. Pakistani jets streaked across the night sky, striking Taliban government defence facilities, ammunition depots, and military sites in Kabul, Kandahar, and the southeastern province of Paktia. Pakistan had done something almost unthinkable just a few years ago. It bombed the capital of a neighbouring country and declared that it was now in a state of “open war.” This was not an impulsive act but the result of years of deteriorating relations. The situation had been building since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021.

A Historical Overview of The Broken Brotherhood

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a relationship that defies easy description. The South Asian neighbours are both Muslim-majority states and share a 2,611-kilometer border. For decades, Pakistan was among the most important backers of the Afghan Taliban, supporting the movement ideologically, financially, and logistically through its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. When the Taliban swept back into Kabul in August 2021 following the withdrawal of American and NATO forces, Pakistan initially welcomed the development as a strategic gain. Pakistan thought a friendly government in Kabul might counter Indian influence and give Islamabad so-called “strategic depth.”

That calculation unravelled almost immediately. The Taliban government in Kabul was not interested in being a client state of Islamabad. Far from reining in anti-Pakistan militant groups operating from Afghan soil, the Taliban appeared unwilling to do so. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) started using Afghan territory as a base from which to launch increasingly devastating attacks on Pakistan. Pakistan’s frontier provinces bordering Afghanistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) bore the brunt. Suicide bombings, ambushes on security forces, and targeted assassinations increased. A particularly devastating attack struck a Shia Mosque in Islamabad, killing at least 40 people and claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), adding another militant dimension to Pakistan’s security nightmare.

At the same time, the Durand Line (the colonial-era boundary drawn by the British in 1893) remained a festering point of contention. Afghanistan has never formally recognised this border as legitimate, viewing it as an arbitrary demarcation that divides the Pashtun ethnic group between two states. The Taliban government maintained that position firmly, resisting Pakistan’s attempts to fence the border and frequently allowing its fighters to interfere with construction efforts. It is estimated that there had been at least 75 recorded clashes between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the Durand Line between 2021 and 2026, a frequency that made some form of major escalation almost inevitable.

The Military Balance

The difference in military strength between Pakistan and Afghanistan is stark. Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country, has a considerable military force with 660,000 active personnel (560,000 soldiers in the army, 70,000 in the air force, and 30,000 in the navy). Pakistan also boasts of 465 combat aircraft, over 260 helicopters, more than 6,000 armoured fighting vehicles, and over 4,600 artillery pieces.

The Afghan Taliban, by contrast, commands approximately 172,000 active military personnel. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, it inherited a substantial inventory of US-supplied military equipment left behind by the former Afghan National Army, including armoured vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. But without international recognition, without access to spare parts, and without functioning military training institutions, much of that equipment became unusable. Afghanistan has no functioning air force to speak of: at most six aircraft, some of Soviet vintage, and 23 helicopters, the airworthiness of an unknown number of which remained in doubt.

On paper, Pakistan could crush the Taliban’s conventional military capacity with relative ease. Yet history has shown repeatedly that wars in Afghanistan are not won on paper. It is called the “Graveyard of Empires” for a reason. The Taliban’s fighters are combat-hardened veterans of a 20-year insurgency against the most powerful military alliance in history. They know their terrain intimately. And Islamabad should know better than most that guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Khost and Kunar can render any conventional military advantage irrelevant.

Collapse of the October 2025 Ceasefire

The crisis did not erupt without prior warning. In October 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan had already fought a week of fierce and deadly clashes along their contested frontier. More than 70 people were killed on both sides in what at the time represented the worst bout of open fighting between the two neighbours in recent memory. The violence was enough to prompt international intervention. Qatar and Turkey brokered an emergency ceasefire in Doha, and for a few months, the shooting largely stopped.

But the ceasefire was always fragile. Sporadic violations continued, and none of the underlying causes had been addressed. Pakistan still wanted the Taliban to crack down on the TTP. The Taliban still refused to recognise the Durand Line. Militant attacks inside Pakistan continued. Border crossings, including the key Torkham and Chaman crossings, remained largely shut, causing severe economic strain on both sides and enormous suffering for Afghan refugees and returnees caught between two hostile states. Several rounds of negotiations followed the October ceasefire, reportedly involving Qatar and Turkey as mediators, but no lasting agreement emerged.

The February 2026 Skirmish

Pakistan launched airstrikes targeting what it described as militant camps belonging to the TTP and ISKP in Afghan provinces (Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost). Islamabad claimed that the strikes had killed at least 70 terrorists. The Taliban government and independent observers had a different story. The UN mission in Afghanistan reported that at least 13 civilians had been killed in those initial Pakistani strikes. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the attacks had “killed and wounded dozens, including women and children.” A provincial director of the Afghan Red Crescent Society said 18 people were killed and many more wounded in Nangarhar alone. These were not terrorists on a training ground, but residents of border villages.

Afghanistan issued a stern warning, which Pakistan dismissed. On the night of February 26, Afghan forces launched a large-scale offensive operation against Pakistan. They targeted Pakistani military installations along the Durand Line.

Pakistan responded by launching Operation Ghazab lil Haq (Righteous Fury) on 27 Feb 26. It involved combined air and ground strikes against Taliban posts, headquarters, and ammunition depots.

According to Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, the operation killed at least 133 Afghan Taliban fighters and wounded more than 200. Pakistan also claimed that 27 Taliban posts had been destroyed and nine captured, along with over 80 tanks, artillery pieces, and armoured personnel carriers. The Taliban gave a starkly different account: eight of its fighters killed and eleven wounded, and 55 Pakistani soldiers killed, with 19 posts seized. Neither set of figures could be independently verified by the time news organisations were reporting from the ground.

The conflict quickly introduced new dimensions of warfare. Afghanistan claimed its forces had “successfully conducted” drone strikes hitting military targets inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s Information Minister said the drone attempts had been intercepted by anti-drone systems in the cities of Abbottabad, Swabi, and Nowshera, with no damage to life.

The Torkham crossing remained one of the most dangerous and symbolically loaded flashpoints. It had been kept partially open for Afghans returning en masse from Pakistan. Now those returnees found themselves trapped between two armies.

Regional and Global Reactions

The international response to the outbreak of open war was swift and almost uniformly alarmed. The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was among the first to respond. He called for both parties to de-escalate immediately and continue to seek to resolve the differences through diplomacy.

India condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes. It described the strikes as “another attempt by Pakistan to externalise its internal failures”. It also affirmed India’s support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Pakistan’s Foreign Office rejected India’s comments and alleged that the Taliban had become a proxy for India.

Iran has borders with both countries and has long positioned itself as a bridge between them. It called on both governments to resolve their differences within the framework of good neighbourliness. Iran also offered mediation and readiness to assist in facilitating dialogue.

China maintains close ties with both Pakistan and the Taliban government in Kabul. It expressed deep concern and conveyed Beijing’s willingness to play a constructive role in cooling the situation. Russia called on both parties to immediately halt cross-border attacks and offered to mediate if requested by both sides. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held separate calls with his counterparts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to coordinate diplomatic pressure. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan spoke with Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar to discuss “ways to reduce tensions.”

Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, though holding no official position, issued a public statement. Pakistan cannot free itself from the self-created problems of violence and bombings. Still, it must change its own policy and choose the path of good neighbourliness, respect, and civilised relations with Afghanistan.

What Drives This War

The hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the product of an irreconcilable contradiction. Pakistan created, supported, and enabled the Taliban as a strategic instrument for more than two decades. It sheltered the Taliban’s senior leadership during the years of US occupation. It allowed recruitment and fundraising on Pakistani soil. It lobbied internationally for international recognition of Taliban governance. Pakistan expected gratitude and compliance from the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.

What it got instead was a sovereign government that pursued its own interests. It refused to recognise the Durand Line, declined to crack down on the TTP, and increasingly viewed Islamabad as a threat rather than a patron. The Pakistani analyst Mariam Solaimankhil, a member of Afghanistan’s Parliament in Exile, framed it bluntly in a television interview during the crisis: “Pakistan is fighting the monster it helped create.” She argued that the TTP’s roots, the Afghan Taliban’s ideology, and the networks of militant groups were all products of Pakistani state policy over decades, and that the civilians now dying in Pashtun villages on both sides of the border, in Balochistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, were paying the price for choices made in Rawalpindi’s military headquarters.

Where It Might Lead

Where the conflict goes from here remains deeply uncertain. The military balance favours Pakistan overwhelmingly in conventional terms, but history suggests that Afghanistan defeats its invaders not by winning battles but by outlasting occupiers. Pakistan has no stated intention of occupying Afghanistan. Still, each round of airstrikes radicalises new fighters, destroys what little infrastructure the Taliban government has, and strengthens the hand of hardliners on both sides.

The international community (China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the UN) has called for de-escalation, but none of these actors has the leverage or the will to impose a solution. The United States, which spent 20 years and trillions of dollars trying to stabilise Afghanistan and failed, is unlikely to re-engage substantively. Qatar and Turkey, who brokered the October 2025 ceasefire that lasted barely four months, again tried to mediate, but without addressing the root causes. In this scenario, any ceasefire will be temporary.

The Durand Line was drawn by a British diplomat in 1893 to serve imperial interests. More than 130 years later, it remains a wound that neither side can agree to close. Until it is resolved, the cycle of violence that has defined this relationship will continue to grind on—one airstrike, one ceasefire, and one broken promise at a time.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:

Ahmed, R. (2000). “Taliban: Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia”. Yale University Press.

Bijan Omrani, B. (2009). “The Durand Line: History and problems of the Afghan-Pakistan border”. Asian Affairs, 40(2), 177–195.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2021–2026). “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and regional militancy reports”. https://www.csis.org

Chatham House. (2021–2026). “Afghanistan post-2021 political and security analysis”. https://www.chathamhouse.org

Council on Foreign Relations. (2021–2026). “Backgrounders on Afghanistan, Taliban, and regional geopolitics”. https://www.cfr.org

International Crisis Group. (2021–2026). “Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions and militancy reports”. https://www.crisisgroup.org

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025). “The military balance 2025”. Routledge.

Reuters. (2025–2026). “Coverage of Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict and regional tensions”. https://www.reuters.com

Rubin, B. R. (2002). “The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system” (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.