834: INTEGRATING AIR OPERATIONS FOR CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Article published in the inaugural issue of

ADITI NATIONAL STRATEGY MAGAZINE

Credible conventional deterrence is not a function of numerical superiority alone. It is the demonstrated capacity to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary. The cost is imposed at short notice, with sufficient speed, precision, and integration across all domains, with a message that aggression will not be rewarded but punished. In this sense, deterrence is as much a matter of perception as of capability. The adversary must believe that the costs of military action will outweigh any conceivable gain. That belief must rest on something more substantial than a declaratory posture. It must rest on observable, tested, and credible military power.

For India, the architecture of conventional deterrence has been evolving gradually. At its heart is the transformation in how the three services fight, plan, and operate together. Jointness, once an aspirational buzzword, is now the necessary operative principle behind India’s warfighting doctrine. The nation’s security establishment has recognised that the conventional deterrent value of its armed forces is only as strong as the degree to which those forces can act in concert, with speed, precision, and lethality, across all domains simultaneously.

A Collusive Threat Environment. Understanding why joint operations matter to conventional deterrence requires first understanding the threat environment in which India operates. India faces a collusive threat and the possibility of concurrent or coordinated military pressure from both China and Pakistan. This is not merely a theoretical construct. The deepening military-to-military ties between Beijing and Islamabad, evidenced by technology transfer, co-developed weapons systems, and coordinated diplomatic positions, mean that India cannot plan its conventional responses in a sequential or siloed manner. It must be prepared to fight on multiple fronts and in multiple domains simultaneously.

Doctrine of Punitive Deterrence. Pakistan’s long-standing strategy has been of sponsoring cross-border terrorism while sheltering behind its nuclear umbrella (bleed India through a thousand cuts). It has compelled India to rethink and change its conventional response. For decades, India’s posture was one of strategic restraint (absorbing provocations diplomatically and avoiding military action). That calculus has fundamentally changed as India has shifted toward a doctrine of punitive deterrence. Air strikes on terror camps have been carried out (Balakot in 2019 and Op Sindoor in 2025) as an instrument of punitive action.

Airpower Contribution to Conventional Deterrence. Deterrence refers to the ability to prevent an adversary from undertaking hostile action. It is achieved by convincing the enemy that the costs of aggression will outweigh any potential gains. Air power is an important part of military deterrence. It provides rapid military response options and creates strategic uncertainty for adversaries. The ability to strike with speed, precision, and unpredictability produces disproportionate strategic effects relative to the scale of force employed.

Misunderstood Roles. The Indian Air Force has repeatedly demonstrated that it can conduct joint operations while independently shaping strategic outcomes. Yet scepticism persists among some observers. Some view air power as an auxiliary arm supporting surface operations. This perspective is flawed as it ignores the inherent flexibility and reach of air power. Viewing air power through the narrow lens of close air support ignores its role in shaping the entire battlefield before the surface engagement begins. To relegate the IAF to a support arm is to ignore the vertical dimension that prevents conflict from degenerating into attritional, terrain-bound warfare.

Air Superiority as an Enabler of Joint Operations. No element of joint warfighting is more foundational to conventional deterrence than air superiority. Control of the air domain enables all other joint force activities: it shields ground and maritime forces from enemy air attack, provides real-time intelligence that improves situational awareness across the force, and enables deep strike against adversary command nodes, logistics centres, and critical infrastructure. Conversely, the absence of air superiority exposes every other component of the joint force to attrition and denial. The objective is not to achieve a permanent air superiority across an entire area of operations. A window to enable uninterrupted operations would suffice.

SEAD/DEAD as the Gateway. The Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences mission is neither a secondary nor a preliminary task. It is the gateway through which the joint force enters the contested battlespace. An adversary’s integrated air defence network is its primary tool for denying the air superiority required for joint operations. The systematic suppression and destruction of that network (radars, fire-control systems, surface-to-air missile batteries, and command nodes) is therefore among the most operationally significant tasks the IAF performs and among the most strategically visible. An adversary that knows its air defence architecture can be comprehensively degraded in the opening hours of a conflict must factor that vulnerability into its pre-conflict calculations. That factoring is deterrence.

Demonstrated Capability and the IAF’s Evolution. The IAF has transformed from a tactical air force to a broad-spectrum aerospace power. The induction of airborne early warning and control systems gave the IAF the ability to manage the air battle across a vast area in real time. Aerial refuelling tankers extended strike ranges to operational depths. These capabilities fundamentally altered the adversary’s assessment of which assets were at risk. Stand-off precision capability enabled the IAF to engage hardened targets deep inside adversary territory without entering the engagement envelopes of the most capable surface-to-air missile systems.

Jointness as a Force Multiplier. While air power possesses independent strategic utility, its effectiveness increases when integrated into a joint operational framework. For India, the importance of this integration is amplified by the need for two-front planning. No single service has sufficient capacity to address the full scope of requirements on both fronts simultaneously. Joint planning that optimises the employment of air power across combat zones, that allocates strike, surveillance, airlift, and air defence assets according to operational priority rather than service entitlement, and that fuses the intelligence from all domains into a single coherent picture for commanders at every level, is the only organisational response adequate to the problem India faces.

The Maritime Dimension. Conventional deterrence is not a purely continental affair for India. The Indian Ocean Region is India’s strategic backyard and the artery of its economic prosperity. More than 80 per cent of India’s energy imports transit these waters. Any adversarial interdiction of these sea lanes, or a hostile maritime presence in the IOR, represents a direct threat to national interest. The Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept being employed by the maritime forces aligns with India’s broader strategy to control key chokepoints and sustain an uninterrupted supply chain in the IOR. Airpower (integral with IN and AF), operating within a networked joint framework, makes the maritime deterrent credible against both state and grey-zone threats.

The Emerging Domain Space and Intelligence. The exploitation of space has become indispensable to joint conventional operations. Space assets provide the persistent surveillance, early warning, precision navigation, and communications infrastructure upon which joint warfighting depends. The key challenge that India’s joint space and intelligence architecture must address is fusing multi-source intelligence into a single, coherent operational picture that field commanders can act upon with confidence. Space-based surveillance, airborne radar, electronic intelligence, and human intelligence currently flow through separate chains before being reconciled at higher levels of command. An intelligence fusion center, is required to create a Common Operational Picture.

Building a Credible Joint Deterrence Architecture. An adversary assessing India’s military balance would also evaluate mobilisation speed, reinforcement capacity, and sustainment resilience as carefully as it evaluates weapon and platform inventories. Several priorities emerge for India in translating these principles into a credible conventional deterrent.

- Strengthening joint planning at the operational and strategic levels must be institutionalised. The Joint Operations Control Centre, bringing all three services together into a single, real-time command-and-control node, is a critical step in this direction.

- Military reorganisation should prioritise meeting future challenges. A command-level joint structure for the space and cyber domains is a high priority. The existing joint Command (Andaman and Nicobar Command) on the eastern seaboard needs to be strengthened, and a similar structure needs to be established on the western seaboard.

- The theatre command concept is one means of achieving jointness, not an ultimate panacea. Its relevance is greater for expeditionary operations conducted with adequate resources, far from the homeland. The challenge is to formulate a model suitable for domestic needs.

- Expanding indigenous capability in critical systems enhances strategic resilience. It reduces dependence on foreign supply chains.

- Developing a multi-domain doctrine that genuinely integrates air, land, maritime, cyber, and space operations would enhance the deterrence value.

- Aerospace Doctrine’s assertion (that “space exploitation is integral to achieving national security objectives”) needs to be translated into institutional practice.

Concluding Thoughts

The character of warfare is changing rapidly. In contemporary warfare, the actions in space affect outcomes on the ground, electronic warfare shapes the effectiveness of kinetic strikes, and information operations condition the political environment. In such a scenario, no single service can act alone. The interconnectedness of the modern battlespace demands a high level of integration and coordination. The necessity of integrated multi-domain operations will increase as the security environment grows more complex.

India faces a two-front threat environment, has vast maritime responsibilities, and growing strategic obligations across the Indo-Pacific.

Joint air operations are the cornerstone for achieving credible conventional deterrence. The integration of aerospace power with land, maritime, cyber, and space capabilities is the work on which India’s deterrent credibility ultimately rests. All-around integration is required across planning, doctrine, and command architecture. An institutional culture needs to be shaped so that officers from all three services understand one another’s roles. India’s journey toward a credible conventional deterrent is inseparable from the journey toward jointness. The future of deterrence will depend on how effectively India integrates all domains into a coherent, credible, and lethal strategic instrument.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

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July 25, 2026

831: INDIA’S EYES IN THE STRATOSPHERE The High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite Programme

The Defence Acquisition Council’s approval of a ₹52,000 crore package in July 2026, which includes Acceptance of Necessity for Fixed-Wing High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite platforms for the Indian Air Force, closes in on a surveillance gap that has troubled Indian planners for the better part of a decade. The gap sits between what a satellite can offer and what a drone can sustain, and it is this middle band that the FW-HAPS programme is designed to occupy.

HAPS

High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellites are unmanned, fixed-wing aircraft built to operate in the stratosphere, typically between 18 and 20 kilometres. It is roughly double the cruising altitude of a commercial airliner, and comfortably above both civil air traffic and the weather systems that constrain conventional aviation. They are not satellites in any orbital sense. Rather than circling the earth every ninety minutes as a low-earth-orbit satellite does, a HAPS holds station over a single point on the ground, watching it continuously; the term “pseudo-satellite” describes function, not physics.

That persistence is the entire argument for the platform. A satellite crosses a given stretch of border only a handful of times a day, and an adversary choosing when to move will choose the interval between passes. A conventional drone can loiter for a day or two before it needs fuel and a fresh crew. A HAPS can remain on station for weeks or months, low enough to return sharper imagery and a stronger signal than any satellite. It returns to Earth at the end of a mission rather than being abandoned in orbit or lost to re-entry. It also means its sensor payload can be swapped between sorties, something no satellite operator has ever had the luxury of doing.

These platforms can be classified under two broad configurations. Lighter-than-air platforms such as balloons and airships, and heavier-than-air fixed-wing designs of the kind India is pursuing. Fixed-wing solar variants have gained ground globally because they hold station more reliably against variable stratospheric winds.

Necessity

India’s land borders run to more than 15,000 kilometres across neighbours as varied as China, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, much of it through terrain that makes continuous observation difficult by any conventional means. The terrain at these borders includes the high Himalaya, the Rajasthan desert, the forests of the northeast, and the valleys of Jammu and Kashmir. Ground patrols cover limited sectors, satellites revisit a location on a fixed schedule, Manned aircraft are too costly to sustain over long periods, and Drones need to land back for refuelling. HAPS close this gap.

Operational Roles

Continuous border surveillance is the most direct military application of HAPS. It can hold station over a sensitive sector for months at a stretch. This allows commanders to read patterns of activity rather than isolated sightings. During periods of heightened tension, it can give early warning of troop concentrations or unusual logistic movement.

As an ISR platform, HAPS carry sensor payloads tailored to the mission — infrared for continuous day-night coverage, radar to see through cloud cover and poor weather — and because they operate far closer to the ground than an orbital platform, the imagery they return is correspondingly sharper without sacrificing persistence. This combination is what makes the platform useful across roles that would otherwise need separate assets: border security, maritime surveillance and counter-terrorism support.

The communications-relay role matters as much for the Indian context as the ISR role does. A HAPS at 20 kilometres functions as an airborne tower capable of relaying voice, video and encrypted data across terrain where ground infrastructure struggles — the Himalayan ranges block radio signals and expose ground stations to extreme weather, and a platform stationed above the region sidesteps both problems, linking forward units, command centres and other surveillance assets into a single network. That role grows more important as network-centric warfare depends on intelligence gathered by one platform reaching every authorised user without delay.

Disaster response is the fourth military-relevant role, and one with obvious civilian overlap. India’s exposure to floods, cyclones, earthquakes and forest fires regularly knocks out communication networks precisely when they are needed most; a HAPS already on station, or one repositioned quickly, can re-establish emergency connectivity and secure links for rescue teams while relaying real-time imagery to emergency management agencies.

Beyond defence, the same platform lends itself to rural broadband, precision agriculture, environmental and fisheries monitoring, and infrastructure inspection. These applications will also matter for how the programme is funded and sustained, even though defence is what is driving its development.

The Global Approach

India is entering a field where other nations have a head start. The United Kingdom (Airbus) has flown the Zephyr. This solar-powered stratospheric aircraft has demonstrated multi-week endurance carrying surveillance and communications payloads. The United States has pursued several HAPS concepts across its defence agencies and private industry, oriented toward intelligence collection, missile warning and battlefield networking. China has invested heavily in solar-powered high-altitude platforms as part of a wider aerospace modernisation effort, a natural extension of its own extensive border and maritime surveillance requirements. Japan and South Korea are pursuing stratospheric aircraft chiefly for communications, disaster response and environmental monitoring. Against this field, India’s programme is a late but not a laggard entry, provided the timeline holds.

India’s Programme

CSIR-NAL in Bengaluru has led India’s indigenous HAPS development, with the explicit aim of building a sovereign capability rather than depending on foreign satellites or foreign drone technology for a mission this sensitive. A subscale demonstrator with a twelve-metre wingspan and a twenty-two-kilogram takeoff weight has flown multiple sorties at DRDO’s Aeronautical Test Range in Challakere, Karnataka, accumulating dozens of flight hours and, in one test, more than eight hours of endurance at altitudes up to 25,000 feet. These trials validated the core technologies the full-scale aircraft will depend on (solar integration, battery management, flight control and propulsion). The full-scale platform would operate at 20 to 23 kilometres with endurance measured in weeks to months. The stratospheric flight is slated for around 2027. The DAC’s approval, for a ₹52,000 crore package cleared in July 2026, greenlights both continued development and procurement of operational platforms for the Indian Air Force.

Concluding Thoughts

The Fixed-Wing High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite programme represents more than the acquisition of another surveillance platform. It reflects a broader shift in India’s approach to persistent intelligence, resilience and strategic autonomy. In an era where information superiority often determines operational success, the ability to maintain an unbroken watch over sensitive borders and maritime approaches is becoming as valuable as traditional firepower. HAPS occupy the critical space between satellites and conventional aircraft, providing persistence without the prohibitive costs of continuous manned operations or the limitations of orbital revisit cycles. Their dual-use potential further strengthens the investment case, extending benefits beyond defence into disaster management, communications, environmental monitoring and digital connectivity. Yet the programme’s ultimate success will depend not merely on proving that the aircraft can remain aloft for months, but on integrating them seamlessly into India’s wider intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and command-and-control architecture. Indigenous development through CSIR-NAL and DRDO also offers an opportunity to nurture a domestic ecosystem in advanced materials, solar technologies, batteries and autonomous flight systems, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers in a strategically sensitive domain. If the planned timelines are achieved and operational capability follows as envisaged, India’s HAPS programme could emerge not simply as a new airborne asset, but as a defining component of the nation’s future aerospace and security architecture.

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References: –

Bisht, I. S. (2026, July 13). India approves high-altitude pseudo satellite to fill surveillance gap. The Defence Post.

https://thedefensepost.com/2026/07/13/high-altitude-pseudo-satellite/

Council of Scientific and Industrial Research – National Aerospace Laboratories. (n.d.). HAPS (High Altitude Pseudo Satellite).

https://www.nal.res.in/en/directors

Ministry of Defence. (2026, July 3). *DAC approves capital acquisition proposals worth Rs 52,000 crore*. Press Information Bureau.

https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2280728

TOI News Desk. (2026, July 4). Flying above weather, watching for weeks: How HAPS will strengthen India’s armed forces. The Times of India.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/flying-above-weather-watching-for-weeks-how-haps-will-strengthen-indias-armed-forces/articleshow/132178332.cms

Venkatakrishnan, L. (n.d.). *The CSIR-NAL high altitude platform (HAP)*. Journal of Aerospace Sciences and Technologies. https://www.joast.org/public/journals/1/docs/CSIR_NAL_High_Altitude_Platform_(HAP).pdf

AALTO HAPS. (2025, May 1). Zephyr sets world-record for longest continuous flight, flying 67 days in stratosphere. https://www.aaltohaps.com/zephyr-sets-world-record-for-longest-continuous-flight-flying-67-days-in-stratosphere/

July 20, 2026

830: AI-ENABLED COLLABORATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT RESHAPING THE AIR POWER

On July 10 this year, over restricted airspace at Edwards Air Force Base in California, an uncrewed aircraft crossed an important threshold in military aviation. An Anduril Industries YFQ-44A fired a live AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile at a simulated target after receiving only the command to strike from a human operator. The aircraft itself handled the engagement geometry, target tracking and weapon release, becoming the first American autonomous combat wingman to complete a live air-to-air weapons engagement. The test, supported by the Air Dominance Combined Test Force from Edwards’ 412th Test Wing, marked far more than a successful missile launch.

The event’s demonstration was significant. The autonomy software managed the entire sensor-to-shooter chain. The aircraft managed the mechanics of the engagement while the human retained the firing authority. It was a clear demonstration of how future air combat is likely to be fought. Allowing pilots to command formations of autonomous teammates rather than fly every engagement themselves.

Collaborative Combat Aircraft

An AI-enabled collaborative combat aircraft, also known as an ‘Uncrewed collaborative combat aircraft’ (UCCA) or ‘loyal wingman’, is an autonomous, armed aerial platform designed to operate alongside fighter jets. It can fly in formation, engage threats, and respond to changing battlefield conditions without requiring a ground operator to manage its every move. The main idea behind the CCA is to increase ‘combat mass’ during operations and extend the reach of crewed aircraft.

This is where the concept of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) comes in. In essence, crewed combat aircraft act as the command centre, while the CCA is the operator’s ‘extended arm’. The pilot provides high-level mission objectives, which the CCA then executes at the desired level of autonomy. They can take on specialised roles: for instance, one CCA might engage an enemy target while others jam enemy radar or scan the battlefield and relay real-time data back to the pilot.

The CCAs can even coordinate among themselves, dynamically dividing responsibilities for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, decoy operations, and strike operations. Authority over the use of lethal force remains with the human operator, who is assisted by AI-based decision-support software.

The concept also changes how missions are executed. AI fuses all the sensor inputs (radar returns, infrared imagery, electronic support measures and off-board sensor feeds) into a single tactical picture. Machine-learning algorithms continuously improve target recognition.

All of this is made possible by a sophisticated mission system. These systems allow humans and machines to work together seamlessly as a team. The CCA takes on the cognitive burden of processing data and carrying out routine manoeuvres, allowing the human pilot to focus on high-level tactical decisions.

CCA Necessity

In modern warfare, the side that can process information and act fastest has the advantage. In addition, it’s not just about the first 24 hours of a conflict; it’s also about endurance. The attraction of Collaborative Combat Aircraft is as much economic as technological.

Modern fifth-generation fighters are extraordinarily capable but also extraordinarily expensive to procure, sustain and replace. Every aircraft lost represents not only a financial cost but also years of pilot training. CCAs are designed to generate what air forces increasingly describe as affordable combat mass: multiplying combat power by pairing each crewed fighter with several autonomous aircraft that can undertake high-risk tasks without putting pilots in harm’s way.

This development changes the way air superiority is achieved, especially against a peer competitor. Commanders can distribute tasks, sensors, payloads, and weapons across a larger network of autonomous platforms.

They do not have to rely solely on a relatively small number of exquisite aircraft.

Global Programs

The United States Move from Experiment to Capability Development. The United States has progressed further than any other country in translating this concept into operational capability. The Air Force’s Increment 1 programme selected two aircraft for production: Anduril’s YFQ-44A and General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Dark Merlin. Together, they will form the service’s first operational fleet of Collaborative Combat Aircraft. The pace of their development has been remarkable. Within less than a year, the YFQ-44A progressed from its maiden flight (in October 2025) to a successful live air-to-air missile engagement. The industrial ecosystem is also expanding rapidly. Northrop Grumman, Kratos and General Atomics’ modular Gambit family are all developing related concepts. At the same time, the Air Force has indicated that future increments could follow a collaborative approach with allied participation. The objective would no longer be to build a better aircraft but to field interoperable autonomous combat fleets capable of operating alongside allied air forces.

British Program. Britain’s Royal Air Force has launched the £300 million Storm Fighter programme to develop autonomous aircraft capable of operating alongside the Typhoon, F-35, and, eventually, the Tempest sixth-generation fighter.

Australian Program. Australia’s Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat, developed under the Airpower Teaming System, predates the American CCA designation and has accumulated significantly more flight experience than either of the US Increment 1 designs.

Although these programmes differ in design philosophy and industrial approach, they reflect a striking convergence. Independent air forces have reached the same operational conclusion: future air superiority will depend less on ever more expensive crewed fighters operating alone and more on tightly integrated formations of humans and autonomous systems.

Chinese Program. China has pursued a more opaque but equally ambitious path towards AI-enabled collaborative combat aircraft. Rather than treating loyal wingmen as standalone projects, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) appears to be developing them as integral components of a networked combat ecosystem centred on the J-20 stealth fighter and future sixth-generation aircraft. State-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) has unveiled several candidate platforms, including the FH-97A, widely regarded as China’s analogue to the US Collaborative Combat Aircraft, as well as concepts such as the Dark Sword and other high-speed unmanned combat air vehicles. Chinese military publications suggest these systems are intended to undertake high-risk missions including forward reconnaissance, electronic attack, suppression of enemy air defences, decoy operations and air-to-air combat, while remaining under human command for the employment of lethal force.

The Indian Approach

On the indigenous side, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) envisions a Tejas or future AMCA acting as a “mothership”, controlling multiple Warrior and Hunter drones capable of conducting reconnaissance, suppressing enemy air defences, defending the crewed fighter and striking high-value targets. HAL’s Unmanned Kiran programme offers a complementary, lower-cost route by converting existing Kiran Mk-II trainers into optionally manned aircraft capable of both piloted and autonomous operation.

The longer-term vision extends into the AMCA programme itself. Rather than retrofitting autonomy onto an existing platform, the AMCA is expected to incorporate manned-unmanned teaming from the outset, potentially supported by a future Combat Cloud architecture that links fighters, satellites, AWACS, and autonomous aircraft into a single combat network.

The Bottom Line

Collaborative Combat Aircraft represent the most significant conceptual shift in the application of airpower since the advent of stealth. CCAs would not replace the pilots but redefine their role. Future aviators will increasingly command formations of autonomous formations.

The air force that masters networked integration will enjoy advantages in decision speed, survivability, and operational endurance. The future of air power will belong not to the aircraft with the best individual performance, but to the force that can most effectively combine humans, machines and networks into a single fighting system.

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References: –

U.S. Air Force News, “Air Dominance Combined Test Force conducts first autonomous CCA live missile firing at Edwards AFB”, 2025. https://www.af.mil/, https://www.edwards.af.mil/

Anduril Industries. “YFQ-44A Autonomous Collaborative Combat Aircraft”, 2025. https://www.anduril.com/

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. YFQ-42A Collaborative Combat Aircraft. (2025). https://www.ga-asi.com/

Future Combat Air System (FCAS), Tempest Programme, https://www.raf.mod.uk/

Boeing Defence Australia. MQ-28 Ghost Bat (Airpower Teaming System). https://www.boeing.com/defense/

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) https://hal-india.co.in/

Scharre, P. Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. W. W. Norton. (2018).

RAND Corporation. Studies on Autonomous Air Combat, Human-Machine Teaming, https://www.rand.org/

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Airpower and AI Future Combat Aircraft, https://www.csis.org/

Endsley, M. R. (2017). From Here to Autonomy: Lessons Learned From Human–Automation Research. Human Factors.