826: NETRA GETS ITS WINGS

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On 25 June 2026, the Defence Research and Development Organisation formally conveyed Final Operational Clearance for the Netra Airborne Early Warning and Control system to the Indian Air Force at the Centre for Airborne Systems in Bengaluru. The occasion was noted in official circles with measured satisfaction. It deserved rather more. Nine years elapsed between Initial Operational Clearance in 2017 and this milestone.

India has operated the Netra on Embraer ERJ-145 platforms for several years. The aircraft flew in support of operations following the 2019 Balakot strikes and has participated in operational exercises that tested its ability to sustain surveillance in contested electromagnetic environments.

FOC represents the stage at which a developmental platform relinquishes its limitations and transforms into a fully operational instrument of air power. It signifies unrestricted deployment and comprehensive integration within the Indian Air Force (IAF) operational frameworks.

The Netra, developed indigenously, allows India to control the radar parameters, mission software, ESM configurations, and data link protocols. In an era when adversary electronic warfare suites are specifically engineered to exploit known platform signatures and communication patterns, this freedom of customisation is not a convenience; it is a strategic necessity and an asset.

 

Capabilities

The Netra’s Active Electronically Scanned Array radar, mounted in a dorsal fairing on the ERJ-145, reportedly provides 240-degree surveillance coverage with detection ranges ranging from 250 to 375 kilometres, depending on the target’s radar cross-section. Operating at altitude, it overcomes the fundamental limitation of ground-based radar (the curvature of the earth and the masking effects of terrain). A cruise missile flying at 30 metres above the surface of the earth will be invisible to a ground radar station 150 kilometres away. It won’t be invisible to Netra.

This capability matters enormously in the threat environment India now faces. The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated that cruise missiles and drone swarms are no longer the preserve of great powers. Pakistan has invested substantially in loitering munitions and cruise missile capabilities. China’s inventory of precision standoff weapons is extensive and growing. India’s adversaries have, in effect, made low-observable, low-altitude attack the standard opening move of any escalatory exchange.

Netra’s signal processing architecture is designed to address this. Advanced moving-target indication algorithms filter out ground clutter and extract the signatures of slow-moving, low-radar-cross-section targets (armed UAVs and loitering munitions) from the background noise that defeats simpler systems. This is not a straightforward technical problem. Ground clutter at low altitude is dense and variable. The ability to distinguish a drone flying at 200 metres from weather returns, terrain features, and electronic noise is what separates a capable AEW system from an expensive radar platform.

The Force Multiplication Calculus

An airborne early warning platform does not shoot anything down. Its value lies in compressing decision cycles across the joint force. Netra fuses data from its primary radar, secondary surveillance radar, and ESM suite. She transmits a real-time tactical picture via secure data links to IAF fighters, surface-to-air missile batteries, and the Integrated Air Command and Control System. A pilot, upon receiving that picture, knows where the threat is, what it is, and which other friendly assets are addressing it before the threat enters his own sensor range. An Akash battery operator is cued to an incoming cruise missile while it is still 40 kilometres away, rather than learning of it from the engagement radar at 10km.

This compression of the sensor-to-shooter timeline is the operative measure of Netra’s contribution. In a high-tempo, multi-axis conflict, the difference between a twelve-minute warning and a four-minute warning is the difference between a coordinated intercept and a reactive scramble. FOC gives the IAF assurance that Netra will perform this function at full capacity, without degradation due to developmental limitations, during sustained combat operations.

The Expansion Imperative

India currently operates three Netra aircraft. Against a two-front operational requirement spanning the northern and western theatres simultaneously, three platforms represent a starting point, not a final solution. Sustained AEW coverage over two active fronts demands continuous on-station presence, which in turn demands rotation cycles and adequate reserve. Three aircraft cannot credibly provide this. The FOC must therefore be viewed as the formal beginning of a programme of scale.

Achieving FOC for the Mk-1 accelerates the case for funding and fielding these variants. It demonstrates to the defence acquisition apparatus that DRDO can deliver a complex, software-intensive, operationally demanding platform to the IAF’s qualitative requirements. The developmental pathway is defined. The Netra Mk-1A incorporates enhanced processing for low-observable target detection. The Mk-2, proposed on the Airbus A321 platform, would carry a larger radar array with 300 to 360-degree coverage, substantially increasing both the surveillance footprint and the battle management capacity of each airborne asset.

 

The Indigenisation Dividend

India’s defence self-reliance agenda has produced a mixed record. In some domains, the trajectory has been positive even when timelines have slipped. In others, dependence on imported platforms has persisted despite stated policy intent. Netra’s FOC represents a genuine indigenisation success in one of the most technically demanding categories of military aviation. These include integration of complex sensor fusion, real-time data processing, and secure communications in an airborne environment. The significance extends beyond the platform itself. The Centre for Airborne Systems has, over two decades, built the engineering and systems integration competence required to deliver and sustain an AEW capability.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The FOC for Netra is strategically significant for three reasons. First, it removes the last formal constraints on the full operational deployment of an indigenous airborne early warning platform. Second, it positions India to accelerate the Mk-1A and Mk-2 variants at a moment when the regional threat environment makes expanded AEW capacity an operational necessity rather than a procurement aspiration. Third, it validates the DRDO-industry pathway for delivering advanced airborne systems and strengthens the argument for funding the next generation of indigenous surveillance and battle management platforms.

Modern air power is, at its core, an information contest. The side that sees first, identifies first, and coordinates first holds the initiative. Netra, fully cleared and operationally deployed, moves India measurably closer to holding that initiative over the contested airspace that will define any future conflict with regional adversaries.

 

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823: Wings of Dominance: The Future of Air Warfare

 

Q1.  What is the new balance of air power in the world today? Are fighter jets still the focus of warfare, or are drones beginning to take their place?

Fighter jets remain the backbone of air power, and that is not about to change. What has changed fundamentally is the ecosystem around them. A modern fighter operates in a networked environment comprising long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, and space-based ISR.

Drones are taking over the missions that are too risky, too repetitive, or too economically unjustifiable to warrant a manned sortie. They are not replacing the manned aircraft.

The prevailing trend favours a combination of manned and unmanned systems. Manned aircraft are focusing on contested, high-end missions that require judgment, adaptability, and versatile payloads. Concurrently, unmanned systems are being employed in persistent, attritable, and mass-effect roles.

The adaptation to this hybrid model is no longer merely a tactical requirement; it has become a strategic necessity.

 

Q2.  Russia’s Su-57 and the US F-35 embody different philosophies — one emphasises air combat, the other network-centric warfare. Whose future will it be?

The Su-57 seems to reflect the traditional Russian emphasis on kinematic performance and super-manoeuvrability.

The F-35 is claimed to be built around sensor fusion and battlespace awareness. It is advertised as capable of detecting, classifying, and engaging the threat at beyond-visual-range distances through a data architecture spanning an entire networked force.

Future aerial combat is progressing towards a network-centric model. Contemporary air engagements are increasingly determined by the priority of achieving information and decision dominance, rather than by performance alone.

Compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline is now as critical as speed or manoeuvrability. This is fundamentally a problem of decision architecture, not merely of technology.

The sixth-generation programmes are pushing emerging platforms toward multi-domain integration.  Fusion of air, space, cyber, and electronic warfare into a single operational architecture will make the network-centric model more definitive.

 

Q3.  China already has the J-20. Has India delayed the AMCA too long, or is it still possible to turn the situation around?

It is a fact that India’s timeline has slipped. The J-20 has been operational for nearly a decade. China is already iterating toward a sixth-generation capability, as evidenced by the prototypes that emerged publicly in late 2024.

AMCA is still working through prototype development. The gap is significant and widening. Reversal of the trend is a realistic necessity.

India can recover lost ground in fighter development if the programme is properly resourced, executed and politically backed.

A significant structural shift is also underway with the Ministry of Defence opening AMCA prototype development to private consortia rather than relying exclusively on the public-sector model.

The window to close the capability gap exists. It will not remain open indefinitely, and the margin for complacency on programme management is close to zero.

 

Q4.  In the wars to come, will Artificial Intelligence and Loyal Wingman drones be more important than pilots?

The pilot does not become less important. His job changes, and in some respects becomes more demanding, not less.

Manned-unmanned combat air teams would have one crewed aircraft effectively commanding a tactical formation of attritable unmanned assets, absorbing risk that would otherwise fall on the manned platform, carrying missiles, jammers, decoys, or forward reconnaissance payloads.

What AI is changing is the speed and volume of decision-making below the human threshold.

AI-enabled satellites and sensors, capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets, can push that picture directly to the shooter over tactical data links, rather than routing it back through a ground station first. That is what compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. However, human intervention cannot be removed from the kill chain.

As of now, the human crew retains authority over decisions that carry lethal and political consequences, while AI absorbs the burden of processing, prioritising, and routing information faster than any human can.

So, AI and unmanned teaming will unquestionably become more important than they are today. But the human crew would remain relevant and in control.

The pilot of 2040 will be managing a far more complex battle picture, commanding a digital wolfpack rather than flying a single aircraft.

 

Q5.  If India has the opportunity to purchase the F-35 or the Su-57, should we go ahead and purchase them, or stick to developing our own aircraft?

These are not competing choices, and treating them as such leads to a false dilemma.

The IAF’s squadron strength shortfall is real, immediate, and strategically significant. The Rafale has helped close that numerical gap, but has not closed it.

Further, there is a case for qualitative enhancement by the induction of fifth-generation aircraft.

The F-35 carries substantial geopolitical weight, end-use restrictions, and software dependency. Cost, delivery timelines, extended supply chains, Transfer of technology and trust deficit are other factors to be taken into account.

Russia has been a trusted partner, willing to share its technology to a certain extent and accepting Make in India. The Su-57 also raises several concerns besides the factors listed above. India had earlier walked out of the co-development program mainly due to concerns related to cost and technology sharing.

Neither platform offers a clean, dependency-free solution. The importance of self-reliance in defence production is a common lesson emerging from recent wars. The Indigenous program (AMCA) is some time away and urgently needs a technology infusion.

The logical answer is to plug the gap pragmatically by expanding the Rafale order and carefully reassessing the induction of fifth-generation aircraft, while protecting AMCA’s funding and schedule as a non-negotiable national priority.

The near-term interim acquisition and the long-term indigenous programme must be advanced concurrently. The contract should be negotiated in a manner that boosts the indigenous programme rather than undermining it.

 

Q6.  Is engine technology still India’s biggest weakness today?

The answer is YES. The Tejas Mark 1A flies on the American GE F404. AMCA’s initial squadrons will likely depend on an imported engine in the ninety-kilonewton class. The latest news is that negotiations for the GE 414 engine for AMCA have hit rough weather due to a 300 per cent cost increase.

India still does not have a proven indigenous engine anywhere near the ninety to one hundred ten kilonewton range required for a credible fifth or sixth-generation fighter. The Kaveri programme, running since the mid-1980s, is the most visible illustration of how difficult this problem is. High-performance turbofan technology demands a combination of high-temperature metallurgy, single-crystal turbine blade manufacturing, precision tolerances, and decades of iterative test data that very few nations have accumulated.

Urgent need of the hour is a deal that includes a degree of co-production and technology transfer for engine manufacturing in India. Co-production extends the supply chain into India, but it does not give India the ability to independently design, test, and certify a clean-sheet high-thrust engine. Engine independence remains the single weakest link in the self-reliance story.

 

Q7.  Will the export of fighter jets become an increasingly important geopolitical tool?

Fighter exports are already an important geopolitical tool, and their leverage is intensifying rather than diminishing.

Fighter exports create decades of dependency for the buyer. The seller retains influence over the buyer’s operational readiness (by supplying spares, software updates, weapons integration, training pipelines, and maintenance protocols). This dependency lasts for the life of the platform (often 30 to 40 years after the sale).

India’s own indigenous push is a deliberate effort to reduce exposure to precisely this kind of dependency.  India’s active promotion of the Tejas and its indigenous missile systems in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Gulf reflects a clear understanding that defence exports are as much an instrument of foreign policy as of industrial economics. Future fighter sales will be negotiated as much on reliability of supply and strategic alignment as on cost or raw capability.

 

Q8.  What are India’s greatest achievements and biggest challenges in defence self-reliance?

Tejas moving from a deeply troubled programme to a credible inducted fighter is, to a certain extent, an achievement.  The development of indigenous rotary-wing platforms (Dhruv, Rudra, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand) demonstrates that the industrial capacity extends beyond fast jets. The Astra beyond-visual-range missile and the continued maturation of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile represent genuine capability in the weapons domain. The missile and space programs are doing comparatively well.

Perhaps most significantly, India’s defence production turnover has grown substantially over the past decade. The country has moved from being almost exclusively an arms importer to a growing exporter, which is a structural shift that would have seemed improbable fifteen years ago.

The challenges are equally tangible. Squadron strength remains well below the sanctioned forty-two. Force multipliers, tankers, airborne early warning and control platforms are inadequate in numbers for a force that needs to project across two frontiers simultaneously. Engine technology remains unresolved.

The achievements prove India can build technically demanding systems. What remains unproven is whether it can build them at the pace and scale that the threat environment now demands.

 

Q9.  How will the Indian Air Force look in 2040, compared to today?

By 2040, assuming the squadron strength target is met or even meaningfully mitigated, the IAF should be a genuinely different force, operating on a different conceptual basis.

AMCA should be in serial production, forming the high-end backbone alongside an upgraded Rafale fleet and a substantially modernised Su-30MKI. The Tejas Mark 2 and the twin-engine deck-based fighter should round out the order of battle, bringing the indigenous content of the combat fleet to a level inconceivable at the beginning of this decade.

Loyal Wingman and unmanned systems would be standard formation elements rather than experimental adjuncts.

AI-assisted Space-based ISR would be integrated into the network.

The UCAV and other Unmanned platforms will significantly enhance airpower capabilities.

If the present trajectory and pace are sustained, by 2040 the IAF should be more networked, more integrated with the space and cyber domains, and far less dependent on foreign supply chains than anything currently in service.

 

Q10.  If you had to identify one defining trend in air warfare over the next twenty years, what would it be?

The shift from platform-centric to weapon-centric airpower operating in a networked environment. The idea that the decisive factor in air combat is increasingly not which aircraft you fly, but how fast you can sense, decide, and act across a distributed force. Ada result:

The sensor-to-shooter timeline will get shortened further.

Space-based satellites with onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing the targets will push that picture directly to the shooter.

Manned and unmanned systems will operate as a single collaborative entity rather than parallel fleets.

Mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum, with digital and cognitive dimensions layered on top, would become essential.

Stealth, hypersonics, manoeuvrability, drone swarms, and directed energy technologies/capabilities would follow this shift.

The air forces that adapt to it early will hold the operational advantage in 2040 and beyond. The ones that keep procuring better individual platforms while neglecting the architecture around them (i.e. modern equipment running on an outdated decision framework) will find themselves technologically current but operationally lagging.

 

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820: ARTEMIS II AND THE SECOND SPACE RACE FOR THE LUNAR RESOURCES

 

Article published in the jun 26 edition of the News Analytics Magazine

 

On April 1, 2026, the Space Launch System ignited at Launch Pad 39B at Kennedy Space Centre and punched the Orion spacecraft into a clear Florida sky. Onboard were Commander Reid Wiseman, Pilot Victor Glover, Mission Specialist Christina Koch, and Canadian Space Agency astronaut Jeremy Hansen. Ten days and 1.4 million kilometres later, having looped around the far side of the Moon on a free-return trajectory and broken the distance record set by Apollo 13, they splashed down in the Pacific off San Diego. Artemis II was complete.

It is humanity’s first crewed journey to the vicinity of the Moon in more than fifty years. It was also the first test of Orion’s life-support systems with humans aboard in deep space. The Orion capsule’s computers ran 20,000 times faster than those used during Apollo, while the European Service Module, built by ESA, provided propulsion, power, water, and oxygen throughout. The Space Launch System, generating roughly 15 per cent more thrust than the Saturn V, performed without issue. Technicians were already beginning work on the hardware for Artemis III before the recovery ships reached the crew.

But the mission’s significance goes far beyond the engineering feat. Artemis II is a move in a geopolitical contest. The stakes are much higher than Apollo’s. The second space race has started, and this time the prize is not prestige alone.

From Apollo to Artemis. The first space race was about ideology. The United States claimed a symbolic victory over the Soviet Union when Neil Armstrong stepped onto the Moon in July 1969. Then the urgency collapsed for several reasons. These included budget constraints, a shift toward the Space Shuttle and low-Earth orbit, and the thawing of the Cold War. The pace became a domain of cautious cooperation, culminating in the International Space Station. Even that era is over now. The Artemis programme, announced in 2017, has revived lunar ambition on entirely different terms.  The Artemis Program is built around a sustained presence and a plan to use the Moon as a proving ground for Mars.

Racing Blocs. The geopolitical architecture of the second space race is hardening into two distinct coalitions.

 

    • The American-led bloc is around the Artemis Accords. It has now been signed by 61 nations, establishing principles for transparency, interoperability, and the legality of resource extraction under existing international law. The partners include Canada, ESA member states, Japan, the UK, Australia, and the UAE.

 

    • China’s answer is the International Lunar Research Station, co-founded with Russia in 2021. Russia has become a junior partner in a China-led programme. China has recruited 13 countries to the ILRS framework, including Pakistan, Belarus, South Africa, and Venezuela, and is aggressively expanding that list through a “5-5-5” initiative. The initiative aims to enrol 50 nations, 500 institutions, and 5,000 researchers in lunar science by the early 2030s. Beijing is offering low-interest loans for ground stations, technology transfer guarantees and payload slots on Chinese missions.
    • India occupies the middle ground. India has signed the Artemis Accords while simultaneously building indigenous capability. While joining the Accord, India is not a direct participant in the NASA-led Artemis Programme’s mission-driven hardware development, but rather a partner in its guiding principles. By joining, India aligns with international principles for space exploration. These include transparency, interoperability, and the peaceful use of space resources. The agreement fosters strengthening space cooperation between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and NASA.

South Pole: Ground Zero for the Next Space Race. Every major programme (Artemis, the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, and Chandrayaan) targets the same narrow strip of terrain. The reason is water ice, preserved for billions of years in permanently shadowed craters at temperatures around -173°C. Through electrolysis, that ice can be split into hydrogen and oxygen (which are useful for rocket propulsion). A reliable South Pole water supply could turn the Moon into what planners call a gas station in the sky. There is also helium-3 stock, deposited by solar wind over billions of years. It is estimated at around one million tonnes across the lunar surface. Helium-3 holds promise as a fuel for aneutronic fusion reactions that produce far less radioactive waste than conventional fission. The South Pole’s value is as much strategic as it is geological. Both Artemis and the ILRS are fixated on the same area.

US Increasing the Pace. The Artemis programme, announced in 2017, is built around a sustained presence around the moon. Artemis II was the crewed proof of concept for that ecosystem. Artemis III will test lunar landing equipment in Earth orbit in 2027. Artemis IV, carrying the first crew actually to land at the South Pole, is targeted for 2028. Each member of the accord is contributing hardware or expertise (Canada’s Canadarm3 for the Gateway, ESA’s service modules, and Japan’s logistics). The programme also integrates the private industry. SpaceX holds the Artemis IV lander contract, and Blue Origin holds the Artemis V contract. Intuitive Machines and Firefly Aerospace are conducting robotic precursor missions under NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services programme.

China Maintaining the Momentum. In roughly two decades, the China National Space Administration has gone from launching its first taikonaut in 2003 to landing a rover on the lunar far side, returning samples from the surface, operating its own space station, and sending a rover to Mars. The Chang’e programme has been methodical: Chang’e-4 became the first mission to soft-land on the far side in 2019; Chang’e-5 returned near-side samples in 2020; Chang’e-6 brought back far-side samples in 2024,  the first time that had been done. Chang’e-7, scheduled for late 2026, will survey the south pole for water ice. Chang’e-8, in 2028, will test in situ source utilisation. China is targeting a crewed landing by 2030. The crewed mission will adopt a dual-launch architecture. The Long March 10 rocket will carry the Mengzhou spacecraft, which will carry three taikonauts. Another one will deliver the Lanyue lander. The two vehicles will rendezvous in lunar orbit. Two crew members will descend to the surface while a third remains above. The ILRS envisions a permanent facility near the Lunar South Pole being built and operationalised in three phases—reconnaissance through 2025, construction from 2026 to 2035, and full utilisation from 2036.

Indian Effort. India’s space programme has, in a short span, moved from ambition to achievement. In August 2023, Chandrayaan-3’s soft landing near the lunar south pole was a landmark moment. No nation had touched down on that terrain before. The feat placed the Indian Space Research Organisation in a category, until then occupied only by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, in terms of demonstrated lunar landing capability. The follow-up mission, Chandrayaan-4, targets the MM-4 site on Mons Mouton at nearly 84 degrees south latitude. The return mission planned for 2028  will push India’s indigenous capability further still.

The Stakes. The Apollo contest was primarily a demonstration of ideological and technological superiority. The Artemis contest is about infrastructure and norms. Leadership in space is not symbolic. It shapes standards, partnerships and long-term strategic influence. Whoever builds the first permanent presence at the South Pole gains the standing to set the terms for everyone who follows.  These include docking interfaces, communication protocols, and resource-extraction norms. The United States set them for the internet. China is making a methodical bid for the lunar space. The stakes are much higher than in the 1960s race. The logic is simple. Resources are needed to sustain presence, but presence is needed to access resources. What matters is who reaches first.

 

What Next. The Artemis programme is moving, but so is China’s IRLS. The ILRS coalition continues to add members. Artemis II proved the hardware works with people inside. The Orion heat shield held, the SLS performed, and the European Service Module delivered. Work on Artemis III and IV is already underway. On the other hand, China’s Chang’e-7 is planned for launch later in 2026 to map resources at the South Pole. The Long March 10 crewed vehicle is approaching its maiden flight. The window to set multilateral governance frameworks before the first permanent infrastructure goes into the ground is closing.

 

The Moon that humanity walked away from after Apollo 17 in December 1972 is returning to the centre of global attention. This time, not as a destination for brief visits but as a domain to be occupied, developed, and contested. The second space race is not a metaphor or a rhetorical convenience. It is a structural feature of twenty-first-century great-power competition. The race, playing out at a quarter-million miles, is just warming up.

 

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References: –

  1. NASA, “Artemis II: First crewed Orion & SLS flight test”, 2026. https://www.nasa.gov/mission/artemis-ii
  1. NASA, “NASA’s plan for sustained lunar exploration and development”, 2017. https://www.nasa.gov/artemis
  1. NASA, “The Artemis Accords”, 2020. https://www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords
  1. China National Space Administration, “China and Russia sign a MoU to construct the International Lunar Research Station”, CNSA, 2021. http://www.cnsa.gov.cn
  1. China Manned Space Agency, “Long March 10 and crewed lunar mission architecture”, 2026. http://www.cmse.gov.cn
  1. Jones A, “Chang’e-6 returns first samples from the Moon’s far side”, Space News, 25 Jun 2024. https://spacenews.com
  1. Indian Space Research Organisation, “Chandrayaan-3 mission: Successful soft landing on lunar south pole”, 2023. https://www.isro.gov.in/Chandrayaan3
  1. Indian Space Research Organisation, “Chandrayaan-4: Site selection for sample return at Mons Mouton”, Apr 2026.  https://www.isro.gov.in
  1. Ministry of External Affairs, GOI, “Joint statement from the United States and India: A partnership for the 21st century”, 2023. https://www.mea.gov.in
  1. Lowy Institute, “Artemis II and the geopolitics of the second space race”, Apr 2026. https://www.lowyinstitute.org

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