806: SPACE – THE NEW ARENA OF WARFARE

 

(Inputs to Questions)

 

Q1. Compressing the Sensor-to-Shooter Timeline

In today’s evolving warfare landscape, the true strength and deterrence now come from long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, space-based ISR networks, and the collaboration between manned and unmanned systems. This shift in military strategy calls for a broader structural change. Delays in taking action are no longer just tactical setbacks; they become a significant strategic vulnerability.

The sensor-to-shooter timeline compression is not only a technological problem but also a fundamental issue in decision architecture. Compressing that timeline requires work in several areas.

First, satellites must carry onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets.  They should be able to transmit actionable intelligence over tactical data links. This eliminates the round-trip to a ground station for analysis.

Second, pre-authorised engagement envelopes, i.e. defined target criteria against which strike authority is delegated to the satellite before conflict begins. A satellite can trigger an execution sequence rather than a consultation.

Third, a direct machine-to-machine network between ISR assets and strike platforms, with AI cross-referencing satellite data with other sensors (UAVs, SIGINT, and ground radars) to automatically produce a confidence-rated target package.

The legal and ethical concerns surrounding a misattributed strike are understandable, highlighting the importance of having a careful approach in the kill chain. It’s essential to keep the human in the loop, ensuring the human authorises each kinetic attack. While smart machines can identify and designate targets, human oversight remains a crucial safeguard.

 

Q2. Fighting Through the Electronic Fog

Fighting through the Fog of war has existed since wars began. Electronic fog is a part of it. In the future, assessments of the threat environment should treat GPS jamming and ISR spoofing as baseline assumptions in conflict scenarios. The opening moves of any conflict involve cyber and electronic attacks before any kinetic exchange. Electronic attack is now a feature of even ostensibly non-combat environments (IAF aircraft flying into earthquake-hit Myanmar faced GPS spoofing).

The response must be across three levels. At the platform level, the need is for integrated systems with multiple guidance modes (inertial navigation, terrain-referenced navigation, NavIC integration, and optical terminal guidance). so that loss of GPS does not render the platform/weapon ineffective. Multi-constellation receivers (combining NavIC, GLONASS, and Galileo) would force an adversary to jam multiple frequencies simultaneously. In the future, quantum computing will enable precise navigation without reliance on GPS. At the same time, the implementation of quantum cryptography will secure communications.

At the space segment level, satellites should be capable of operating in a degraded communications environment. Resilience must be built into the architecture from the outset. They need anomaly-detection capability, frequency agility and hardened electronics. Optical communication between satellites is one way of reducing RF vulnerability.

At the operational level, the goal is not to eliminate the electronic fog but to remain functional inside it. Combat personnel must train regularly in GPS-denied and communications-degraded environments. Spectrum-agile systems, low-probability-of-intercept communications, and redundant networks are required to counter EW threats. Redundancy in sensors, communications, and commanders’ cognitive habits produces all-around resilience.

 

Q3. Distributed Constellations vs. Exquisite Satellites

The doctrine of “space deterrence” has become a key part of modern defence strategies. Protecting satellites through resilience and backups is now more important than ever. While a single valuable satellite can be a tempting target, having a group of smaller satellites spreads out the risk, making the overall system much sturdier. Each small satellite is less critical on its own, but together, they create a network that’s much harder to disrupt.

However, there are some trade-offs. Smaller satellites can carry smaller payloads. They have lower sensor resolution and have narrower per-node bandwidth. They may be suitable for tactical ISR functions, but insufficient for certain high-end ISR requirements. The practical answer is a tiered architecture. A mix of a small number of high-capability strategic satellites complemented by a larger constellation of capable, expendable ones.

Stratospheric airships present an exciting alternative! Operating comfortably at altitudes of 20–30 km, they blend the long-lasting qualities of satellites with the flexibility of terrestrial systems. Unlike geostationary satellites, airships can be moved, repaired, or upgraded with ease, allowing them to adapt to changing mission needs. The successful flight trial of DRDO’s stratospheric platform in May 2025 is a significant milestone. While these platforms won’t replace satellites, they offer a cost-effective addition to the overall surveillance setup.

India’s SBS-III programme, targeting 52 dedicated military satellites (equipped with SAR, electro-optical, and infrared payloads), is a step in the right direction. The involvement of private industry in a significant portion of those satellites signals an important shift toward faster production and greater cost efficiency.

 

Q4. Fusing Space Assets into a Common Operational Picture

The data fusion problem is a real challenge. Without integration, more sensors produce more confusion, rather than clarity. The challenge is to get the processed sensor data to the right person, in usable form, at the right time. It is more of an organisational and doctrinal issue than a technical one.

The information from space sensors must be fused into a single picture. The Common Operational Picture that a field commander can rely on must be continuously updated and remain current.  It needs AI-driven correlation engines that perform real-time multi-sensor fusion, with confidence scoring for each data element, so a commander knows not just what the picture shows but how much to trust it.  Building this requires common data standards across the IAF, the Army, the Navy, and the Defence Space Agency.  This is a foundational necessity.

The most critical single step is to establish a jointly manned Space and Intelligence Fusion Center. The center should have real-time data access, direct connectivity and the authority to produce an integrated assessment. In the current model, information from different agencies passes through separate chains before being reconciled at a higher level. It introduces a delay that defeats the purpose of persistent surveillance. AI-enabled networked solutions for data collection, analysis, planning, dissemination, and monitoring must sit at the heart of this center.

 

Q5. Responsive Space and Tactical Satellite Launch

Space is becoming more militarised, with countries developing anti-satellite weapons, directed-energy systems, and cyber tools to disrupt vital assets such as GPS, reconnaissance, and communications satellites. Countries that can quickly rebuild their space infrastructure during challenges enjoy a lasting edge over those that can’t.

Tactical gaps can arise during hostilities due to satellite attrition or new threat activity not accounted for in pre-conflict planning. The ability to task a launch in response to these situations is necessary. The concept needs a shift in mindset of viewing the space as a static strategic asset to a fluid manoeuvre domain. In the longer term, the vision of a field commander requesting coverage over a sector and receiving a dedicated satellite within 24 to 72 hours is both feasible and strategically significant.

Current launch timelines are measured in weeks or months, not hours. Closing that gap requires investment in small launch vehicles with rapid turnaround capability. India’s SSLV technology transfer to industry is a step in the right direction. A stock of ready-to-launch, pre-integrated satellites with modular payloads needs to be built up.  Launch infrastructure capable of supporting surge operations, including mobile or dispersed pad options, would also be required.

The more immediately achievable priority is responsive tasking of satellites already in orbit. The existing assets should be dynamically reprogrammable to cover a priority area at short notice. That is primarily a software and ground architecture problem and should be the near-term focus while launch responsiveness matures.

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805: REIGNITED DEBATE: FIGHTER JETS VS. LONG-RANGE VECTORS AND DRONES

 

The Russian-Ukrainian war and the US-Israel-Iran War have reignited the debate about the cost-benefit analysis of fighter jets vis-à-vis long-range vectors and drones. Some analysts feel that the fighter aircraft have become obsolete.

 

The Cost-Benefit Reality

The approximate cost of various air platforms and weapon systems is as follows: –

    • A modern aircraft would cost anywhere between 100 and 120 million dollars.
    • A loitering munition would cost approximately 20,000–50,000 dollars.
    • A cruise missile would cost around 2 million dollars.

On a per-unit cost basis, the cost asymmetry among fighter aircraft, loitering munitions, and cruise missiles is stark. However, the cost-benefit analysis in warfare is not purely a function of unit cost. It depends on the effect achieved (Bang for Buck). It is measured across the full mission profile, including survivability, reusability, flexibility, and escalation management.

Fighter jets are reusable. A modern fighter that completes a strike mission and returns to base amortises its $100 million price tag across every sortie it flies over a 30-year service life. A cruise missile or kamikaze drone is single-use. When you factor in sortie economics across a full operational life, the per-strike cost of a modern multi-role fighter often competes favourably with standoff missiles for missions that don’t require deep penetration of layered air defences.

The greater cost-benefit advantage of long-range vectors and drones lies in scenarios with high attrition risk. This is the genuine strategic logic behind standoff weapons. It is not that they are cheaper in absolute terms, but that they preserve the most expensive and irreplaceable asset in the equation, i.e. the trained pilot. It takes a decade and an enormous investment to produce a combat-ready fighter pilot. A cruise missile battery can be replenished within months if the industrial base is functioning.

Drones depend on datalinks, GPS navigation, and communications.  In a sophisticated EW environment, these dependencies become vulnerabilities. Fighter jets, on the other hand, with onboard avionics, EW self-protection suites, and pilot judgment, prove to be more robust.

 

Obsolescence / Relevance Deliberation

The short answer is that the recent wars have not signalled the obsolescence of fighter aircraft. However, they have issued a clear warning about the utilisation pattern.

The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that surface-launched systems can achieve kill rates against aircraft. It makes conventional air operations near the front line prohibitively expensive. The aircraft do not become irrelevant, but they are forced to operate at the outer edge of the threat envelope. They serve as a standoff launch platform.

The drone utilisation in the war in Ukraine is revolutionary. Cheap FPV drones could destroy air and ground platforms worth millions. They could disrupt logistics and even impose psychological costs.

The US-Israel-Iran exchanges offer a different set of lessons.  This is the cost-benefit problem in reverse: defending against mass drone and missile attacks with expensive interceptors is fiscally unsustainable in repeated exchanges.

The broader conclusion these conflicts bring out is that fighter jets have not become obsolete. However, their employment methodology has evolved. They are not the sole instrument of the kill chain of air combat.

 

Noteworthy Changes to be Adapted

Three things have genuinely changed, and air forces need to absorb them.

    • First, forward basing of high-value aircraft is more dangerous than ever. The logic of static forward basing is being superseded by the demands of survivability, dispersal, and mobility.
    • Second, electronic warfare and EW resilience are now as important as kinetic capability. Investment in the electromagnetic dimension of air combat is no longer optional.
    • Third, the cost-comparison (between incoming projectiles and defence weapons) problem is real and demands a structural response. The answer is to develop a layered response that places cheap effectors against cheap threats and reserves expensive ones for high-value targets.

 

Fighter jets remain the most flexible, survivable, and capable instruments of air power available for high-end contested environments.

Fighter jets are the most capable instruments of air power. However, no single platform or vector can win the modern air war. The answer lies in integrating manned fighters, Long-range standoff weapons, drones, and layered air defences into a coherent operational architecture.

The air forces that will prevail in future conflicts are not those with the most aircraft, nor those that have replaced aircraft with drones. The ones that will prevail are the ones that have integrated the full spectrum of air power tools under a doctrine sophisticated enough to deploy them appropriately.

 

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804: PAKISTAN’S MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA: A TIGHTROPE WALK OR A STRATEGIC MASTER STROKE

 

On 11 April 2026, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed the arrival of a massive Pakistani military contingent at its King Abdulaziz Air Base. Approximately 13,000 troops joined the 10,000 Pakistani personnel already stationed in the Kingdom.  This brings the total to over 23,000. Between 10 and 18 Pakistan Air Force fighter jets, support aircraft, and missile interceptors arrived alongside them. The last comparable Pakistani deployment to the Gulf was during the 1991 Gulf War. This military move is of consequential significance at a time when the Middle East is on fire.

 

Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the SMDA on 17 September 2025.  Previous cooperation between them was limited to military training, advisory roles, and limited support on security matters. The SMDA fundamentally changed the character of their relationship. It also has a collective security clause that suggests that “an attack on one country is considered an attack on both”. The recent deployment of Pakistani troops and fighter jets in Saudi Arabia marks the first major operational activation under the SDMA. It represents a significant escalation from earlier engagements between the two countries.

 

Pakistani Deployment. The deployment of PAF assets and ground forces suggests that the reality is considerably more serious than a symbolic gesture. The strategic logic of the deployment’s location is also noteworthy. King Abdulaziz Air Base is located in the heartland of Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure. Important oil infrastructure, i.e. the Abqaiq processing facility and the Ras Tanura terminal, is in this region. Reportedly, the missile interceptors were dispatched earlier following Iranian strikes on Gulf targets in March 2026. The phased deployment suggests that it is a deliberate, staged increase of Pakistan’s forces in the Kingdom. The air assets provide enhanced interception capability against the drone and missile threats that have characterised Iranian and Houthis’ offensive operations. The ground forces serve a dual purpose: deterring Houthi incursions from the south and freeing Saudi forces for higher-technology defensive and offensive operations.

 

Political Signalling. Some analysts still characterise the SMDA as primarily a political signal of solidarity. Pakistani officials have been careful with their framing. The forces are “not there to attack anyone.” The deployment is a form of defensive cooperation under an existing bilateral agreement. Saudi officials described it as aimed at “enhancing joint military coordination, raising operational readiness, and supporting security and stability at both the regional and international levels.” The language is measured. The military footprint is not.  This transforms Pakistan from a secondary security provider into a primary deterrent.

The Diplomatic Tightrope. What makes Pakistan’s position uniquely complex is what was happening in Islamabad at the same time. Even as Pakistani jets were landing in the Eastern Province, Pakistan was hosting direct US-Iran ceasefire negotiations in its capital. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, visited Riyadh and Tehran during this period. It indicates that Pakistan is trying to maintain both relationships simultaneously. Reuters reported that PAF jets provided a military escort for Iranian officials coming to Islamabad for the peace talks. Pakistan was, in the same week, escorting Iranian diplomats to safety and sending troops to Saudi Arabia against Iran. The diplomatic tightrope does not get more precarious than that.

 

Economic Dimension. Pakistan’s involvement cannot be understood without its economic context. Pakistan’s economy has been under severe stress. Gulf remittances are a structural pillar of its balance of payments. Saudi financial bailouts have repeatedly given Islamabad breathing room to prevent default. The troop deployment reflects a relationship that is simultaneously strategic, institutional, transactional, and above all, symbiotic. Pakistan is providing the military power and the associated nuclear umbrella. In return, Saudi Arabia would provide the financial support to keep Pakistan’s economy afloat. Concurrent with this military deployment, Saudi Arabia and Qatar pledged an additional $5 billion in financial support to Pakistan. The Jerusalem Post and Gulf analysts have described this bluntly as a “military repayment” system.

 

Regional Stakeholder. How the key actors read this deployment reveals the full complexity of what Pakistan has stepped into.

    • Saudi Arabia views the SMDA’s activation as long overdue. A formalisation of “Muslim brotherhood” solidarity and a critical component of strategic diversification at a moment when the widening conflict in West Asia has strained US reassurances. For Riyadh, Pakistani forces provide a tangible backstop that no amount of American diplomatic signalling can substitute.
    • Iran officially welcomed the SMDA when it was signed, labelling it as part of a “regional security system.” However, the circumstances for this deployment are different. A nuclear-armed state has deployed its doorstep, on the side of its principal regional adversary. The risk of Iranian miscalculation cannot be dismissed.
    • Israel faces more intricate repercussions. Pakistan’s presence constrains Iranian offensive options against Saudi targets. In some ways, it serves Israeli interests by restricting the opening of multiple fronts. But it also brings a nuclear-armed hostile state into the region. Israel would be watching the developments with sustained attention.
    • India is monitoring closely and quietly. The combat experience Pakistani forces will accumulate in a high-intensity multi-domain environment, the financial windfalls from Gulf support, and the deepening military-institutional ties with well-equipped Gulf partners. All of this has implications for India’s security calculus. The Line of Control is not the Eastern Province. But armies learn, adapt, and bring lessons home. India would be unwise to treat this deployment as a matter of purely West Asian concern.

 

Challenges. Pakistan’s military is already involved with the Afghan border, the Line of Control with India, and domestic counterterrorism operations.  Now, a major overseas deployment in an active conflict zone has been added to the commitments. Sustaining 23,000 personnel in the Gulf while maintaining domestic readiness is a significant challenge for resources and logistics. The escalation risk is also equally real. Pakistani forces are positioned in a high-readiness status region.  In this region, miscalculations have already produced multiple unintended engagements. If Iranian strikes resume against Saudi energy infrastructure, Pakistani personnel could be caught in the crossfire.  The SMDA’s collective defence clause obligates a legal and political response. Defensive cooperation can rapidly escalate into direct involvement.  Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. Its conventional forces in the Gulf operate under the implied umbrella of that deterrent. Every actor in the region is aware of this. It shapes calculations in ways that are difficult to model and impossible to predict.

 

Concluding Thoughts.

It is the first time since 1991 that Pakistan has committed forces at this scale to an active crisis zone outside its immediate neighbourhood. The SMDA has moved from paper to practice. A nuclear-armed state is now a frontline participant in the most volatile regional security environment on the planet.

Pakistan’s deployment to Saudi Arabia is either one of five things, or a combination of them.

    • Honouring of the treaty obligation.
    • Sustenance of financial relationship.
    • Diplomatic signalling.
    • Establishment of deterrence posture.
    • Acceptance of strategic risk.

The move could either strengthen deterrence and contribute to de-escalation or deepen polarisation and raise the risk of miscalculation. It will depend on decisions made in Tehran, Riyadh, Washington, and Islamabad in the weeks ahead.

What is already clear is that Pakistan has crossed a threshold (willingly or under duress). The coming months will determine whether that crossing was wise.

 

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References: –

  1. “Pakistan sends military force, jets to Saudi Arabia under 2025 defence pact”, Al Arabiya English, 11 Apr 26. https://english.alarabiya.net (or relevant article URL)
  1. “The Saudi defence ministry says military force from Pakistan reached King Abdulaziz Air Base” Arab News, 11 Apr 26. https://www.arabnews.com
  1. “Pakistan sends a military force to Saudi Arabia as part of a pact”, Bloomberg, 11 Apr 26. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-11/pakistan-sends-military-force-to-saudi-arabia-as-part-of-pact
  1. “Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi defence agreement”, Global Security Review, 03 Nov 25.

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement

  1. “Why did Pakistan deploy soldiers and fighter jets to Saudi Arabia?”, The New Arab, Apr 26. https://www.newarab.com/news/why-did-pakistan-deploy-soldiers-fighter-jets-saudi-arabia
  1. “US-Iran war: Pakistan-Saudi defence pact, Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement details”, NDTV, Apr 26. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-iran-war-pakistan-saudi-secret-defence-pact-strategic-mutual-defence-agreement-details-11355801
  1. “Pakistan sends fighter jets to Saudi Arabia under a mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 11 Apr 26. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-says-pakistan-sends-fighter-jets-kingdom-under-defence-pact-2026-04-11/
  1. “Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan sign mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 17 Sep 25. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/
  1. “Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement: Implications for India”, Vivekananda International Foundation, 30 Sep 26. https://www.vifindia.org/2025/september/30/Saudi-Arabia-Pakistan-Strategic-Mutual-Defence-Agreement
  1. “Pakistan’s dual role is that of a mediator and military ally”, WION, Apr 26. https://www.wionews.com/world/pakistan-saudi-smda-pact-us-iran-war-1776144006783

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