News. Russia successfully test-launched the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk region) on 12 May 26. The missile followed its planned profile and struck its designated target (at Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula) approximately thirty minutes after launch. Strategic Missile Forces commander Sergei Karakayev reported that all specified technical characteristics had been validated. Putin described the test as a “major event and unconditional success” and congratulated the defence ministry, scientists, engineers, and the thousands of workers whose collaborative effort brought the programme to this milestone.
Missile. The Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau produces the RS-28 Sarmat. It is a silo-launched, three-stage, liquid-fuelled super-heavy ICBM (35.3 metres in length and approximately 208 tonnes in launch weight). It is claimed to be the largest ballistic missile ever constructed. Its payload capacity is ten tonnes, and it can carry a variety of warheads (including multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and, reportedly, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Its operational flexibility significantly exceeds that of its predecessor.
Capability. Among the Sarmat’s most strategically significant attributes is its capacity to approach targets via non-standard flight trajectories. Unlike conventional ICBMs that follow northern polar arcs, the Sarmat is capable of fractional orbital bombardment, i.e. flying a depressed, sub-orbital trajectory over the South Pole to reach targets in North America. This gives it the ability to approach from directions that existing American missile defence interceptor networks, positioned primarily in Alaska and California and oriented toward northern approach corridors, are not designed to engage. Putin has noted that the missile can travel on both ballistic and suborbital trajectories, with a maximum range reportedly exceeding 35,000 kilometres.
Feature Enhancement. The missile has a shorter boost phase than its predecessor. This reduces the window for tracking by the space-based infrared sensors. It is a meaningful enhancement for the missile’s survivability. The Sarmat is also claimed to be more accurate than the Voyevoda. Putin has stated that the Sarmat’s destructive potential substantially exceeds that of any comparable Western system.
Strategic Implication. The successful launch carries significant strategic implications. The R-36M2 Voyevoda, a Soviet-era heavy ICBM, had been the backbone of Russia’s silo-based deterrent for decades. The Sarmat is intended to replace it, and it represents the most consequential upgrade to Russia’s nuclear triad in the post-Cold War period. Putin announced that Russia would deploy the first Sarmat-equipped regiment for combat duty before the end of 2026. It is claimed to be designed to penetrate both existing and prospective ballistic missile defences. This capability is important for Russia to maintain credible second-strike deterrence.
Race. The Sarmat is one of six next-generation strategic weapons that Putin unveiled in March 2018, presenting them as Russia’s response to the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the subsequent development of American missile defence infrastructure. From Moscow’s perspective, a credible and penetrating nuclear second-strike capability is the foundation of strategic stability. The assurance that no adversary can neutralise Russia’s deterrent through a disarming first strike and expect to intercept the surviving response. The Sarmat is engineered specifically to preserve that assurance against all foreseeable developments in missile defence technology.
Timing. The test comes at a time of considerable significance in the current global landscape. The New START treaty (the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms limitation agreement between Russia and the United States) expired in February 2026. Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, citing what it described as the fundamentally changed strategic environment resulting from Western military support for Ukraine. The absence of any active treaty framework means that both sides are now free to expand and modernise their arsenals without the notification and inspection. The Sarmat’s development and operational deployment will proceed in this unconstrained environment.
Domestic Significance. Domestically, the test carries political weight as well as military significance. It arrives days after Russia’s Victory Day commemorations. It demonstrates the continued vitality of Russia’s defence industrial and scientific base under sustained international sanctions and economic pressure. It affirms the country’s standing as a nuclear superpower capable of fielding world-leading weapons systems.
Global Interest. Internationally, the Sarmat’s deployment will be watched closely in capitals around the world (from Washington to Beijing and from New Delhi to Brussels). For NATO’s strategic planners, it represents a genuine generational upgrade to Russia’s land-based deterrent. It will force them to recalibrate their threat assessments and defence postures. For countries in the Global South, it is a reminder that the nuclear dimension of great-power competition remains very much alive and is, if anything, intensifying.
Concluding Thought. Russia’s strategic modernisation programme has always been driven by the conviction that a strong nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The Sarmat’s successful test and approaching operational debut confirm that this conviction remains the organising principle of Russian defence policy. It also proves that Russia retains both the industrial capacity and the scientific expertise to give it material form.
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In the early hours of February 27, 2026, explosions shook the Afghan capital Kabul. Pakistani jets streaked across the night sky, striking Taliban government defence facilities, ammunition depots, and military sites in Kabul, Kandahar, and the southeastern province of Paktia. Pakistan had done something almost unthinkable just a few years ago. It bombed the capital of a neighbouring country and declared that it was now in a state of “open war.” This was not an impulsive act but the result of years of deteriorating relations. The situation had been building since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021.
A Historical Overview of The Broken Brotherhood
Pakistan and Afghanistan share a relationship that defies easy description. The South Asian neighbours are both Muslim-majority states and share a 2,611-kilometer border. For decades, Pakistan was among the most important backers of the Afghan Taliban, supporting the movement ideologically, financially, and logistically through its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate. When the Taliban swept back into Kabul in August 2021 following the withdrawal of American and NATO forces, Pakistan initially welcomed the development as a strategic gain. Pakistan thought a friendly government in Kabul might counter Indian influence and give Islamabad so-called “strategic depth.”
That calculation unravelled almost immediately. The Taliban government in Kabul was not interested in being a client state of Islamabad. Far from reining in anti-Pakistan militant groups operating from Afghan soil, the Taliban appeared unwilling to do so. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) started using Afghan territory as a base from which to launch increasingly devastating attacks on Pakistan. Pakistan’s frontier provinces bordering Afghanistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) bore the brunt. Suicide bombings, ambushes on security forces, and targeted assassinations increased. A particularly devastating attack struck a Shia Mosque in Islamabad, killing at least 40 people and claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), adding another militant dimension to Pakistan’s security nightmare.
At the same time, the Durand Line (the colonial-era boundary drawn by the British in 1893) remained a festering point of contention. Afghanistan has never formally recognised this border as legitimate, viewing it as an arbitrary demarcation that divides the Pashtun ethnic group between two states. The Taliban government maintained that position firmly, resisting Pakistan’s attempts to fence the border and frequently allowing its fighters to interfere with construction efforts. It is estimated that there had been at least 75 recorded clashes between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the Durand Line between 2021 and 2026, a frequency that made some form of major escalation almost inevitable.
The Military Balance
The difference in military strength between Pakistan and Afghanistan is stark. Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country, has a considerable military force with 660,000 active personnel (560,000 soldiers in the army, 70,000 in the air force, and 30,000 in the navy). Pakistan also boasts of 465 combat aircraft, over 260 helicopters, more than 6,000 armoured fighting vehicles, and over 4,600 artillery pieces.
The Afghan Taliban, by contrast, commands approximately 172,000 active military personnel. When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, it inherited a substantial inventory of US-supplied military equipment left behind by the former Afghan National Army, including armoured vehicles, artillery, and aircraft. But without international recognition, without access to spare parts, and without functioning military training institutions, much of that equipment became unusable. Afghanistan has no functioning air force to speak of: at most six aircraft, some of Soviet vintage, and 23 helicopters, the airworthiness of an unknown number of which remained in doubt.
On paper, Pakistan could crush the Taliban’s conventional military capacity with relative ease. Yet history has shown repeatedly that wars in Afghanistan are not won on paper. It is called the “Graveyard of Empires” for a reason. The Taliban’s fighters are combat-hardened veterans of a 20-year insurgency against the most powerful military alliance in history. They know their terrain intimately. And Islamabad should know better than most that guerrilla warfare in the mountains of Khost and Kunar can render any conventional military advantage irrelevant.
Collapse of the October 2025 Ceasefire
The crisis did not erupt without prior warning. In October 2025, Afghanistan and Pakistan had already fought a week of fierce and deadly clashes along their contested frontier. More than 70 people were killed on both sides in what at the time represented the worst bout of open fighting between the two neighbours in recent memory. The violence was enough to prompt international intervention. Qatar and Turkey brokered an emergency ceasefire in Doha, and for a few months, the shooting largely stopped.
But the ceasefire was always fragile. Sporadic violations continued, and none of the underlying causes had been addressed. Pakistan still wanted the Taliban to crack down on the TTP. The Taliban still refused to recognise the Durand Line. Militant attacks inside Pakistan continued. Border crossings, including the key Torkham and Chaman crossings, remained largely shut, causing severe economic strain on both sides and enormous suffering for Afghan refugees and returnees caught between two hostile states. Several rounds of negotiations followed the October ceasefire, reportedly involving Qatar and Turkey as mediators, but no lasting agreement emerged.
The February 2026 Skirmish
Pakistan launched airstrikes targeting what it described as militant camps belonging to the TTP and ISKP in Afghan provinces (Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost). Islamabad claimed that the strikes had killed at least 70 terrorists. The Taliban government and independent observers had a different story. The UN mission in Afghanistan reported that at least 13 civilians had been killed in those initial Pakistani strikes. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the attacks had “killed and wounded dozens, including women and children.” A provincial director of the Afghan Red Crescent Society said 18 people were killed and many more wounded in Nangarhar alone. These were not terrorists on a training ground, but residents of border villages.
Afghanistan issued a stern warning, which Pakistan dismissed. On the night of February 26, Afghan forces launched a large-scale offensive operation against Pakistan. They targeted Pakistani military installations along the Durand Line.
Pakistan responded by launching Operation Ghazab lil Haq (Righteous Fury) on 27 Feb 26. It involved combined air and ground strikes against Taliban posts, headquarters, and ammunition depots.
According to Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, the operation killed at least 133 Afghan Taliban fighters and wounded more than 200. Pakistan also claimed that 27 Taliban posts had been destroyed and nine captured, along with over 80 tanks, artillery pieces, and armoured personnel carriers. The Taliban gave a starkly different account: eight of its fighters killed and eleven wounded, and 55 Pakistani soldiers killed, with 19 posts seized. Neither set of figures could be independently verified by the time news organisations were reporting from the ground.
The conflict quickly introduced new dimensions of warfare. Afghanistan claimed its forces had “successfully conducted” drone strikes hitting military targets inside Pakistan. Pakistan’s Information Minister said the drone attempts had been intercepted by anti-drone systems in the cities of Abbottabad, Swabi, and Nowshera, with no damage to life.
The Torkham crossing remained one of the most dangerous and symbolically loaded flashpoints. It had been kept partially open for Afghans returning en masse from Pakistan. Now those returnees found themselves trapped between two armies.
Regional and Global Reactions
The international response to the outbreak of open war was swift and almost uniformly alarmed. The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was among the first to respond. He called for both parties to de-escalate immediately and continue to seek to resolve the differences through diplomacy.
India condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes. It described the strikes as “another attempt by Pakistan to externalise its internal failures”. It also affirmed India’s support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Pakistan’s Foreign Office rejected India’s comments and alleged that the Taliban had become a proxy for India.
Iran has borders with both countries and has long positioned itself as a bridge between them. It called on both governments to resolve their differences within the framework of good neighbourliness. Iran also offered mediation and readiness to assist in facilitating dialogue.
China maintains close ties with both Pakistan and the Taliban government in Kabul. It expressed deep concern and conveyed Beijing’s willingness to play a constructive role in cooling the situation. Russia called on both parties to immediately halt cross-border attacks and offered to mediate if requested by both sides. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held separate calls with his counterparts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to coordinate diplomatic pressure. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan spoke with Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar to discuss “ways to reduce tensions.”
Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, though holding no official position, issued a public statement. Pakistan cannot free itself from the self-created problems of violence and bombings. Still, it must change its own policy and choose the path of good neighbourliness, respect, and civilised relations with Afghanistan.
What Drives This War
The hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the product of an irreconcilable contradiction. Pakistan created, supported, and enabled the Taliban as a strategic instrument for more than two decades. It sheltered the Taliban’s senior leadership during the years of US occupation. It allowed recruitment and fundraising on Pakistani soil. It lobbied internationally for international recognition of Taliban governance. Pakistan expected gratitude and compliance from the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.
What it got instead was a sovereign government that pursued its own interests. It refused to recognise the Durand Line, declined to crack down on the TTP, and increasingly viewed Islamabad as a threat rather than a patron. The Pakistani analyst Mariam Solaimankhil, a member of Afghanistan’s Parliament in Exile, framed it bluntly in a television interview during the crisis: “Pakistan is fighting the monster it helped create.” She argued that the TTP’s roots, the Afghan Taliban’s ideology, and the networks of militant groups were all products of Pakistani state policy over decades, and that the civilians now dying in Pashtun villages on both sides of the border, in Balochistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, were paying the price for choices made in Rawalpindi’s military headquarters.
Where It Might Lead
Where the conflict goes from here remains deeply uncertain. The military balance favours Pakistan overwhelmingly in conventional terms, but history suggests that Afghanistan defeats its invaders not by winning battles but by outlasting occupiers. Pakistan has no stated intention of occupying Afghanistan. Still, each round of airstrikes radicalises new fighters, destroys what little infrastructure the Taliban government has, and strengthens the hand of hardliners on both sides.
The international community (China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the UN) has called for de-escalation, but none of these actors has the leverage or the will to impose a solution. The United States, which spent 20 years and trillions of dollars trying to stabilise Afghanistan and failed, is unlikely to re-engage substantively. Qatar and Turkey, who brokered the October 2025 ceasefire that lasted barely four months, again tried to mediate, but without addressing the root causes. In this scenario, any ceasefire will be temporary.
The Durand Line was drawn by a British diplomat in 1893 to serve imperial interests. More than 130 years later, it remains a wound that neither side can agree to close. Until it is resolved, the cycle of violence that has defined this relationship will continue to grind on—one airstrike, one ceasefire, and one broken promise at a time.
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References:
Ahmed, R. (2000). “Taliban: Militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia”. Yale University Press.
Bijan Omrani, B. (2009). “The Durand Line: History and problems of the Afghan-Pakistan border”. Asian Affairs, 40(2), 177–195.
Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2021–2026). “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and regional militancy reports”. https://www.csis.org
Chatham House. (2021–2026). “Afghanistan post-2021 political and security analysis”. https://www.chathamhouse.org
Council on Foreign Relations. (2021–2026). “Backgrounders on Afghanistan, Taliban, and regional geopolitics”. https://www.cfr.org
International Crisis Group. (2021–2026). “Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions and militancy reports”. https://www.crisisgroup.org
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025). “The military balance 2025”. Routledge.
Reuters. (2025–2026). “Coverage of Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict and regional tensions”. https://www.reuters.com
Rubin, B. R. (2002). “The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system” (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.
In today’s evolving warfare landscape, the true strength and deterrence now come from long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, space-based ISR networks, and the collaboration between manned and unmanned systems. This shift in military strategy calls for a broader structural change. Delays in taking action are no longer just tactical setbacks; they become a significant strategic vulnerability.
The sensor-to-shooter timeline compression is not only a technological problem but also a fundamental issue in decision architecture. Compressing that timeline requires work in several areas.
First, satellites must carry onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets. They should be able to transmit actionable intelligence over tactical data links. This eliminates the round-trip to a ground station for analysis.
Second, pre-authorised engagement envelopes, i.e. defined target criteria against which strike authority is delegated to the satellite before conflict begins. A satellite can trigger an execution sequence rather than a consultation.
Third, a direct machine-to-machine network between ISR assets and strike platforms, with AI cross-referencing satellite data with other sensors (UAVs, SIGINT, and ground radars) to automatically produce a confidence-rated target package.
The legal and ethical concerns surrounding a misattributed strike are understandable, highlighting the importance of having a careful approach in the kill chain. It’s essential to keep the human in the loop, ensuring the human authorises each kinetic attack. While smart machines can identify and designate targets, human oversight remains a crucial safeguard.
Q2. Fighting Through the Electronic Fog
Fighting through the Fog of war has existed since wars began. Electronic fog is a part of it. In the future, assessments of the threat environment should treat GPS jamming and ISR spoofing as baseline assumptions in conflict scenarios. The opening moves of any conflict involve cyber and electronic attacks before any kinetic exchange. Electronic attack is now a feature of even ostensibly non-combat environments (IAF aircraft flying into earthquake-hit Myanmar faced GPS spoofing).
The response must be across three levels. At the platform level, the need is for integrated systems with multiple guidance modes (inertial navigation, terrain-referenced navigation, NavIC integration, and optical terminal guidance). so that loss of GPS does not render the platform/weapon ineffective. Multi-constellation receivers (combining NavIC, GLONASS, and Galileo) would force an adversary to jam multiple frequencies simultaneously. In the future, quantum computing will enable precise navigation without reliance on GPS. At the same time, the implementation of quantum cryptography will secure communications.
At the space segment level, satellites should be capable of operating in a degraded communications environment. Resilience must be built into the architecture from the outset. They need anomaly-detection capability, frequency agility and hardened electronics. Optical communication between satellites is one way of reducing RF vulnerability.
At the operational level, the goal is not to eliminate the electronic fog but to remain functional inside it. Combat personnel must train regularly in GPS-denied and communications-degraded environments. Spectrum-agile systems, low-probability-of-intercept communications, and redundant networks are required to counter EW threats. Redundancy in sensors, communications, and commanders’ cognitive habits produces all-around resilience.
Q3. Distributed Constellations vs. Exquisite Satellites
The doctrine of “space deterrence” has become a key part of modern defence strategies. Protecting satellites through resilience and backups is now more important than ever. While a single valuable satellite can be a tempting target, having a group of smaller satellites spreads out the risk, making the overall system much sturdier. Each small satellite is less critical on its own, but together, they create a network that’s much harder to disrupt.
However, there are some trade-offs. Smaller satellites can carry smaller payloads. They have lower sensor resolution and have narrower per-node bandwidth. They may be suitable for tactical ISR functions, but insufficient for certain high-end ISR requirements. The practical answer is a tiered architecture. A mix of a small number of high-capability strategic satellites complemented by a larger constellation of capable, expendable ones.
Stratospheric airships present an exciting alternative! Operating comfortably at altitudes of 20–30 km, they blend the long-lasting qualities of satellites with the flexibility of terrestrial systems. Unlike geostationary satellites, airships can be moved, repaired, or upgraded with ease, allowing them to adapt to changing mission needs. The successful flight trial of DRDO’s stratospheric platform in May 2025 is a significant milestone. While these platforms won’t replace satellites, they offer a cost-effective addition to the overall surveillance setup.
India’s SBS-III programme, targeting 52 dedicated military satellites (equipped with SAR, electro-optical, and infrared payloads), is a step in the right direction. The involvement of private industry in a significant portion of those satellites signals an important shift toward faster production and greater cost efficiency.
Q4. Fusing Space Assets into a Common Operational Picture
The data fusion problem is a real challenge. Without integration, more sensors produce more confusion, rather than clarity. The challenge is to get the processed sensor data to the right person, in usable form, at the right time. It is more of an organisational and doctrinal issue than a technical one.
The information from space sensors must be fused into a single picture. The Common Operational Picture that a field commander can rely on must be continuously updated and remain current. It needs AI-driven correlation engines that perform real-time multi-sensor fusion, with confidence scoring for each data element, so a commander knows not just what the picture shows but how much to trust it. Building this requires common data standards across the IAF, the Army, the Navy, and the Defence Space Agency. This is a foundational necessity.
The most critical single step is to establish a jointly manned Space and Intelligence Fusion Center. The center should have real-time data access, direct connectivity and the authority to produce an integrated assessment. In the current model, information from different agencies passes through separate chains before being reconciled at a higher level. It introduces a delay that defeats the purpose of persistent surveillance. AI-enabled networked solutions for data collection, analysis, planning, dissemination, and monitoring must sit at the heart of this center.
Q5. Responsive Space and Tactical Satellite Launch
Space is becoming more militarised, with countries developing anti-satellite weapons, directed-energy systems, and cyber tools to disrupt vital assets such as GPS, reconnaissance, and communications satellites. Countries that can quickly rebuild their space infrastructure during challenges enjoy a lasting edge over those that can’t.
Tactical gaps can arise during hostilities due to satellite attrition or new threat activity not accounted for in pre-conflict planning. The ability to task a launch in response to these situations is necessary. The concept needs a shift in mindset of viewing the space as a static strategic asset to a fluid manoeuvre domain. In the longer term, the vision of a field commander requesting coverage over a sector and receiving a dedicated satellite within 24 to 72 hours is both feasible and strategically significant.
Current launch timelines are measured in weeks or months, not hours. Closing that gap requires investment in small launch vehicles with rapid turnaround capability. India’s SSLV technology transfer to industry is a step in the right direction. A stock of ready-to-launch, pre-integrated satellites with modular payloads needs to be built up. Launch infrastructure capable of supporting surge operations, including mobile or dispersed pad options, would also be required.
The more immediately achievable priority is responsive tasking of satellites already in orbit. The existing assets should be dynamically reprogrammable to cover a priority area at short notice. That is primarily a software and ground architecture problem and should be the near-term focus while launch responsiveness matures.
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