797: HYPERSONIC WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE 2.0: NEW STRATEGIC CALCULUS

Paper published in the April 2026 edition of “The News Analytics” Journal

Hypersonic weapons are weapons capable of sustained flight at Mach 5 or higher. Existing missile defence systems do not cater for this new threat. Their speed and manoeuvrability demand a new approach to early warning and subsequent neutralisation. These weapons are emerging as highly valued systems for militaries worldwide. Their rapid development marks a turning point in military technology and strategic thought. These weapons are giving a new meaning to deterrence and stability.

Hypersonic Weapons. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) can also reach hypersonic speeds. However, they travel through space in a predictable parabolic arc. Their trajectory becomes predictable, and long-range radars can track them. On the other hand, the characteristics of hypersonic weapons include sustained high speed, increased manoeuvrability, and a high-altitude trajectory (in the upper atmosphere – higher than cruise missiles but lower than the apogee of ballistic missiles). These attributes of hypersonic weapons are blurring the line between ballistic and cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons are classified into two categories: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). HGVs are carried and launched from ballistic missiles. Post-separation, they glide through the upper atmosphere at extreme speeds following a controllable trajectory. HCMs sustain hypersonic flight within the atmosphere using advanced scramjet engines. Hypersonic weapons can alter their trajectory. This adds to the complexity of detecting, tracking, and intercepting them. High speed also compresses decision-making time. It shortens the window for assessing the threat and making a decision on counteraction.

Speed and Manoeuvrability: A Strategic Game-Changer. Hypersonic missiles are commonly depicted as a “game changer and the unprecedented capabilities of these weapons portend a revolution in missile warfare. It is considered that the speed, accuracy, and manoeuvrability of hypersonic boost-glide weapons will fundamentally change the character of warfare. Developments in hypersonic propulsion will revolutionise warfare by enabling faster strikes. With unmatched speed, these weapons will likely hit over-the-horizon targets in a fraction of the time. This claimed speed advantage is ostensibly accompanied by near-immunity to detection, rendering hypersonic weapons “nearly invisible” to existing early warning systems. Together, these capabilities will significantly compress decision and response times.

Missile Defence 2.0: Adapting to the Hypersonic Age

Missile Defence in the Pre-Hypersonic Era. Existing defences are primarily designed to counter ballistic missiles. They rely on layered architectures that include early-warning launch detection, long-range radar-based trajectory tracking, and interception. The destruction could occur during the boost, midcourse, or terminal phases. These systems operate on the logic of predictability. However, these systems are not optimised for low-flying targets that manoeuvre frequently and have little warning time.

Hypersonic Threat Mitigation. A comprehensive missile defence strategy is required to provide an integrated and practical capability to counter ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. The speed of hypersonic weapons leaves little time to compute a fire-control solution, communicate with command authorities, and complete an engagement to intercept them actively. Anti-Hypersonic defence would require a combination of disruptive data links and sensors, space-based tracking sensors, and innovative interception methods. Some passive defensive measures against traditional missiles are also effective against hypersonic weapons; these include deception, dispersal, hardening, concealment, etc.

Missile Defence 2.0. To counter hypersonic threats, defence developers are exploring what might be called Missile Defence 2.0. This concept emphasises integration, speed, and adaptability. One key area is sensor networks. Future defences rely on constellations of space-based infrared and tracking satellites that can track hypersonic weapons throughout their flight. Methods of interception also need to evolve. Instead of relying solely on kinetic weapons, multiple new interceptors may be required to neutralise the threat. Artificial intelligence would be essential for data fusion from multiple sensors. Another element of Missile Defence 2.0 is layered resilience rather than perfect protection, recognising that no defence will be impenetrable.

Hypersonic Race

The United States, China, and Russia are competing to develop these weapons. They would be fielding a wide array of hypersonic systems in the coming decades. The development of short-, medium-, and long-range variants of these weapons by major powers is resulting in an arms race. These technologies are changing the nature of warfare, and they have the potential to destabilise the global security environment.

USA. The U.S. has pursued both hypersonic weapons technologies since the early 2000s. It has sought to develop longer-range systems capable of reaching deep into an adversary’s territory to attack defended, hardened, and time-urgent targets. The Department of Defence (DOD) is developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program and through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.

Russia. Russia is reportedly the first nation to deploy a hypersonic missile. It characterises these weapons as a centrepiece of its security strategy and has extensively tested at least three distinct hypersonic systems. Russia’s HGV, known as Avangard, is equipped with a nuclear warhead and deployed on SS-19 long-range land-based ballistic missiles. Avangards reportedly feature onboard countermeasures and can manoeuvre in flight to evade ballistic missile defences. Russia has successfully fielded the Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic weapons, and it has launched the air-launched Kinzhal hypersonic missiles (with a speed of Mach 10 and a payload of 480kg) against Ukraine.

China. China has made a significant effort to match Russian and U.S. capabilities. It has invested heavily in the hypersonic research, development, test, and evaluation programs in the past decade. China is also investing heavily in hypersonic development infrastructure and weapon systems, reportedly outpacing the United States in testing these technologies. China has developed an HGV known as the DF-ZF, previously referred to as the WU-14. China is also developing the DF-41 long-range intercontinental ballistic missile, which could carry a nuclear hypersonic glide vehicle.

India. India has been investing in hypersonic weapon development. In Sep 2020, India successfully tested the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV). HSTDV is a hypersonic unmanned scramjet demonstration aircraft. In addition to the HSTDV program, India is continuing its research and development efforts across various aspects of hypersonic technology (propulsion systems, materials science, and guidance systems). In July 2025, India reportedly conducted a successful test of a hypersonic cruise missile capable of reaching Mach 8 under Project Vishnu. Reportedly, the project aims to develop the Extended Trajectory-Long Duration Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM), a weapon system that will fundamentally enhance India’s strategic capabilities.

Great Power Competition and Technological Asymmetry. The development of hypersonic weapons has the potential to create a new form of asymmetry. In technologically advanced states, having these weapons gives them an edge in overcoming opponents’ defences. On the other hand, smaller or less tech-savvy states find it difficult to keep up. This creates a growing divide between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This asymmetry is reshaping the strategic calculus. Major powers may become aggressive, while weaker states may double down on asymmetric strategies such as cyber operations or unconventional warfare.

Implications for Deterrence Stability. The most concerning aspect of hypersonics is their impact on deterrence stability. During the Cold War, stability was based on the philosophy of “Mutually Assured Destruction”. However, now with reduced reaction time, the risk of miscalculation has increased dramatically. The shift is taking place from ‘Launch on Warning’ to ‘Launch on Uncertainty’. States may get tempted to launch their own weapons at the first sign of a perceived threat. This “crisis instability” is compounded by Strategic Ambiguity: most hypersonic vehicles can carry either a conventional or nuclear payload, leaving an adversary to guess the stakes of an incoming strike.

Conclusion

Technology is a good gadget, but a destructive weapon. Hypersonic weapons signify a significant advancement in military technology. These weapons are even more powerful than traditional ballistic ones because of their incredible speed and agility. Many countries are actively working on developing and testing them. At the same time, Missile Defence 2.0 is evolving to counter this new threat. It includes advanced sensors, smarter interceptors, and a robust architecture to provide better protection. The proliferation of hypersonic weapons could have significant implications for the global security landscape. Their speed and manoeuvrability could reduce decision-making time in crises, increasing the risk of miscalculation. The development of hypersonic weapons is also starting a new arms race, as countries seek to maintain or gain military superiority in this field.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

“Hypersonic missiles: What are they and can they be stopped?”, Partyard Defence, May 10, 2019. https://partyardmilitary.com/hypersonic-missiles-what-are-they-and-can-they-be-stopped/

“Hypersonic Technology”, Drishti IAS, 10 Oct 21. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/hypersonic-technology-2

“Russia, China, the U.S.: Who Will Win the Hypersonic Arms”, IEEE Spectrum, Dec 2020. https://spectrum.ieee.org/russia-china-the-us-who-will-win-the-hypersonic-arms-race

Air Marshal Anil Khosla, “Hypersonic Long Range Weapons”, Air Marshals’ Perspective, 10 Nov 2021. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/11/10/hypersonic-long-range-weapons/

Air Marshal Anil Khosla, “Countering Hypersonic Weapon Threat: A Difficult But Manageable Problem”, Air Marshals’ Perspective, 07 Jun 2024. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/06/07/countering-hypersonic-weapon-threat-a-difficult-but-manageable-problem/

Tom Karako and Masao Dahlgren, “Complex Air Defence Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat”, A Report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defence Project, February 2022.

Rylie White, “An Emerging Threat: The Impact of Hypersonic Weapons on National Security, Crisis Instability, and Deterrence Strategy”, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

David Roza, “Why Hypersonic Missiles’ Greatest Strength Also Makes Them Vulnerable”, Air and Space Forces Magazine, Dec 2023.

Col Mandeep Singh, “Countering Hypersonics”, Indian Defence Review, Jan 2024.

Economic Times. (2025, July 16). Why India’s new hypersonic missile may outrun Israel’s Iron Dome and Russia’s S-500 and shift the balance in Asia.

Aroor, Shiv. “India’s Hypersonic Missile Ambitions: DRDO’s Project Vishnu and the Road Ahead.” India Today.

March 25, 2026

795: SPECTRA: THE INVISIBLE SHIELD OF THE DASSAULT RAFALE

Survivability in a modern aerial combat environment depends on mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum. This mastery in the Dassault Rafale is provided by a single sophisticated system called SPECTRA (Système de Protection et d’Évitement des Conduites de Tir du Rafale). It is a state-of-the-art, fully integrated electronic warfare suite developed jointly by Thales Group and MBDA.

Unlike external EW pods that compromise aerodynamics and radar cross-section, SPECTRA is embedded directly within the Rafale’s airframe. Sensors are distributed across the fuselage, wing roots, wingtips, and tail sections. This creates an all-aspect awareness bubble with no blind spots. This “smart skin” philosophy means the system is not an add-on but is a core nervous system. It is networked directly with the aircraft’s RBE2 AESA radar, OSF infrared search-and-track system, and mission computer to produce a single, fused tactical picture for the pilot.

360-Degree, Multi-Spectral Coverage. SPECTRA’s defining capability is its ability to detect, classify, and respond to threats across the full electromagnetic spectrum simultaneously. It monitors radar emissions from enemy SAM batteries and airborne fire-control radars, detects the heat signatures of infrared-homing missiles, and identifies laser rangefinders and target designators — all in real time, from any direction. This matters immensely in modern contested airspace where multiple weapons create an overlapping defensive envelope. A system that addresses only one spectral dimension leaves the aircraft exposed to the others. SPECTRA addresses all three simultaneously, with sensors capable of detecting threats at ranges that provide the pilot with a meaningful reaction time.

The Architecture: Key Components. The system’s effectiveness flows from four tightly integrated subsystems working in concert:

- The DDM NG (Détecteur de Départ Missile Nouvelle Génération) is MBDA’s next-generation missile approach warning system. It uses advanced infrared and ultraviolet sensors with wide-angle coverage to detect missile launches at long range — including from low-observable platforms — with sub-degree angular resolution. Critically, it can detect non-radiating passive threats that older UV-based systems miss.

- The Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) passively scans for hostile radar emissions. It identifies and geolocates emitters using techniques such as interferometry and time-difference-of-arrival. It compares signals against an extensive, field-reprogrammable threat library capable of distinguishing an S-400 battery from an airborne AESA fire-control radar, and assigning threat priority accordingly.

- The Laser Warning System (LWS) detects when laser rangefinders or weapon designators are illuminating the Rafale, providing precise bearing data to cue the appropriate countermeasure.

- The Phased Array Jammer (JAM NG) is the most potent and secretive element. Using active electronically scanned array technology, it directs precisely shaped jamming energy toward specific emitters — applying noise jamming, false target generation, or range deception — without broadcasting the aircraft’s position. This targeted approach is far more effective and far harder to counter than legacy brute-force jammers.

Data Fusion. SPECTRA is not just an assembly of sensors. Its strength lies in its data fusion capability. A central management unit continuously merges raw signals received from multiple sensors (RWR, DDM NG, and LWS). The CMU assesses threat lethality, trajectory and urgency. It then presents the crew with a prioritised, actionable threat picture. In practice, this means that if the RWR detects a fire-control radar and the DDM NG simultaneously observes a launch from the same bearing, the system doesn’t merely alert the pilot — it identifies the optimal countermeasure (chaff for radar-guided threats, flares for infrared seekers, or active jamming), and can execute it automatically within milliseconds. Pilots retain full manual override, but the cognitive burden during high-G combat manoeuvring is dramatically reduced. Equally significant is SPECTRA’s offensive contribution: by passively geolocating enemy radars without emitting, it allows the Rafale to prosecute SEAD missions or precision strikes without activating its own radar — preserving the aircraft’s electromagnetic silence and complicating the adversary’s situational picture.

Constant Evolution. SPECTRA has demonstrated the Rafale’s ability to penetrate contested airspace without dedicated SEAD escorts. SPECTRA is designed for longevity. Its modular architecture permits continuous software and hardware updates. Its threat libraries can be refreshed easily to address new radar types, advanced IR seekers, and low-probability-of-intercept systems. The new standards introduced in the system have improved its jamming performance and AI-assisted threat recognition. The future enhancements include capabilities to counter stealth-detecting low-frequency radars and future hypersonic threats.

For air forces like India’s, operating in environments bracketed by advanced Chinese and Pakistani integrated air defence systems, it is not merely a defensive feature. It is a strategic enabler.

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March 22, 2026March 21, 2026

793: IRAN WAR: MANY QUESTIONS, DIVERSE PERCEPTIONS (PART 3)

The answers are collated from open sources. Information warfare and propaganda are generally active, as in any other war. Bias in the answers cannot be ruled out.

GEOPOLITICAL & STRATEGIC

How did the conflict affect US relations with Gulf Arab states?

Iran’s decision to strike across nine countries — including previously neutral Gulf states such as Oman and Qatar — has had the paradoxical effect of pushing Gulf governments into closer alignment with the US-Israeli security architecture, even as they publicly demand restraint. Iran’s widening of attacks to encompass all GCC states has demonstrated that passive neutrality offers no protection, underscoring that regional threats are better countered collectively. Intelligence-sharing and covert security cooperation between Israel and Gulf neighbours would deepen.

Did the conflict accelerate or derail Israel-Saudi normalisation?

The conflict has deepened covert alignment but left formal normalisation frozen. The Palestinian issue — dramatically amplified in the Arab public sphere by the Gaza war — remains a fundamental political obstacle that shared threat perception of Iran cannot simply override. Arab governments already obtain meaningful security benefits from covert cooperation with Israel without assuming the domestic political risk of formal recognition. US officials, including Senator Graham, have publicly framed the post-war period as a “historic opportunity” to revive normalisation once Iranian pressure recedes, but the structural obstacles remain formidable.

DIPLOMACY & CEASEFIRE

What diplomatic efforts were made to prevent full-scale war, and why did they fail?

Oman led indirect nuclear negotiations in Geneva in February 2026, with Iran reportedly agreeing to forgo stockpiling enriched uranium and accept permanent, full IAEA verification — significant concessions that represented a near-breakthrough. Oman’s Foreign Minister publicly declared peace “within reach.” The US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury regardless, with Oman’s mediator expressing he was “dismayed” that active negotiations had been overridden by military action. The deeper failure of diplomacy traces to accumulated mistrust, Iran’s reconstitution of its programme after the 2025 setback, the IAEA’s discovery of hidden HEU in February 2026, and an Israeli/US assessment that a narrow preemption window was closing.

What were the terms of any ceasefire agreements, and what role did mediators play?

The June 2025 Twelve-Day War ended in a US-brokered ceasefire on 24 June 2025. No comparable agreement has been reached in the ongoing 2026 conflict. Khamenei’s assassination has shattered the established rules of engagement, leaving the conflict without clear diplomatic off-ramps and deepening into a war of attrition. Oman served as the primary channel for both the 2025 ceasefire and the aborted 2026 nuclear talks. Qatar hosted US military assets while simultaneously coming under Iranian attack — a contradictory position that constrained its mediating role. Egypt maintained a relative distance. China is positioning itself as the primary post-conflict stabiliser, dispatching diplomatic envoys while warning publicly against spreading “flames of war.”

CONSEQUENCES & LONG-TERM OUTLOOK

How significantly has Iran’s military capability been degraded?

Severely. Israel claims approximately 60–90% of Iran’s estimated 500 ballistic missile launchers have been destroyed or disabled. Over 100 air defence systems and 120 detection systems were eliminated in the opening 24 hours. More than 1,700 military industrial assets have been struck, with the campaign working systematically through Iran’s missile production chain. Over 50 naval vessels have been destroyed, effectively decimating Iran’s navy. Nuclear infrastructure is severely damaged. IRGC command nodes and leadership have been targeted. Iran retains core enrichment knowledge, some dispersed material, and the institutional will to reconstitute — but its conventional military power has been fundamentally degraded.

What is the long-term trajectory of Iran-Israel relations?

Persistent, entrenched hostility is the most probable outcome. Iran perceives the conflict as existential and has shown no interest in an off-ramp, calculating that a prolonged war of attrition may eventually favour it. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei — widely described as more hardline than his father and closely tied to the IRGC — signals continuity of confrontational posture rather than moderation. The most dangerous near-term risks are an Iranian nuclear dash to weaponise as the ultimate deterrent, or asymmetric revenge operations through reconstituted proxy networks or cyber means. A long-term “new normal” of uneasy, diminished-Iran deterrence is possible if the regime survives in weakened form; outright regime collapse would open a different and highly unpredictable set of outcomes.

Has the conflict changed the doctrine of deterrence in the Middle East?

Profoundly. The killing of a sitting Supreme Leader has shattered red lines that were previously considered inviolable, signalling that no leader or asset is beyond reach for a sufficiently capable and determined adversary. The conflict has validated the superiority of offensive preemption combined with layered defence over passive deterrence-by-denial, and has demonstrated that proxy networks are unreliable against determined state-on-state military action. The perverse global signal, noted by RAND analysts, is that states without nuclear weapons remain existentially vulnerable to decapitation strikes, which may accelerate proliferation among states watching the outcome and drawing their own conclusions.

What are the military lessons for nations like India from this conflict?

The conflict carries direct and urgent lessons for Mission Sudarshan Chakra and India’s broader defence doctrine. First, layered, integrated air defence, combining short-, medium-, and long-range systems with real-time intelligence, is essential against mixed salvos of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones — validating India’s multi-layered architecture. Second, interceptor stockpile depth is as critical as interception technology itself; saturation rapidly depletes inventories, making directed-energy weapons an operational necessity for economically defeating cheap drone swarms. Third, offensive counter-strikes on launcher and C2 infrastructure are force multipliers — pure defence is strategically and financially unsustainable against a determined adversary, validating the offensive-defensive integration at the heart of Mission Sudarshan Chakra. Fourth, space-based early warning and AI-driven command and control are now operational necessities, not aspirational future capabilities. Fifth, allied interoperability — the US-Israeli model — multiplies system effectiveness in ways that no single national architecture can replicate, underscoring the importance of India deepening defence technology partnerships with the US and Israel in particular.

(More to follow)

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