Air Marshal's Perspective – CANDID AND TO THE POINT / काम की बात

September 5, 2026September 4, 2026

848: GROWTH MINDSET: THE POWER TO GROW, LEARN AND BECOME BETTER

Recently, I was invited to Apex University (Jaipur) as a guest. I met Prof. (Dr.) Raghuvir Singh, the President and Vice-Chancellor of Apex University, Jaipur. Our interaction highlighted several key aspects of a growth mindset. That interaction inspired this blog.

GROWTH MINDSET: THE POWER TO GROW, LEARN AND BECOME BETTER

Our life is not determined only by where we start. It is greatly influenced by what we do along the way.

A growth mindset is the belief that our abilities, intelligence, skills and character can be developed through effort, learning, practice and perseverance. It does not mean believing that everyone can succeed and achieve everything simply by wishing for it. Instead, it means believing we can learn, improve, and adapt.

Success. What does success really mean? The answer is not the same for everyone. Success can mean getting a good job for one person, starting a business for another, raising a happy family for someone else, or simply becoming a better version of oneself. More importantly, our definition of success can change at different stages of life. What we considered success at the age of twenty may be very different from what we value at forty or sixty. This changing understanding of success is closely connected to one important idea of continuous learning and growth.

Intentions Do Not Take Us Places—Actions Do. Many people have good intentions. They intend to exercise, read more, learn a new skill, start a business, improve their relationships or become more disciplined. But intentions alone do not create results. Intentions are like the destination on a map. They tell us where we want to go, but they don’t take us there. Action is what moves us forward. This is why a growth mindset is closely connected with action. Instead of thinking and saying, “I am not good at this,” one should think and say, “I am not good at this yet.” The word yet changes everything. It turns a permanent judgment into an invitation to learn. Small actions repeated consistently can produce remarkable results over time.

Inner Content Matters More than External Appearance. Consider a balloon. The balloon’s colour does not determine whether it rises into the sky. What is inside makes it rise. The same principle applies to human beings. External appearance may attract attention, but what truly determines our direction is what we carry within us—our beliefs, values, knowledge, attitude, discipline, courage and willingness to learn. Two people may appear equally capable on the outside, yet their results can differ completely because of their internal mindset. A growth mindset therefore asks us to balance appearances with what we develop inside.

Surrounding Environment. One of the strongest influences on our growth is the company we keep. The people around us can shape our thinking, habits, ambitions and even our understanding of what is possible. If we spend time with people who constantly complain, discourage learning, or fear change, their attitudes can gradually influence us. On the other hand, being surrounded by curious, positive and hardworking people can encourage us to think bigger and challenge ourselves. This does not mean that we should only associate with people who agree with us. In fact, people who respectfully challenge our ideas can help us grow even more. A growth mindset welcomes feedback because feedback provides an opportunity to improve.

Travel and Experiences. Growth also comes from stepping outside familiar surroundings. Travel exposes us to different cultures, languages, lifestyles and ways of thinking. We discover many ways to live, work, communicate, and solve problems. But travel does not necessarily mean going to another country. We can travel through books, conversations, education, new experiences and meeting people who are different from us. Every new experience can become a lesson if we are willing to learn from it.

Feeding the Body and Mind. Our physical and mental growth are also affected by what we consume. Food fuels the body, while information fuels the mind. What we read, watch and listen to influences our thoughts. Just as unhealthy food can affect our physical well-being, constantly consuming negative or unproductive information can affect our mental outlook.

Using Knowledge, Skill, Attitude and Wisdom.

Knowledge tells you what to say.

Skill tells you how to say it.

Attitude tells you how much to say.

Wisdom tells you whether to say it or not.

- Knowledge is the foundation. It gives us information and understanding. But knowledge alone is not enough.

- We also need skill, i.e., the ability to apply what we know effectively.

- Then comes attitude. Our attitude determines how we approach people, challenges and opportunities. A person with knowledge and skill but a poor attitude may still struggle to succeed.

- Finally comes wisdom. Wisdom helps us understand when to use knowledge and when silence may be better. It teaches us that being capable of saying something does not necessarily mean that we should say it.

True growth is therefore not simply about becoming more knowledgeable. It is about becoming more thoughtful.

Failure Is Part of Growth. We often treat failure as evidence that we are not capable. But failure can also be evidence that we tried something difficult. Every mistake can show what needs to change. A child learning to walk falls many times, but we do not call the child a failure. We understand that falling is part of learning. Adults should give themselves the same permission to learn. The important question after failure is not, “Why am I so bad at this?” but, “What can I learn from this, and what will I do differently next time?”

The Journey Matters. Ultimately, a growth mindset is about understanding that success is not a fixed destination. It is a journey of continuous development. Our definition of success may change. Our circumstances may change. Our priorities may change. What remains within our control is our willingness to learn, adapt and take action. The people we surround ourselves with, the experiences we seek, the information we consume, the skills we practise and the conversations we have with ourselves all contribute to the direction of our lives. We cannot always control what happens to us, but we can influence how we respond.

So, instead of asking only, “Am I successful?”

perhaps we should also ask:

Am I learning?

Am I improving?

Am I taking action?

Am I becoming wiser?

A growth mindset reminds us that we are not finished products. We are works in progress. The real meaning of success is not simply achieving a goal, but having the courage, curiosity and discipline to keep growing throughout the journey of life.

(Grateful to the Professor).

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

September 4, 2026

847: DETERRENCE IN THE AUTONOMOUS WARFARE SCENARIO

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of “News Analytics” magazine

The character of warfare evolves alongside technological innovation. Today, another transformative revolution is reshaping global security. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous weapons systems, and human-machine teaming into military operations is underway.

Deterrence has traditionally depended on a human adversary believing that the costs of aggression will outweigh its expected benefits. Nuclear weapons made this logic especially powerful by creating the prospect of unacceptable retaliation.

Autonomous warfare, however, is altering the speed, visibility and psychology of military competition. Artificial intelligence-enabled systems can detect, classify, track and engage targets with limited human intervention. In contrast, autonomous drones, loitering munitions, cyber tools, underwater vehicles and defensive systems may operate across several domains simultaneously. The central question is whether autonomous systems will replace conventional or nuclear deterrence or alter its dynamics.

The Transformative Effects on Deterrence

At the core of this transformation is the integration of AI across the full spectrum of military functions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, command and control, logistics, and, increasingly, the application of force. Autonomous platforms (ranging from loitering munitions and drone swarms to AI-enabled decision-support systems) operate with varying degrees of independence once activated. Human-machine teaming seeks to combine the strengths of both.

Autonomous systems are particularly suited to denial because they can support persistent sensing, distributed defence, and rapid disruption. Unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor approaches to military installations; autonomous underwater systems can observe maritime activity; ground robots can support border surveillance; and AI-enabled command systems can fuse information from multiple sensors. A networked force may complicate an adversary’s effort to achieve surprise, suppress defences or destroy high-value targets.

Autonomy can enhance capability by allowing military systems to process enormous quantities of data and act faster than human operators. An AI-enabled surveillance network may identify changes in an adversary’s deployment patterns before traditional intelligence systems do. Autonomous platforms can then maintain continuous patrols, coordinate with one another and respond to selected threats without waiting for detailed instructions. Such capabilities may strengthen deterrence by denial.

The importance of denial will increase as military forces become more dispersed. Instead of protecting a small number of vulnerable platforms, states may deploy large numbers of mobile, concealed and networked systems. An adversary would then face a difficult targeting problem: destroying some autonomous platforms would not necessarily turn off the entire force. This resilience can reduce the attractiveness of a first strike.

Autonomy can influence credibility. A state with resilient, dispersed, and relatively inexpensive autonomous systems may be able to respond to aggression even after suffering damage to its command centres, air bases, or naval facilities. Swarms and unmanned systems can generate operational effects without exposing large numbers of personnel to danger. This may make retaliation more politically acceptable and therefore more credible.

Autonomy can also impose operational costs. Defensive systems may use algorithms to detect incoming missiles, drones or aircraft and recommend or initiate responses. If these systems are reliable and their employment conditions are clearly defined, they can reduce the prospect that an adversary will achieve a quick victory. The strategic message becomes: aggression will encounter a persistent, adaptive and difficult-to-suppress defence.

Escalation Dynamics

The most serious challenge is compressed decision time. Autonomous systems can identify and respond to threats faster than human institutions can verify information, consult political leaders or establish whether an incident was deliberate. In a crisis, this may generate a “use-or-lose” mentality. Commanders may fear that delaying action will allow an adversary’s autonomous systems to destroy their own sensors, communications or retaliatory forces.

Machine-speed operations can therefore create pressure for pre-delegation. Political and military leaders may authorise automated responses in advance because human approval would be too slow. Yet pre-delegation carries significant risks. An algorithm may misinterpret a civilian aircraft, a training exercise or a cyber intrusion as an attack. A technical malfunction could trigger a chain of responses that neither side intended.

Autonomous warfare also creates the possibility of machine-to-machine interaction. One state’s defensive algorithm may classify the activation of another state’s autonomous system as hostile. The second state may then respond automatically, producing reciprocal escalation. Unlike human decision-makers, algorithms do not possess political intuition, historical memory or an inherent preference for restraint. They optimise according to programmed objectives and available data. If the data are incomplete or manipulated, the resulting decision may be technically rational but strategically disastrous.

Strategic Stability

Autonomous warfare will have its most consequential impact on strategic stability when it interacts with nuclear forces. AI-enabled systems may improve early warning, intelligence analysis and the protection of nuclear assets. They could help identify suspicious activity and strengthen command-and-control resilience. In this respect, autonomy may reduce uncertainty and support more informed decisions.

The opposite is also possible. AI-enabled surveillance and autonomous strike systems could threaten mobile missiles, submarines, command centres and communications networks. If one state believes that its nuclear deterrent is becoming vulnerable, it may adopt more aggressive readiness postures or delegate greater authority to military commanders. The combination of improved detection, persistent tracking and rapid attack could generate fears of a disarming first strike.

This danger is not limited to actual technical capability. Perception also does matter. A state may respond to what it believes an adversary can do, even if the adversary’s systems are not as effective as assumed. Strategic competition could consequently become unstable through exaggerated assessments of AI-enabled counterforce capabilities. The combination of advanced intelligence, strike systems and missile defence may challenge the traditional assumption that retaliation remains assured after a first strike.

Autonomous systems may also blur the boundary between conventional and nuclear operations. An attack on dual-use command-and-control infrastructure by conventional autonomous weapons could be interpreted as preparation for a nuclear attack. If a state cannot distinguish between an anti-conventional operation and an anti-nuclear operation, it may escalate rapidly. Maintaining clear separation between nuclear and conventional assets, preserving human decision authority and establishing crisis communication channels will therefore become increasingly important.

Implications for India and Regional Security

For India, autonomous warfare is directly relevant to a security environment characterised by contested borders, maritime competition, terrorism, cyber threats, and the possibility of simultaneous pressure from multiple directions. Autonomous systems can enhance surveillance along difficult terrain, improve maritime domain awareness and support the protection of critical infrastructure. They can also strengthen deterrence by denial by making surprise incursions, drone attacks and limited aggression more difficult to execute successfully.

However, technology alone cannot provide deterrence. India would require an integrated architecture combining sensors, secure communications, electronic warfare, cyber resilience, air defence, space-based support and trained human operators. Autonomous platforms must remain connected to a wider command-and-control system that can function even when communications are degraded, or networks are attacked.

Concluding Thoughts

The transition to algorithm-assisted autonomous warfare will not change the basic concept of strategic deterrence. It will mandate a more controlled version of it. One that accounts for machine-speed decision cycles and distributed, ambiguous chains of responsibility. It will also have to cater for an adversary whose calculations are also based on software architectures. Autonomy will create an additional layer of deterrence, one based on persistent surveillance, rapid response, distributed force structures, denial of objectives and the ability to impose costs at machine speed.

As autonomous capabilities continue to grow, policymakers will have the important task of adapting and finding balance during this transition. In autonomous warfare, deterrence will depend not just on cutting-edge technologies but also on ensuring these systems operate within clear, transparent guidelines, robust command structures, well-rounded legal frameworks, and internationally accepted norms. The goal isn’t to slow technological progress, but to ensure that humans, who are ultimately responsible for warfare, still have the power to choose peace.

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References: –

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (2019). Artificial intelligence and national security: Indian perspectives. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Rajaraman, V. (2014). Robot soldiers: Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare. Resonance, 19(11), 1037–1048.

Horowitz, M. C. (2016). The ethics & morality of robotic warfare: Assessing the debate over autonomous weapons. Political Science Quarterly, 131(2), 331–351.

Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Peldán Carlsson, M. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Su, F., Wan, W., Saalman, L., & Chernavskikh, V. (2025). Pragmatic approaches to governance at the artificial intelligence–nuclear nexus. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Peldán Carlsson, M. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Johnson, J. (2020). Artificial intelligence, drone swarming and deterrence. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(5), 1–24.
Horowitz, M. C. (2019). When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapons, deterrence, and stability. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(5), 764–788.

September 3, 2026September 1, 2026

846: VEER GUARDIAN 2026: SMALL EXERCISE WITH LARGER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Inputs shared with journalists on the joint Indo-Japan air exercise “Veer Guardian 2026”

India and Japan’s air forces will conduct a joint training exercise, Veer Guardian 26, from September 9 to 21 in the Jodhpur area of Rajasthan, western India. As part of the joint training, Tokyo will deploy three F-2 fighter jets to India, as well as about 110 personnel from the Eighth Air Wing stationed at Tsuiki Airbase in southwestern Japan’s Fukuoka prefecture.

The first-time deployment of Japan’s fighter aircraft for Exercise Veer Guardian 26 is an important milestone in India–Japan air cooperation. High-end air combat training on each other’s soil signals a major increment in the partnership and defence cooperation.

Air Exercise

Veer Guardian introduces cooperation at the sharp end of air power: fighter operations, mission planning, air-combat training, communications, deconfliction and the practical problems of deploying and sustaining aircraft on a foreign airbase. The larger objective is therefore not platform-versus-platform competition, but gradually building a more interoperable air ecosystem.

The exercise provides both sides with an opportunity to understand different operating philosophies and equipment ecosystems. The JASDF operates predominantly US-origin or US-derived platforms, while the IAF fields a much more diverse inventory combining Russian, French, Israeli, indigenous and other technologies. Training across these differences matters because interoperability cannot be created through political agreements alone. It has to be built through repeated operational contact.

Strategic and Geopolitical Importance

For years, Indo-Japan bilateral security cooperation has been centred on diplomatic consultations, senior-level exchanges, logistics arrangements and broader Indo-Pacific initiatives. That relationship is now acquiring a more operational character.

The agreements reached during the India-Japan defence ministerial meeting (in August 2026) confirm this trend. The two countries agreed to conduct more complex exercises at short notice. They also agreed to expand cooperation in operational activities, intelligence, equipment, technology, and the defence industry.

That makes Veer Guardian 2026 less an isolated fighter exercise than one component of an increasingly institutionalised defence relationship under the India-Japan “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”

The exercise aligns with other tracks of a more resilient partnership, namely defence industry cooperation, maritime domain awareness, and economic security.

For Japan, this is part of a broader shift from “defence only” postures to expeditionary, coalition-capable air operations, including long-range deployments and integration with non-US partners.

Indo-Pacific context

Exercise Veer Guardian 26 also fits well within the larger Indo-Pacific framework. It follows the India–Japan agreement on Maritime Security Cooperation, signed at the defence ministers’ meeting on 20 Aug 26. The agreement stresses interoperability, security of the sea lanes of communication, and a ‘stable Indo-Pacific order’.

It dovetails with other bilateral/multilateral drills: Malabar (navies), Dharma Guardian (armies), JAIMEX (special forces), and the expanding US–Japan–India–Australia web of exercises.

Strategically, this is a sort of minilateralism. Defence ties and cooperation without a formal alliance. It should be viewed as one component of a much larger India-Japan military relationship that is becoming increasingly operational.

Upset China

India maintains defence and strategic relationships with a wide range of countries (including the United States, Japan, France, Russia and Southeast Asian partners. Its objective is to expand strategic options rather than subordinate its security policy to any single bloc.

India conducts joint exercises with numerous nations to learn best practices and improve interoperability. These engagements do not mean that India is joining a military bloc. This is best understood as alignment without alliance. India’s participation should therefore not be interpreted as a decision to join an anti-China coalition. Veer Guardian fits that model, and not every event should be viewed through a China lens.

Japan and India confront different manifestations of the same broad strategic challenge. Japan is increasingly concerned about China’s military power and its activities in the East China Sea, around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and across the western Pacific. India faces China along the Line of Actual Control and is increasingly attentive to China’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

India and Japan are Special Strategic and Global Partners with converging interests in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries have disagreements and clash of interest with China. They view China’s military modernisation, grey-zone activities and territorial assertiveness as challenges. Such joint military events naturally make China wary and uncomfortable.

Future Trajectory

Veer Guardian 26 can be seen as an early building block of a much deeper India-Japan security relationship. Such frequent, routine deployments reduce political and logistical barriers. Future exercises could involve larger participation and scope. Deployments could include more fighter aircraft, support aircraft, unmanned systems, and electronic-warfare elements. They could expand to include more complex fighter training, stronger logistics cooperation, and increasingly rapid or short-notice deployments.

Concluding Thoughts

The scale of Japanese participation (with three fighters and about 110 personnel) is modest. Veer Guardian 26 is therefore best understood as a milestone rather than a military game-changer. Its immediate combat value may be limited, but its interoperability dividend is significant. Its political signalling value is even greater.

The exercise demonstrates that:

- Japan can deploy combat aircraft to India and sustain them there;
- the two air forces are willing to deepen tactical interoperability;
- Japan is gaining experience operating militarily farther from its immediate home environment;
- the bilateral relationship is becoming increasingly connected to the wider Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The future iterations are likely to grow in complexity if the political relationship and defence cooperation continue on their current trajectory.

Bottom Line

India and Japan are not creating an alliance. They are creating the interoperable capacity to act together.

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References and credits

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References: –

Japan Ministry of Defence, “Japan-India joint press statement”, Japan Ministry of Defence, 20 Aug 26.

Japan Ministry of Defence, “Extraordinary press conference by Defence Minister Koizumi on Thursday, August 20, 2026, at 3:02 PM”, Japan Ministry of Defence, 20 Aug 26.

Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “IAF & Japan Air Self Defence Force set to exercise jointly in Japan”, Press Information Bureau. 07 Jan 26.

Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “IAF’s joint air defence exercise with Japan, ‘Veer Guardian 2023’ concludes”, Press Information Bureau. 27 Jan 26.

Embassy of India, Tokyo, “Veer Guardian 2023”, Embassy of India, Tokyo, 2026.

Embassy of India, Tokyo, “India-Japan defence cooperation”, Embassy of India, Tokyo, 2026.

The Diplomat, “JASDF fighter jets to visit India for first time”, The Diplomat, Aug 26.