857: Veer Guardian 2026 Brings Air Exercises in the Limelight

 

Discussion with Shivan Chanana on the “DefencePulse” program of WION TV  

Talked about  “Beyond Exercise Veer Guardian”:  Japanese fighter operates from Indian soil for the first time. Fighters fly together: India & Japan build greater air force interoperability. India and Japan are moving from air exercises to deeper synergy.

 

Link to the WION post:-

 

 

Inputs to the questionnaire from a journalist on exercise.

 

  1. What’s driving the jump in India’s exercise tempo in the last 12–18 months?

I don’t think there’s really a “jump” in the strict sense. India has been steadily engaging in bilateral and multilateral exercises with a wide range of countries as part of its defence cooperation and military diplomacy for years now. What has changed is media attention. These exercises are, in fact, a continuation of an established trajectory. India’s participation has also evolved and expanded in scope over time, a logical progression as its defence relationships and operational engagements grow.

 

  1. Given today’s volatile geopolitics, China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and persistent border/maritime tensions—is India’s surge in joint exercises about deterrence, asserting power, or both?

In my view, it would be difficult to characterise these exercises primarily as being about either deterrence or power projection. At its core, India’s participation is an evolving, natural progression, increasing in scope and complexity as our forces mature and our partnerships deepen.

That said, these exercises do carry strategic and political signalling value. Globally, partners and adversaries alike read into who exercises with whom, and how often.  Highly complex, multi-domain drills (such as Malabar, Tarang Shakti, or Yudh Abhyas) signal that India has both high-end capability and coalition interoperability. Expanding exercise zones into the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and deep into the Southern IOR asserts India’s status as a power capable of out-of-area contingency responses.

The exercises should therefore be seen in the broader context of India’s growing engagement with different countries and armed forces, rather than being attributed to a single strategic objective.

 

  1. Apart from geopolitical benefits, what are the military benefits for a country conducting these many exercises?

Beyond diplomacy and geopolitics, these exercises yield critical military-technical advantages. Exercises provide several direct military benefits:

    • They increase interoperability between participating forces, including communications, procedures, command relationships and tactical coordination.
    • They allow each force to learn from the other’s operational practices, training methods, logistics systems and tactical experience.
    • They build military-to-military familiarity and trust, which are particularly valuable during a crisis.
    • They expose personnel to unfamiliar operating environments, doctrines and equipment.
    • They improve the ability to conduct coordinated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime-security and evacuation operations.
    • They strengthen military solidarity and professional relationships among participating forces.

 

  1. How do these exercises fit into India’s broader alliance calculus balancing Quad engagements, SCO ties with Russia/China, and deeper drills with France/UK without slipping into a NATO-style bloc?

India engages in joint bilateral and multilateral exercises across a wide spectrum of partners, but that participation does not signal a drift toward any military alliance. Strategic autonomy remains a cornerstone of Indian policy, and historically India has never been part of a formal military alliance. Exercising with multiple, even competing, blocs simultaneously is entirely consistent with that autonomy; it is not a contradiction.  India’s model is closer to strategic autonomy with selective interoperability rather than a collective security model.

 

  1. What’s one clear sign this high tempo of exercises will last, not just a short spike? For example, more back-to-back drills, new first-time exercises with partners, or procurement/MRO deals linked to the platforms used in these drills.

These exercises are not ad hoc events. The proposals are drawn up for three-to five-year horizons and put up for in-principle approval, followed by detailed annual planning. Naturally, execution of the planned calendar depends on several factors. The mix of exercise partners (old and new) changes with the geopolitical landscape. These exercises are not intended to secure defence procurement deals. Dedicated platforms like DefExpo or Aero India serve that function. However, they do advertise and showcase exportable equipment.

 

  1. Where do you see the clearest line from exercise outcomes to procurement/co-production in the next 12–24 months?

Exercises primarily have an operational and training purpose. They can improve understanding of each other’s capabilities and operating procedures, but that does not mean that participation will automatically lead to a procurement or co-production agreement. Those decisions are driven by separate strategic, operational, technological and commercial considerations. The two tracks, operational exercises and acquisition, are largely separate and run through different processes and forums.

 

  1. Is it smarter for India to keep connections and allies across groups—Quad, SCO, France/UK rather than locking into one bloc like NATO, and does this exercise-heavy approach fit India’s non-aligned strategy better?

India engages with countries across different blocs based on mutual interest and benefit, not bloc allegiance. This approach is consistent with India’s long-standing emphasis on strategic autonomy. Maintaining defence relationships across different groupings gives India greater flexibility to cooperate with individual countries on areas of common interest without necessarily joining a formal military bloc.

 

  1. With drills stretching from the Bay of Bengal to the Western Pacific and new activities with Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines and others, is India subtly pushing back on China’s “String of Pearls,” and how does this change the South Asian geopolitical game?

I would not characterise India’s exercise engagements as being directed at any particular adversary. They are part of India’s broader defence cooperation with partner countries.

That said, the interoperability and logistical familiarity built through these exercises do enable operations across diverse geographies.

Clearly, a common strategic concern or adversary can incentivise closer defence cooperation, including joint exercises, between two or more countries. But that does not mean that every exercise should be viewed through that lens.

 

  1. India is deepening economic and diplomatic ties with both the US and China, while simultaneously building military power through these exercises, does this “engage all, prepare for all” approach work, or does it risk overstretch and mixed signals?

The sound policy is to engage everyone, including potential adversaries. International relations have no permanent friends or enemies; national interests and the geopolitical environment are dynamic and can change over time. India therefore has an interest in maintaining relationships across different groupings while building the capabilities necessary to protect its own interests. The challenge is to maintain that flexibility while ensuring that defence engagements remain aligned with India’s broader strategic priorities.

 

  1. With India-Japan air drills and other IAF exercises, which air-domain capabilities and platforms are being stress-tested, and what does that mean for spares, engines, and MRO in India?

These exercises have significant training and learning value, particularly in terms of operational procedures, interoperability and exposure to different methods of conducting air operations.

However, I would not describe them as placing extraordinary additional stress on the aircraft or leading to exceptional spare consumption. The flying and maintenance requirements associated with exercises are generally factored into the annual spare and maintenance support planning.

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References and credits

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The information and data in this blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

856: Podcast with Ashtosh on “The Brand Called You”

 

I was privileged to be hosted at  “The Brand Called You (TBCY)”. I had an interesting, thought-provoking conversation with Ashutosh Garg on the rapidly evolving landscape of air and space warfare.

The conversation explored the changing nature of warfare, lessons from recent global conflicts, emerging technologies, and the capabilities needed for a resilient and future-ready aerospace ecosystem.

 

00:00 – Introduction to Air Marshal Anil Khosla

01:12 – Defining Moments in Leadership & Military Strategy

02:57 – Strategic Lessons from Doklam & Balakot

05:26 – Rapid Evolution in Air & Space Warfare

07:23 – Lessons from Global Conflicts: Ukraine, Israel & Iran

08:59 – Understanding China’s Military Mindset

11:42 – China’s Military-Civil Fusion Model

13:12 – Drones vs. Fighter Aircraft: What’s the Future?

15:31 – The Strategic Importance & Vulnerabilities of Space

19:10 – Should India Establish a Full Aerospace Command?

22:47 – AI in Air Combat: Replacing Pilots?

25:31 – The Threat of AI-Enabled Cognitive & Information Warfare

28:28 – Three Key Investments for India’s Aerospace Capabilities

30:44 – Personal Reflections & Advice for Young Officers

32:14 – Closing Thoughts

 

Link to the Podcast:-

Key Takeaways

Adapt Quickly to Technological Change: The future of warfare is moving beyond pilot- and platform-centric models toward integrated ecosystems involving drones, AI, networked assets, and advanced technologies. Anticipating technological shifts will be increasingly important for future preparedness.

Build Resilience and Self-Reliance: Recent conflicts have highlighted the importance of indigenous capabilities, resilient supply chains, and secure infrastructure. From satellites and aerospace systems to cyber capabilities, resilience is becoming increasingly important.

Understand Information Warfare and AI: Modern conflicts extend beyond the physical battlefield into the information and cognitive domains. AI-enabled misinformation and perception management highlight the importance of media literacy, responsible AI development, and stronger information resilience.

 

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853: Putin’s Visit and BRICS Summit

 

The 18th BRICS Summit is being held on September 12–13, 2026, at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, under India’s BRICS chairship.

    • Key Leaders: President Vladimir Putin (Russia), President Xi Jinping (China), and President Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa)
    • Expanded Members: Represented by top officials and leaders, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto. Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira represents Brazil as President Lula da Silva attends local elections.
    • Core Agenda. Discussions on multilateral cooperation, economics, and reforming international institutions.
    • Bilateral Meetings: High-profile sideline talks focusing on energy, commerce, and regional diplomacy.

Negotiators are working to finalise a consensus text covering regional security, trade, and financial frameworks. The media is already reading between the lines to extrapolate the summit outcome and the messages emerging out of bilateral talks.

 

Talked to Navbharat News

We talked about the following: –

The Modi-Putin bilateral (held 11 September 2026 on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi) treats defence, energy/trade, and the broader strategic partnership as interconnected priorities rather than ranking one as clearly dominant.

Technology-transfer expectations (especially around Su-57 production tech).

Expanding trade in national currencies and working to reduce dependence on the dollar.

On Trump-related tariffs and BRICS de-dollarisation challenging the dollar.

Sectors of greatest potential benefit for India.

India’s balancing policy.

BRICS de-dollarisation and Chinese-currency risk.

Biggest change in India-Russia relations over the next 2–3 years.

Link to the talk:-

 

Inputs provided to a journalist on the likely SU-57 deal

Q1: Is Russia backtracking from the earlier offer?

I wouldn’t call it backing away, backtracking, or a reversal. Instead, I’d call it Russia negotiating.

The original Russian pitch was unusually ambitious. In 2025, Russia reportedly offered India the Su-57E with local production and technology transfer, including production and long-term upgrade cooperation.

But there are several layers in the phrase technology transfer:

    • transfer of assembly technology
    • transfer of manufacturing processes
    • transfer of maintenance/overhaul capability
    • transfer of component manufacturing
    • access to design documentation
    • access to mission-system/software interfaces
    • and, at the highest level, transfer of genuinely sensitive technologies such as stealth treatments, AESA technology, EW systems, propulsion and materials/process know-how

Peskov’s remarks do not indicate that Russia is retracting its Su-57 technology-transfer offer. They do, however, confirm that the phrase “technology transfer” is not a settled, unlimited commitment. Moscow appears to be distinguishing between a political offer of cooperation and the specific production technologies, source code, design data, and intellectual property India wants.

It depends on how much Russia is willing to share and at what cost.

 

  1. Should India buy the Su-57 off the shelf if production-tech transfer isn’t agreed?

The answer is no, as it does not serve the purpose. India’s interest is to become self-reliant while maintaining minimum deterrence. To achieve this aim, India doesn’t merely need another fighter aircraft. It needs quality platforms along with access to associated technology to advance its indigenous program.

India is simultaneously trying to develop AMCA as its indigenous fifth-generation fighter. The government has been moving the programme forward, with private-sector contenders now involved in the development/production process. Therefore, India shouldn’t allow the Su-57 to become a substitute for AMCA.

Bottom line: India should buy the Su-57 only if it comes with an industrial capability (at a reasonable cost), not merely an aircraft.

  

Video Bytes for Vistaar News

The video bytes cover the meaning and message of President Putin’s second visit to India in 9 months and his meeting with PM Modi before the BRICS summit.

Link to the Video Bytes:-

https://youtu.be/6mm-KSTsS-8?si=wFwU2pQ4FY03VQYN

 

New Delhi Declaration

 Reportedly, the BRICS nations have unanimously adopted the New Delhi Declaration 2026 on the opening day of the summit at Bharat Mandapam. Achieving a full consensus was hailed as a major diplomatic success, especially given deep geopolitical divisions and sharp initial disagreements between member states like Iran and the UAE.

Key declarations and takeaways from the joint document include:

  1. Geopolitical Conflicts & Middle East Restraint
    • Call for Calm: The declaration urges restraint regarding escalating conflicts in West Asia and the Middle East, specifically highlighting a firm opposition to the forced displacement of Palestinians.
    • Peaceful Resolution: Member nations underlined the importance of preventing conflict, addressing root causes, and resolving international disputes through dialogue, consultation, and diplomacy.
    • Sovereignty Protection: Leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, emphasised the need to oppose sovereignty violations and interference in other nations’ internal affairs.
  1. Global Trade & Trade Protectionism
    • Rejection of Unilateral Barriers: The document strongly condemns arbitrary trade restrictions and unilateral tariffs.
    • Supply Chain Security: Members pledged to work collectively to maintain the smooth, unhindered flow of global trade, energy, and vulnerable supply chains.
    • De-Dollarisation: The grouping reiterated its push for local-currency settlements in cross-border trade to reduce dependence on Western-dominated financial networks.
  1. Global Governance & WTO Reform
    • UNSC Restructuring: The declaration calls for a “structural update” and reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to give the Global South a louder voice and better representation.
    • WTO Dispute Mechanism: The bloc explicitly demanded the immediate restoration of a fully functioning, two-tier dispute settlement mechanism at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the swift appointment of new Appellate Body members.
  1. Public Health & Technical Cooperation
    • Global Health Focus: In a significant healthcare push, the declaration formally recognises obesity and Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) as major public health threats.
    • Mental Health Initiatives: The text established a new mechanism to govern a network of Centers of Excellence (CoEs) aimed at integrating mental well-being and psychosocial interventions directly into primary healthcare systems.

 

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