867: CHINA’S DREAM: ROAD BLOCKS AND ROAD AHEAD

 

China’s rise is a long-term political and strategic project aimed at restoring the country’s position as a leading world power. Under President Xi Jinping, this ambition has been articulated through the concept of the Chinese Dream, i.e., the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In a 2012 speech, Xi linked national rejuvenation to the goal of building a modern socialist country by 2049 (the centenary year of the founding of the People’s Republic of China).

China’s approach is economic rise through the industrial route. The strategic question is whether China can convert its economic scale into comprehensive global power. That requires more than manufacturing dominance. It requires technological independence, diplomatic influence, military capability, secure borders and the ability to shape international rules. China’s challenge also includes pursuing its interests without creating a regional coalition determined to contain its rise.

The years 2035, 2047 and 2049 are important milestones. 2035 is an official modernisation milestone; 2049 is the stated centenary horizon for national rejuvenation; and 2047 can be treated as an analytical marker for assessing China’s regional and global ambitions, rather than a formally established deadline for world domination.

 

China’s Approach: Industrial Foundation of Strategic Power

China’s ambitions depend heavily on its manufacturing base. Industrial capacity provides employment, export revenue, technological learning and the ability to produce goods at enormous scale.

The original Made in China 2025 initiative focused on upgrading domestic industry and reducing reliance on foreign technology in strategic sectors. China’s subsequent industrial and economic plans have continued to emphasise advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, robotics and scientific self-reliance.

The 2035 objective is broader than simply producing more goods. Beijing wants China to become a technological power capable of designing, developing and manufacturing critical technologies rather than depending on foreign suppliers.

Yet industrial scale has limitations. Manufacturing leadership does not automatically produce technological independence, strong consumer demand, high household incomes or sustainable economic growth. China must also contend with demographic pressures, debt, property-sector difficulties and the challenge of shifting towards consumption-led growth.

 

Xi Jinping’s Global Initiatives

China’s global initiatives are designed to expand its influence through infrastructure, development finance, trade, security cooperation and international institutions.

The Belt and Road Initiative has helped Beijing build economic connections across Asia, Africa, Europe and other regions. The Global Development, Security and Civilisation Initiatives express broader Chinese ambitions to influence how international development, security and political diversity are discussed.

These initiatives are not identical, and countries participate for different reasons. Some seek investment, infrastructure and market access; others are attracted by China’s diplomatic support or preference for non-interference in domestic political affairs.

An important dimension of this approach is Beijing’s argument that no single political model is suitable for every country. China promotes its own system of governance, in which Communist Party leadership is central to political authority and national development.

This presents an alternative to the Western argument that liberal democracy, competitive elections and individual political freedoms should be central to legitimate governance.

However, an alternative model is not necessarily universally accepted. China’s ability to attract partners depends on whether its economic engagement delivers lasting benefits, whether its diplomacy addresses the concerns of smaller countries, and whether other governments trust its intentions.

 

Conflict of Interest with the USA

 The United States has increasingly treated China as both an economic competitor and a strategic challenger. American policy has included tariffs, export controls, investment restrictions and measures designed to limit Chinese access to sensitive technologies.

The broader strategic effect, however, is clear: Washington is attempting to limit certain Chinese capabilities while preserving or reshaping its own technological and industrial advantages.

Beijing has responded by emphasising self-reliance, domestic innovation and alternative supply chains. This creates a vicious circle: American restrictions increase China’s incentives to develop domestic alternatives, while China’s technological progress encourages further scrutiny from the United States. The result is a competition in which industrial policy, trade, technology and national security increasingly overlap.

 

Analytical Review

 One of the most provocative descriptions of China’s comparative position (vis-à-vis the USA) is that it is an economic heavyweight, a diplomatic lightweight and a military featherweight.

The phrase reflects the gap between the size of China’s economy and its capacity to translate that size into global leadership that is widely accepted by all. Yet, if taken literally, it fails to account for China’s rapid rise in its current diplomatic and military capabilities.

Economic Power. China is one of the largest economies in the world and plays a central role in manufacturing and trading. The country has considerable international influence due to its industrial capacity, its infrastructure, its technological development and its position within global supply chains.

Diplomatic Influence. China enjoys a great deal of influence via international organisations, trade ties, financing for infrastructure and through its partnerships with developing countries. Nevertheless, influence is uneven. Distrust among some neighbours, concerns about economic coercion and resistance to its maritime claims limit its ability to translate economic relationships into political support.

Military Power with Operational Constraints. China has invested heavily in its navy, air force, missile forces, space capabilities and nuclear deterrent. It is a major military power, not a featherweight. The more relevant question is how effectively it could use those capabilities in a particular conflict, especially far from the mainland or against an adversary supported by regional allies.

China’s challenge is therefore to integrate its economic, diplomatic, technological and military strengths into a coherent strategy. Its rivals, meanwhile, will seek to exploit the gaps between these different forms of power.

 

Road Ahead

 China’s long-term ambition is best understood as an effort to become a country with comprehensive national power: a modern industrial economy, technological self-reliance, a capable military, greater diplomatic influence and a stronger voice in international rule-making.

The road to that position is not guaranteed. China must address structural economic pressures, maintain innovation, manage its demographic transition and avoid turning regional neighbours into permanent strategic opponents. It must also decide how much economic disruption it is willing to tolerate in pursuit of territorial and security objectives.

The United States retains important advantages through its alliance network, advanced technology, financial system and global military reach. Japan, India, Australia and European powers also influence the strategic environment in which China operates. Other countries may welcome Chinese investment while remaining unwilling to accept Chinese political or military dominance.

The international system is therefore unlikely to be transformed by economic growth alone. Power will depend on the interaction of industrial capacity, technological leadership, alliances, institutional credibility and military effectiveness.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The China Dream is a long-term initiative aimed at national rejuvenation, with its targets for modernisation in 2035 and its milestone of the centenary in 2049 serving as official benchmarks against which Beijing’s achievements can be evaluated. 2047 may be used as a useful point for analysis, but it must not be mistaken for a verified deadline by which China will achieve global supremacy.

China has shown that economic development can change a country’s standing in the international arena. The next step is to determine whether that economic power can translate into solid diplomatic influence and reliable military deterrence without provoking a broader regional reaction.

Ultimately, China’s rise will be judged not only by the strength of its economy or armed forces, but also by its ability to manage disagreements, sustain partnerships and reassure other countries that its growing power need not come at their expense.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 22 Oct 22. Full text of resolution on the report of the 19th Central Committee.
  1. García-Herrero, A., & Krystyanczuk, M. How does China conduct industrial policy: Analyzing words versus deeds. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 24, Article 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-024-00413-w
  1. Chen, K., Meng, Q., Sun, Y., et al. How does industrial policy experimentation influence innovation performance? A case of Made in China 2025. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 11, Article 40, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-02497-x
  1. Han, X., & Liu, W. Belt and Road Initiative. In Oxford bibliographies in geography. Oxford University Press, 12 Jan 23.
  1. Yu, H. Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Springer, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9633-9
  1. S. Department of Defense. Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual report to Congress, 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
  1. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 23 Dec 23. USTR initiates Section 301 investigation on China’s acts, policies, and practices related to targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance.

 

866: CHINA: ONE DREAM, SIX STRATEGIC CHALLENGES, TWO KEY EVENTS

China’s rise is not simply an economic success story. It is also a long-term political and strategic project to restore the country’s position as a leading world power. Under President Xi Jinping, this ambition has been articulated through the concept of the Chinese Dream (the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation).

In a 2012 speech, Xi linked national rejuvenation to the goal of building a modern socialist country by 2049 (the centenary year of the founding of the People’s Republic of China). Beijing’s official development framework also identifies 2035 as a major milestone for technological advancement, economic strength and military modernisation.

The strategic question is whether China can convert its economic scale into comprehensive global power. That requires more than manufacturing dominance. It requires technological independence, diplomatic influence, military capability, secure borders and the ability to shape international rules.

Rejuvenation: Reclaiming Historical Greatness

The Chinese Communist Party views national rejuvenation as a response to a history of foreign interference and territorial losses. It considers restoring national pride through economic development a source of political legitimacy.

This vision also stems from outstanding sovereignty disputes. The most important example is Taiwan. Beijing considers Taiwan to be part of China. It has not ruled out using force to achieve unification; at the same time, Taiwan has its own government, elected by its citizens, and rejects Beijing’s claim to authority over the island.

In the South China Sea, China’s wide-ranging maritime claims overlap with those of a number of Southeast Asian countries, and on the Himalayan frontier its boundary dispute with India is still not resolved; at the same time, its relations with Japan are complicated by matters concerning the East China Sea, historical resentments and competing security interests.

These disputes should not all be described as a single programme of territorial conquest. They differ in their legal histories, strategic importance and diplomatic context. Nevertheless, they show how the pursuit of national rejuvenation can collide with neighbouring countries’ sovereignty and security concerns.

 China’s Six Challenges

Although China is facing a variety of geopolitical challenges, six relationships in particular have the potential to hinder its rise. These are also referred to as “six wars China has to fight”. This reflects the intensity of strategic competition, but it should not be taken to mean China will actually go to war with six countries.

 Taiwan. Taiwan is the most dangerous potential flashpoint because it combines sovereignty claims, military planning, advanced technology and the interests of the United States and its regional partners. A conflict could disrupt semiconductor production, maritime trade and global financial markets. It could also trigger a wider military confrontation. China can apply military, diplomatic, economic and information pressure without immediately resorting to invasion. Taiwan’s resilience, defensive capabilities, and the credibility of external support will shape Beijing’s calculations.

South China Sea. The South China Sea is vital to international shipping, fisheries, energy exploration and regional security. China seeks to protect its maritime interests and strengthen its presence, while other claimant states resist actions they consider inconsistent with their sovereignty and maritime rights. Coast guard operations, military deployments, island infrastructure and maritime law enforcement can all generate friction. A collision or miscalculation could escalate a limited incident into a wider crisis.

India. China and India are both major powers with unresolved border disputes and competing interests in Asia. The relationship involves trade, infrastructure, regional influence, and security competition. Although both countries want to avoid another serious border crisis, deep distrust remains. India’s strategic partnerships, military modernisation, and growing economic ambitions make it a key factor in China’s long-term calculations. At the same time, China remains an important economic and diplomatic actor for India. The relationship is therefore neither simply a military rivalry nor a straightforward contest for regional dominance. It combines competition with selective opportunities for cooperation.

Japan. Japan’s proximity to Taiwan, its maritime interests and its alliance with the United States place it at the centre of East Asian security. Disputes in the East China Sea, concerns about Chinese military activity and tensions surrounding Taiwan have encouraged Japan to strengthen its defence posture. Japan is also a significant technological and industrial power. Its economic and security partnerships with the United States and other regional states complicate China’s efforts to establish a dominant regional position.

Mongolia. Mongolia occupies a sensitive geographic position between China and Russia. Its economic dependence on its two large neighbours creates strategic constraints, while its pursuit of diversified international relationships gives it room to manoeuvre. China has strong interests in Mongolian minerals, energy, transport links and trade. Nevertheless, there is no sound basis for treating Mongolia as an inevitable military opponent of China. Its significance lies more in regional access, resource security and the balance between Chinese and Russian influence than in the likelihood of a direct war.

Russia. China and Russia have expanded cooperation in trade, energy, and diplomacy, and have opposed aspects of US-led international influence. Their relationship is strategically important, but it is not a formal alliance with identical interests. Historical mistrust, geographic asymmetries and competition for influence in parts of Eurasia remain relevant. Russia can provide China with energy and diplomatic support, yet Beijing must also account for the risks of secondary sanctions, instability near its borders and excessive dependence on any single partner. For these reasons, Russia belongs in an assessment of China’s strategic relationships.

 

Timelines & Influencing Events

The years 2035, 2047, and 2049 are important milestones. 2035 is an official modernisation milestone; 2049 is the stated centenary horizon for national rejuvenation; and 2047 can be treated as an analytical marker for assessing China’s regional and global ambitions, rather than a formally established deadline for world domination.

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party is scheduled for October 2026. Official statements identify party governance and discipline as the primary topics, alongside a review of the economic situation and policy priorities. The meeting’s policies are expected to reflect Beijing’s priorities in economic restructuring, technological self-reliance, national security, and long-term political governance.

In the United States, the congressional midterm elections on 3 November 2026 will determine the makeup of the House of Representatives and part of the Senate. The outcome may affect trade policy, defence spending, aid to Taiwan, export controls and the political room available for negotiations with Beijing.

Domestic politics in Beijing and Washington could influence the next phase of strategic competition. Neither event should be interpreted as a trigger for military action. Chinese strategic decisions depend on multiple factors, including military readiness, economic conditions, domestic stability and the expected response of the United States and its partners.

Concluding Thoughts

The China Dream is a long-term initiative aimed at national rejuvenation, with its 2035 modernisation targets and the 2049 centenary milestone serving as official benchmarks against which Beijing’s achievements can be evaluated. 2047 may be a useful point for analysis, but it must not be mistaken for a verified deadline by which China will achieve global supremacy. Economic development can change a country’s position in the international arena, but the next step is to determine whether that economic power can translate into solid diplomatic influence and credible military deterrence without provoking a broader regional reaction.

Taiwan, the South China Sea, India, Japan, Mongolia and Russia represent different dimensions of that challenge—not six inevitable wars, but six distinct strategic relationships requiring different approaches.

Ultimately, China’s rise will be judged not only by the strength of its economy or armed forces, but also by its ability to manage disagreements, sustain partnerships and reassure other countries that its growing power need not come at their expense.

The decisive question is not whether China can become powerful by 2047 or 2049. It is whether China can turn its growing power into a stable international position without making the rest of the world increasingly determined to resist it.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. The 2012 Chinese Dream speech, National Museum of China. (n.d.). The Chinese Dream.

https://www.neac.gov.cn/seac/c103372/202201/1156514.shtml

  1. State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (n.d.). Major targets in 14th Five-Year Plan. https://english.www.gov.cn/w/14thfiveyearplan/
  2. U.S. Department of Defense. (2024). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual report to Congress. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615417/-1/-1/0/2024-CMPR-FACT-SHEET.PDF
  3. Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
  4. Shambaugh, D. (2013). China goes global: The partial power. Oxford University Press.
  5. Congressional Research Service. Taiwan: Background and U.S. relations (IF10275), 05 Aug 2026.

 https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF10275.html

  1. Permanent Court of Arbitration. The South China Sea arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China): Award, 12 Jul 2012. https://pca-cpa.org/en/documents/publications/pca-award-series/
  2. Noorani, A. G. India–China boundary problem 1846–1947. Oxford University Press, 2011.

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198070689.001.0001

  1. Westcott, S. P. Armed coexistence: The dynamics of the intractable Sino-Indian border dispute. Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7450-1
  2. Government of Japan. National security strategy of Japan, 2022.

 https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou.html

  1. President of Mongolia. Press release on the Third Neighbour Trade Act legislative bill. 30 Jul 2018 https://president.mn/en/2018/07/30/press-release-on-third-neighbour-trade-act/
  2. U.S. Department of Defense. (2024). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual report to Congress. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615417/-1/-1/0/2024-CMPR-FACT-SHEET.PDF

857: Veer Guardian 2026 Brings Air Exercises in the Limelight

 

Discussion with Shivan Chanana on the “DefencePulse” program of WION TV  

Talked about  “Beyond Exercise Veer Guardian”:  Japanese fighter operates from Indian soil for the first time. Fighters fly together: India & Japan build greater air force interoperability. India and Japan are moving from air exercises to deeper synergy.

 

Link to the WION post:-

 

 

Inputs to the questionnaire from a journalist on exercise.

 

  1. What’s driving the jump in India’s exercise tempo in the last 12–18 months?

I don’t think there’s really a “jump” in the strict sense. India has been steadily engaging in bilateral and multilateral exercises with a wide range of countries as part of its defence cooperation and military diplomacy for years now. What has changed is media attention. These exercises are, in fact, a continuation of an established trajectory. India’s participation has also evolved and expanded in scope over time, a logical progression as its defence relationships and operational engagements grow.

 

  1. Given today’s volatile geopolitics, China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and persistent border/maritime tensions—is India’s surge in joint exercises about deterrence, asserting power, or both?

In my view, it would be difficult to characterise these exercises primarily as being about either deterrence or power projection. At its core, India’s participation is an evolving, natural progression, increasing in scope and complexity as our forces mature and our partnerships deepen.

That said, these exercises do carry strategic and political signalling value. Globally, partners and adversaries alike read into who exercises with whom, and how often.  Highly complex, multi-domain drills (such as Malabar, Tarang Shakti, or Yudh Abhyas) signal that India has both high-end capability and coalition interoperability. Expanding exercise zones into the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and deep into the Southern IOR asserts India’s status as a power capable of out-of-area contingency responses.

The exercises should therefore be seen in the broader context of India’s growing engagement with different countries and armed forces, rather than being attributed to a single strategic objective.

 

  1. Apart from geopolitical benefits, what are the military benefits for a country conducting these many exercises?

Beyond diplomacy and geopolitics, these exercises yield critical military-technical advantages. Exercises provide several direct military benefits:

    • They increase interoperability between participating forces, including communications, procedures, command relationships and tactical coordination.
    • They allow each force to learn from the other’s operational practices, training methods, logistics systems and tactical experience.
    • They build military-to-military familiarity and trust, which are particularly valuable during a crisis.
    • They expose personnel to unfamiliar operating environments, doctrines and equipment.
    • They improve the ability to conduct coordinated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime-security and evacuation operations.
    • They strengthen military solidarity and professional relationships among participating forces.

 

  1. How do these exercises fit into India’s broader alliance calculus balancing Quad engagements, SCO ties with Russia/China, and deeper drills with France/UK without slipping into a NATO-style bloc?

India engages in joint bilateral and multilateral exercises across a wide spectrum of partners, but that participation does not signal a drift toward any military alliance. Strategic autonomy remains a cornerstone of Indian policy, and historically India has never been part of a formal military alliance. Exercising with multiple, even competing, blocs simultaneously is entirely consistent with that autonomy; it is not a contradiction.  India’s model is closer to strategic autonomy with selective interoperability rather than a collective security model.

 

  1. What’s one clear sign this high tempo of exercises will last, not just a short spike? For example, more back-to-back drills, new first-time exercises with partners, or procurement/MRO deals linked to the platforms used in these drills.

These exercises are not ad hoc events. The proposals are drawn up for three-to five-year horizons and put up for in-principle approval, followed by detailed annual planning. Naturally, execution of the planned calendar depends on several factors. The mix of exercise partners (old and new) changes with the geopolitical landscape. These exercises are not intended to secure defence procurement deals. Dedicated platforms like DefExpo or Aero India serve that function. However, they do advertise and showcase exportable equipment.

 

  1. Where do you see the clearest line from exercise outcomes to procurement/co-production in the next 12–24 months?

Exercises primarily have an operational and training purpose. They can improve understanding of each other’s capabilities and operating procedures, but that does not mean that participation will automatically lead to a procurement or co-production agreement. Those decisions are driven by separate strategic, operational, technological and commercial considerations. The two tracks, operational exercises and acquisition, are largely separate and run through different processes and forums.

 

  1. Is it smarter for India to keep connections and allies across groups—Quad, SCO, France/UK rather than locking into one bloc like NATO, and does this exercise-heavy approach fit India’s non-aligned strategy better?

India engages with countries across different blocs based on mutual interest and benefit, not bloc allegiance. This approach is consistent with India’s long-standing emphasis on strategic autonomy. Maintaining defence relationships across different groupings gives India greater flexibility to cooperate with individual countries on areas of common interest without necessarily joining a formal military bloc.

 

  1. With drills stretching from the Bay of Bengal to the Western Pacific and new activities with Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines and others, is India subtly pushing back on China’s “String of Pearls,” and how does this change the South Asian geopolitical game?

I would not characterise India’s exercise engagements as being directed at any particular adversary. They are part of India’s broader defence cooperation with partner countries.

That said, the interoperability and logistical familiarity built through these exercises do enable operations across diverse geographies.

Clearly, a common strategic concern or adversary can incentivise closer defence cooperation, including joint exercises, between two or more countries. But that does not mean that every exercise should be viewed through that lens.

 

  1. India is deepening economic and diplomatic ties with both the US and China, while simultaneously building military power through these exercises, does this “engage all, prepare for all” approach work, or does it risk overstretch and mixed signals?

The sound policy is to engage everyone, including potential adversaries. International relations have no permanent friends or enemies; national interests and the geopolitical environment are dynamic and can change over time. India therefore has an interest in maintaining relationships across different groupings while building the capabilities necessary to protect its own interests. The challenge is to maintain that flexibility while ensuring that defence engagements remain aligned with India’s broader strategic priorities.

 

  1. With India-Japan air drills and other IAF exercises, which air-domain capabilities and platforms are being stress-tested, and what does that mean for spares, engines, and MRO in India?

These exercises have significant training and learning value, particularly in terms of operational procedures, interoperability and exposure to different methods of conducting air operations.

However, I would not describe them as placing extraordinary additional stress on the aircraft or leading to exceptional spare consumption. The flying and maintenance requirements associated with exercises are generally factored into the annual spare and maintenance support planning.

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