IAF STRATEGIES: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE

 

Article Published in the book on

India’s Military Strategy

 

 

Book released by Gyan Chakra: Western Army Command Think Tank

 

 

IAF STRATEGIES: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE

 

“The art of winning a war can be learnt by understanding some rules (Strategies) and then applying them in a practical manner.”

―  Chanakya & the Art of War: excerpts

 

Introduction

 

Aerospace power is a decisive factor and a game-changer in the current context of geostrategic uncertainties. The application of aerospace power, although looks simple but is a complex process. Major roles of aerospace power during war include shaping the environment, offensive force application, and synergising the operations with surface forces, but aerospace power plays a pivotal role during peace and transition from peace to war.

 

Military strategy refers to the art and science of planning and directing military operations and campaigns. It involves the development of plans and tactics for the use of military force in achieving specific objectives, whether in a single battle or a larger campaign. Military strategy is based on the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both one’s own forces and those of the enemy, as well as the political and social context of the conflict. The military strategy typically involves a number of components, including, objectives, force structure, and deployment, logistics, tactics, intelligence, communications, risk assessment, etc. Effective military strategy requires careful planning and execution, as well as flexibility and adaptation based on changing circumstances. Successful military leaders must be able to think creatively, make quick decisions under pressure, and inspire and motivate their troops to achieve their objectives.

 

Air warfare strategy, a subset of military strategy, is the art of planning and directing overall air operations, and it depends on several factors. Effective air strategy requires careful consideration of these factors and needs to adapt to changing circumstances and situations. 

 

The air strategy of the Indian Air Force (IAF) has evolved over a period of time, reflecting changes in strategic priorities, operational environment, doctrine and technology. While it is worthwhile to trace the evolutionary process of the past, it is also valuable to look at the ones to deal with existing challenges and suggest some future strategies.

 

Air Strategies & Influencing Factors

 

Strategy is a broad concept that embraces objectives, resources, and a plan for using those resources to achieve the objective.

 – William P. Snyder

 

Air strategy is the process of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of aerospace power assets to achieve National Security Objectives. It flows through the Joint Military Strategy and is laterally interlinked with the land and maritime strategies. Air Strategy should cover and must be specific to the entire spectrum of war, no war no peace, and peace. Air warfare strategy typically involves conceptualisation and articulation of several key campaigns focussed on effectively and efficiently achieving stated military objectives and could include offensive counter-air to achieve the desired degree of control of the air, defensive counter-air for protection, strategic air operations, force application to shape the battlefield, Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, etc. Effective air warfare strategy requires the integration of these components into a cohesive plan that can be executed efficiently and effectively.  Air warfare strategy also requires careful consideration of the risks involved, including the possibility of collateral damage and the potential for escalation of the conflict besides imponderables like weather.

 

The aerospace power could be applied to deter, deny, coerce, or punish during No War No Peace (NWNP) situations. The strategies employed would be for external or internal security operations, shaping the zone of operation, and information dominance to improve situational awareness and command and control. The peacetime strategy of aerospace power deals essentially with sovereignty protection, deterrence, air diplomacy, and nation-building by assisting the government and other agencies during HADR situations.

 

Factors Influencing Air Strategy. Several factors dictate air strategy. Effective air strategy requires careful consideration of these factors, as well as the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, to take advantage of new opportunities as they arise. These factors include:

 

  • Political Considerations: Political factors, such as the potential impact on civilians, international relations, and public opinion, can also influence air strategy.

 

  • Military objectives: The overall objectives of the military campaign or operation will determine the specific tasks that airpower needs to accomplish.

 

  • Capability Comparison: Relative capability comparison between the warring sides including doctrinal precepts, the quantum and quality of equipment, technological disparity, infrastructure, and human resource dictate the scope and nature of the air campaign.

 

  • Geographic Factors: The terrain, weather conditions, and other geographic factors can impact the effectiveness of air operations, such as visibility, range, and access to targets and form a part of air strategy deliberations.

 

Evolution of IAF Strategies

 

Historic Perspective

 

Like the role of air power in the last century, the air strategy of the Indian Air Force (IAF) has evolved, reflecting changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. Some key milestones in the evolution of the air strategy of the IAF are:

 

Genesis & Early Years. The Indian Air Force was established in British India as an auxiliary air force of the Royal Air Force on 8 Oct 1932, with four Westland Wapiti biplanes and five Indian pilots. The then Royal IAF (RIAF) grew in size during World War II to eventually ten squadrons. In the early years of the IAF, the primary focus was on providing air support to British and Commonwealth ground forces. During World War II, the IAF played a significant role in the Burma campaign by halting the advance of the Japanese army, by providing air cover and support for ground troops. IAF evolved initially in a tactical role primarily to support surface and maritime wars.

              

Partition in 1947. Indian Air Force (IAF) of independent India came into being with seven squadrons (six fighter squadrons and one transport squadron). By then the IAF had a well-established professional ethos and a reputation to live up to.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947. Almost immediately after Independence, India, and Pakistan clashed over the future of Kashmir. On the first day itself on 27 October 1947, an infantry battalion was airlifted from Delhi to Srinagar. IAF thereafter carried out air operations (airlift of troops and supplies, photo-reconnaissance, bombing, strafing, and interdiction), in support of surface forces. The air power usage was tactical and reactionary to emerging situations.

 

Initial Growth. The decade of the 1950s saw the induction of aircraft and support systems, both in quantity and quality, into the IAF.  During this period, the IAF acquired its first jet fighters and transport aircraft and India began to develop its own indigenous aircraft and weapons systems. IAF began to shift its focus to defending India’s borders and air space, and its capabilities started developing beyond the limited scope of the support role.

 

1962 war. The ground reality in 1962 was that IAF had relatively potent air power with Western aircraft vis-a-vis old Russian aircraft with China. Despite a clear combat edge, the fighter component of the air force was not used during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. There has been a general reluctance to use air power due to the perceived fear of escalation of conflict, which was evident even up to the 1999 Kargil conflict and has changed since the Balakot strike in 2019. However, post-war it was decided to build up the IAF strength to 45 squadrons.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. In 1965, the IAF gave a good account in the skies and in support of ground operations. Air superiority in specific terms was not contested by either side. IAF provided close air support to help the Army stem Pak armoured thrusts. Eventually, the Pakistan offensive was stopped, and the war ceased. After the war, the IAF continued to acquire modern combat aircraft and had 39 combat aircraft squadrons by 1971. It also improved tactics and techniques based on the lessons of the 1965 war. IAF decided the war priorities in sequence to be air defence, support to surface forces, and offensive action to counter or neutralise or counter the enemy air.

 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. In 1971 the IAF was in much better shape in qualitative and quantitative terms than the PAF. This was the first time the IAF actively engaged the enemy air force. IAF achieved complete air superiority over the eastern wing of Pakistan within a few days. Air operations included close air support and air cover to the Indian Army, independent raid missions against Pakistani Air Force bases, assistance to Indian Navy in maritime operations, offensive attacks on enemy armour, and strategic bombing. IAF played a pivotal role in the victory, leading to the liberation of Bangladesh, and it was probably the high point for the IAF. In this war, IAF carried out all air campaigns in parallel.

 

Modernization and Expansion (1980-2000): To retain relevance in the evolving operational environment with the induction of modern aircraft and systems in the immediate neighbourhood, in the 1980s and 1990s, the IAF modernised itself with advanced aircraft, weapons, and sensors, and expanded its capabilities to include strategic airlift.

 

Power Projection Abroad. During 1987-90 IAF was involved with operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives. IAF established an “air bridge” between mainland India and Sri Lanka for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Although combat aircraft were not used, IAF helicopters provided fire support for the army. In 1988, IAF undertook Operation Cactus, wherein, it flew at least a battalion of paratroopers, more than 1000 Miles away to Maldives when rebels attempted to overthrow the government. In these operations, the IAF demonstrated its ability to project forces on short notice.

 

Kargil Operations 1999. Kargil operations demonstrated once again the impact of air power in the achievement of objectives. The IAF flew hundreds of strike missions supported by combat patrols and escorts. Air power was employed in a very innovative way in high altitudes. The Kargil War forced the IAF to rethink aerial strategies as it attempted to orchestrate an aerial campaign at altitudes of 14,000 to 18,000 feet against well-camouflaged targets.

 

Balakot Strike. A game-changer shift took place on 26 February 2019, when India decided to use offensive air power by carrying out deep strikes against targets in Pakistan even beyond the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The myth about the use of air power being escalatory in nature was broken.

 

Strategic Transformation. Originally the IAF had formed purely for the requirements of the British interests of its Empire, its roles and responsibilities were limited to tactical applications of air power. Post-independence also the application of air power continued to remain tactical in nature. It was only in 1971 that the IAF carried out strategic effect-based operations with air campaigns in parallel. In the first decade of this century, IAF inducted airborne early warning, and aerial refuelling capability leading to an increase in strategic reach along with conventional deterrence. The transformation of the Indian Air Force from a tactical air power to a strategic one had begun, and subsequently, the pace picked up for it to become a broad-spectrum air force in future.

 

Doctrinal Evolution

IAF formally formulated and published its first doctrine in 1995. This was the basic doctrine covering air assets, tasks, and campaigns. Thereafter, the doctrine was revised in 2012 and the latest version has been released in 2022. The salient aspects of these editions are in the succeeding paragraphs.

 

1995 doctrine. The IAF was the first among the three services in India to formulate a doctrine in 1995.

 

  • The first IAF doctrine provided an exhaustive description of the basics of air power. It covered topics such as – the theory of war, characteristics of air power and its relationship with strategy, aspects related to prosecuting an air war, various air campaigns, and combat support operations.

 

  • The doctrine laid emphasis on the importance of offensive air operations, the increase in technology levels, the role of combat support operations by force multipliers, and the network-centric environment.

 

  • It stressed on modernisation of air defence and communications networks and C4I structures.

 

2012 Doctrine. This version of the doctrine went beyond outlining what airpower is, to establish a connection between airpower and national security. It brought out the greater role of air power in the full spectrum of national security and diplomacy. Relevant additions were as follows:

 

  • It provided a clear vision of how it could contribute to sub-conventional operations including counter-terrorism missions.

 

  • It brought into focus the enabling characteristics of air power such as air mobility, helicopter support for Special Forces operations, casualty evacuation, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

 

  • Aspects related to nation-building, aerial diplomacy, and perception management were also added.

 

  • It included the strategic significance of space (and space-enabled capabilities).

 

  • It also covered maritime air operations and how air power could be used in the maritime domain for many of its roles and functions.

 

  • It highlighted the importance of modernisation of the Air Force’s, transport and training aircraft, helicopters, the induction of force enhancers, modern armaments and weapon systems, space-based systems, bolstering of air defence systems, information/electronic warfare abilities, secure communication set-ups, and up gradation of training facilities.

 

  • It highlights the strategic aspect of the control of the air by suggesting that deterrence and control of the air as inextricably intertwined.

 

  • It pointed out that the classification of an offensive air operation as ‘strategic’ is not determined by range, platform type or the weaponry used, but is determined by the objective or the purpose served.

 

2022 doctrine. The major differences from the previous doctrine are as follows:

 

  • It proposes a larger regional role for IAF, beyond territorial defence.

 

  • The 2022 doctrine unequivocally advocates the shift from air power to aerospace power and stresses greater space exploitation for the achievement of national objectives.

 

  • It asserts that aerospace power is the foundation for sustained surface operations.

 

  • It recommends increased bilateral and multilateral exercises with extra-regional actors as part of military diplomacy.

 

  • It elucidates a No War, No Peace (NWNP) strategy, based on kinetic (including punitive strikes) as well as non-kinetic responses.

 

  • It explains how the technology has transformed core characteristics of reach, flexibility and versatility, mobility, responsiveness, offensive lethality, and trans-domain capabilities.

 

  • It contains an exhaustive chapter on air strategy, which covers its doctrinal and structural engagement across the entire spectrum and levels of conflict, with the nations’ joint military strategy, and land and maritime strategies.

 

  • Peace time strategy constitutes sovereignty protection, deterrence, air diplomacy, and nation-building.

 

  • A first no-war-no-peace strategy, covers the employment of aerospace power in the continuum between peace and war, for information dominance, shaping operations, and external and internal security operations.

 

  • The wartime strategy and the campaigns have been covered comprehensively, for the employment of aerospace power in the unique multi-domain-multi-spectrum Indian security context.

 

  • The doctrine also elaborates on multi-domain operations, and the importance of battle-space transparency, combat networking, cyber and information warfare, electronic warfare, techno-logistics, administration and human resource management, and training, in this scenario.

 

Air Strategies to Deal with the Current Situation

 

Challenges

India faces two nuclear-powered inimical neighbours. China is emerging as a major regional power with the aspiration to be a global power and her desire to dominate Asia and finally, the world has implications for India. India’s relations with China are changing from cooperative to competitive to combative. China also continues to enhance its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean Region and is investing in the littoral countries to achieve a foot-hold and extend influence. China sees India as a competitor and would like to keep India off-balance. China’s warfare strategy is focused on developing a modern and capable force that can support its national security interests and regional/global ambitions. The Chinese forces are undergoing significant modernisation and expansion at a rapid pace, with particular emphasis on developing advanced technologies and capabilities. Some key elements of China’s warfare strategy include:

 

  • Developing expeditionary capability by enhancing the capabilities of PLAAF and PLAN.

 

  • Infusion of existing and future technologies.

 

  • Reorganisation to deal with future challenges in all domains of warfare including cyber, space, electronic, and information.

 

  • Mastering the art of grey zone warfare, using anything and everything as a weapon.

 

  • Investing in long-range vectors (including hypersonic weapons) and unmanned platforms, to resort to no-contact warfare.

 

  • Military-civil fusion for a whole-of-government approach.

 

  • A string of pearls strategy to develop support and logistic bases in IOR.

 

  • Salami slicing and cabbage strategy to achieve objectives without serious military action.

 

  • A robust defence industry producing indigenous platforms, weapons, and systems (including developing and producing modern fifth and sixth-generation stealth aircraft).

 

Pakistan remains a security threat and continues to use non-state actors to maintain a situation of unrest. Asymmetric warfare will remain an instrument of its state policy. Pakistan’s strategy would continue to be, to wage proxy war and in the event of an escalation, use the nuclear card.

 

 China – Pak Collusive Challenge. China’s increasing economic and political ties with Pakistan influence the geostrategic balance of the region. China has strategic interests in using Pakistani territory to reach West Asia and Africa and has invested in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that connects the Xinjiang region in West China to the China-built-and-operated Gwadar port near the Gulf of Hormuz. In case of a conflict between India and Pakistan, China would posture along the northern and eastern border to keep the Indian military divided. Pakistan openly boasts of collusive support from China in case of a war with India. These two countries have a close and longstanding strategic partnership that includes cooperation even in areas of defence and security. China has even helped Pakistan militarily to acquire technologies for its nuclear weapons and missile program. In the context of air warfare, there are a number of ways in which China and Pakistan collaborate to enhance their respective capabilities. This includes Joint development of aircraft (JF-17 Thunder), supply of advanced aircraft (including the J-10 and J-11), supplying defence systems and technologies, and training and exercises.

 

Recent Lessons

 

At this juncture, it is important to pick up lessons from various conflicts going around the globe to evolve a suitable strategy for the Indian operational environment.

 

Lessons from Recent Wars. Recent wars, such as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Ukraine have provided several important lessons for air strategy. Some key lessons include:

 

  • Effect-based, offensive application of airpower yields faster results due to the shock and awe effect that it creates.

 

  • Restrictions in the of air power increase the cost (Cost in terms of time, money, and life) of achievement of objectives.

 

  • The offensive counter-air and defensive counter-air campaigns are enmeshed with each other. These cannot be planned and executed independently in isolation.

 

  • A no-fly Zone is viable and effective only if it is backed up by the wherewithal to implement it.

 

  • Stealth technology is essential for undetected penetration of enemy airspace with minimal risk of interception and attrition.

 

  • Networked air environment (including AWACS and AEW&C aircraft) provides comprehensive situational awareness and command and control capabilities.

 

  • A high degree of situational awareness is of utmost importance and can be achieved by good ISR capability and effective information-sharing mechanisms.

 

  • Air warfare is witnessing the enhanced role of unmanned platforms, drones, and swarms.

 

  • Shoulder-fired air defence systems can cause prohibitive damage to enemy aerial platforms in urban areas and hilly terrain.

 

  • The efficacy of airborne operations (using fixed-wing and/or helicopters) is doubtful in a contested air space proliferated with AD weapons.

 

  • Precision and Stand-off capabilities are important for punitive air strikes in urban areas.

 

  • Protection of own assets by protective infrastructure, dispersal, and passive measures is essential to safeguard own assets from enemy attack, especially during the opening phases of the conflict.

 

  • Intangible factors like morale, training, tactics, and leadership are very important for military success.

 

  • Coordinated application of surface and air force is very important. The operations need to be planned and executed jointly.

 

Suggested Strategies

 

Orchestrating an air war, especially with multiple threats and limited resources, needs some innovative strategies that maximise the use of available resources. These strategies are somewhat applicable even when adequate resources are available but are more important with limited resources. Some suggestions are as follows:

 

  • Integrated Conceptualization. Conflict is multidomain and to optimise resource utilisation, integration of all capabilities is necessary at conceptual and strategic levels before making a comprehensive plan to chalk out national military objectives and pursuant strategies. Land, maritime and air strategies need to germinate in an integrated manner.

 

  • Resource Allocation. Providing resources (platforms, sensors, and weapons) to the command headquarters for fighting the air war is the responsibility of the service headquarters. These resources are allotted ab initio, and reallocation is done during the war depending on the situation. No problem is faced if the resources are adequate, with the possibility of keeping some as a reserve. However, with limited resources, the principle of “Sharing of poverty rather than the distribution of riches” needs to be followed. Air assets of other services and civil aviation too need to be factored in the overall allocation matrix.

 

  • Active Monitoring. In the orchestration of air war, the roles of the service headquarter includes conveying higher directions, monitoring the progress of operations in all zones/fronts, and providing the required wherewithal. Active monitoring means not only listening out or observing, but collecting data continuously, analysing, anticipating, and proactively providing resources by transferring from one zone to the other. The principle followed would be “Providing milk before the baby cries”. A dynamic resource allocation model for various sectors can help optimise resource utilisation and this is possible with high-speed high volume data transfers between various entities.

 

  • Swing Force Concept. Generally, the fighter squadrons are capable of operating from two to three operational locations. These locations are pre-decided and have a certain amount of supporting infrastructure and equipment. Even the aircrew are familiar with the area of operation. In the swing force concept, some of the capability-based assets would swing from one front to the other depending on how the situation is developing.

 

  • Seamless Operations. The air command area of responsibilities is delineated with earmarked boundaries. The targets and resources for air operations are planned accordingly. More resources if needed are sought from the service headquarters. In the concept of seamless operations, a higher degree of synergy, cooperation, and teamwork between the command headquarters would have to be exercised

 

  • Effect-Based Force Application. Air war entails effect-based operations. However, with limited resources, the available resources would have to be employed judiciously to obtain maximum effect. Some of the relevant aspects include selective dominance rather than attempting to achieve air superiority, selective targeting to hit where it hurts the most, Parallel operations (on a tactical, operational, and strategic level), and conservative risk-taking.

 

  • Protection of Assets. Protection of assets becomes a priority in a limited assets scenario. The air assets would be the first ones to be targeted by the standoff, precision weapons, and missiles. Various measures need to be employed to ensure the protection of assets. These would include the dispersal of assets following the principle of “not keeping all the eggs in one basket”, need-based induction of resources, Protective infrastructure, and passive measures of deception, camouflage, and concealment. To increase survivability in the air, the self-protection suite and systems of the platforms would be essential besides the use of tactical routing. Besides platforms, the protection of networks would be equally vital.

 

  • Effective Air Strategies. These would include developing multi-role capabilities, a networked air defence system, investing in unmanned aerial platforms, focused training and readiness, and interoperability with air forces of friendly foreign countries.

 

Strategy Enablers. The success of the suggested strategies depends upon several factors. Some of these include integrated air and surface forces Plans, prioritised joint target lists, AI-supported Multi-domain, and multi-sensor for a high degree of situational awareness, a Network environment with efficient Information sharing mechanism, Rapid mobility capability, and adequate supporting equipment and infrastructure.

  

Future Air Strategies

 

Technology has had a profound influence on and is a major driver of innovation and evolution in air strategy.  Future strategies would generally depend upon the influence of technology on warfare and the changing nature of warfare, besides the prevailing threats. Some of these aspects are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

 

Investment in Technology.  Air Force is a technology-intensive service and converting technology into capability is a time-consuming process. To stay on top of the challenges, there is a need to invest in emerging technologies and ideate about their utilisation in warfare. Some of the future technologies that are impacting the air war are: 

 

  • Quantum computing. 
  • Hypersonic weapon systems.
  • Artificial Intelligence. 
  • Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology. 
  • Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems.

 

Situational Awareness & Decision Making. One of the effects of advanced technology on air warfare is the increased pace and intensity of air operations. In such a scenario the decision-making process has to be quick to keep up with the OODA cycle. The three most important contributing factors are a high degree of situational awareness, a robust and fast, network system for information sharing, and AI-based decision support systems.

 

Unmanned Platforms. The use of unmanned platforms and systems is growing in warfare. This shift is expected to continue as technology advances and the capabilities of unmanned systems improve further. Drones of various sizes and capabilities are taking over the tasks of conventional platforms. Their utilisation is spread across the entire spectrum of threats ranging from sub-conventional, and conventional to long-range attacks. Investment in anti-drone systems is also a need of the hour.

 

Loyal Wing Man Concept. Both man and unmanned platforms have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The thought process for the next generation of platforms is to harness the advantages of both and develop networked systems, wherein, both can work in an integrated manner. Research is going on in many countries on the “Loyal wingman” concept. HAL in India is also working on the ICATs program on similar lines.

 

Sixth Generation Aircraft. Sixth-generation aircraft are still in the development phase however, based on current trends in air technology, sixth-generation aircraft will likely have several key features that will shape air strategy in the future. They are likely to have increased automation with advanced AI and machine learning algorithms that will enable autonomous decision-making and allow them to adapt to changing situations quickly. They would also have enhanced stealth capabilities making them virtually invisible to radar and other detection systems. Integrated sensor systems in these aircraft will provide comprehensive situational awareness and the ability to engage targets with great precision. Overall, sixth-generation aircraft are expected to have a significant impact on air strategy in the future, with their advanced capabilities enabling air forces to operate with greater autonomy and to strike enemy targets with unprecedented precision and speed. However, as with any new technology, there may also be challenges associated with the introduction of sixth-generation aircraft, including the need to develop new tactics, training programs, and support infrastructure to fully realize their potential.

 

Hypersonic Weapons. The development of hypersonic weapons is likely to have a significant impact on air strategy. Hypersonic weapons provide new opportunities for rapid response and long-range strike capabilities with precision. They also pose new challenges in terms of protection and air defence.  The high speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons will require the development of new air defence strategies, as traditional air defence systems may be unable to detect or intercept these weapons. This could lead to the development of new technologies, such as directed energy weapons or advanced sensors, to counter the threat posed by hypersonic weapons. Also, protective infrastructure would be required which can withstand the destructive power of these weapons.

 

New Domains of Warfare. The domains like cyber, space, electronics and information are coming into the influence of warfare. China’s formation of a Joint Strategic Support Force (JSSF) as a separate service, with defensive and offensive capabilities, in above mentioned four domains, indicates future challenges. Reorientation is required in IAF to deal with these changes.

 

Grey Zone Operations.  Grey zone operations are operations in the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare.  These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both the adversaries of India are resorting to these operations regularly. Air power besides offensive use can also be effectively utilised in many ways, in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Various aspects of grey zone operations need to be deliberated from the point of view of airpower involvement. A certain amount of reorientation would be required in the application of airpower in these grey zone situations supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

 

Space-Based Capabilities.  The term airpower has changed to aerospace power with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the domain of space. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. In Grey zone warfare the involvement of space-based equipment and systems is on an even larger scale. Space-based systems are becoming increasingly important in air warfare, providing capabilities such as navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches and space-based surveillance.  The integration of these systems with air assets is expected to continue, providing new opportunities for offensive and defensive operations.

 

Defence Diplomacy. Defence diplomacy is conducted utilizing several defence activities like defence cooperation, exchange visits, joint exercises, training, and loan or gift of equipment etc. Air Force has a big role in defence diplomacy. It is an effective tool for political signalling and strategic coercion. The escalation matrix can be developed by a combination of the number and extent of these defence activities. Multi-lateral, multi-service and multi-domain exercises are essential for defence cooperation, not only during hostilities but even for grey zone operations during peace.  Even without a military alliance certain degree of interoperability with friendly foreign forces is desirable.

 

Self-Reliance, Indigenisation and Make in India. Indian Air Force has always encouraged the development of indigenous defence production capability and it is one of its key result areas. It has played an important role in creating an aerospace ecosystem in India and has been operating indigenously built aircraft and also aircraft built in India under licence production. This has given impetus to indigenous industry in the past and will continue to support it in future. The important thing to remember is that while supporting self-reliance the minimum level of deterrence capability needs to be maintained at all times. Also, the balance between quality and quantity needs to be maintained all the time.

 

Conclusion

 

The determinants of a successful air campaign are complex and interwoven. There is no “one best solution” for all cases. Doctrine shows how things should be done, and the strategy dictates how things will be done in the existing circumstances.

 

The IAF should continue to prioritize modernization efforts, including the acquisition of advanced aircraft, weapons systems, and sensors. This will enable the IAF to maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries and respond effectively to emerging threats. The IAF should give up capabilities that are duplicated with the other two services like surface-to-surface weapons and special operations Garud force and instead concentrate on new areas of capability development, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber warfare, and space-based systems. These capabilities will enhance its ability to conduct a wide range of operations, from intelligence gathering to precision strikes. The IAF should work closely with the surface forces to develop joint operations capabilities, with emphasis on joint conceptualisation, planning, command and control systems, and integrated training exercises. The IAF should continue to be proactive in its role of providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, both domestically and internationally.

 

Overall, the IAF should strive to maintain a balance between traditional air power capabilities and emerging areas of strategic importance. This will enable the IAF to meet its primary mission of defending India’s air space and national security interests, while also contributing to regional stability and humanitarian efforts.

 

References:

  1. Valuable inputs from Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi PVSM AVSM VM (Retd) and Air Marshal Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, VrC and Bar (Retd).
  1. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/closing-gap-doctrinal-capability-appraisal-iaf-plaaf/
  1. https://airpowerasia.com/2020/06/15/air-power-transformational-challenges-india/
  1. Aerospace strategy: An idea whose time has come. By Air Mshl D Choudhury, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd).
  1. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-01_Issue-1/04-F-Goulter-Pant.pdf
  1. https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2MB.pdf
  1.  Doctrines of the Indian Air Force 1995, 2012 and 2022.
  1. https://theprint.in/opinion/iaf-doctrine-leverages-air-power-it-also-has-the-first-no-war-no-peace-strategy/1379156/
  1. https://capsindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Bhashyam-Kasturi.pdf
  1. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/

 

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27 Replies to “IAF STRATEGIES: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE”

  1. A well researched article. The details give a lot of food for thought. Having broken the shackles of a “Tactical Air Force” to be an independent force, the Air Force has literally grown in strength & stature.
    The mantra should be “Think Strategic Act Tactical”.
    Enjoyed reading the article which showcases the depth of knowledge of the author!

  2. A very comprehensive, well researched and very well articulated article. It shows your depth and understanding of Aerospace / Airpower. Compliments Anil, keep writing.

  3. A very well written article on strategies followed in the past. I would like to add that any air strategy needs to flow from the joint military strategy which addresses an evolving or appreciated scenario. Every scenario will have a different strategy. An evolving and changing scenario would be a nightmare for the practitioner of air power and so we need to equip ourselves with capabilities that will be needed. Flexibility will be the key for integrated application of combat power.

  4. Dear Air Marshal,

    May I please raise the following queries:

    1. First 72 hours of onset of hostilities has to be devoted to gain a ‘Favourable Air Situation’. Shouldn’t the IAF concentrate on knocking off every radar emission emitter in Enemy territory?

    2. If the Enemy has launched a massive “Ground Offensive” at the outbreak of hostilities, then it is the IAF’s responsibility to ensure that the Enemy Force does not get logistics replenishment. This will involve crippling his routes of communication and destroying his forward dumps.

    3. The Enemy’s ‘Command & Control’ set-up needs to be targetted and paralysed at the earliest and on priority.

    4. Loss of own aircrafts and trained pilots in large numbers during the initial weeks of the War has to be avoided at all costs, as this would sap our morale. The employment of air assets strategy should factor in, this axiomatic principle.

    5. Own ground offensive operations are crucially dependant on reliable air support, both ‘preplanned’ and ‘on call’. Therefore the IAF should dictate to the OFC as to when this can be feasible at the earliest ‘window of opportunity’ to guarantee its success and to reduce our personnel and equipment casualties. A fine balance has to struck between the conflicting aspects of concentration of all available offensive air assets forward and the need to reduce any quick attrition of available air assets. In this connection, the ideal example to study is the Japanese Invasion of Malaya in Dec 1941-Jan 1942. The RAF violated all governing principles which would have made the Japs pay a heavy price and indefinitely delay their onslaught!

    May deliberations be also made and strategies evolved in our operational contexts, regarding these issues too please……..

    1. All these come under the purview of strategy of parallel operations.
      The amount of effort may vary dynamically depending on numerous factors.
      That is why joint planning (Pre-planned and dynamic in-war) is most essential.

      1. Thank you Marshal! There is absolute clarity in your exposition on parallel strategic planning, that should be the ‘rigour-de-non’!

  5. Well done sir. So happy for you to not only be abreast with the professional and strategical know-how of the IAF but presenting the same with alacrity and creative perspective. Stay blessed. Best wishes and regards.
    – Col Pritam Singh

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