Anil Khosla – Air Marshal's Perspective

May 14, 2026

815: BOOK REVIEW: WE TOO WERE THERE: INDIANS AT GALLIPOLI

Book Review published in the May 26 edition of “The Book Review Literary Trust” Publication.

WE TOO WERE THERE: INDIANS AT GALLIPOLI

Written by : (By Col Tejinder Hundal)

Reviewed by: Air Marshal Anil Khosla (Retd) PVSM, AVSM, VM

The Gallipoli campaign (also called the Dardanelles campaign, the Defence of Gallipoli, or the Battle of Gallipoli) was a military operation during the First World War on the Gallipoli Peninsula (now Gelibolu) from 19 February 1915 to 9 January 1916. The Allied powers, Britain, France, and the Russian Empire, aimed to capture the Ottoman Empire, one of the Central Powers, by gaining control of the Turkish straits. This would have exposed the Ottoman capital at Constantinople to bombardment by Allied warships and cut it off from the Asian part of the empire. With the Ottoman Empire defeated, the Suez Canal would be protected, and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits would be open to Allied supplies to the Black Sea and Russian warm-water ports.

In February 1915, the Allied fleet failed to force a passage through the Dardanelles. An amphibious landing on the Gallipoli peninsula began in April 1915. Gallipoli was the first major amphibious operation in modern warfare. British (including troops from the British Empire) and French troops landed on the Ottoman-held peninsula in the Dardanelles Straits. In January 1916, after eight months’ fighting, with approximately 250,000 casualties on each side, the campaign was abandoned, and the invasion force was withdrawn. It was a costly campaign for both the Allied powers and the Ottoman Empire.

Indian troops played crucial roles in several key battles during the 1915 Gallipoli Campaign, suffering heavy casualties while supporting Allied efforts against Ottoman defences. On 12 May 1915, the 29th Indian Brigade, including the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, captured a coastal hill feature west of Krithia, named Gurkha Bluff for their effective action; this marked their first significant engagement in the Helles area. In the third Battle of Krithia, fought on 4 June 1915, the 14th Sikhs (Jat Sikhs) from the 29th Indian Brigade charged Turkish positions at Gully Ravine amid intense machine-gun fire and barbed wire, suffering 82% casualties as nearly the entire battalion was wiped out in close-quarters fighting. Indian units repelled Turkish assaults on 3 and 5 July 1915 near Gully Spur and Gurkha Bluff, with Gurkha battalions pushing back the enemy by 1,000 yards over eight days of counterattacks, while sustaining 40% casualties. In the August 1915 offensive, the 29th Indian Brigade landed at ANZAC Cove on 5-6 August and assaulted Sari Bair Ridge; on 9 August, the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles briefly crested the summit before artillery and counterattacks forced a retreat.

The histories of Gallipoli have traditionally focused on the ANZACs (Australia and New Zealand) and British forces. The book “We Too Were There: Indians at Gallipoli” by Col Tejinder Hundal is a detailed military history that focuses on the Indian Army’s role (over 16,000 Indian troops) in the Gallipoli Campaign during the First World War. Hundal’s book seeks to restore the Indian soldiers’ service, sacrifices, and experiences to the narrative. Hundal argues that the “spirit of Gallipoli” wasn’t just an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon. It was a multicultural crucible where Indian soldiers earned the respect of their peers through sheer grit and professionalism. The book follows the 13th Frontier Force Rifles, the Indian Mountain Artillery, and the thousands of mule drivers and medical personnel who served on the rugged Turkish peninsula. Hundal doesn’t just provide a dry military report; he reconstructs the campaign through a lens of shared sacrifice.

Author Col. Tejinder Hundal is a serving Indian Army officer with a PhD in Defence and Strategic Studies. He has a keen interest in the participation of Indian Army troops in the two World Wars. At over 600 pages, his book is comprehensive and deeply researched. The book is built from extensive research into primary sources, including war diaries, personal letters, and regimental records. These sources document the deployment of Indian infantrymen, artillery units, mule transport and logistic corps, and the hardships they endured on the Dardanelles peninsula from April to December 1915. The book includes maps and sketches that help visualise the Dardanelles’ impossible terrain. It doesn’t just recount battles; it delves into mobilisation, logistics, adaptation to harsh conditions, and the administrative challenges of war from an Indian perspective. These topics are rarely covered in mainstream histories of Gallipoli.

Hundal highlights how Indian mountain batteries provided the only effective artillery support for the Anzacs in the early days of the landing. A significant portion is dedicated to the 6th Gurkha Rifles and their legendary capture of “Sari Bair,” the highest point reached by Allied troops. Beyond the frontline, the book also emphasises the Indian mule corps, who navigated treacherous terrain under constant fire to deliver water and ammunition.

The first Chapter of the book “The Activation” unravels the decisions and strategies of the belligerents (mainly Britain and Turkey) in their efforts to capture and defend the peninsula, respectively. The chapter also discusses the origins of the various Indian Expeditionary Forces and their deployments in the various theatres of war. It finally covers the operations of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade’s troops in the peninsula.

The second chapter of the book “The Arrangements” provides a detailed analysis of the recruitment system, patterns, Incentives, and the state of the Indian Army (Infantry, Artillery, and the Imperial Service Troops) in 1914. It also briefly includes the oft-neglected component of the Burma Military Police, which was part of the Indian Brigade at Gallipoli. The third chapter of the book “The Affirmation” is dedicated to the participation and contributions of the Indian Troops in the various battles fought in the peninsula.

The penultimate chapter of the book “The Administration” discusses the personal arms and ammunition, food, water, medical supplies, and the pay and allowances of the Indian Troops at Gallipoli. The chapter also deals with the issues of reinforcements and reporting of casualties of the Indian forces. The last chapter of the book, “The Acknowledgement”, is dedicated to the memories of the soldiers who sacrificed their lives at Gallipoli. The chapter delves into the trials and tribulations of the Indian soldiers. Stories of three sikh soldiers who participated in the campaign are also painstakingly developed.

Hundal’s central aim is to acknowledge and honour the Indian troops whose contributions have been historically overlooked. The narrative draws attention to the courage, discipline, and heavy casualties suffered by formations like the Sikh infantry and support units. Hundal’s work also serves as a corrective to colonial-era histories that minimised the Indian role in favour of Western front perspectives. This makes the book not just historical but also commemorative, appealing to readers interested in hidden or marginalised war narratives.

Hundal’s writing is deeply researched, striking a balance between military strategy and human emotion. It is a vital read for anyone interested in how the Indian Army became a world-class fighting force. The book is most useful for military historians, defence professionals, students of World Wars, and readers interested in the overlooked role of Indian soldiers in global wars.

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May 13, 2026

814: RUSSIA’S RS-28 SARMAT ADDS A NEW CHAPTER IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNISATION

News. Russia successfully test-launched the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk region) on 12 May 26. The missile followed its planned profile and struck its designated target (at Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula) approximately thirty minutes after launch. Strategic Missile Forces commander Sergei Karakayev reported that all specified technical characteristics had been validated. Putin described the test as a “major event and unconditional success” and congratulated the defence ministry, scientists, engineers, and the thousands of workers whose collaborative effort brought the programme to this milestone.

Missile. The Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau produces the RS-28 Sarmat. It is a silo-launched, three-stage, liquid-fuelled super-heavy ICBM (35.3 metres in length and approximately 208 tonnes in launch weight). It is claimed to be the largest ballistic missile ever constructed. Its payload capacity is ten tonnes, and it can carry a variety of warheads (including multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and, reportedly, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Its operational flexibility significantly exceeds that of its predecessor.

Capability. Among the Sarmat’s most strategically significant attributes is its capacity to approach targets via non-standard flight trajectories. Unlike conventional ICBMs that follow northern polar arcs, the Sarmat is capable of fractional orbital bombardment, i.e. flying a depressed, sub-orbital trajectory over the South Pole to reach targets in North America. This gives it the ability to approach from directions that existing American missile defence interceptor networks, positioned primarily in Alaska and California and oriented toward northern approach corridors, are not designed to engage. Putin has noted that the missile can travel on both ballistic and suborbital trajectories, with a maximum range reportedly exceeding 35,000 kilometres.

Feature Enhancement. The missile has a shorter boost phase than its predecessor. This reduces the window for tracking by the space-based infrared sensors. It is a meaningful enhancement for the missile’s survivability. The Sarmat is also claimed to be more accurate than the Voyevoda. Putin has stated that the Sarmat’s destructive potential substantially exceeds that of any comparable Western system.

Strategic Implication. The successful launch carries significant strategic implications. The R-36M2 Voyevoda, a Soviet-era heavy ICBM, had been the backbone of Russia’s silo-based deterrent for decades. The Sarmat is intended to replace it, and it represents the most consequential upgrade to Russia’s nuclear triad in the post-Cold War period. Putin announced that Russia would deploy the first Sarmat-equipped regiment for combat duty before the end of 2026. It is claimed to be designed to penetrate both existing and prospective ballistic missile defences. This capability is important for Russia to maintain credible second-strike deterrence.

Race. The Sarmat is one of six next-generation strategic weapons that Putin unveiled in March 2018, presenting them as Russia’s response to the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the subsequent development of American missile defence infrastructure. From Moscow’s perspective, a credible and penetrating nuclear second-strike capability is the foundation of strategic stability. The assurance that no adversary can neutralise Russia’s deterrent through a disarming first strike and expect to intercept the surviving response. The Sarmat is engineered specifically to preserve that assurance against all foreseeable developments in missile defence technology.

Timing. The test comes at a time of considerable significance in the current global landscape. The New START treaty (the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms limitation agreement between Russia and the United States) expired in February 2026. Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, citing what it described as the fundamentally changed strategic environment resulting from Western military support for Ukraine. The absence of any active treaty framework means that both sides are now free to expand and modernise their arsenals without the notification and inspection. The Sarmat’s development and operational deployment will proceed in this unconstrained environment.

Domestic Significance. Domestically, the test carries political weight as well as military significance. It arrives days after Russia’s Victory Day commemorations. It demonstrates the continued vitality of Russia’s defence industrial and scientific base under sustained international sanctions and economic pressure. It affirms the country’s standing as a nuclear superpower capable of fielding world-leading weapons systems.

Global Interest. Internationally, the Sarmat’s deployment will be watched closely in capitals around the world (from Washington to Beijing and from New Delhi to Brussels). For NATO’s strategic planners, it represents a genuine generational upgrade to Russia’s land-based deterrent. It will force them to recalibrate their threat assessments and defence postures. For countries in the Global South, it is a reminder that the nuclear dimension of great-power competition remains very much alive and is, if anything, intensifying.

Concluding Thought. Russia’s strategic modernisation programme has always been driven by the conviction that a strong nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The Sarmat’s successful test and approaching operational debut confirm that this conviction remains the organising principle of Russian defence policy. It also proves that Russia retains both the industrial capacity and the scientific expertise to give it material form.

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May 12, 2026May 12, 2026

813: BEHIND ENEMY LINES: THE DEADLY ART OF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Article published in the May 26 edition (volume 1, Issue 9) of the Business Standard BLUEPRINT Magazine

On April 3, a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran’s rugged Zagros Mountains. The two-man crew ejected safely, but their recovery triggered one of the most complex CSAR operations in recent history. What followed was not a simple rescue; reportedly, the U.S. deployed a package of more than 150 aircraft. It was a massive, multi-domain effort. It involved fighters, tankers, electronic warfare platforms, and special operations forces. All the elements worked in concert in an active enemy-threat environment. The extraction operation was costly. Few aircraft were damaged, platforms were lost or abandoned, and crews faced sustained ground fire in a contested environment.

The incident has thrust Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) back to the centre of a fierce debate over whether the principle of “leaving no man behind” remains viable in highly contested, peer-level environments. CSAR, by definition, involves locating, supporting, and extracting isolated personnel from hostile territory while under fire. The risks to aircrews operating in dense air defence networks, drone-saturated battlespaces, and irregular threat environments have grown dramatically. This has made the personnel recovery both more essential and more perilous than at any point in recent decades.

CSAR Complexity

CSAR operations involve locating the downed crew, authenticating, and then extracting them. Unlike peacetime search and rescue, the process takes place in a hostile environment. In an environment where the adversary is alert, armed, and converging towards the same location as the rescue force. The fundamental difficulty stems from the tactical reality that, the moment an aircraft goes down in enemy territory, the adversary knows where the crew has landed. The downed aviator’s greatest assets are speed of recovery and the element of surprise. Both erode with every passing minute.

The rescue force must fly into the same threat environment that just destroyed the aircraft it is trying to recover from — often without knowing precisely what brought it down or whether that threat is still active. The helicopter crews executing the final pickup, flying low and slow in a hover over a precise location the enemy also knows, are among the most exposed personnel in modern warfare.

A CSAR package must simultaneously suppress enemy fighters, neutralise SAM systems, jam enemy radar and communications, provide airborne command and control, extend loiter time through aerial refuelling, and insert pararescue teams capable of parachuting or fast-roping (slithering) into the recovery zone, providing emergency medical treatment, and fighting their way out if necessary. Orchestrating this package, at night, often in radio silence, against an alerted adversary, is a feat of operational complexity that few military organisations can reliably execute.

The potential capture of aircrew is a significant, high-stakes consideration in military operations. Captured aircrew pose a multi-faceted threat. Adversaries can utilise captured aircrew to leverage concessions during negotiations. They may be coerced into making statements or appearing in the media, undermining the friendly nation’s public support for the war. Aircrew may possess knowledge of sensitive mission objectives, technology, or intelligence, which they could be forced to reveal. These sensitivities drive military decision-making to prioritise personnel recovery and, at times, accept higher risk to avoid capture, such as risking additional assets for rescue operations.

Combat Search and Rescue: A Global Survey

The First Rescue. The first recorded rescue took place in 1915. A British RNAS Commander Richard Bell-Davies landed his single-seat aircraft behind enemy lines in Bulgaria. He retrieved his downed wingman despite approaching enemy troops. That act established the founding principle of combat rescue.

The United States. America didn’t invent combat search and rescue, but systematised it. The U.S. converted this wartime necessity into a formal doctrine. The Korean War highlighted the helicopter’s primacy in CSAR as nearly 1,000 personnel were recovered from behind the enemy lines. The Vietnam War was the crucible. Reportedly, over 3,800 recovery missions saved approximately 3,900 lives, at the cost of 71 rescue aircraft and 45 crewmen. During this war, the core package concept emerged. This includes suppression aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, airborne command-and-control aircraft, tankers, and helicopters carrying pararescuemen. The Gulf War validated the CSAR doctrine. The full-strike package concept against sophisticated air defences was validated during the 1999 Kosovo War. The April 2026 Iran operation represents the most demanding CSAR execution since Vietnam.

Britain: The Falklands Lesson. The RAF CSAR lineage runs back to Channel rescues in 1940. The Falklands War imposed the harshest test on the British CSAR mechanism, operating 8,000 miles from home. The extraction capability was lost with the sinking of the ship SS Atlantic Conveyor, along with the onboard Chinook helicopters. The lesson that emerged was that CSAR depends entirely on pre-positioned assets. Loss of these assets mid-campaign is catastrophic.

Israel: Forged in Continuous Conflict. The Israel Air Force has the most combat-tested CSAR doctrine. It has been shaped by over five decades of continuous conflict. The fundamental restructuring took place during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It included dedicated rescue helicopters with fighter escort, pre-planned extraction corridors, and an emphasis on SEAD as a prerequisite. The spirit of CSAR is aptly conveyed in their phrase “we will not abandon our soldiers in the field”.

France: Africa as the Laboratory. France’s CSAR doctrine was built through near-continuous operations in Africa since decolonisation — Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel. It has a relatively small but genuinely capable CSAR force. The Caracal helicopter, with aerial refuelling, terrain-following radar, and special forces integration, forms the core of capability. Operation Serval in Mali demonstrated France’s credible CSAR across vast, severe terrain.

Russia. Compared to Western forces, Russia does not have dedicated CSAR units. Russian combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability utilises a mix of air and ground forces. Helicopters like the Mil Mi-8 are used for extraction. They are often escorted by armed platforms such as the Kamov Ka-52. Spetsnaz teams provide ground support.

The Universal Pattern/Lesson. CSAR is the direct determinant of aircrew morale and operational aggression. The air forces that invest in dedicated recovery capability demonstrate measurably different aircrew behaviour. The institutional promise embedded in CSAR is not a humanitarian sentiment. It is a force multiplier. Every air force that has learned this lesson has learned it the hard way — usually over the loss of aircrew who ejected into hostile territory and waited for a recovery that never came. Across every air force and every conflict, the same pattern recurs. CSAR capability is almost always inadequate. It improves through the painful experience of early failures.

India: CSAR Challenges

The Indian Air Force’s CSAR history spans seven decades of conflict in some of the world’s most demanding terrain — the defining characteristic being that India has repeatedly demonstrated the operational requirement for CSAR capability while repeatedly discovering the institutional gap between that requirement and available resources.

The 1947-48 Kashmir War saw the IAF’s earliest combat rescue operations. Dakota transport aircraft were used to evacuate wounded from forward airstrips, which were under Pakistani fire. The 1962 Sino-Indian War saw IAF helicopter units flying Alouette IIIs at altitudes above 14,000 feet in the North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh. They conducted casualty evacuations at the limits of their performance.

The IAF’s Garud Commando Force was raised in 2004. This was the most significant value addition to the CSAR capability. Garuds train for heliborne insertion in hostile environments. Armed helicopters with survivability systems serve as the extraction platform. The combat helicopters provide air cover as escorts. India’s two-front threat scenario makes CSAR capability development not merely desirable but operationally essential.

Way Ahead: Building a Credible CSAR Capability

The following recommendations are based on the specific threat environment India faces. High-altitude Himalayan terrain, a nuclear-armed peer adversary to the west, and a rising competitor to the north.

Dedicated CSAR Squadron. The CSAR demands a dedicated squadron with a specific mandate. No dedicated unit means no dedicated training, no dedicated equipment procurement cycle, and no institutional memory. A dedicated unit with a fixed order of battle is essential. CSAR specialism should be considered a career path rather than an additional duty. Without a dedicated unit, every other recommendation is aspirational.

Acquire a Purpose-Built CSAR Helicopter. Not all the helicopters are specifically equipped for the CSAR role. A CSAR helicopter needs specific systems such as terrain-following radar, an aerial refuelling probe, integrated defensive aids, and a hoist system. A specially equipped platform, in meaningful numbers, would offer a credible organic recovery capability.

Raise and Train a Pararescue Cadre. Aircraft are necessary, but so are the pararescuemen. The Garud Commando Force of the Indian Air Force already has CSAR listed among its roles. The logical step is to develop within Garud a dedicated personnel recovery element, trained specifically in high-altitude medicine, combat casualty care, evasion assistance, and the mechanics of survivor authentication.

Develop High-Altitude CSAR SOP. No air force in the world has more operational experience of high-altitude aerial combat than the Indian Air Force. The Kargil war highlighted the peculiarities of operations in the Himalayan terrain. The IAF should develop an area-specific CSAR doctrine for each prevailing terrain type.

Integrate SEAD Planning into Every CSAR Package. The clearest lesson from the past is that sending recovery assets into an unsuppressed threat environment compounds losses rather than preventing them. Every CSAR planning process must include a suppression-of-enemy-air-defences element as a prerequisite, not an afterthought. This requires coordination between the CSAR element, fighter escort squadrons, and electronic warfare assets.

Accelerate the Unmanned CSAR Programme. The ongoing Indian programme to develop an unmanned CSAR is a strategically sound idea. An autonomous platform capable of locating survivors via Emergency Locator Transmitters, navigating to 20,000 feet, and operating in GPS-denied environments addresses the specific CSAR requirements. However, unmanned systems cannot replicate the pararescueman’s ability to provide emergency medical care, authenticate survivors under ambiguous conditions, or fight through a compromised extraction. The unmanned programme should be developed as a complementary capability.

Invest in SERE Training. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training is the other half of the CSAR equation. The downed aircrew’s own decisions in the hours after ejection determine whether a recovery is possible. The SERE training programme should be made compulsory for all aircrew. It should be periodically reviewed, upgraded, and stress-tested against the specific threat scenarios.

Concluding Thoughts

Each of the recommendations above costs money. Developing a dedicated squadron, purpose-built platforms, a trained pararescue cadre, and a genuine SEAD integration framework requires substantial expenditure and investment. However, it is still worth it as an effective Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) capability is a powerful force multiplier for any air force. When pilots and aircrew are confident they will be rescued no matter what happens, they perform far more effectively and aggressively in combat.

In the Indian context, this assurance becomes even more critical. India is likely to face high-intensity, short-duration conflicts in highly contested, geographically challenging terrain such as the Himalayas and deserts. The suggested elements of the process exist in some form. They need to be reviewed, enhanced, integrated and formalised in a time-bound manner. CSAR is not merely an auxiliary or secondary function; it is an essential operational necessity. Investing in CSAR is therefore not about saving isolated personnel alone, but about preserving combat effectiveness and the will to fight.

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References:

(April 6, 2026). Risky rescue of US crew downed in Iran relied on dozens of aircraft and subterfuge, Trump says. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/7d8cfb6d0fd400abdc71f8c9d67408fe

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Operations in Russia, (August 3, 2025). https://en.iz.ru/en/1930757/2025-08-03/ministry-defense-showed-footage-search-and-rescue-operations-mi-8psg-helicopter-crew

“The U.S. launched an air armada to rescue the F-15 crew in Iran”. (06 April 2026). https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-f15-rescue-caine-trump

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). GlobalSecurity.org. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/csar.htm

Medicine, N. A. Combat Search and Rescue in Highly Contested Environments: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief. https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/25156/chapter/1

RAND Corporation, “Combat search & rescue in a contested environment: Implications for future operations”.

Galdorisi, G., & Phillips, T, “Leave no man behind: The saga of combat search and rescue”, Zenith Press, 2009.

“Personnel recovery operations (AFDP 3-50)”. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, 2019.
“Allied joint doctrine for personnel recovery (AJP-3.7)”. NATO Standardisation Office, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2016.
Air Force would like to call a drone for crew rescue – sUAS News. https://www.suasnews.com/2019/05/air-force-would-like-to-call-a-drone-for-crew-rescue/