India has operated leased SeaGuardians since 2020. India leased them because the Navy needed persistent ISR capability while the much larger procurement moved through the system. The Indian Navy has found them useful and has flown them for thousands of hours.
The new lease contract has reportedly been signed on17 August 2026. It includes a 30-month lease for two MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. The contract is valued at approximately ₹1,943 crore.
On the face of it, ₹1,943 crore for two MQ-9B SeaGuardians for only 30 months looks extremely expensive. The ₹1,943 crore price tag is not a basic rental fee for two airframes. It represents a Company-Owned, Company-Operated (COCO) capability package. The value proposition includes sensors, communications, ground-control infrastructure, technical support, maintenance, operators/support personnel, availability, etc.
Complete Operational Burden. General Atomics (GA-ASI) provides the entire ecosystem (possibly including Ground Control Stations (GCS), satellite communication bandwidth, continuous payload integration, spare parts, and on-site engineering support).
Assured Flight-Hours. The cost includes availability of a guaranteed number of operational flight hours. The manufacturer would bear the cost associated with airframe degradation, maintenance cycles, component failures, and logistics overhead.
Specialised Payload Rent. The lease includes high-end, mission-specific sensor suites (360-degree maritime surface search radars, synthetic aperture radars (SAR), electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) balls, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) packages).
The lease would buy time and capability. India entered into the agreement in October 2024 for 31 MQ-9Bs (specifically 15 SeaGuardians and 16 SkyGuardians). India’s acquisition of 31 aircraft does not mean they will become operational right away; reports indicate the first deliveries will not take place until late 2028 or early 2029. Since we need the capability right now, there will be a gap of several years. To sum up, the purchase is the long-term solution, while the lease is a short-term remedy.
There’s another way of looking at it. The lease would be a training and transition bridge. The new lease could allow personnel, maintenance teams, operators and mission planners to continue building experience while the larger fleet is inducted. It would allow operational availability, training, experience, maintenance support, sensors, contractor support, insurance/replacement risk, and immediate access. Rather than a redundant expense, the lease would serve as a high-readiness bridge. It would provide immediate maritime surveillance capacity while laying the tactical groundwork for the larger fleet’s arrival.
In short, the two newly leased Sea Guardians are not a standalone act but a deliberate interim measure that keeps the Navy’s IOR surveillance posture strong and operationally continuous while the larger, permanent 31-aircraft tri-service fleet is manufactured and delivered.
The bigger picture
The drones complement, rather than replace, the P-8I fleet. India’s surveillance architecture is increasingly layered:
MQ-9B SeaGuardian: long-endurance unmanned surveillance, able to remain on station for extended periods.
P-8I Poseidon: manned long-range maritime patrol aircraft with sophisticated radar and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
Satellites: wide-area, space-based observation.
Coastal and island-based sensors/radars: persistent monitoring closer to shore and around strategic maritime chokepoints.
Other naval assets: ships, submarines and aircraft that can investigate or act on information generated by the surveillance network.
A layered network:
Satellites → see broadly ↓ MQ-9Bs → stay over an area for a long time. ↓ P-8Is → investigate and conduct sophisticated maritime/ASW missions. ↓ Ships/submarines → physically respond.
The MQ-9B lease fits into that picture as the tactical, tasking-responsive layer of a system whose outer layers are space-based sensing and coastal radar, and whose command layer is the fusion-centre network.
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
The review was published in the IIRF Strategic Yearbook 2026
Co-authored with Rishi Athreya
The last year has been very eventful. The Global order continues to be in flux. It is increasingly becoming Realist and Anarchical. Global disarmament is clearly in tatters. World military expenditure reached $2887 billion in 2025, up 2.9 per cent in real terms from 2024. The top three military spenders—the USA, China, and Russia—spent a combined total of $1480 billion, or 51 per cent of the global total. India, the world’s fifth-largest military spender in 2025, increased its military spending by 8.9 per cent to $92.1 billion[1].
Immediate Neighbours
Continental neighbours are of relevance to India.
Nepal: Nepal has a new government. This is a change to the entire political order. India continues to provide development assistance to Nepal[2]. India has resumed land trade with China through the Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand, Shipki La Pass in Himachal Pradesh, and Nathu La Pass in Sikkim[3]. India continues to have close ties with Bhutan[4].
Bangladesh: Bangladesh elections have restored an elected government. The current Prime Minister, Tarique Rehman of the Bangladesh National Party, represents a change from the Awami League. This government creates an opportunity for India to restore ties that had dipped during the Yunus caretaker government[5]. Here too India continues to assist in the political, security, economic and cultural domains[6].
Pakistan: OP SINDOOR has changed the entire South Asian scenario. One result is Pakistan’s rapid military modernisation. Pakistan’s military spending increased by 11 per cent to $11.9 billion[7]. Further, Pakistan is acquiring advanced military hardware that brings it nearly on par with India. However, this is largely driven by borrowing and overseas support. Moreover, Pakistan is integrated into collective security with Saudi Arabia[8]. Pakistan continues to be a global hub of terror. Pakistan is a base of operations and/or target for numerous armed, non-state militant groups, some of which have existed since the 1980s. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, and Hizbul Mujahideen are the main anti-India groups[9]. Pakistan has a unique ability to chase with the hounds and run with the hares[10].
China: China remains active along its borders with India and neighbouring countries. China’s establishment of new administrative counties near the tri-junction of Xinjiang, Afghanistan, and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) must be understood not merely as an internal adjustment but as part of a geopolitical strategy with significant implications for India’s territorial sovereignty and regional security[11]. China is engaging in the Sinicisation of Tibet to reduce the legitimacy of the Tibetan Government in exile in India. Further, it is building dams on the rivers in Tibet to restrict water flow to India and increase the danger of flooding. These create threats that India would need to address[12].
Maritime Scenario: As a largely maritime nation, India faces vital challenges in this sphere[13]. India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and Vision MAHASAGAR, i.e. Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions[14]. The entire Indian Ocean Region remains important to India[15]. As part of its global strategy, China has been developing ports and other infrastructure in littoral countries of the Indian Ocean Region for many years. It has a maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region, including anti-piracy escort missions, port calls, and the deployment of research and survey vessels. India’s relations with regional countries are distinct from those with other countries[16]. India continues to have security links with several littoral states. It also has links in economic, developmental, humanitarian, and technological spheres[17]. The recent crisis in Iran has disrupted maritime security[18].
Iran Crisis
The attacks by the US on Iran commencing 28 Feb 2026, titled OP EPIC FURY, are a mark of the greatest watershed in the West Asia region in several decades. These attacks are the culmination of several decades of effort by the US, Europe, Oman, and the IAEA to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme. Notwithstanding various efforts, Iran remained nuclear-capable. The US and Israel claim to have attacked because they feared an Iranian strike[19]. Israel launched OP ROARING LION on Iran alongside the US. Besides removing nuclear installations, the objective was the overall degradation of Iran’s missile capability. Both the US and Israel expected a short operation of around 72 Hrs. Israel has, for over a year, been targeting Iran[20]. This has clearly been a miscalculation. There are fears of long-term strategic overreach by the US[21]. In response, Iran claims to have never started a war. It claims that starting with the coup in 1953, and later support for Iraq in the war, the US has been hostile to Iran. Iran claims that US bases in the region pose a threat to it. Iran condemns the destruction of their infrastructure. Further, it claims a legitimate right to defend itself[22]. Iran continues to claim readiness to respond to attacks, even as mediation continues[23].
Doubtful Planning: As pointed out in a RUSI Commentary, there has been poor planning by the US in anticipating the implications for maritime security, especially in the Strait of Hormuz. While the US and Israel deployed aerial power, they provided little maritime support. Iran enjoys a geographic advantage and operational readiness in the region[24]. As highlighted in an NMF Commentary, the maritime aspect is a serious casualty of the US-Iran conflict. The US has apparently damaged parts of the Iranian Navy assets using land-based air power. However, the IRGC Navy (Sepah), a distinct entity, has not been damaged. The US has assets through CENTCOM. However, these may not be deployable in the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman[25]. Any US naval asset deployed in the region becomes a soft target[26].
Hormuz Strait: Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz. While a few ships are selectively allowed, any ship deemed affiliated with the USA or Israel is not permitted. In response, the USA has blockaded the Strait and is stopping ships bound for Iranian ports[27]. Saudi Arabia has reportedly expressed concern to the US administration that its action may encourage the Iran-backed Houthis to attack and disrupt Red Sea shipping routes, as was the case from 2023 to 2025. Iran has said that it would threaten trade in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Gulf of Oman if the US “create[s] insecurity for Iran’s commercial vessels”, describing the US action as a “prelude to a violation of the ceasefire”[28]. Irrespective of a ceasefire being announced, the US claims that it is serving as a deterrent to Iran[29]. The Strait of Hormuz remains a flashpoint. The USA claims to be enforcing a blockade on Iranian ships[30]. However, Iran claims that its ships are crossing the Hormuz Strait[31]. At another level, Iran is treating US actions as piracy and terrorism[32].
Negotiations: Pertinently, the USA has released a statement claiming that there is ample legal justification for the attack on Iran. They claim that even after June 2025, hostilities between Iran, Israel and the USA continued. They also assert that negotiations with Iran failed[33]. Conversely, Iran claims that the attack was launched amid negotiations[34]. A day before the commencement of OP EPIC FURY, Iran released a statement that claimed that negotiations were going well[35].
Israel Factor: Iran considers the US a proxy for Israel[36]. A noteworthy point is that the USA has openly supported Israel[37]. In some ways, Israel is a major factor in the West Asian scenario. Israel and the US said that Pakistan’s agreement did not include Lebanon. Iran said any negotiations with the US would be “unreasonable” if the Israel–Hezbollah conflict were to continue[38].
GCC Countries: Iran’s strategy to cause a rift between the Arab states and their US and Israeli allies appears to have failed; rather, it had an opposite effect of unifying them in their opposition to Iran and improving their security bond with America and possibly with Israel further. At the High-level GCC summit in Jeddah on 28 April 2026, the six GCC members Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported American action. Emphasising the need to secure the Strait of Hormuz’s opening, which impedes the flow of one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies, the US must caution that any finalised deal must result in a permanent, long-term arrangement[39]. At a deeper level, the GCC Countries have a larger oil supply than Iran. Moreover, they have invested in Artificial Intelligence and technology. This gives them a clear edge over Iran, as well as China and the USA[40].
Russian Stance: Russia remains a major player in the region and globally. It is an active party in the war in Ukraine. It is also present geographically in the West Asian context. Russia is a continental neighbour of Iran. Their relationship has long been troubled, driven by pragmatic considerations. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed in 2025[41]. It is not a mutual defence agreement. Russia was quick to condemn the attacks on Iran. A key point was that these attacks occurred while Iran was engaged in negotiations, including on the nuclear issue. Russia claims this attack is akin to the 2003 attack on Iran, based on false claims of weapons of mass destruction[42]. Most recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Russia and met President Vladimir Putin. Russia commended Iran for facing the American aggression[43]. Russia appreciates India’s multi-pronged foreign policy and respects it unconditionally. However, it believes in the particularly privileged strategic partnership with Russia[44].
Sanctions: The USA has applied sanctions on China for buying and refining Iranian Oil[45]. These target independent “teapot” oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, because they continue to import and refine Iranian crude oil[46].
Talks and Mediation: Pakistan is mediating talks between the US and Iran, and issues under discussion include freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programme, reconstruction and sanctions, and a long-term peace agreement. On 11 April, talks were held in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. Both sides reported progress, but they reached no agreement. No further talks have been confirmed[47]. Pakistan has been facilitating talks between the USA and Iran. This is an example of Pakistan’s effective Perception Management. It has long been very effective in the Cognitive and Information domains.
Challenges for India: The recent crisis in Iran has once again posed a maritime challenge[48]. There is the targeting of civilians, of infrastructure and of commercial shipping. It also raises economic concerns, including energy, fertilisers, and food security[49]. The sinking of IRIS Dena by the US is a diplomatic incident with extensive consequences[50]. From India’s perspective, the issue has raised questions about whether the entire Indian Ocean could be seen as India’s sphere of influence. While India is not expansionist, deeper strategic challenges remain[51].
Multilateral Reactions. The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz has drawn the attention of multilateral organisations, especially the International Maritime Organisation, and the United Nations Security Council.
IMO Task Force: A major concern has centred on the safety of merchant mariners. The International Maritime Organisation has raised this issue[52]. France and the UK chaired a conference on the Strait of Hormuz Maritime Navigation Initiative. The conference brought together around fifty non-belligerent states[53]. The meeting underlined the international community’s determination to support freedom of navigation, uphold international law, and safeguard global economic stability and energy security. France and the United Kingdom confirmed that they are establishing an independent, strictly defensive multinational mission. It would protect merchant vessels, reassure commercial shipping operators, and conduct mine-clearance operations. Further planning is underway to implement this multinational force[54].
United Nations Resolution: the SC Resolution of 11 March 2026, which demanded that Iran stop the attacks on its neighbours[55]. The UN Security Council has failed to adopt a resolution aiming to boost security in the Strait of Hormuz as the critical shipping corridor remains largely closed to global trade and the transport of humanitarian aid, with war continuing to rage across the region. Bahrain submitted the text alongside Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Eleven countries voted in favour of the draft, which the permanent members vetoed. China and Russia voted in favour, while Colombia and Pakistan abstained. One concern of China and Russia was that the resolution was biased against Iran and failed to mention the role of the USA and Israel in initiating the attack[56].
UN Open Debate: The United Nations Security Council held a High-Level Open Debate on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain[57]. The Secretary-General highlighted the current disruption to global shipping caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. He mentioned the humanitarian effects, including in energy and food security. The SG also mentioned the dangers faced by seafarers and commercial vessels. Other issues raised were piracy, terrorism, and damage to critical maritime infrastructure. The Black Sea Initiative is cited as a successful example of a humanitarian navigational agreement, even during a war[58]. Several member nations raised broader concerns about commercial vessels, seafarers, economics, piracy, and shadow fleets[59]. China made a statement condemning the attack by Israel and the USA on Iran. China commended Pakistan’s mediation efforts. Further, China raised issues of UNCLOS, Piracy, and Ocean Governance[60]. China also expressed concern about the situation in Gaza and the humanitarian fallout. They believe that Israel is unnecessarily attacking Gaza, and the two-state solution is non-negotiable[61]. Russia continues to hold the USA and Israel responsible for the war in Iran. Further, they hold that in times of war, a coastal State under attack may limit navigation in its territorial waters for security purposes. Russia also raised concerns about energy, the economy, fertilisers, and food security[62]. The USA also lamented China and Russia vetoing the aforementioned resolution. The USA also mentioned the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The support by Iran of the Houthis in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is also condemned. They highlighted the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. A concern raised was around sea mines supposedly planted by Iran. Finally, the USA called for commercial shipping, maritime finance and insurance, humanitarian aid agencies, and militaries to come together to address this situation. The USA mentioned the need for an anti-piracy force in the Strait of Hormuz[63]. The Baltic states also share concerns about navigation in the Strait of Hormuz[64]. The UK condemned the veto on the UN resolution. They stressed the need to open the Strait of Hormuz and highlighted their joint efforts with France[65]. In this context, the IMO mentioned freedom of navigation without tariffs. They also said seafarers are being evacuated[66].
Ukraine War
The war in Ukraine continues unabated, with several consequences.
Military Spending: The main contributor to the global increase in military spending in 2025 was a 14 per cent rise in Europe to $864 billion. Spending by Russia and Ukraine continued to grow in the fourth year of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, ongoing rearmament by European NATO members drove the sharpest annual growth in spending in Central and Western Europe since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s military spending grew by 5.9 per cent in 2025 to $190 billion, bringing its military burden to 7.5 per cent of GDP. Ukraine, the seventh-largest spender in 2025, increased spending by 20 per cent to $84.1 billion, or 40 per cent of GDP. The USA made no new allocation for Ukraine in 2025[67].
Changing US Stance: The USA has reduced assistance to Ukraine. The European Union, the UK and NATO are picking up the tab[68]. Some argue Europe should emerge as a military bloc independent of the USA[69]. There are calls to use the European Defence Industrial Programme to build more weapons within Europe. Europe is described as a sleeping giant[70]. Ukraine, for its part, calls for more support from Europe and NATO. It links the broader European safety from Russia to the Ukrainian front. There is even a view that the USA is appeasing Russia to the detriment of Ukraine and even Europe[71].
Maritime Aspects: Russia, at another level, accuses Ukraine of armed attacks on civilian vessels flying the Russian flag or transporting Russian energy resources in different waterways around the globe. These concerns affect seafarers, energy, the environment, and trade. Russia claims that attacks are occurring on the coasts of countries supporting Ukraine, which raises questions about their complicity in these attacks. The Black and Mediterranean Seas, and the Bosphorus Strait, are mentioned as sites of these attacks. Russia suggests upholding UNCLOS 1982 to prevent future incidents[72]. On the other hand, the EU is concerned that Shadow Fleets support the Russian war economy[73]. Nordic countries also worry about Russia’s interference with the satellite navigation system in the Baltic Sea[74].
Minerals Deal: The US and Ukraine signed a deal granting the US access to Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth, including Critical Minerals[75]. This is supposed to give the US access to mining while recognising Ukraine’s ownership. This pact would make it difficult for the USA to recognise Russian sovereignty over Ukrainian territory and deter further territorial claims[76].
China Factor: Some view China as supporting Russia in the war in Ukraine. China has supplied military supplies, including Drones. China is also buying oil from Russia[77].
Sanctions: The USA has applied sanctions on both Iran and Russia. These are in response to Iran’s support for Russia in the Ukraine War[78].
Global Energy Scenario
Both wars are affecting the global supply of natural resources and their prices[79].
Oil: A major consequence of this crisis is the need to use alternative, often more expensive, sea routes[80]. Around 20% of global petroleum and 20% of liquefied natural gas traverse the strait each year. Pre-conflict, around 3,000 vessels used the strait each month. Their numbers now stand at around 5% of this level. This has pushed up global oil and gas prices (benefiting both Russia and, temporarily, Iran). Several Arab states were forced to cut or suspend oil production due to Iranian attacks[81]. Russia remains India’s leading supplier of Hydrocarbons[82].
Effect on Fertiliser: The sustained reduction in LNG production and/or shipments from the Gulf (Qatar supplies around 10% of globally traded natural gas) will affect worldwide nitrogen fertiliser production. Natural gas is both a key feedstock and the primary energy source for producing ammonia, the building block for all nitrogen fertilisers. Other ingredients include urea, Phosphate, and Sulphur. India is particularly affected by these shortages[83]. Fertiliser shortages also threaten major global food insecurity[84].
Alternative Energy Routes: Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have operational crude oil pipelines that could reroute flows to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. While additional capacity may exist in major pipelines to bypass the Strait, the logistics and supply chains needed to reroute and export substantial flows have not been tested under stress[85].
Maritime Insurance: Opening the Strait of Hormuz remains a grave issue. A deeper problem is whether commercial underwriters will insure vessels at reasonable rates. This would essentially need a political solution[86]. One suggestion is for India to have national Protection and Indemnity Clubs[87]. Most recently, the Government of India has approved this in principle[88].
Indian Energy Situation. India has made significant strides in energy and climate change.
Power Generation: India is successfully balancing the twin goals of meeting rising electricity demand and promoting sustainability. According to the International Energy Agency, 85% of the increase in global electricity demand over the next three years will come from emerging and developing economies. As one of the fastest-growing major economies, India plays a central role in the global energy transition. India’s share in global primary energy consumption is projected to double by 2035. Electricity generation has increased from 1,168 billion units (BU) in 2015–16 to an estimated 1,824 BU in 2024–25. Similarly, total installed capacity has grown from 305 gigawatts (GW) in 2015–16 to a projected 475 GW in 2024–25[89].
Multiple Energy Sources: India’s energy journey is no longer defined by a single source; it’s now drawing strength from solar parks, rooftop panels, hydrogen pilots, modernised nuclear frameworks, smart meters, and digital platforms. Milestones such as expanding renewable capacity, advancing the National Green Hydrogen Mission, strengthening DISCOMs, and building the India Energy Stack reflect a structured, forward-looking transition. Policy reform, infrastructure investment, technological innovation, and global cooperation support this transformation. As India moves toward its Net Zero 2070 commitment, the evolving energy mix shows that growth and sustainability can go hand in hand. India is redesigning how power is produced, delivered, and shared for a future that is secure, sustainable, and self-reliant[90]. India is increasing its use of renewable energy, and the country now ranks third globally[91].
Emerging Trends
Events over the past year point to a few emerging trends to watch in the coming years. The war in Ukraine remains a stalemate. The West Asia scenario got more complicated with the US-Israel attacks on Iran. This is also an asymmetric conflict and remains inconclusive. Both these conflicts show the chasm in NATO. While continental Europe is fighting against Russia in the Ukraine War, the USA has reduced its support. While the EU and even the UK offer diplomatic support to the USA in West Asia, this does not translate into military backing. Russia is the active party in the war in Ukraine. Iran has been supporting Russia. The USA sanctioned this. China has also been supporting Russia. Currently, both Russia and China are providing diplomatic support to Iran against the USA. The partnership agreement, while not necessarily military, has political objectives. While it may not be obvious, there are currently two powers, namely the USA and Russia, at war, where the other supports the adversary. China, while not a party to either war, is on the opposite side to the USA.
Both wars are linked in the maritime sphere. Discussing one leads to the other. There are concerns about maritime aggression by both the USA and Russia. Russia, for its part, accuses Ukraine of maritime hostility. China, while apparently concerned about the USA’s maritime belligerence in the Iran War, is itself confrontational in the South China Sea. The concerns of the UN and the IMO, supported by France and the UK, show that the Hormuz Strait has morphed from a military issue to a constabulary one. The IMO is taking positive steps to address humanitarian issues.
The Iran War is also in the Cognitive domain, with both sides making claims and counterclaims. While specific battles and incidents are a matter of detail, the underlying issue is around the legitimacy of the USA and Israel invading Iran. Moreover, there is the whole issue of whether Iran is justified or not in building up an arsenal, including nuclear weapons.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
[22] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), President Pezeshkian says Iran has never initiated war, https://irangov.ir/detail/479346
[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran, (21 April 2026), Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the US attack on an Iranian commercial vessel and the hostage-taking of Its crew and their families, https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/786655
[34] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), President Pezeshkian says Iran has never initiated war, https://irangov.ir/detail/479346
[35] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (27 Feb 2026), Significant Progress Made in Third Round of Iran–U.S. Talks in Geneva, FM Says, https://irangov.ir/detail/478575
[36] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), Ibid
[37] US Department of State, (21 April 2026), Ibid
[41] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (02 Oct 2025), Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the entry into force of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2050909/
[42] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (28 Feb 2026), Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UNSC Briefing in connection with US and Israeli Strikes against Iran, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/28022026
[44] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (25 April 2026), Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova interview with an Indian news website Firstpost, April 25, 2026, https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/2100214/?lang=en
[59] United Nations, (27 April 2026), Immediately Restore Freedom of Navigation through Strait of Hormuz, Speakers Urge in Security Council Condemning Critical Waterway’s Use as ‘Bargaining Chip’, SC/16349, https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16349.doc.htm
[62] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (27 April 2026), Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at a UNSC Briefing on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/27042026
[64] Permanent Mission of Iceland to the UN Statements, (27 April 2026), N5 Statement at the Security Council Open Debate on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain
[70] European Commission, (10 Feb 2026), Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament “Building a stronger European defence in light of an increasingly volatile international environment”, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_26_367
[72] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (27 April 2026), Ibid
[73] Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, (27 April 2026), EU Statement – UN Security Council: The Safety and Protection of Maritime Waterways
[82] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (25 April 2026), Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova interview with an Indian news website Firstpost, April 25, 2026, https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/2100214/?lang=en
Defending national airspace has become far more demanding as military technology advances rapidly, bringing a new generation of threats—hypersonic missiles that can cross continents in minutes, stealth aircraft designed to slip past conventional radar, and swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles that can overwhelm defences through sheer numbers. Meeting these challenges calls for a fundamentally different approach towards air defence. Multiple sensors, interceptors, and command nodes must work as a single, coherent network. This is the essence of an Integrated Air Defence System, or IADS — a continuously operating shield that watches the sky, assesses every contact, and directs the appropriate response before a threat can cause harm. IADS gives commanders real-time awareness and the ability to act decisively by integrating detection platforms, command centres, secure communications, weapon systems, and electronic warfare assets into a unified whole. The result is a force capable of countering not only the familiar threats of manned aircraft but also the rapidly growing challenge posed by drones and ballistic missiles. For a growing number of nations, the IADS has become the cornerstone of national security — the means by which a state asserts sovereignty over its own skies at a time when technological parity can no longer be taken for granted. For many countries, IADS constitutes the core of national security.[1]
On 15 August 2025, Indian Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi announced
one of the most significant national security initiatives. Mission Sudarshan Chakra is an air defence shield to protect India’s critical assets from multiple enemy threats. With a target of full operational capability by 2035, it aims to develop a wholly indigenous, multi-layered national security shield—a system capable of confronting evolving threats from ballistic missiles, drone swarms, cyber warfare, and the full spectrum of hybrid conflict.[2]
Concept: Integrated Air Defence
An Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) is a networked, orchestrated system that brings together the full range of a nation’s air defence assets — radars, interceptors, command centres, and communication links — to detect, track, engage, and destroy incoming aerial threats. Those threats may take the form of manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, or ballistic missiles. What distinguishes an IADS from a collection of individual defensive units is its integration: instead of isolated batteries operating independently, every element feeds data to a common picture and acts on common instructions.[3]
Components. The effectiveness of any IADS rests on the performance of its constituent parts and, critically, on how well those parts work together. A modern IADS includes five capability categories.[4]
Detection and surveillance systems form the system’s foundation. An array of ground-based radars, airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS and AEW&C), and space-based surveillance assets collectively provide wide-area monitoring. This multi-layered configuration provides comprehensive coverage and redundancy. Redundancy is essential as no single platform, however capable, should be the sole means of situational awareness.[5]
Command and Control (C2) systems function as the intellectual core of the IADS. They transform raw sensor data into decisions. Modern C2 nodes are increasingly augmented by artificial intelligence. AI helps in threat assessment, computation of probable trajectories, and coordination of intercepts. These centers may be centralised or distributed, but in either configuration, they must provide continuous, reliable command authority over all elements of the system.[6]
Communication networks form the backbone of the IADS. They link all components with secure, high-speed connections. These networks enable real-time data exchange even under challenging conditions (electronic attacks). [7]
Weapon systems provide the means to act on the assessments the C2 node generates. Surface-to-air missiles (such as the Patriot and S-400) and Fighter jets (interceptor aircraft) add versatility by engaging threats beyond the reach of ground-based systems. [8]
Electronic Warfare (EW) Units strengthen the IADS by disrupting enemy activities. Through jamming, deception, and the suppression of enemy radar and guidance systems, EW assets reduce the probability that incoming threats will find their targets, creating windows of opportunity for kinetic systems to exploit.[9]
Operational Mechanism. The operating logic of an IADS is built around layered defence — multiple overlapping rings of capability, each offering the chance to destroy a threat before it reaches the next. The Center for Strategic and International Studies has observed that the hallmark of an effective IADS is its ability to integrate real-time data, synchronise assets across multiple domains, and adapt dynamically as the nature of the threat evolves. In practice, this takes the form of a sequence of coordinated functions.[10]
Early detection and monitoring begin the process. Radar systems, satellites, and airborne warning platforms maintain continuous surveillance, and any contact that departs from expected patterns triggers closer examination. The further out a threat is detected, the more time the system has to respond — making early warning not merely useful but decisive.
Identification and classification: Once an object is identified, the system activates Identification and Classification procedures. IADS uses Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders, signal analysis, and ELINT to distinguish between friendly, neutral, and hostile targets.
Threat assessment is then conducted at the command-and-control level. The command-and-control (C2) centres analyse factors such as speed, altitude, trajectory, and intent to determine the threat level. Based on these analyses, threats are prioritised so that the most urgent and dangerous targets receive immediate attention.[11]
Engagement coordination translates the threat assessment into action. The command node selects the most suitable weapon system available — a SAM battery, anti-aircraft artillery, or an intercepting aircraft — and directs it to engage. The precision of this coordination and the speed with which it occurs largely determine whether the intercept succeeds.
Post-engagement assessment closes the cycle. This phase reviews the outcome to determine whether the threat was successfully neutralised or if further action is necessary.[12]
Key Features. The key features of an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) are vital in improving its ability to detect, track, and neutralise aerial threats.[13]
Interoperability is essential to enable diverse platforms, weapons and systems to operate in a unified manner. This seamless integration and coordination enhance threat response times and situational awareness. [14]
Another vital feature is redundancy and resilience. It ensures that the overall system remains operational, without performance degradation, even if some components are disabled. Backup sensors, alternative communication links, and multiple control nodes ensure the system continues to function.[15]
A layered defence structure is crucial for assured protection. Long-range surveillance and engagement capabilities, along with medium- and short-range systems, are required to create overlapping defensive coverage. This multi-tiered strategy enhances the chances of detecting and neutralising threats at various stages
Scalability allows the architecture to be sized and configured to the specific geography and threat environment it must cover. A system designed to protect a single military airfield and one designed to defend a country the size of India are built on the same principles but tailored to vastly different requirements. This flexibility is what allows IADS concepts to remain relevant across a wide range of national security contexts.
Global Developments
Israel’s IADS. Israel’s Integrated Air Defence System is one of the world’s most sophisticated and operationally proven. It has evolved over the years in a hostile threat environment that demands continuous adaptation. Israel fields three weapon systems. The “Iron Dome” is for the interception of short-range rockets and artillery projectiles. “David’s Sling” neutralises the medium-range threat posed by cruise and ballistic missiles. Lastly, the Arrow system provides the outermost layer of defence against long-range ballistic missiles. These layers are not merely co-located — they are actively integrated via a centralised command-and-control network that ensures rapid, coordinated response. Israel’s IADS has been tested repeatedly in live operations. Quite often, in countering large rocket barrages from Hamas and Hezbollah. Recently, in response to direct missile attacks launched from Iran. Israel’s system has integrated AI-driven automation and expanded its ability to counter emerging threats (including drone swarms and hypersonic weapons). Now, the directed-energy weapon Iron Beam is also being integrated into the IADS. The final result is an air defence system that simultaneously deters adversaries, protects the population, and preserves Israel’s strategic freedom of action in a volatile neighbourhood. [16]
Russian IADS. Russia’s Integrated Air Defence System is one of the most extensive and technically layered in existence, originally built to defend an enormous national territory against the massed air campaigns expected during the Cold War. The system includes long-range weapon systems (S-400 and S-500) that provide strategic depth at ranges beyond 400 kilometres. These systems can engage aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles at high and medium altitudes. The medium-range layer and close-in threats are also covered. A dense early-warning radar network and dedicated electronic warfare units are integrated into a command structure that coordinates responses across the entire defended area. Russia’s IADS is concentrated most heavily around the centres of political and military gravity, but its reach extends across the country. In Syria, deployed Russian air defence systems demonstrated a real deterrent effect. In Ukraine, Russian air defences have engaged Ukrainian drones and missile strikes with notable frequency. Russia continues to develop next-generation interceptors, with the S-500 representing a significant step toward defeating hypersonic weapons. [17]
US IADS. The United States possesses the most globally deployed integrated air defence system. At the strategic end of its spectrum, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system is capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles. Whereas THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) offers theatre-level protection against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Patriot system provides medium-range defence, whereas closer-range coverage is provided by the NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System), and Avenger SAMs (effective against drones and cruise missiles). NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command) ties the architecture together. The United States is actively investing in directed-energy weapons, AI-enabled threat assessment, and hypersonic interceptors to keep its IADS relevant against the next generation of adversary capabilities. [18]
Indian Approach
Necessity. India’s approach to Integrated Air Defence is shaped largely by a security environment unlike that faced by almost any other nation: two nuclear-armed adversaries sharing long, contested land borders, each actively modernising its aerial and missile capabilities, and each capable of threatening Indian territory with little strategic warning. India’s extensive territory and precarious security landscape necessitate robust air defence measures. Against this backdrop, a robust, multi-layered air defence capability is not a discretionary investment for India — it is a fundamental requirement of national security, underpinning both deterrence and the ability to respond effectively if deterrence fails.[19]
Existing Structure. India’s current IADS is a layered architecture that integrates domestically developed systems with platforms acquired from foreign suppliers, brought together under a common command framework.
At the strategic level, the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) provide the command-and-control framework. IACCS nodes draw on radar data from a wide range of sources (including ground-based radars and airborne platforms). A near real-time air picture is generated, enabling continuous tracking and threat prioritisation.
At the operational level, India has a mix of indigenous and imported surface-to-air missile systems. The indigenous Akash missile system protects against low-flying threats. The Israeli SPYDER SR/MR and Barak-8 complement it for extended medium-range engagements. Gun systems address low-altitude drone threats. The induction of the Russian S-400 Triumf system has added significant strategic depth. It has created an engagement envelope extending beyond 400 kilometres. [20]
India’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme provides a further layer above the conventional IADS. The two-tier system — the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) interceptor for exo-atmospheric engagements at high altitude, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) system for endo-atmospheric intercepts at lower altitudes — has undergone successful tests in recent years and is progressively advancing toward declared operational capability.[21]
Indian IADS Performance during Operation Sindoor. Operation Sindoor tested the Indian Air Defence System against a broad and simultaneous range of aerial threats. These included cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, drones, and loitering munitions. The system faced simultaneous multi-dimensional attacks (kinetic, electronic, and cyber). The system displayed a high degree of responsiveness, accuracy and robustness. Operation Sindoor validated the core architecture of India’s IADS while identifying areas where capability development must accelerate to stay ahead of evolving threats.
Challenges in India’s Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS). Despite notable advancements, India’s IADS faces a few challenges that demand sustained, deliberate attention. India fields a diverse array of systems of Russian, Israeli, American, and indigenous origin. One of the foremost problems is ensuring interoperability and seamless integration. Investing in Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) and hardening communications against electronic attack are integral to IADS effectiveness. Sustaining the network also imposes significant, recurring financial demands. It also requires a deep pool of technical expertise that must be built over time and continuously refreshed. Managing these constraints — allocating resources strategically, promoting indigenous production to reduce long-term import dependency, and planning for whole-of-life system sustainability — will determine whether India’s IADS remains modern and operationally effective in the years ahead. [22]
Mission Sudarshan Chakra: An Indigenous Multi-Layered National Defence Shield
In Hindu mythology, the Sudarshan Chakra is the weapon wielded by Lord Krishna. In the epics, the Sudarshan Chakra represents precision, protective power, and the capacity to strike when necessary. These are the same qualities the mission is designed to embody in the modern security environment. Mission Sudarshan Chakra is conceived as an integrated national security ecosystem. It encompasses surveillance, interception, electronic warfare, counter-strike capability, and the digital architecture that ties them all together. The programme aligns with India’s recent Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) approach.[23]
Strategic Vision and Objectives.[24] The primary objective of “Mission Sudarshan Chakra” is to create a comprehensive national security shield. The shield is envisioned to defend India’s critical infrastructure against a wide range of threats. Single-threat-capable Air Defence systems are no longer adequate. To address contemporary threats, the Indian initiative aims to develop a multi-domain defence system integrating air, land, sea, space, and cyber capabilities. This networked system would enable real-time detection, tracking, interception, and retaliation against threats originating from multiple directions simultaneously. The program places major emphasis on protecting critical national infrastructure. This includes military bases and strategic installations, as well as economic assets.
The Multi-Layered Defence Architecture.[25] At the heart of Mission Sudarshan Chakra lies a multi-layered air and missile defence shield designed to intercept threats at different ranges and altitudes. By deploying several defensive layers, the system increases the probability of successfully neutralising incoming attacks before they reach their targets.
Outer Layer — Long-Range Threat Interception. The outermost layer is designed to engage long-range ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and high-altitude aircraft. These threats need to be intercepted as far as possible. Engagement at extended range protects not only the intended target but also reduces the risk of debris from destroyed missiles falling over populated areas. The planned capabilities for this layer centre on the Project Kusha long-range air defence system and India’s indigenous ballistic missile defence interceptors — the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) system, which engages targets outside the atmosphere in the exo-atmospheric phase, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) system, which complements it at lower altitudes during the terminal descent phase.
Mid-Layer — Medium-Range Air Defence. The second layer is tasked with engaging conventional combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and medium-range ballistic missiles that survive or bypass the outer ring. The Akash missile family, the Quick Reaction Surface-to-Air Missile (QRSAM), and the Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (MRSAM) are the primary systems at this layer. Their mobility is a significant attribute: unlike fixed installations, these platforms can reposition to defend both static infrastructure and moving military formations, providing flexibility that a purely static architecture cannot offer.
Inner Layer — Close-Range Protection. The innermost layer addresses the threat categories that have proved most consequential in recent conflicts. These include small, inexpensive drones operating individually or in swarms, loitering munitions, and short-range rockets. The mission plans to deploy the Very Short-Range Air Defence System (VSHORADS), high-power directed-energy weapons and specialised anti-drone electronic warfare systems.
The Command, Control, and Intelligence Backbone.[26] The weapon systems that constitute Mission Sudarshan Chakra’s visible face are only as effective as the architecture that directs them. Successful missile and air defence in the modern era requires ingesting and processing enormous volumes of sensor data—from ground radars, airborne platforms, satellites, and electronic intelligence sources—and translating that data into decisions and commands within seconds. The mission plans to build upon and substantially expand India’s existing IACCS, which already provides some multi-service integration and a common air picture. Under Mission Sudarshan Chakra, this network would be enhanced with advanced AI-enabled computing power. The envisioned command architecture would automatically identify probable threats, compute their trajectories, and generate interception recommendations—while retaining human authority over final engagement decisions. AI would systematise target prioritisation, one of the most cognitively demanding tasks in high-intensity air defence, ensuring the most dangerous contacts receive immediate attention regardless of the total number of simultaneous threats. Space-based assets would play a significantly expanded role, with military satellites equipped to detect the infrared signature of missile launches within seconds of ignition — providing early warning of attacks originating from far away.
Offensive Capability: The “Sword” Component.[27] Mission Sudarshan Chakra differs from conventional air defence in one key way: it does not stop at interception. Once an incoming attack is detected and traced to its point of origin, the system can direct a counter-strike against that source. This approach marks a shift in India’s active defence doctrine. The message it sends is unambiguous — any attack on Indian territory will not only fail to reach its targets, but will draw a precise and swift response against the hand that launched it.
Implementation
Integration with Existing Defence Systems.[28] Mission Sudarshan Chakra is designed explicitly as an umbrella framework rather than a clean-sheet replacement for India’s existing air defence inventory. India will not discard the substantial investments it has made in current-generation systems (S-400, Akash, PAD, AAD, SPYDER, Barak-8, and the IACCS, etc.). They are likely to be upgraded (where necessary) and integrated into the new architecture. All surveillance radars and interceptor weapons will connect to a unified data-sharing network that eliminates the current seams between independently operating systems. New interceptors capable of addressing hypersonic threats and drone swarms would be introduced alongside, and complementary to, existing platforms rather than replacing them. Advanced sensor systems — ground-based radars, electro-optical tracking devices, and satellite-based detectors — will collectively form a comprehensive surveillance grid that provides far greater coverage depth than the current system achieves. As military systems become more software-dependent and network-connected, an adversary’s ability to disrupt, deceive, or disable them through cyber means becomes as significant a threat as a physical attack. Cybersecurity would be embedded throughout the architecture as a fundamental requirement, not an afterthought.
Alignment with India’s Self-Reliance Strategy.[29] Historically, India has relied heavily on foreign suppliers for advanced weapons systems. Mission Sudarshan Chakra is likely to be committed to indigenous development. The government has indicated that research, design, and manufacturing for the system will largely take place in-house. A collaborative approach is being envisaged among national research organisations, defence agencies, and private technology firms. Mission Sudarshan Chakra aims to build a sustainable technological base to support long-term security needs. The initiative also has significant implications for India’s defence industry. Indigenous development could stimulate research and development in areas such as artificial intelligence, radar technology, directed-energy weapons, cybersecurity, and advanced materials.
Implementation Timeline.[30] By 2035, the government hopes to establish a nationwide defence umbrella. The program would be implemented in two phases.
Phase One (2025–2030). This phase is likely to focus on developing key technologies, integrating existing systems, and conducting initial testing of the command-and-control architecture.
Phase Two (2030–2035). This phase is likely to expand the defensive network to its full intended coverage, deploy advanced interceptors and sensor systems developed in Phase One, and achieve full operational capability.
Analytical Perspective
Strategic Importance.[31] Mission Sudarshan Chakra’s strategic significance extends well beyond the technical breakthrough. A functioning multi-layered air and missile defence system of this kind would materially strengthen India’s ability to protect its critical infrastructure against modern threats. By diminishing the expected effectiveness of missile and drone strikes, the system also strengthens India’s deterrent posture: the calculus of a potential adversary contemplating an aerial campaign against India would shift if that adversary could no longer rely on the ability to hold Indian cities or military installations at credible risk. The programme’s implications for India’s long-term technological standing are equally significant. Developing advanced defence systems of this complexity domestically requires, and simultaneously builds, expertise across the most consequential fields of twenty-first-century technology — artificial intelligence, aerospace engineering, robotics, semiconductor design, and cybersecurity. Investment at the scale Mission Sudarshan Chakra demands can generate technology transfer, industrial capability, and human capital that benefit India’s broader economy.
Challenges and Risks.[32] Mission Sudarshan Chakra faces several challenges.
Technical Complexity. Creating a seamless network that integrates all the components (sensors, missiles, satellites, cyber defences, etc.) is extremely complex. Achieving real-time integration across multiple domains will require sophisticated software, secure communication channels, and extensive testing.
Financial Costs. Large-scale missile defence systems are expensive to develop and maintain. India’s defence budget, while growing, must also fund a wide range of other modernisation priorities. Maintaining the financial commitment Mission Sudarshan Chakra requires over a decade will demand careful budgetary planning and sustained dedication.
Geographic Challenge. India’s territory presents a uniquely demanding coverage challenge. The country has thousands of kilometres of contested land borders, two major maritime flanks, and critical infrastructure and large population centres distributed across highly varied terrain. Providing meaningful defensive coverage across this landscape is a complex, order-of-magnitude challenge.
Timeline Uncertainty. The target date of 2035 provides a reasonable development timeframe. However, technological obstacles or budgetary constraints could cause delays. Many advanced defence programs worldwide have faced similar challenges during development.
Conclusion
India’s core proposition is that the country must design, build, and operate its own integrated, multi-layered national security shield, capable of defeating the full spectrum of emerging aerial and missile threats. The program’s three highlights are indigenous development, multi-domain integration, and offensive-defensive capability. Mission Sudarshan Chakra is the most ambitious defence modernisation initiative India has announced in decades. Whether one considers Mission Sudarshan Chakra as a shield raised to protect a billion people, or as a sword kept sheathed but within reach to deter those who might test it, the underlying message is the same: India is not leaving its security to chance.
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References:-
[1] Air Mshl Anil Khosla, “Integrated Air Defence Systems: Comprehensive Airspace Protection, 23 Jan 26.https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2026/01/23/782-integrated-air-defence-systems-comprehensive-airspace-protection/
The first portion of the article on the “Integrated Air Defence System” is a rephrased, abridged version of the same author’s article that first appeared in the combined CAW USI Journal.
[2]“Every Citizen Must Feel Protected”: PM Modi Announces ‘Mission Sudarshan Chakra’, NDTV, Indo-Asian News Service, Aug 15, 2025
[3] Johnson, L. (2022). Integrated Air Defence Systems: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[4] Smith, E. (2024). The Evolution of Air Defence Systems in Modern Warfare. Boston: Harvard University Press.
[5] Brown, T. (2023). Modern Air Defence: Technologies and Challenges. New York: Routledge.
[6] Lee, H. (2024). AI and the Future of Air Defence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[7] Wilson, K. (2023). Network-Centric Warfare and Air Defence Systems. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation.
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[9] Taylor, P. (2023). Electronic Warfare in Modern Air Defence. London: Routledge.
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[11] Johnson, L. (2022). Integrated Air Defence Systems: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[12] Brown, T. (2023). Modern Air Defence: Technologies and Challenges. New York: Routledge.
[13] Smith, E. (2024). The Evolution of Air Defence Systems in Modern Warfare. Boston: Harvard University Press.
[14] Wilson, K. (2023). Network-Centric Warfare and Air Defence Systems. Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation.
[15] Taylor, P. (2023). Electronic Warfare in Modern Air Defence. London: Routledge.
[16] Cohen, R. (2023). Israel’s Multi-Layered Air Defence Network. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies.
[17] Petrov, A. (2023). Russia’s Air Defence Network: Capabilities and Limitations. Moscow: Center for Military Analysis.
[18] Adams, J. (2024). U.S. Air Defence Systems: Evolution and Strategic Deployment. Washington, DC: National Defence University Press.
[19] Singh, R. (2023). India’s Integrated Air Defence System: Strategic Imperatives. New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
[20] Kumar, S. (2023). India’s Air Defence Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 17(4), 55–70.
[21] Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). (2024). India’s Ballistic Missile Defence Program: Progress and Prospects. New Delhi: DRDO Publications.
[22] Kumar, S. (2023). India’s Air Defence Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 17(4), 55–70.
[23] Snehashish Roy, “Modi invokes Lord Krishna, announces Sudarshan Chakra Mission to boost security”, Hindustan Times, Aug 15, 2025.
[24] “CDS General Chauhan talks about Mission Sudarshan Chakra: How it will help defend India”, The Indian Express, Aug 26, 2025.
[25] Air Marshal P.K. Roy, “Mission Sudarshan Chakra: India’s Quest For a Multi-Layered Defence Shield”, Blog, 20 Aug 25.
[26] Vedansh Arora, “Mission Sudarshan Chakra: India’s Iron Dome-Inspired Defence Shield for 2035”, Georgian Defence academy, 07 Oct 25.
[27] Rajat Pandit, “Mission Sudarshan Chakra: Multi-layered air and missile defence shield integrated with offensive weapons”, The Times of India, 16 Aug 25.
[28] Issue Brief, “Mission Sudarshan Chakra and the India–Israel Special Strategic Partnership”, MPIDSA, 06 Mar 26.
[29] PM Modi announces ‘Mission Sudarshan Chakra’ to secure key establishments with indigenous technology” DD News, 15 Aug 25.
[30] Vinod Janardhanan, “Sudarshan Chakra will be ‘shield and spear’: Air Chief Marshal AP Singh reveals timeline of India’s own ‘Iron Dome’ defence system deployment”, 03 Oct 2025.
[31] Editor, “Modi’s ‘Sudarshan Chakra’ Vision – What is India’s Nationwide, Integrated Missile Shield”, Defence Star, 19 Aug 2025.
[32] Ritwik Sharma, “Sudarshan Chakra Mission: Shielding the nation from aerial attacks”, 22 Aug 2025.
