813: BEHIND ENEMY LINES: THE DEADLY ART OF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

 

Article published in the May 26 edition (volume 1, Issue 9) of the Business Standard BLUEPRINT Magazine

On April 3, a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran’s rugged Zagros Mountains. The two-man crew ejected safely, but their recovery triggered one of the most complex CSAR operations in recent history. What followed was not a simple rescue; reportedly, the U.S. deployed a package of more than 150 aircraft. It was a massive, multi-domain effort.  It involved fighters, tankers, electronic warfare platforms, and special operations forces. All the elements worked in concert in an active enemy-threat environment. The extraction operation was costly. Few aircraft were damaged, platforms were lost or abandoned, and crews faced sustained ground fire in a contested environment.

The incident has thrust Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) back to the centre of a fierce debate over whether the principle of “leaving no man behind” remains viable in highly contested, peer-level environments. CSAR, by definition, involves locating, supporting, and extracting isolated personnel from hostile territory while under fire. The risks to aircrews operating in dense air defence networks, drone-saturated battlespaces, and irregular threat environments have grown dramatically. This has made the personnel recovery both more essential and more perilous than at any point in recent decades.

 

CSAR Complexity

CSAR operations involve locating the downed crew, authenticating, and then extracting them.  Unlike peacetime search and rescue, the process takes place in a hostile environment. In an environment where the adversary is alert, armed, and converging towards the same location as the rescue force. The fundamental difficulty stems from the tactical reality that, the moment an aircraft goes down in enemy territory, the adversary knows where the crew has landed. The downed aviator’s greatest assets are speed of recovery and the element of surprise. Both erode with every passing minute.

The rescue force must fly into the same threat environment that just destroyed the aircraft it is trying to recover from — often without knowing precisely what brought it down or whether that threat is still active. The helicopter crews executing the final pickup, flying low and slow in a hover over a precise location the enemy also knows, are among the most exposed personnel in modern warfare.

A CSAR package must simultaneously suppress enemy fighters, neutralise SAM systems, jam enemy radar and communications, provide airborne command and control, extend loiter time through aerial refuelling, and insert pararescue teams capable of parachuting or fast-roping (slithering) into the recovery zone, providing emergency medical treatment, and fighting their way out if necessary. Orchestrating this package, at night, often in radio silence, against an alerted adversary, is a feat of operational complexity that few military organisations can reliably execute.

The potential capture of aircrew is a significant, high-stakes consideration in military operations. Captured aircrew pose a multi-faceted threat. Adversaries can utilise captured aircrew to leverage concessions during negotiations. They may be coerced into making statements or appearing in the media, undermining the friendly nation’s public support for the war. Aircrew may possess knowledge of sensitive mission objectives, technology, or intelligence, which they could be forced to reveal. These sensitivities drive military decision-making to prioritise personnel recovery and, at times, accept higher risk to avoid capture, such as risking additional assets for rescue operations. 

 

Combat Search and Rescue: A Global Survey

The First Rescue. The first recorded rescue took place in 1915.  A British RNAS Commander Richard Bell-Davies landed his single-seat aircraft behind enemy lines in Bulgaria. He retrieved his downed wingman despite approaching enemy troops. That act established the founding principle of combat rescue.

The United States. America didn’t invent combat search and rescue, but systematised it. The U.S. converted this wartime necessity into a formal doctrine. The Korean War highlighted the helicopter’s primacy in CSAR as nearly 1,000 personnel were recovered from behind the enemy lines. The Vietnam War was the crucible. Reportedly, over 3,800 recovery missions saved approximately 3,900 lives, at the cost of 71 rescue aircraft and 45 crewmen. During this war, the core package concept emerged. This includes suppression aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, airborne command-and-control aircraft, tankers, and helicopters carrying pararescuemen.  The Gulf War validated the CSAR doctrine. The full-strike package concept against sophisticated air defences was validated during the 1999 Kosovo War.  The April 2026 Iran operation represents the most demanding CSAR execution since Vietnam.

Britain: The Falklands Lesson. The RAF CSAR lineage runs back to Channel rescues in 1940. The Falklands War imposed the harshest test on the British CSAR mechanism, operating 8,000 miles from home. The extraction capability was lost with the sinking of the ship SS Atlantic Conveyor, along with the onboard Chinook helicopters.  The lesson that emerged was that CSAR depends entirely on pre-positioned assets. Loss of these assets mid-campaign is catastrophic.

Israel: Forged in Continuous Conflict. The Israel Air Force has the most combat-tested CSAR doctrine. It has been shaped by over five decades of continuous conflict. The fundamental restructuring took place during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  It included dedicated rescue helicopters with fighter escort, pre-planned extraction corridors, and an emphasis on SEAD as a prerequisite. The spirit of CSAR is aptly conveyed in their phrase “we will not abandon our soldiers in the field”.

 France: Africa as the Laboratory. France’s CSAR doctrine was built through near-continuous operations in Africa since decolonisation — Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel. It has a relatively small but genuinely capable CSAR force. The Caracal helicopter, with aerial refuelling, terrain-following radar, and special forces integration, forms the core of capability. Operation Serval in Mali demonstrated France’s credible CSAR across vast, severe terrain.

Russia. Compared to Western forces, Russia does not have dedicated CSAR units. Russian combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability utilises a mix of air and ground forces. Helicopters like the Mil Mi-8 are used for extraction. They are often escorted by armed platforms such as the Kamov Ka-52. Spetsnaz teams provide ground support.

The Universal Pattern/Lesson. CSAR is the direct determinant of aircrew morale and operational aggression. The air forces that invest in dedicated recovery capability demonstrate measurably different aircrew behaviour. The institutional promise embedded in CSAR is not a humanitarian sentiment. It is a force multiplier. Every air force that has learned this lesson has learned it the hard way — usually over the loss of aircrew who ejected into hostile territory and waited for a recovery that never came. Across every air force and every conflict, the same pattern recurs. CSAR capability is almost always inadequate. It improves through the painful experience of early failures.

 

India: CSAR Challenges

The Indian Air Force’s CSAR history spans seven decades of conflict in some of the world’s most demanding terrain — the defining characteristic being that India has repeatedly demonstrated the operational requirement for CSAR capability while repeatedly discovering the institutional gap between that requirement and available resources.

The 1947-48 Kashmir War saw the IAF’s earliest combat rescue operations. Dakota transport aircraft were used to evacuate wounded from forward airstrips, which were under Pakistani fire. The 1962 Sino-Indian War saw IAF helicopter units flying Alouette IIIs at altitudes above 14,000 feet in the North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh. They conducted casualty evacuations at the limits of their performance.  

The IAF’s Garud Commando Force was raised in 2004. This was the most significant value addition to the CSAR capability.  Garuds train for heliborne insertion in hostile environments. Armed helicopters with survivability systems serve as the extraction platform. The combat helicopters provide air cover as escorts. India’s two-front threat scenario makes CSAR capability development not merely desirable but operationally essential.

 

Way Ahead: Building a Credible CSAR Capability

The following recommendations are based on the specific threat environment India faces. High-altitude Himalayan terrain, a nuclear-armed peer adversary to the west, and a rising competitor to the north.

Dedicated CSAR Squadron. The CSAR demands a dedicated squadron with a specific mandate. No dedicated unit means no dedicated training, no dedicated equipment procurement cycle, and no institutional memory. A dedicated unit with a fixed order of battle is essential.  CSAR specialism should be considered a career path rather than an additional duty. Without a dedicated unit, every other recommendation is aspirational.

Acquire a Purpose-Built CSAR Helicopter. Not all the helicopters are specifically equipped for the CSAR role.  A CSAR helicopter needs specific systems such as terrain-following radar, an aerial refuelling probe, integrated defensive aids, and a hoist system. A specially equipped platform, in meaningful numbers, would offer a credible organic recovery capability.

Raise and Train a Pararescue Cadre. Aircraft are necessary, but so are the pararescuemen. The Garud Commando Force of the Indian Air Force already has CSAR listed among its roles. The logical step is to develop within Garud a dedicated personnel recovery element, trained specifically in high-altitude medicine, combat casualty care, evasion assistance, and the mechanics of survivor authentication.

Develop High-Altitude CSAR SOP. No air force in the world has more operational experience of high-altitude aerial combat than the Indian Air Force.  The Kargil war highlighted the peculiarities of operations in the Himalayan terrain. The IAF should develop an area-specific CSAR doctrine for each prevailing terrain type.

Integrate SEAD Planning into Every CSAR Package. The clearest lesson from the past is that sending recovery assets into an unsuppressed threat environment compounds losses rather than preventing them. Every CSAR planning process must include a suppression-of-enemy-air-defences element as a prerequisite, not an afterthought. This requires coordination between the CSAR element, fighter escort squadrons, and electronic warfare assets.

Accelerate the Unmanned CSAR Programme. The ongoing Indian programme to develop an unmanned CSAR is a strategically sound idea. An autonomous platform capable of locating survivors via Emergency Locator Transmitters, navigating to 20,000 feet, and operating in GPS-denied environments addresses the specific CSAR requirements. However, unmanned systems cannot replicate the pararescueman’s ability to provide emergency medical care, authenticate survivors under ambiguous conditions, or fight through a compromised extraction. The unmanned programme should be developed as a complementary capability.

Invest in SERE Training. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training is the other half of the CSAR equation. The downed aircrew’s own decisions in the hours after ejection determine whether a recovery is possible. The SERE training programme should be made compulsory for all aircrew. It should be periodically reviewed, upgraded, and stress-tested against the specific threat scenarios.

 

Concluding Thoughts

Each of the recommendations above costs money. Developing a dedicated squadron, purpose-built platforms, a trained pararescue cadre, and a genuine SEAD integration framework requires substantial expenditure and investment. However, it is still worth it as an effective Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) capability is a powerful force multiplier for any air force. When pilots and aircrew are confident they will be rescued no matter what happens, they perform far more effectively and aggressively in combat.

In the Indian context, this assurance becomes even more critical. India is likely to face high-intensity, short-duration conflicts in highly contested, geographically challenging terrain such as the Himalayas and deserts. The suggested elements of the process exist in some form. They need to be reviewed, enhanced, integrated and formalised in a time-bound manner.  CSAR is not merely an auxiliary or secondary function; it is an essential operational necessity.  Investing in CSAR is therefore not about saving isolated personnel alone, but about preserving combat effectiveness and the will to fight.

 

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References:
 

  1. (April 6, 2026). Risky rescue of US crew downed in Iran relied on dozens of aircraft and subterfuge, Trump says. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/7d8cfb6d0fd400abdc71f8c9d67408fe
  1. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Operations in Russia, (August 3, 2025). https://en.iz.ru/en/1930757/2025-08-03/ministry-defense-showed-footage-search-and-rescue-operations-mi-8psg-helicopter-crew
  1. The U.S. launched an air armada to rescue the F-15 crew in Iran”. (06 April 2026).  https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-f15-rescue-caine-trump
  1. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). GlobalSecurity.org. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/csar.htm
  1. Medicine, N. A.  Combat Search and Rescue in Highly Contested Environments: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief. https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/25156/chapter/1
  1. RAND Corporation, “Combat search & rescue in a contested environment: Implications for future operations”.

 

  1. Galdorisi, G., & Phillips, T, “Leave no man behind: The saga of combat search and rescue”, Zenith Press, 2009.

 

  1. “Personnel recovery operations (AFDP 3-50)”. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, 2019.
  2. “Allied joint doctrine for personnel recovery (AJP-3.7)”. NATO Standardisation Office, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2016.
  3. Air Force would like to call a drone for crew rescue – sUAS News. https://www.suasnews.com/2019/05/air-force-would-like-to-call-a-drone-for-crew-rescue/

776:FORWARD AIR BASES VULNERABLE TARGETS OR CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ASSETS

 

Forward air bases (FABs) have long been viewed as critical assets in aerial warfare. They reduce response times and extend reach in the offensive/defensive air operations. However, in the emerging age of long-range precision and stand-off weapons, hardened air defences, and networked multi-domain warfare, the logic underpinning forward air bases is under serious stress. This article examines why FABs are increasingly becoming vulnerable, less relevant, and less decisive in modern stand-off wars.

Traditional Rationales. There were several well-known advantages to positioning air bases forward:-

    • Reduced flight time to the target, enabling rapid reaction and shorter sortie durations. According to the concept of loss-of-strength gradient, combat power decreases the farther forces operate from their home base. Forward bases mitigate that.
    • The utilisation of infrastructure near potential hot spots by deploying combat aircraft signalled intent and readiness.
    • Operating from forward airbases heightened the operational tempo by increasing sortie rates. Aircraft could spend more time on station because of a shorter transit time.

In the earlier combat scenarios, these rationales held great weight. Bases close to the front or forward edge enabled rapid interception of enemy aircraft, quick retaliation, and facilitated air dominance in a given theater.

 

Stand-off Warfare Changes the Calculus

But the nature of war has evolved. Several factors now undercut the logic of forward air bases.

Extended Ranges of Weapons. Modern precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and cruise/stand-off missiles enable strikes well beyond the immediate battle zone or border. Precision-guided munitions like the SCALP cruise missile and BrahMos supersonic missile have rendered traditional geographical barriers ‘almost meaningless’. With the ability to engage airfields, runways, and rear infrastructure from distances, being close to the front becomes less of an advantage and possibly more of a liability.

Increased Vulnerability. Forward bases have become increasingly vulnerable in modern warfare due to the proliferation of advanced stand-off weapons. The long-range missiles, precision-guided munitions, and armed drones now allow air forces to strike targets from great distances. As a result, forward deployment now entails a higher risk. Forward-deployed infrastructure (including runways, fuel depots, and command centres) presents lucrative targets for standoff precision strikes. Moreover, aircraft operating from these bases can be easily monitored and targeted as soon as they take off.

The Changing Front-to-Rear Distinction. In earlier times, the front line, rear area, and logistics tail had a clear separation. With long-range strike capability, unmanned systems, and satellite/ISR coverage, the borders of the battle space have blurred. Forward bases lose the advantage that they once had.

Higher Cost and Diminishing Marginal Returns. Setting up and then hugely investing in defending forward air bases is expensive. When many of the sorties can be launched from more distant, safer bases with mid-air refuelling and stand-off weapons, the marginal advantage of being forward drops. The concept of forward bases is less cost-effective when they become high-risk assets on day one of a war.

Diminished Need. The air power can now be projected from deeper bases. It has been made possible by the introduction of long-range weapons, aerial refuellers, ISR platforms, unmanned systems, and networked logistics.

 

Irrelevant or Severely Diminished.

Given the above, one can argue that forward air bases are becoming less relevant. Their primacy in high-intensity stand-off wars is waning. They may not be totally useless, but they may be losing their centrality in air power projection. They remain relevant and valuable in rapid deployment and sustenance. They can still play an essential role in low-intensity conflict and fast reaction situations.  Their role becomes more supportive, logistical, or semi-peripheral rather than central to the strike posture. Some relevant aspects are as follows:-

    • Against adversaries with less precision strike capability, forward bases remain justifiable. The irrelevance argument is mostly in the context of high-end, modern stand-off threats.
    • If air superiority is not contested and the adversary lacks strike capacity, forward bases still offer a considerable advantage in sortie rate and quick reaction.
    • Regional geography & constraints do matter. In some theatres, geography demands forward basing (islands, remote outposts, limited tanking options).
    • For air defence, interception missions, quick reaction alerts, forward bases may still matter, whereas for deep strike or suppression operations, their utility is reduced.

 

Implications for the Doctrine on Air Force Basing

Move Deeper and Disperse. Forward air bases need not be abandoned entirely. They must be complemented (or possibly replaced) by dispersed, deep-located, remote operating hubs that enjoy greater sanctuary.

Harden and Improve Survivability. The forward air bases need to improve their survivability. Possible measures would include hardened shelters, rapid runway repair capability, passive defence, decoys, underground infrastructure, and layered air and missile defences.

Shift to Resilience and Mobility. Forward basing as a static posture becomes more vulnerable. Mobility has become more critical.  There is a need to be able to move air assets, use expeditionary airfields, operate from unprepared landing grounds, rotate squadrons and avoid presenting a fixed target.

Rely on a Stand-off and Networked Force Structure. The real strike and deterrent value now lies in long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, ISR networks, and mixed manned/unmanned teaming.

 

Conclusion

The concept of forward air bases developed and matured in the era when proximity to the area of operation was equated to rapid reaction and operational advantage. Long-range precision weapons, networked sensors, and multi-domain threats are shaping modern aerial warfare. Forward bases may not be inherently beneficial.  For high-intensity operations against capable, near-parity adversaries, the optimal basing posture is shifting toward depth, dispersion, resilience and network-centric operations.  However, forward air bases will continue to exist, but they will be less decisive and useful in certain limited scenarios.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

  1. Warden, John A, “The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat”, National Defence University Press, 1989.
  1. Freedman, Lawrence, “Stand-off Warfare, Precision Strike & Changing Calculus”, The Future of War: A History, Public Affairs, 2017.
  2. Blurring of Front and Rear / Multi-Domain Warfare, US Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations.
  3. Robert C. Owen, “Basing Strategies for Airpower” (Air Force Research Institute, 2015).
  1. John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, “Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks”, RAND Corporation, 1999.
  1. U.S. Department of the Air Force, “Extended Ranges, Increased Vulnerability, and Stand-off Warfare, Department of the Air Force Report, 2025.
  1. U.S. Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment (ACE), “Diminishing Returns, Cost, and Shift to Depth/Dispersion/Resilience”, August 2022.
  1. Frank Kendall’s Operational Imperative No. 5: “Resilient Basing” (U.S. Air Force, 2023). Prioritises dispersion, hardening, and mobility to counter stand-off attacks.

775: Podcast with Anmol

 

Had a very lively chat with Anmol. We talked about a variety of topics, ranging from personal life to life in the air force. The chat included aspects related to motivation, stress management, decision making, air power, deterrence, new domains of war, Info warfare and a whole lot of other issues.  One of the best podcasts.

 

 

Link to the podcast:-

 

Comments, views and suggestions are most welcome.

 

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