823: Wings of Dominance: The Future of Air Warfare

 

Q1.  What is the new balance of air power in the world today? Are fighter jets still the focus of warfare, or are drones beginning to take their place?

Fighter jets remain the backbone of air power, and that is not about to change. What has changed fundamentally is the ecosystem around them. A modern fighter operates in a networked environment comprising long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, and space-based ISR.

Drones are taking over the missions that are too risky, too repetitive, or too economically unjustifiable to warrant a manned sortie. They are not replacing the manned aircraft.

The prevailing trend favours a combination of manned and unmanned systems. Manned aircraft are focusing on contested, high-end missions that require judgment, adaptability, and versatile payloads. Concurrently, unmanned systems are being employed in persistent, attritable, and mass-effect roles.

The adaptation to this hybrid model is no longer merely a tactical requirement; it has become a strategic necessity.

 

Q2.  Russia’s Su-57 and the US F-35 embody different philosophies — one emphasises air combat, the other network-centric warfare. Whose future will it be?

The Su-57 seems to reflect the traditional Russian emphasis on kinematic performance and super-manoeuvrability.

The F-35 is claimed to be built around sensor fusion and battlespace awareness. It is advertised as capable of detecting, classifying, and engaging the threat at beyond-visual-range distances through a data architecture spanning an entire networked force.

Future aerial combat is progressing towards a network-centric model. Contemporary air engagements are increasingly determined by the priority of achieving information and decision dominance, rather than by performance alone.

Compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline is now as critical as speed or manoeuvrability. This is fundamentally a problem of decision architecture, not merely of technology.

The sixth-generation programmes are pushing emerging platforms toward multi-domain integration.  Fusion of air, space, cyber, and electronic warfare into a single operational architecture will make the network-centric model more definitive.

 

Q3.  China already has the J-20. Has India delayed the AMCA too long, or is it still possible to turn the situation around?

It is a fact that India’s timeline has slipped. The J-20 has been operational for nearly a decade. China is already iterating toward a sixth-generation capability, as evidenced by the prototypes that emerged publicly in late 2024.

AMCA is still working through prototype development. The gap is significant and widening. Reversal of the trend is a realistic necessity.

India can recover lost ground in fighter development if the programme is properly resourced, executed and politically backed.

A significant structural shift is also underway with the Ministry of Defence opening AMCA prototype development to private consortia rather than relying exclusively on the public-sector model.

The window to close the capability gap exists. It will not remain open indefinitely, and the margin for complacency on programme management is close to zero.

 

Q4.  In the wars to come, will Artificial Intelligence and Loyal Wingman drones be more important than pilots?

The pilot does not become less important. His job changes, and in some respects becomes more demanding, not less.

Manned-unmanned combat air teams would have one crewed aircraft effectively commanding a tactical formation of attritable unmanned assets, absorbing risk that would otherwise fall on the manned platform, carrying missiles, jammers, decoys, or forward reconnaissance payloads.

What AI is changing is the speed and volume of decision-making below the human threshold.

AI-enabled satellites and sensors, capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets, can push that picture directly to the shooter over tactical data links, rather than routing it back through a ground station first. That is what compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. However, human intervention cannot be removed from the kill chain.

As of now, the human crew retains authority over decisions that carry lethal and political consequences, while AI absorbs the burden of processing, prioritising, and routing information faster than any human can.

So, AI and unmanned teaming will unquestionably become more important than they are today. But the human crew would remain relevant and in control.

The pilot of 2040 will be managing a far more complex battle picture, commanding a digital wolfpack rather than flying a single aircraft.

 

Q5.  If India has the opportunity to purchase the F-35 or the Su-57, should we go ahead and purchase them, or stick to developing our own aircraft?

These are not competing choices, and treating them as such leads to a false dilemma.

The IAF’s squadron strength shortfall is real, immediate, and strategically significant. The Rafale has helped close that numerical gap, but has not closed it.

Further, there is a case for qualitative enhancement by the induction of fifth-generation aircraft.

The F-35 carries substantial geopolitical weight, end-use restrictions, and software dependency. Cost, delivery timelines, extended supply chains, Transfer of technology and trust deficit are other factors to be taken into account.

Russia has been a trusted partner, willing to share its technology to a certain extent and accepting Make in India. The Su-57 also raises several concerns besides the factors listed above. India had earlier walked out of the co-development program mainly due to concerns related to cost and technology sharing.

Neither platform offers a clean, dependency-free solution. The importance of self-reliance in defence production is a common lesson emerging from recent wars. The Indigenous program (AMCA) is some time away and urgently needs a technology infusion.

The logical answer is to plug the gap pragmatically by expanding the Rafale order and carefully reassessing the induction of fifth-generation aircraft, while protecting AMCA’s funding and schedule as a non-negotiable national priority.

The near-term interim acquisition and the long-term indigenous programme must be advanced concurrently. The contract should be negotiated in a manner that boosts the indigenous programme rather than undermining it.

 

Q6.  Is engine technology still India’s biggest weakness today?

The answer is YES. The Tejas Mark 1A flies on the American GE F404. AMCA’s initial squadrons will likely depend on an imported engine in the ninety-kilonewton class. The latest news is that negotiations for the GE 414 engine for AMCA have hit rough weather due to a 300 per cent cost increase.

India still does not have a proven indigenous engine anywhere near the ninety to one hundred ten kilonewton range required for a credible fifth or sixth-generation fighter. The Kaveri programme, running since the mid-1980s, is the most visible illustration of how difficult this problem is. High-performance turbofan technology demands a combination of high-temperature metallurgy, single-crystal turbine blade manufacturing, precision tolerances, and decades of iterative test data that very few nations have accumulated.

Urgent need of the hour is a deal that includes a degree of co-production and technology transfer for engine manufacturing in India. Co-production extends the supply chain into India, but it does not give India the ability to independently design, test, and certify a clean-sheet high-thrust engine. Engine independence remains the single weakest link in the self-reliance story.

 

Q7.  Will the export of fighter jets become an increasingly important geopolitical tool?

Fighter exports are already an important geopolitical tool, and their leverage is intensifying rather than diminishing.

Fighter exports create decades of dependency for the buyer. The seller retains influence over the buyer’s operational readiness (by supplying spares, software updates, weapons integration, training pipelines, and maintenance protocols). This dependency lasts for the life of the platform (often 30 to 40 years after the sale).

India’s own indigenous push is a deliberate effort to reduce exposure to precisely this kind of dependency.  India’s active promotion of the Tejas and its indigenous missile systems in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Gulf reflects a clear understanding that defence exports are as much an instrument of foreign policy as of industrial economics. Future fighter sales will be negotiated as much on reliability of supply and strategic alignment as on cost or raw capability.

 

Q8.  What are India’s greatest achievements and biggest challenges in defence self-reliance?

Tejas moving from a deeply troubled programme to a credible inducted fighter is, to a certain extent, an achievement.  The development of indigenous rotary-wing platforms (Dhruv, Rudra, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand) demonstrates that the industrial capacity extends beyond fast jets. The Astra beyond-visual-range missile and the continued maturation of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile represent genuine capability in the weapons domain. The missile and space programs are doing comparatively well.

Perhaps most significantly, India’s defence production turnover has grown substantially over the past decade. The country has moved from being almost exclusively an arms importer to a growing exporter, which is a structural shift that would have seemed improbable fifteen years ago.

The challenges are equally tangible. Squadron strength remains well below the sanctioned forty-two. Force multipliers, tankers, airborne early warning and control platforms are inadequate in numbers for a force that needs to project across two frontiers simultaneously. Engine technology remains unresolved.

The achievements prove India can build technically demanding systems. What remains unproven is whether it can build them at the pace and scale that the threat environment now demands.

 

Q9.  How will the Indian Air Force look in 2040, compared to today?

By 2040, assuming the squadron strength target is met or even meaningfully mitigated, the IAF should be a genuinely different force, operating on a different conceptual basis.

AMCA should be in serial production, forming the high-end backbone alongside an upgraded Rafale fleet and a substantially modernised Su-30MKI. The Tejas Mark 2 and the twin-engine deck-based fighter should round out the order of battle, bringing the indigenous content of the combat fleet to a level inconceivable at the beginning of this decade.

Loyal Wingman and unmanned systems would be standard formation elements rather than experimental adjuncts.

AI-assisted Space-based ISR would be integrated into the network.

The UCAV and other Unmanned platforms will significantly enhance airpower capabilities.

If the present trajectory and pace are sustained, by 2040 the IAF should be more networked, more integrated with the space and cyber domains, and far less dependent on foreign supply chains than anything currently in service.

 

Q10.  If you had to identify one defining trend in air warfare over the next twenty years, what would it be?

The shift from platform-centric to weapon-centric airpower operating in a networked environment. The idea that the decisive factor in air combat is increasingly not which aircraft you fly, but how fast you can sense, decide, and act across a distributed force. Ada result:

The sensor-to-shooter timeline will get shortened further.

Space-based satellites with onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing the targets will push that picture directly to the shooter.

Manned and unmanned systems will operate as a single collaborative entity rather than parallel fleets.

Mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum, with digital and cognitive dimensions layered on top, would become essential.

Stealth, hypersonics, manoeuvrability, drone swarms, and directed energy technologies/capabilities would follow this shift.

The air forces that adapt to it early will hold the operational advantage in 2040 and beyond. The ones that keep procuring better individual platforms while neglecting the architecture around them (i.e. modern equipment running on an outdated decision framework) will find themselves technologically current but operationally lagging.

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

816: Podcast on Sainik Welfare News

 

Had an Interesting Chat with Capt Lokendra Singh (Retd) on Sainik Welfare News Podcast.

 

We talked about:-

  1. The biggest lesson from the journey in service.
  2. Decision Making. 
  3. Role of Airpower in the maritime domain and IOR.
  4. Challenges in commanding a base.
  5. China’s airpower balance.
  6. Role of AF in the Doklam standoff.
  7. Strategic message from Balakot air strikes.
  8. Future of Manned fighter aircraft.
  9. Jointness and Integrated Operations.
  10. Qualities of a good military leader.
  11. The most risky and challenging flying.
  12. Balanced life.
  13. Flying training challenges.
  14. Role of technology in airpower
  15. Tejas Project.
  16. message to young aspirants.
  17. Most memorable aircraft to fly.
  18. Most memorable posting.
  19. Most impressionable book, person, or idea.
  20. Advice to your younger self.

 

 

Comments and Views are most Welcome.

 

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813: BEHIND ENEMY LINES: THE DEADLY ART OF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

 

Article published in the May 26 edition (volume 1, Issue 9) of the Business Standard BLUEPRINT Magazine

On April 3, a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran’s rugged Zagros Mountains. The two-man crew ejected safely, but their recovery triggered one of the most complex CSAR operations in recent history. What followed was not a simple rescue; reportedly, the U.S. deployed a package of more than 150 aircraft. It was a massive, multi-domain effort.  It involved fighters, tankers, electronic warfare platforms, and special operations forces. All the elements worked in concert in an active enemy-threat environment. The extraction operation was costly. Few aircraft were damaged, platforms were lost or abandoned, and crews faced sustained ground fire in a contested environment.

The incident has thrust Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) back to the centre of a fierce debate over whether the principle of “leaving no man behind” remains viable in highly contested, peer-level environments. CSAR, by definition, involves locating, supporting, and extracting isolated personnel from hostile territory while under fire. The risks to aircrews operating in dense air defence networks, drone-saturated battlespaces, and irregular threat environments have grown dramatically. This has made the personnel recovery both more essential and more perilous than at any point in recent decades.

 

CSAR Complexity

CSAR operations involve locating the downed crew, authenticating, and then extracting them.  Unlike peacetime search and rescue, the process takes place in a hostile environment. In an environment where the adversary is alert, armed, and converging towards the same location as the rescue force. The fundamental difficulty stems from the tactical reality that, the moment an aircraft goes down in enemy territory, the adversary knows where the crew has landed. The downed aviator’s greatest assets are speed of recovery and the element of surprise. Both erode with every passing minute.

The rescue force must fly into the same threat environment that just destroyed the aircraft it is trying to recover from — often without knowing precisely what brought it down or whether that threat is still active. The helicopter crews executing the final pickup, flying low and slow in a hover over a precise location the enemy also knows, are among the most exposed personnel in modern warfare.

A CSAR package must simultaneously suppress enemy fighters, neutralise SAM systems, jam enemy radar and communications, provide airborne command and control, extend loiter time through aerial refuelling, and insert pararescue teams capable of parachuting or fast-roping (slithering) into the recovery zone, providing emergency medical treatment, and fighting their way out if necessary. Orchestrating this package, at night, often in radio silence, against an alerted adversary, is a feat of operational complexity that few military organisations can reliably execute.

The potential capture of aircrew is a significant, high-stakes consideration in military operations. Captured aircrew pose a multi-faceted threat. Adversaries can utilise captured aircrew to leverage concessions during negotiations. They may be coerced into making statements or appearing in the media, undermining the friendly nation’s public support for the war. Aircrew may possess knowledge of sensitive mission objectives, technology, or intelligence, which they could be forced to reveal. These sensitivities drive military decision-making to prioritise personnel recovery and, at times, accept higher risk to avoid capture, such as risking additional assets for rescue operations. 

 

Combat Search and Rescue: A Global Survey

The First Rescue. The first recorded rescue took place in 1915.  A British RNAS Commander Richard Bell-Davies landed his single-seat aircraft behind enemy lines in Bulgaria. He retrieved his downed wingman despite approaching enemy troops. That act established the founding principle of combat rescue.

The United States. America didn’t invent combat search and rescue, but systematised it. The U.S. converted this wartime necessity into a formal doctrine. The Korean War highlighted the helicopter’s primacy in CSAR as nearly 1,000 personnel were recovered from behind the enemy lines. The Vietnam War was the crucible. Reportedly, over 3,800 recovery missions saved approximately 3,900 lives, at the cost of 71 rescue aircraft and 45 crewmen. During this war, the core package concept emerged. This includes suppression aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, airborne command-and-control aircraft, tankers, and helicopters carrying pararescuemen.  The Gulf War validated the CSAR doctrine. The full-strike package concept against sophisticated air defences was validated during the 1999 Kosovo War.  The April 2026 Iran operation represents the most demanding CSAR execution since Vietnam.

Britain: The Falklands Lesson. The RAF CSAR lineage runs back to Channel rescues in 1940. The Falklands War imposed the harshest test on the British CSAR mechanism, operating 8,000 miles from home. The extraction capability was lost with the sinking of the ship SS Atlantic Conveyor, along with the onboard Chinook helicopters.  The lesson that emerged was that CSAR depends entirely on pre-positioned assets. Loss of these assets mid-campaign is catastrophic.

Israel: Forged in Continuous Conflict. The Israel Air Force has the most combat-tested CSAR doctrine. It has been shaped by over five decades of continuous conflict. The fundamental restructuring took place during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  It included dedicated rescue helicopters with fighter escort, pre-planned extraction corridors, and an emphasis on SEAD as a prerequisite. The spirit of CSAR is aptly conveyed in their phrase “we will not abandon our soldiers in the field”.

 France: Africa as the Laboratory. France’s CSAR doctrine was built through near-continuous operations in Africa since decolonisation — Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel. It has a relatively small but genuinely capable CSAR force. The Caracal helicopter, with aerial refuelling, terrain-following radar, and special forces integration, forms the core of capability. Operation Serval in Mali demonstrated France’s credible CSAR across vast, severe terrain.

Russia. Compared to Western forces, Russia does not have dedicated CSAR units. Russian combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability utilises a mix of air and ground forces. Helicopters like the Mil Mi-8 are used for extraction. They are often escorted by armed platforms such as the Kamov Ka-52. Spetsnaz teams provide ground support.

The Universal Pattern/Lesson. CSAR is the direct determinant of aircrew morale and operational aggression. The air forces that invest in dedicated recovery capability demonstrate measurably different aircrew behaviour. The institutional promise embedded in CSAR is not a humanitarian sentiment. It is a force multiplier. Every air force that has learned this lesson has learned it the hard way — usually over the loss of aircrew who ejected into hostile territory and waited for a recovery that never came. Across every air force and every conflict, the same pattern recurs. CSAR capability is almost always inadequate. It improves through the painful experience of early failures.

 

India: CSAR Challenges

The Indian Air Force’s CSAR history spans seven decades of conflict in some of the world’s most demanding terrain — the defining characteristic being that India has repeatedly demonstrated the operational requirement for CSAR capability while repeatedly discovering the institutional gap between that requirement and available resources.

The 1947-48 Kashmir War saw the IAF’s earliest combat rescue operations. Dakota transport aircraft were used to evacuate wounded from forward airstrips, which were under Pakistani fire. The 1962 Sino-Indian War saw IAF helicopter units flying Alouette IIIs at altitudes above 14,000 feet in the North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh. They conducted casualty evacuations at the limits of their performance.  

The IAF’s Garud Commando Force was raised in 2004. This was the most significant value addition to the CSAR capability.  Garuds train for heliborne insertion in hostile environments. Armed helicopters with survivability systems serve as the extraction platform. The combat helicopters provide air cover as escorts. India’s two-front threat scenario makes CSAR capability development not merely desirable but operationally essential.

 

Way Ahead: Building a Credible CSAR Capability

The following recommendations are based on the specific threat environment India faces. High-altitude Himalayan terrain, a nuclear-armed peer adversary to the west, and a rising competitor to the north.

Dedicated CSAR Squadron. The CSAR demands a dedicated squadron with a specific mandate. No dedicated unit means no dedicated training, no dedicated equipment procurement cycle, and no institutional memory. A dedicated unit with a fixed order of battle is essential.  CSAR specialism should be considered a career path rather than an additional duty. Without a dedicated unit, every other recommendation is aspirational.

Acquire a Purpose-Built CSAR Helicopter. Not all the helicopters are specifically equipped for the CSAR role.  A CSAR helicopter needs specific systems such as terrain-following radar, an aerial refuelling probe, integrated defensive aids, and a hoist system. A specially equipped platform, in meaningful numbers, would offer a credible organic recovery capability.

Raise and Train a Pararescue Cadre. Aircraft are necessary, but so are the pararescuemen. The Garud Commando Force of the Indian Air Force already has CSAR listed among its roles. The logical step is to develop within Garud a dedicated personnel recovery element, trained specifically in high-altitude medicine, combat casualty care, evasion assistance, and the mechanics of survivor authentication.

Develop High-Altitude CSAR SOP. No air force in the world has more operational experience of high-altitude aerial combat than the Indian Air Force.  The Kargil war highlighted the peculiarities of operations in the Himalayan terrain. The IAF should develop an area-specific CSAR doctrine for each prevailing terrain type.

Integrate SEAD Planning into Every CSAR Package. The clearest lesson from the past is that sending recovery assets into an unsuppressed threat environment compounds losses rather than preventing them. Every CSAR planning process must include a suppression-of-enemy-air-defences element as a prerequisite, not an afterthought. This requires coordination between the CSAR element, fighter escort squadrons, and electronic warfare assets.

Accelerate the Unmanned CSAR Programme. The ongoing Indian programme to develop an unmanned CSAR is a strategically sound idea. An autonomous platform capable of locating survivors via Emergency Locator Transmitters, navigating to 20,000 feet, and operating in GPS-denied environments addresses the specific CSAR requirements. However, unmanned systems cannot replicate the pararescueman’s ability to provide emergency medical care, authenticate survivors under ambiguous conditions, or fight through a compromised extraction. The unmanned programme should be developed as a complementary capability.

Invest in SERE Training. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training is the other half of the CSAR equation. The downed aircrew’s own decisions in the hours after ejection determine whether a recovery is possible. The SERE training programme should be made compulsory for all aircrew. It should be periodically reviewed, upgraded, and stress-tested against the specific threat scenarios.

 

Concluding Thoughts

Each of the recommendations above costs money. Developing a dedicated squadron, purpose-built platforms, a trained pararescue cadre, and a genuine SEAD integration framework requires substantial expenditure and investment. However, it is still worth it as an effective Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) capability is a powerful force multiplier for any air force. When pilots and aircrew are confident they will be rescued no matter what happens, they perform far more effectively and aggressively in combat.

In the Indian context, this assurance becomes even more critical. India is likely to face high-intensity, short-duration conflicts in highly contested, geographically challenging terrain such as the Himalayas and deserts. The suggested elements of the process exist in some form. They need to be reviewed, enhanced, integrated and formalised in a time-bound manner.  CSAR is not merely an auxiliary or secondary function; it is an essential operational necessity.  Investing in CSAR is therefore not about saving isolated personnel alone, but about preserving combat effectiveness and the will to fight.

 

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References:
 

  1. (April 6, 2026). Risky rescue of US crew downed in Iran relied on dozens of aircraft and subterfuge, Trump says. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/7d8cfb6d0fd400abdc71f8c9d67408fe
  1. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Operations in Russia, (August 3, 2025). https://en.iz.ru/en/1930757/2025-08-03/ministry-defense-showed-footage-search-and-rescue-operations-mi-8psg-helicopter-crew
  1. The U.S. launched an air armada to rescue the F-15 crew in Iran”. (06 April 2026).  https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-f15-rescue-caine-trump
  1. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). GlobalSecurity.org. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/csar.htm
  1. Medicine, N. A.  Combat Search and Rescue in Highly Contested Environments: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief. https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/25156/chapter/1
  1. RAND Corporation, “Combat search & rescue in a contested environment: Implications for future operations”.

 

  1. Galdorisi, G., & Phillips, T, “Leave no man behind: The saga of combat search and rescue”, Zenith Press, 2009.

 

  1. “Personnel recovery operations (AFDP 3-50)”. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, 2019.
  2. “Allied joint doctrine for personnel recovery (AJP-3.7)”. NATO Standardisation Office, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2016.
  3. Air Force would like to call a drone for crew rescue – sUAS News. https://www.suasnews.com/2019/05/air-force-would-like-to-call-a-drone-for-crew-rescue/
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