military capability – Air Marshal's Perspective

May 12, 2026May 12, 2026

813: BEHIND ENEMY LINES: THE DEADLY ART OF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Article published in the May 26 edition (volume 1, Issue 9) of the Business Standard BLUEPRINT Magazine

On April 3, a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran’s rugged Zagros Mountains. The two-man crew ejected safely, but their recovery triggered one of the most complex CSAR operations in recent history. What followed was not a simple rescue; reportedly, the U.S. deployed a package of more than 150 aircraft. It was a massive, multi-domain effort. It involved fighters, tankers, electronic warfare platforms, and special operations forces. All the elements worked in concert in an active enemy-threat environment. The extraction operation was costly. Few aircraft were damaged, platforms were lost or abandoned, and crews faced sustained ground fire in a contested environment.

The incident has thrust Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) back to the centre of a fierce debate over whether the principle of “leaving no man behind” remains viable in highly contested, peer-level environments. CSAR, by definition, involves locating, supporting, and extracting isolated personnel from hostile territory while under fire. The risks to aircrews operating in dense air defence networks, drone-saturated battlespaces, and irregular threat environments have grown dramatically. This has made the personnel recovery both more essential and more perilous than at any point in recent decades.

CSAR Complexity

CSAR operations involve locating the downed crew, authenticating, and then extracting them. Unlike peacetime search and rescue, the process takes place in a hostile environment. In an environment where the adversary is alert, armed, and converging towards the same location as the rescue force. The fundamental difficulty stems from the tactical reality that, the moment an aircraft goes down in enemy territory, the adversary knows where the crew has landed. The downed aviator’s greatest assets are speed of recovery and the element of surprise. Both erode with every passing minute.

The rescue force must fly into the same threat environment that just destroyed the aircraft it is trying to recover from — often without knowing precisely what brought it down or whether that threat is still active. The helicopter crews executing the final pickup, flying low and slow in a hover over a precise location the enemy also knows, are among the most exposed personnel in modern warfare.

A CSAR package must simultaneously suppress enemy fighters, neutralise SAM systems, jam enemy radar and communications, provide airborne command and control, extend loiter time through aerial refuelling, and insert pararescue teams capable of parachuting or fast-roping (slithering) into the recovery zone, providing emergency medical treatment, and fighting their way out if necessary. Orchestrating this package, at night, often in radio silence, against an alerted adversary, is a feat of operational complexity that few military organisations can reliably execute.

The potential capture of aircrew is a significant, high-stakes consideration in military operations. Captured aircrew pose a multi-faceted threat. Adversaries can utilise captured aircrew to leverage concessions during negotiations. They may be coerced into making statements or appearing in the media, undermining the friendly nation’s public support for the war. Aircrew may possess knowledge of sensitive mission objectives, technology, or intelligence, which they could be forced to reveal. These sensitivities drive military decision-making to prioritise personnel recovery and, at times, accept higher risk to avoid capture, such as risking additional assets for rescue operations.

Combat Search and Rescue: A Global Survey

The First Rescue. The first recorded rescue took place in 1915. A British RNAS Commander Richard Bell-Davies landed his single-seat aircraft behind enemy lines in Bulgaria. He retrieved his downed wingman despite approaching enemy troops. That act established the founding principle of combat rescue.

The United States. America didn’t invent combat search and rescue, but systematised it. The U.S. converted this wartime necessity into a formal doctrine. The Korean War highlighted the helicopter’s primacy in CSAR as nearly 1,000 personnel were recovered from behind the enemy lines. The Vietnam War was the crucible. Reportedly, over 3,800 recovery missions saved approximately 3,900 lives, at the cost of 71 rescue aircraft and 45 crewmen. During this war, the core package concept emerged. This includes suppression aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, airborne command-and-control aircraft, tankers, and helicopters carrying pararescuemen. The Gulf War validated the CSAR doctrine. The full-strike package concept against sophisticated air defences was validated during the 1999 Kosovo War. The April 2026 Iran operation represents the most demanding CSAR execution since Vietnam.

Britain: The Falklands Lesson. The RAF CSAR lineage runs back to Channel rescues in 1940. The Falklands War imposed the harshest test on the British CSAR mechanism, operating 8,000 miles from home. The extraction capability was lost with the sinking of the ship SS Atlantic Conveyor, along with the onboard Chinook helicopters. The lesson that emerged was that CSAR depends entirely on pre-positioned assets. Loss of these assets mid-campaign is catastrophic.

Israel: Forged in Continuous Conflict. The Israel Air Force has the most combat-tested CSAR doctrine. It has been shaped by over five decades of continuous conflict. The fundamental restructuring took place during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It included dedicated rescue helicopters with fighter escort, pre-planned extraction corridors, and an emphasis on SEAD as a prerequisite. The spirit of CSAR is aptly conveyed in their phrase “we will not abandon our soldiers in the field”.

France: Africa as the Laboratory. France’s CSAR doctrine was built through near-continuous operations in Africa since decolonisation — Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel. It has a relatively small but genuinely capable CSAR force. The Caracal helicopter, with aerial refuelling, terrain-following radar, and special forces integration, forms the core of capability. Operation Serval in Mali demonstrated France’s credible CSAR across vast, severe terrain.

Russia. Compared to Western forces, Russia does not have dedicated CSAR units. Russian combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability utilises a mix of air and ground forces. Helicopters like the Mil Mi-8 are used for extraction. They are often escorted by armed platforms such as the Kamov Ka-52. Spetsnaz teams provide ground support.

The Universal Pattern/Lesson. CSAR is the direct determinant of aircrew morale and operational aggression. The air forces that invest in dedicated recovery capability demonstrate measurably different aircrew behaviour. The institutional promise embedded in CSAR is not a humanitarian sentiment. It is a force multiplier. Every air force that has learned this lesson has learned it the hard way — usually over the loss of aircrew who ejected into hostile territory and waited for a recovery that never came. Across every air force and every conflict, the same pattern recurs. CSAR capability is almost always inadequate. It improves through the painful experience of early failures.

India: CSAR Challenges

The Indian Air Force’s CSAR history spans seven decades of conflict in some of the world’s most demanding terrain — the defining characteristic being that India has repeatedly demonstrated the operational requirement for CSAR capability while repeatedly discovering the institutional gap between that requirement and available resources.

The 1947-48 Kashmir War saw the IAF’s earliest combat rescue operations. Dakota transport aircraft were used to evacuate wounded from forward airstrips, which were under Pakistani fire. The 1962 Sino-Indian War saw IAF helicopter units flying Alouette IIIs at altitudes above 14,000 feet in the North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh. They conducted casualty evacuations at the limits of their performance.

The IAF’s Garud Commando Force was raised in 2004. This was the most significant value addition to the CSAR capability. Garuds train for heliborne insertion in hostile environments. Armed helicopters with survivability systems serve as the extraction platform. The combat helicopters provide air cover as escorts. India’s two-front threat scenario makes CSAR capability development not merely desirable but operationally essential.

Way Ahead: Building a Credible CSAR Capability

The following recommendations are based on the specific threat environment India faces. High-altitude Himalayan terrain, a nuclear-armed peer adversary to the west, and a rising competitor to the north.

Dedicated CSAR Squadron. The CSAR demands a dedicated squadron with a specific mandate. No dedicated unit means no dedicated training, no dedicated equipment procurement cycle, and no institutional memory. A dedicated unit with a fixed order of battle is essential. CSAR specialism should be considered a career path rather than an additional duty. Without a dedicated unit, every other recommendation is aspirational.

Acquire a Purpose-Built CSAR Helicopter. Not all the helicopters are specifically equipped for the CSAR role. A CSAR helicopter needs specific systems such as terrain-following radar, an aerial refuelling probe, integrated defensive aids, and a hoist system. A specially equipped platform, in meaningful numbers, would offer a credible organic recovery capability.

Raise and Train a Pararescue Cadre. Aircraft are necessary, but so are the pararescuemen. The Garud Commando Force of the Indian Air Force already has CSAR listed among its roles. The logical step is to develop within Garud a dedicated personnel recovery element, trained specifically in high-altitude medicine, combat casualty care, evasion assistance, and the mechanics of survivor authentication.

Develop High-Altitude CSAR SOP. No air force in the world has more operational experience of high-altitude aerial combat than the Indian Air Force. The Kargil war highlighted the peculiarities of operations in the Himalayan terrain. The IAF should develop an area-specific CSAR doctrine for each prevailing terrain type.

Integrate SEAD Planning into Every CSAR Package. The clearest lesson from the past is that sending recovery assets into an unsuppressed threat environment compounds losses rather than preventing them. Every CSAR planning process must include a suppression-of-enemy-air-defences element as a prerequisite, not an afterthought. This requires coordination between the CSAR element, fighter escort squadrons, and electronic warfare assets.

Accelerate the Unmanned CSAR Programme. The ongoing Indian programme to develop an unmanned CSAR is a strategically sound idea. An autonomous platform capable of locating survivors via Emergency Locator Transmitters, navigating to 20,000 feet, and operating in GPS-denied environments addresses the specific CSAR requirements. However, unmanned systems cannot replicate the pararescueman’s ability to provide emergency medical care, authenticate survivors under ambiguous conditions, or fight through a compromised extraction. The unmanned programme should be developed as a complementary capability.

Invest in SERE Training. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training is the other half of the CSAR equation. The downed aircrew’s own decisions in the hours after ejection determine whether a recovery is possible. The SERE training programme should be made compulsory for all aircrew. It should be periodically reviewed, upgraded, and stress-tested against the specific threat scenarios.

Concluding Thoughts

Each of the recommendations above costs money. Developing a dedicated squadron, purpose-built platforms, a trained pararescue cadre, and a genuine SEAD integration framework requires substantial expenditure and investment. However, it is still worth it as an effective Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) capability is a powerful force multiplier for any air force. When pilots and aircrew are confident they will be rescued no matter what happens, they perform far more effectively and aggressively in combat.

In the Indian context, this assurance becomes even more critical. India is likely to face high-intensity, short-duration conflicts in highly contested, geographically challenging terrain such as the Himalayas and deserts. The suggested elements of the process exist in some form. They need to be reviewed, enhanced, integrated and formalised in a time-bound manner. CSAR is not merely an auxiliary or secondary function; it is an essential operational necessity. Investing in CSAR is therefore not about saving isolated personnel alone, but about preserving combat effectiveness and the will to fight.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:

(April 6, 2026). Risky rescue of US crew downed in Iran relied on dozens of aircraft and subterfuge, Trump says. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/7d8cfb6d0fd400abdc71f8c9d67408fe

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Operations in Russia, (August 3, 2025). https://en.iz.ru/en/1930757/2025-08-03/ministry-defense-showed-footage-search-and-rescue-operations-mi-8psg-helicopter-crew

“The U.S. launched an air armada to rescue the F-15 crew in Iran”. (06 April 2026). https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-f15-rescue-caine-trump

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). GlobalSecurity.org. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/csar.htm

Medicine, N. A. Combat Search and Rescue in Highly Contested Environments: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief. https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/25156/chapter/1

RAND Corporation, “Combat search & rescue in a contested environment: Implications for future operations”.

Galdorisi, G., & Phillips, T, “Leave no man behind: The saga of combat search and rescue”, Zenith Press, 2009.

“Personnel recovery operations (AFDP 3-50)”. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, 2019.
“Allied joint doctrine for personnel recovery (AJP-3.7)”. NATO Standardisation Office, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2016.
Air Force would like to call a drone for crew rescue – sUAS News. https://www.suasnews.com/2019/05/air-force-would-like-to-call-a-drone-for-crew-rescue/

May 3, 2026

807: PRE-EMPTION AND NUCLEAR SIGNALLING IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Article published in the May 26 edition of

The News Analytics Magazine

The Iran war began with Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 and culminated in the far larger Operation Epic Fury of 28 February 2026. During this war, the joint US-Israel strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure will be studied in war colleges for decades because of what they represent conceptually. It represents the operational normalisation of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear programmes. Preventive operations against a proliferating adversary, once theoretical, have now become an operational reality.

The February 2026 campaign crossed every threshold that its predecessors had approached but not breached. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in the opening wave. IRGC leadership was decapitated. The key Iranian nuclear installations at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan were struck again, along with command architecture, missile production, and air defence systems. Yet catastrophic escalation has not followed, and the international system has absorbed it so far. This absorption is the strategic fact that changes everything.

Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo (From Osirak to Epic Fury)

The Cold War theory of deterrence rested on the foundational proposition that nuclear weapons created a protective envelope. They deter direct use of military force. This proposition has gradually eroded. Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor established what became known as the Begin Doctrine, i.e. no hostile neighbour would be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons, regardless of international law or diplomatic cost. The 2007 strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar facility extended the precedent. The Stuxnet cyber operation against Natanz in 2010 took it into the covert domain. Yet these attacks remained exceptional and limited, with denial. These attacks were not against a near-nuclear power with a ballistic missile arsenal and a functioning deterrence architecture. The 2025–2026 campaign is different in kind and degree. Iran possesses missiles capable of reaching Israel and American bases across the region. Striking it was pre-empting a perceived near-nuclear power while deliberately managing the risk of escalation to general war.

New Nuclear Signalling Paradigm

The new nuclear signalling paradigm consists of three distinct features. The first one is that deterrence is communicated through action rather than doctrine. Second, escalation is managed by targeting discrimination rather than abstention; third, the nuclear threshold is maintained through real-time reinforcement rather than assumed stability.

Legitimisation of Pre-emption. A doctrine that cannot be justified is a doctrine that cannot be sustained. It was publicised that Iran’s programme had reached an irreversible breakout proximity. The strikes were legitimised as a necessary preventive measure. This is the first lesson of the new paradigm. Pre-emption in the nuclear age requires strategic communication as much as operational capability.

Management of Escalation. The February 2026 strikes targeted enrichment infrastructure, command architecture, and IRGC leadership of Iran. Civilian infrastructure was not attacked, signalling limited objectives. Iran’s retaliation consisted of missile barrages against Israeli cities and US Gulf bases, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides imposed costs on the other without crossing the threshold that would have made retreat impossible. This “controlled chaos” demonstrates that even in direct war between a nuclear power, a presumed nuclear power, and a threshold state, escalation can be managed if both sides retain the discipline and interest to do so.

Holding the Nuclear Threshold. Iran did not cross into nuclear use partly because weaponisation was incomplete, but also because the American strategic umbrella was made explicit in the weeks before the strikes — through repositioned assets, presidential statements, and back-channel communications that made the consequences of nuclear first use unambiguous. Extended deterrence did not merely exist; it was actively performed. The threshold was not held not because deterrence was passive but because it was continuously and visibly reinforced at the moment it was most needed.

Global Implications. The normalisation of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear infrastructure has far-reaching implications. The lesson for the near-nuclear-status states is that the period between “developing” and “possessing” can become an operational trigger point. A not-yet-complete enough-to-deter-nuclear programme is in great danger of adversary attack. For the non-proliferation regime, the damage is structural. The NPT relies on IAEA verification as the mechanism for distinguishing between civilian and military nuclear development. Military strikes that bypass this mechanism hollow out the regime’s legitimacy.

The Indian Calculus

India occupies a position of distinctive complexity in this new landscape. It is a nuclear-armed state with a declared No First Use doctrine, bordered by two nuclear-armed adversaries whose own postures diverge sharply from each other and from India’s own.

China’s nuclear doctrine, while historically minimalist, is in visible transition. It is rapidly expanding its ICBM silos, developing a more survivable sea-based deterrent, and progressively blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear delivery systems in its missile forces. These developments point toward a more assertive posture. China has not adopted preemption as declared policy. But its conventional military assertiveness means that the relevant Indian concern is not Chinese nuclear pre-emption but Chinese conventional operations that generate military pressure in the space below the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan presents a fundamentally more direct and disturbing challenge in this context. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is ambiguous, creating uncertainty about escalation thresholds. The Pakistani military’s institutional identification with its nuclear programme, the domestic political dynamics that any Pakistani government would face after absorbing a pre-emptive strike, and the genuine ambiguity about tactical thresholds all point toward escalation risk substantially higher than what obtained in the Iran case. India cannot assume that the Iran paradigm (i.e., strike, absorb limited retaliation, and manage to a ceasefire) would replicate in South Asia with the same level of containment.

Doctrinal Imperative for India

India’s No First Use doctrine has moral clarity, a stabilising function in crisis management, and diplomatic value in the international community. It remains strategically sound and needs to be retained. But the NFU must be backed by a more explicit, operationally developed conventional deterrence capability and posture. The conventional deterrence posture should credibly signal that India can impose unacceptable costs on an adversary without resorting to nuclear first use. The Iran war demonstrates that pre-emption works when the pre-emptor has overwhelming conventional capability, credible backing, and a carefully constructed legitimising narrative. India must develop all three elements to deter the conditions that would make preemption appear necessary.

Simultaneously, India must develop protective infrastructure for its strategic assets (Critical military infrastructure, command-and-control nodes, and Weapon delivery systems). The investment in survivability, dispersal, hardening, and redundancy for India’s strategic assets is a strategic necessity and priority.

Concluding Thoughts

The operating rules of the Nuclear age are being rewritten. The new paradigm will shape the deterrence calculations globally for decades. The line between war and peace is no longer fixed; it is actively managed, contested, and increasingly blurred. For a country with India’s strategic geography, adversary configuration, and developmental ambitions, adapting to these developments is essential.

The Iran war has normalised pre-emption. Escalation control below the nuclear threshold is now a practised art form. Deterrence is to be earned, not just declared in the doctrine. The question India must now answer is whether its doctrine, force structure, survivability investments, and strategic communication are credible enough to meet the new paradigm.

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References: –

Brodie, B. (Ed.). (1946). The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. Harcourt, Brace.
Clary, C., & Narang, V. (2019). India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities. MIT Press.
Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press.
Chari, P. R. (2003). Nuclear restraint, nuclear risk reduction, and the security-insecurity paradox in South Asia. Nonproliferation Review, 10(1), 73–85.
Clary, C. (2010). Thinking about Pakistan’s nuclear security in peacetime, crisis and war. IDSA Occasional Paper, 12, 1–47.

Fitzpatrick, M. (2016). Iran and nuclear ambitions. Adelphi Papers, 45(374), 1–176.
Sagan, S. D. (1994). The perils of proliferation: Organisation theory, deterrence theory, and the spread of nuclear weapons. International Security, 18(4), 66–107.

Arms Control Association. (2025). Iran’s nuclear program: A history of key agreements and violations. Arms Control Association.

Chaudhuri, R. (2023). India’s nuclear doctrine: Continuity and change. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025). Iran: Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions (Report GOV/2025/14). IAEA Board of Governors.

Panda, A. (2025). Pakistan’s nuclear posture after Nasr: Tactical weapons and strategic instability (Working Paper). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Tellis, A. J. (2025). Striking Iran: What the US-Israeli operations mean for the Asian nuclear order. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Cooper, H., Schmitt, E., & Sanger, D. E. (2026, March 2). American bombers joined Israeli strikes on Iran in the February operation—The New York Times.
Warrick, J. (2025, July 4). Iran’s nuclear infrastructure: What was hit and what remains. The Washington Post.

December 24, 2025

776:FORWARD AIR BASES VULNERABLE TARGETS OR CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ASSETS

Forward air bases (FABs) have long been viewed as critical assets in aerial warfare. They reduce response times and extend reach in the offensive/defensive air operations. However, in the emerging age of long-range precision and stand-off weapons, hardened air defences, and networked multi-domain warfare, the logic underpinning forward air bases is under serious stress. This article examines why FABs are increasingly becoming vulnerable, less relevant, and less decisive in modern stand-off wars.

Traditional Rationales. There were several well-known advantages to positioning air bases forward:-

- Reduced flight time to the target, enabling rapid reaction and shorter sortie durations. According to the concept of loss-of-strength gradient, combat power decreases the farther forces operate from their home base. Forward bases mitigate that.

- The utilisation of infrastructure near potential hot spots by deploying combat aircraft signalled intent and readiness.

- Operating from forward airbases heightened the operational tempo by increasing sortie rates. Aircraft could spend more time on station because of a shorter transit time.

In the earlier combat scenarios, these rationales held great weight. Bases close to the front or forward edge enabled rapid interception of enemy aircraft, quick retaliation, and facilitated air dominance in a given theater.

Stand-off Warfare Changes the Calculus

But the nature of war has evolved. Several factors now undercut the logic of forward air bases.

Extended Ranges of Weapons. Modern precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and cruise/stand-off missiles enable strikes well beyond the immediate battle zone or border. Precision-guided munitions like the SCALP cruise missile and BrahMos supersonic missile have rendered traditional geographical barriers ‘almost meaningless’. With the ability to engage airfields, runways, and rear infrastructure from distances, being close to the front becomes less of an advantage and possibly more of a liability.

Increased Vulnerability. Forward bases have become increasingly vulnerable in modern warfare due to the proliferation of advanced stand-off weapons. The long-range missiles, precision-guided munitions, and armed drones now allow air forces to strike targets from great distances. As a result, forward deployment now entails a higher risk. Forward-deployed infrastructure (including runways, fuel depots, and command centres) presents lucrative targets for standoff precision strikes. Moreover, aircraft operating from these bases can be easily monitored and targeted as soon as they take off.

The Changing Front-to-Rear Distinction. In earlier times, the front line, rear area, and logistics tail had a clear separation. With long-range strike capability, unmanned systems, and satellite/ISR coverage, the borders of the battle space have blurred. Forward bases lose the advantage that they once had.

Higher Cost and Diminishing Marginal Returns. Setting up and then hugely investing in defending forward air bases is expensive. When many of the sorties can be launched from more distant, safer bases with mid-air refuelling and stand-off weapons, the marginal advantage of being forward drops. The concept of forward bases is less cost-effective when they become high-risk assets on day one of a war.

Diminished Need. The air power can now be projected from deeper bases. It has been made possible by the introduction of long-range weapons, aerial refuellers, ISR platforms, unmanned systems, and networked logistics.

Irrelevant or Severely Diminished.

Given the above, one can argue that forward air bases are becoming less relevant. Their primacy in high-intensity stand-off wars is waning. They may not be totally useless, but they may be losing their centrality in air power projection. They remain relevant and valuable in rapid deployment and sustenance. They can still play an essential role in low-intensity conflict and fast reaction situations. Their role becomes more supportive, logistical, or semi-peripheral rather than central to the strike posture. Some relevant aspects are as follows:-

- Against adversaries with less precision strike capability, forward bases remain justifiable. The irrelevance argument is mostly in the context of high-end, modern stand-off threats.

- If air superiority is not contested and the adversary lacks strike capacity, forward bases still offer a considerable advantage in sortie rate and quick reaction.

- Regional geography & constraints do matter. In some theatres, geography demands forward basing (islands, remote outposts, limited tanking options).

- For air defence, interception missions, quick reaction alerts, forward bases may still matter, whereas for deep strike or suppression operations, their utility is reduced.

Implications for the Doctrine on Air Force Basing

Move Deeper and Disperse. Forward air bases need not be abandoned entirely. They must be complemented (or possibly replaced) by dispersed, deep-located, remote operating hubs that enjoy greater sanctuary.

Harden and Improve Survivability. The forward air bases need to improve their survivability. Possible measures would include hardened shelters, rapid runway repair capability, passive defence, decoys, underground infrastructure, and layered air and missile defences.

Shift to Resilience and Mobility. Forward basing as a static posture becomes more vulnerable. Mobility has become more critical. There is a need to be able to move air assets, use expeditionary airfields, operate from unprepared landing grounds, rotate squadrons and avoid presenting a fixed target.

Rely on a Stand-off and Networked Force Structure. The real strike and deterrent value now lies in long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, ISR networks, and mixed manned/unmanned teaming.

Conclusion

The concept of forward air bases developed and matured in the era when proximity to the area of operation was equated to rapid reaction and operational advantage. Long-range precision weapons, networked sensors, and multi-domain threats are shaping modern aerial warfare. Forward bases may not be inherently beneficial. For high-intensity operations against capable, near-parity adversaries, the optimal basing posture is shifting toward depth, dispersion, resilience and network-centric operations. However, forward air bases will continue to exist, but they will be less decisive and useful in certain limited scenarios.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

Warden, John A, “The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat”, National Defence University Press, 1989.

Freedman, Lawrence, “Stand-off Warfare, Precision Strike & Changing Calculus”, The Future of War: A History, Public Affairs, 2017.
Blurring of Front and Rear / Multi-Domain Warfare, US Department of Defence, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations.
Robert C. Owen, “Basing Strategies for Airpower” (Air Force Research Institute, 2015).

John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, “Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise-Missile and Ballistic-Missile Attacks”, RAND Corporation, 1999.

U.S. Department of the Air Force, “Extended Ranges, Increased Vulnerability, and Stand-off Warfare, Department of the Air Force Report, 2025.

U.S. Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment (ACE), “Diminishing Returns, Cost, and Shift to Depth/Dispersion/Resilience”, August 2022.

Frank Kendall’s Operational Imperative No. 5: “Resilient Basing” (U.S. Air Force, 2023). Prioritises dispersion, hardening, and mobility to counter stand-off attacks.