861: INPUTS TO MEDIA QUESTIONNAIRE ON IAF

 

The IAF will celebrate its 94th anniversary on 08 Oct 2026.

Shared my views on some of the aspects the media highlighted.

 

  1. You have discussed India’s air power and the challenges beyond the border on both sides, as well as China’s extensive modernisation. What challenges has the IAF faced in your time in pushing for modernisation? Has it been enough? What would you have liked to see done in your time?

Perspective: China is rapidly modernising its defence forces. It is in competition with the USA and pulling way ahead of us. In the process, they are also pulling along their ally Pakistan, narrowing the gap with India. Of late, both have been belligerent.

India’s Past Approach to Military Modernisation. Until about a decade back, India’s approach was incremental. It was phased and reactive, with war-triggered acquisitions and reforms. It aimed to replace the legacy systems rather than prepare for the future.

Fresh Impetus. In the last decade or so, the approach has shifted to a more proactive stance, driving defence modernisation, self-reliance, and the development of the defence production ecosystem.

Past Challenges:

    • Budgetary Constraints. In the past, India did not spend enough on enhancing the capabilities of its defence forces.
    • Prolonged Procurement Cycles. Procurement processes were tedious and time-consuming, involving approvals, evaluations, trials, negotiations, clearances, and scrutiny.
    • Self-Reliance. The approach towards self-reliance was a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, the leapfrog method didn’t work due to several reasons. A classic example is the Tejas story.
    • Defence Production Ecosystem. The components of the defence production ecosystem worked in individual silos. Further, DPSUs faced no competition because the protectionist approach prevented private-sector participation.

Adequacy of Modernisation. Over the years, the IAF has grown in capability (high-altitude ops, Day, night, and all-weather ops, Precision, standoff, reach, strategic airlift, Combat support ops, etc.). However, its capacity to endure (e.g., the number of fighter squadrons and combat support aircraft) has not kept pace with the perceived threats.

 

  1. Since your tenure as VCAS, there have been considerable changes in how AI, and specifically LLMs, are used in warfare, with the most recent example being Iran-US and Anthropic. What challenges might the IAF face in adopting such autonomous systems? Is it outdated training, or is it domestic capacity and data security?

AI has made a significant impact on the aviation sector, including defence aviation. All three factors mentioned are important.

    • Data Security. AI-enabled fusion of sensors, platforms, and weapons has become central to airpower. The effectiveness of the fusion depends upon software, algorithms, and data. They need comprehensive protection.
    • Training and Doctrine. Air crew, ground crew, and commanders need training to operate in an AI-enabled environment. Synthetic training environments and advanced simulation have become essential. Training exercises need to include operations in degraded environments. Further, Air Forces need to incorporate institutional mechanisms for experimentation, contingency handling, and converting lessons into doctrine.
    • Indigenous Capability. This is the most important aspect to retain strategic autonomy. It also offers scalability when needed.

Broader Challenges.  Beyond the challenges above, broader challenges remain.

    • Change of Mindset. The mindset needs to shift from platform-centric (bean-counting) to developing a comprehensive combat ecosystem.
    • Technology Absorption Cycle. Technological development outpaces procurement cycles. A two-speed mechanism is required. Long-term procurement cycles for platforms, systems, and weapons, and a faster (Experimental and adaptive) cycle for technology absorption.
    • MUM-T Challenge. Manned-unmanned teaming is the future of combat. The loyal wingman concept is already being developed. Beyond the advantages, it also brings associated challenges. The vulnerabilities related to communications, electronic warfare, cyber aspects, and decision support systems need to be addressed.
    • Interconnected Domains. Operations in space, cyber, electronic, and information domains are interconnected. These operations require organisational adaptation. China combined all four domains into a single service. However, after a decade-plus, it realised the drawbacks and reverted to the US model of independent commands for each domain. India has agencies for space, cyber and special forces ops.
    • Extent of Autonomy. The world is still grappling with this question. Technology allows humans to be removed from the kill chain. The bigger question is about responsibility, legality, and ethics.

 

  1. It has been 94 years since the formation of the IAF, and nearly 8 decades since Indian sovereign skies have been protected. You have talked about different “eras” in the force’s life (pilot, platform, weapon); what comes next? AI and LLMs?

Air warfare has continuously changed in how air operations are conducted. It has changed from a pilot-centric era to a platform-centric one, and now to a weapon-centric one.

In my opinion, the next will be the era of three Cs. That is the era of Coherent, Collaborative Combat. Air combat will take place in an environment where all components (sensors, platforms, systems, and weapons) of airpower (ground-, air-, and space-based; manned and unmanned) work as a coherent combat ecosystem.

The acronym RADIANT summarises the characteristics of such a system.

    • Resilience. Can sustain ops even under degraded conditions.
    • Autonomous. With human oversight, accruing the advantage of mass and persistence.
    • Distributed. Ability to generate airpower from multiple, maybe mobile locations.
    • Indigenous. Allowing strategic freedom with the advantage of scalability.
    • Adaptive. Ability to adapt to changes rapidly.
    • Networked. Coherent and resilient architecture.
    • Technology Absorptive. Ability to develop and integrate new technology rapidly.

 

  1. From Operation Safed Sagar (part of Op Vijay) to Operation Sindoor, the IAF has carried out multiple direct strikes to protect its sovereignty. How have you seen the IAF’s operational capacity and strategy change to address direct and ubiquitous threats? Or has it been a mentality of “if not broken, don’t fix it”?

Proactive Approach. IAF’s approach to modernisation and capability enhancement has been proactive and continuous. Its air strategy has evolved over time.

Historical Evolution. The IAF was formed during the British era. It was tactical, supporting ground forces. It remained reactionary post-partition. Post-partition, it grew, with its role expanded to include border and airspace protection. 1971 war saw air campaigns being conducted in parallel. The IAF modernised in the last two decades of the previous century, inducting advanced platforms, systems, and weapons. During the Kargil War, the IAF demonstrated the capability to apply air power innovatively at high altitudes.  Over the last two-plus decades, the IAF has transformed into a capable strategic air force.

Doctrinal Adaptation. The IAF has also been evolving doctrinally. It has published three Doctrines. The first, published in 1995, was a basic doctrine on airpower, the importance of combat support ops, and modernisation. The second doctrine, published in 2012, linked airpower to the national objectives. It included airpower’s role in combating terrorism, as well as space ops, HADR, and the IAF’s role in nation-building. The last one was published in 2022, signalling a shift from airpower to aerospace power, with an emphasis on Multidomain ops and technology absorption.

 

  1. With gender parity in forces a major focus these days, and AVM Shakti Sharma becoming ACAS Education, do you think women fighter pilots will also see themselves elevated to senior ranks soon? Will the IAF see its first woman Chief of Air Staff before completing 100 years of operations?

The induction of women in the IAF has been gradual. From the medical branch to supporting services, then to combat and command roles. 1992, women officers were inducted into the admin branch for the first time. Thereafter, they were inducted into the flying branch (helicopters and transport aircraft) and eventually began flying fighters from 2015 onwards. From initial induction into the short service commission, they were granted a permanent commission. They are now even being utilised for combat and command roles. Now, women are joining the training institutions (NDA and Sainik schools) and being inducted into the non-officer ranks.

The IAF has led the integration of Women in the service. It has the highest percentage of women officers. The IAF has a good track record of balancing their individual aspirations with organisational goals. The IAF’s policies are gender-neutral, providing equal opportunities with no differentiation in performance or standards.

They have already started reaching the senior officer ranks. Someday, one of them may become Chief of the Air Staff. However, becoming CAS by the IAF’s 100th anniversary may not be possible, as they would not reach that seniority within the next six years.

Views are personal.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

852:INDIA’S AIR POWER AMID RISING GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES

 

 

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of the “Blue Print” Magazine

 

Air power has become a crucial instrument of national security. Possessing credible, technologically advanced air power is no longer a luxury but a strategic imperative. India occupies a unique geopolitical position. It shares borders with two nuclear-armed neighbours. Both of whom present distinct and collusive security challenges. The increasing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region is further altering India’s security calculus. Newer technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), hypersonic missiles, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and space-based military capabilities have expanded the dimensions of aerial warfare.

Air power is essential to India’s security. As geopolitical tensions grow and military technology advances, India’s aerial capabilities will become a vital means of deterrence, power projection, and safeguarding national security. The extent to which the country modernises and integrates its aerial forces will significantly affect its ability to cope with the complicated geopolitical situation of the coming decades.

The Strategic Importance of Air Power. Air power constitutes a highly adaptable and lethal instrument of statecraft. It is characterised by its extensive reach, swift responsiveness, and ability to impose shock and influence through precise, non-contact means of applying force. Its effects can be activated or deactivated more easily than other instruments of national power. Although it provides a broad array of offensive capabilities, its utility extends beyond mere offensive operations. It also plays a vital role in deterrence, strategic positioning, and coercion, whether in wartime or peacetime. Unlike ground forces, air power can be deployed over great distances in just a short time and is therefore essential in times of crisis. In natural disasters, air power can provide rapid humanitarian assistance. It supports both military security and national resilience.

 

Geopolitical Challenges and Emerging Threats

India’s air power today sits at the centre of a far more complex security environment than at any point in the past two decades. The challenge is not only the classic two-front problem with China and Pakistan, but also the need to modernise fast enough to preserve deterrence. At the same time, air warfare is being transformed by drones, missiles, cyber, space, and networked targeting.

The China Challenge. China is India’s most significant long-term strategic challenge. The military standoff in eastern Ladakh since 2020 demonstrated that border tensions can escalate rapidly and require sustained military preparedness.  The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone extensive modernisation over the past two decades. China has also developed extensive military infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang. These include upgraded airbases, hardened aircraft shelters, extended runways, and logistics facilities that can support sustained air operations near the Indian border.

Pakistan and the Persistent Security Challenge. Pakistan relies on non-state actors funded and trained on its own soil to keep India in a state of unrest through disinformation, incitement and terrorism.  It remains a security threat across the nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional dimensions simultaneously. The 2019 Balakot air strike and the recent Op Sindoor highlighted the growing role of air power in India’s strategy of punitive deterrence. India’s ability to conduct precision strikes deep inside hostile territory demonstrated a willingness to employ air power. However, the subsequent aerial engagement also emphasised the importance of superior situational awareness, electronic warfare, and beyond-visual-range combat capabilities.

The Rise of Drones and Autonomous Warfare. The rise of autonomous drones is one of the most significant developments in contemporary air warfare. Drones have moved from mere surveillance vehicles to versatile weapons. They can deliver precise strikes, conduct electronic warfare, and carry out reconnaissance and intelligence collection. In recent conflicts, it has been shown that relatively cheap drones can cause disproportionate damage to advanced military equipment. Swarm drone technology in particular poses considerable challenges for traditional air defence systems because it is hard to track and destroy multiple low-cost aerial targets at the same time. India is now encountering increasing drone-related threats on both its western and northern borders, and reports of drone-enabled smuggling, surveillance, and cross-border infiltration highlight the importance of having strong counter-drone capabilities.

Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare. Air operations now rely heavily on secure communication networks, satellite navigation, and data links. As aerial warfare platforms become more interconnected, they also become more susceptible to cyberattacks and electronic interference. Enemies could disrupt air operations by attacking communication systems, navigation networks, or mission-critical software. Electronic warfare can greatly reduce the effectiveness of the most advanced aircraft. Protection of digital infrastructure has become as important as protecting airbases. India must invest in secure communications, encrypted data links, and cyber defence capabilities.

Space as a Strategic Domain. Space has emerged as a critical component of air power. The term airpower has evolved into aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding into the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. They are providing capabilities including navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches, and space-based surveillance. The integration of space-based systems with air assets is expected to increase further. This will create opportunities for both offensive and defensive operations. However, increasing dependence on satellite-based systems also creates vulnerabilities. Anti-satellite warfare spans kinetic weapons such as missiles as well as non-kinetic systems including jammers, laser dazzlers and spoofing equipment. Denial of space-based systems directly affects air warfare.

The Indo-Pacific and Maritime Air Power. India’s strategic interests extend beyond its borders. The Indo-Pacific area is now the centre of global economic activity and strategic competition. It is seeing rising naval deployments, disputes over maritime routes, and a growing number of military cooperation agreements. Air power plays a vital role in protecting maritime interests by enabling long-range surveillance, conducting anti-submarine warfare, conducting maritime reconnaissance, and allowing rapid force deployment. The ability to monitor key sea lanes, respond effectively to humanitarian crises, and support naval operations confirms India’s status as a major security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.

 

Strengthening India’s Air Power

India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action. As the nature of warfare evolves, India’s approach to air power must keep pace. The future lies in building an integrated, technology-driven, and self-reliant aerospace ecosystem that can address conventional, asymmetric, and multidomain threats. Sustained investment in modernisation, indigenous innovation, joint military operations, and human capital will be essential for maintaining India’s strategic advantage.

Capability and Capacity Balance for Credible Deterrence. Warfighting capability and the capacity to sustain operations are both essential, combining quality and quantity. While India’s air power capabilities (in terms of reach, high-altitude operations, precision, standoff, and all-weather performance) have advanced significantly, it must also increase the numerical strength of fighter aircraft, combat enablers, long-range vectors, and drones. One of the Indian Air Force’s foremost priorities is to restore its fighter squadron strength.  Bridging this gap requires the timely induction of new-generation aircraft (fighters and combat support aircraft), while ensuring modernisation plans are financially sustainable.

Enhancing Indigenous Defence Manufacturing. Self-reliance has become a strategic necessity. Relying on imported defence equipment creates vulnerabilities. India should develop its own technological abilities and increase its defence manufacturing capacity. It will reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. Indigenous development of radars, electronic warfare systems, missiles, drones, and aircraft components will strengthen India’s technological base, create jobs, and boost exports. As part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat effort in defence manufacturing, the aim is to enhance self-reliance by encouraging the domestic production of these systems. The initiative has sped up domestic defence production by involving more public sector enterprises, private industries, start-ups, and research institutions. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), academic institutions, and the private sector must work together to shorten development timelines and promote innovation.

Embracing Emerging Technologies. The adoption of emerging technologies. Technological advances are further reshaping the nature of air warfare. Precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, network-centric operations, satellite-enabled communications, artificial intelligence, and autonomous drones are all altering the battlefield. Autonomous drones and the idea of loyal wingmen are expected to transform aerial combat. India should also make investments in directed-energy weapons, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber-resilient command-and-control networks. These technologies can greatly increase operational effectiveness while reducing personnel risk. Air power assets depend heavily on technology. Turning technology into capability takes a long time. To stay ahead of the challenges, we need to invest in emerging technologies and think through their use in warfare. Impetus is also required for existing aviation-related programs such as fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers, stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and long-range vectors.

Airpower Utilisation in Grey Zone Scenario. Grey zone operations occur in a contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare.  These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both of India’s adversaries resort to these operations regularly. Airpower can reinforce the nation’s course of action against grey zone warfare, with involvement in several direct and supporting roles. Besides offensive use, it can also be effectively utilised in many ways in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Applying airpower in these grey zone situations requires some reorientation, supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

 

Conclusion

India’s air Power is at a crucial stage. Competing regional interests, technological progress, and changes in warfare have increased the strategic value of air power. As India faces challenges from both China and Pakistan and the Indo-Pacific region grows more important, it needs constant modernisation and strategic adjustment. India can ensure its air power remains capable of protecting its national interests in this increasingly uncertain and contested geopolitical environment by promoting innovation, supporting domestic research, and adopting multidomain warfare.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. Fontanellaz A, “Operation Sindoor: The India-Pakistan air war”, Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaires (2026).
  1. Jane’s, “Feature: China accelerates air combat modernisation”, Janes.com (2025, November 19).
  1. Jha M K, “IAF – Target “42 squadron”, SP’s Aviation, (9), (2025).
  1. Khosla A, “Future conflict scenarios: Implications for IAF (Part 1)”, Air Marshal’s Perspective, (2021, March 15).
  1. Khosla, A. (2021, July 26). Airpower in the grey zone. USI Journal; reproduced on Air Marshal’s Perspective.
  1. Khosla, A. “Aero India 2025 and key solutions for IAF’s challenges”, SP’s Aviation; reproduced on Air Marshal’s Perspective (2025, February 11).
  1. Khosla, A. (2025, February). Future trends of fighter aircraft—SP Aviation Yearbook; reproduced on Air Marshal’s Perspective.
  1. Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2025, February). Make in India powers defence growth [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

 

846: VEER GUARDIAN 2026: SMALL EXERCISE WITH LARGER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

 

Inputs shared with journalists on the joint Indo-Japan air exercise “Veer Guardian 2026”

 

India and Japan’s air forces will conduct a joint training exercise, Veer Guardian 26, from September 9 to 21 in the Jodhpur area of Rajasthan, western India. As part of the joint training, Tokyo will deploy three F-2 fighter jets to India, as well as about 110 personnel from the Eighth Air Wing stationed at Tsuiki Airbase in southwestern Japan’s Fukuoka prefecture.

The first-time deployment of Japan’s fighter aircraft for Exercise Veer Guardian 26 is an important milestone in India–Japan air cooperation. High-end air combat training on each other’s soil signals a major increment in the partnership and defence cooperation.

 

Air Exercise

Veer Guardian introduces cooperation at the sharp end of air power: fighter operations, mission planning, air-combat training, communications, deconfliction and the practical problems of deploying and sustaining aircraft on a foreign airbase. The larger objective is therefore not platform-versus-platform competition, but gradually building a more interoperable air ecosystem.

The exercise provides both sides with an opportunity to understand different operating philosophies and equipment ecosystems. The JASDF operates predominantly US-origin or US-derived platforms, while the IAF fields a much more diverse inventory combining Russian, French, Israeli, indigenous and other technologies. Training across these differences matters because interoperability cannot be created through political agreements alone. It has to be built through repeated operational contact.

Strategic and Geopolitical Importance

For years, Indo-Japan bilateral security cooperation has been centred on diplomatic consultations, senior-level exchanges, logistics arrangements and broader Indo-Pacific initiatives. That relationship is now acquiring a more operational character.

The agreements reached during the India-Japan defence ministerial meeting (in August 2026) confirm this trend. The two countries agreed to conduct more complex exercises at short notice. They also agreed to expand cooperation in operational activities, intelligence, equipment, technology, and the defence industry.

That makes Veer Guardian 2026 less an isolated fighter exercise than one component of an increasingly institutionalised defence relationship under the India-Japan “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”

The exercise aligns with other tracks of a more resilient partnership, namely defence industry cooperation, maritime domain awareness, and economic security.

For Japan, this is part of a broader shift from “defence only” postures to expeditionary, coalition-capable air operations, including long-range deployments and integration with non-US partners.

 

Indo-Pacific context

Exercise Veer Guardian 26 also fits well within the larger Indo-Pacific framework. It follows the India–Japan agreement on Maritime Security Cooperation, signed at the defence ministers’ meeting on 20 Aug 26. The agreement stresses interoperability, security of the sea lanes of communication, and a ‘stable Indo-Pacific order’.

It dovetails with other bilateral/multilateral drills: Malabar (navies), Dharma Guardian (armies), JAIMEX (special forces), and the expanding US–Japan–India–Australia web of exercises.

Strategically, this is a sort of minilateralism. Defence ties and cooperation without a formal alliance. It should be viewed as one component of a much larger India-Japan military relationship that is becoming increasingly operational.

 

Upset China

India maintains defence and strategic relationships with a wide range of countries (including the United States, Japan, France, Russia and Southeast Asian partners. Its objective is to expand strategic options rather than subordinate its security policy to any single bloc.

India conducts joint exercises with numerous nations to learn best practices and improve interoperability. These engagements do not mean that India is joining a military bloc. This is best understood as alignment without alliance. India’s participation should therefore not be interpreted as a decision to join an anti-China coalition. Veer Guardian fits that model, and not every event should be viewed through a China lens.

Japan and India confront different manifestations of the same broad strategic challenge. Japan is increasingly concerned about China’s military power and its activities in the East China Sea, around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and across the western Pacific. India faces China along the Line of Actual Control and is increasingly attentive to China’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

India and Japan are Special Strategic and Global Partners with converging interests in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries have disagreements and clash of interest with China. They view China’s military modernisation, grey-zone activities and territorial assertiveness as challenges. Such joint military events naturally make China wary and uncomfortable.

 

Future Trajectory

Veer Guardian 26 can be seen as an early building block of a much deeper India-Japan security relationship. Such frequent, routine deployments reduce political and logistical barriers. Future exercises could involve larger participation and scope. Deployments could include more fighter aircraft, support aircraft, unmanned systems, and electronic-warfare elements. They could expand to include more complex fighter training, stronger logistics cooperation, and increasingly rapid or short-notice deployments.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The scale of Japanese participation (with three fighters and about 110 personnel) is modest.  Veer Guardian 26 is therefore best understood as a milestone rather than a military game-changer. Its immediate combat value may be limited, but its interoperability dividend is significant. Its political signalling value is even greater.

The exercise demonstrates that:

    • Japan can deploy combat aircraft to India and sustain them there;
    • the two air forces are willing to deepen tactical interoperability;
    • Japan is gaining experience operating militarily farther from its immediate home environment;
    • the bilateral relationship is becoming increasingly connected to the wider Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The future iterations are likely to grow in complexity if the political relationship and defence cooperation continue on their current trajectory.

 

Bottom Line

India and Japan are not creating an alliance. They are creating the interoperable capacity to act together.

 

Link to the quoted article on the subject:-

https://www.visiontimes.com/2026/09/04/japan-sends-fighter-jets-to-india-as-tokyo-and-new-delhi-eye-china.html

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. Japan Ministry of Defence, “Japan-India joint press statement”, Japan Ministry of Defence, 20 Aug 26.
  1. Japan Ministry of Defence, “Extraordinary press conference by Defence Minister Koizumi on Thursday, August 20, 2026, at 3:02 PM”, Japan Ministry of Defence, 20 Aug 26.
  1. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “IAF & Japan Air Self Defence Force set to exercise jointly in Japan”, Press Information Bureau. 07 Jan 26.
  1. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “IAF’s joint air defence exercise with Japan, ‘Veer Guardian 2023’ concludes”, Press Information Bureau. 27 Jan 26.
  1. Embassy of India, Tokyo, “Veer Guardian 2023”, Embassy of India, Tokyo, 2026.
  1. Embassy of India, Tokyo, “India-Japan defence cooperation”, Embassy of India, Tokyo, 2026.
  1. The Diplomat, “JASDF fighter jets to visit India for first time”, The Diplomat, Aug 26.
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