Warfare – Air Marshal's Perspective

September 4, 2026

847: DETERRENCE IN THE AUTONOMOUS WARFARE SCENARIO

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of “News Analytics” magazine

The character of warfare evolves alongside technological innovation. Today, another transformative revolution is reshaping global security. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous weapons systems, and human-machine teaming into military operations is underway.

Deterrence has traditionally depended on a human adversary believing that the costs of aggression will outweigh its expected benefits. Nuclear weapons made this logic especially powerful by creating the prospect of unacceptable retaliation.

Autonomous warfare, however, is altering the speed, visibility and psychology of military competition. Artificial intelligence-enabled systems can detect, classify, track and engage targets with limited human intervention. In contrast, autonomous drones, loitering munitions, cyber tools, underwater vehicles and defensive systems may operate across several domains simultaneously. The central question is whether autonomous systems will replace conventional or nuclear deterrence or alter its dynamics.

The Transformative Effects on Deterrence

At the core of this transformation is the integration of AI across the full spectrum of military functions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, command and control, logistics, and, increasingly, the application of force. Autonomous platforms (ranging from loitering munitions and drone swarms to AI-enabled decision-support systems) operate with varying degrees of independence once activated. Human-machine teaming seeks to combine the strengths of both.

Autonomous systems are particularly suited to denial because they can support persistent sensing, distributed defence, and rapid disruption. Unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor approaches to military installations; autonomous underwater systems can observe maritime activity; ground robots can support border surveillance; and AI-enabled command systems can fuse information from multiple sensors. A networked force may complicate an adversary’s effort to achieve surprise, suppress defences or destroy high-value targets.

Autonomy can enhance capability by allowing military systems to process enormous quantities of data and act faster than human operators. An AI-enabled surveillance network may identify changes in an adversary’s deployment patterns before traditional intelligence systems do. Autonomous platforms can then maintain continuous patrols, coordinate with one another and respond to selected threats without waiting for detailed instructions. Such capabilities may strengthen deterrence by denial.

The importance of denial will increase as military forces become more dispersed. Instead of protecting a small number of vulnerable platforms, states may deploy large numbers of mobile, concealed and networked systems. An adversary would then face a difficult targeting problem: destroying some autonomous platforms would not necessarily turn off the entire force. This resilience can reduce the attractiveness of a first strike.

Autonomy can influence credibility. A state with resilient, dispersed, and relatively inexpensive autonomous systems may be able to respond to aggression even after suffering damage to its command centres, air bases, or naval facilities. Swarms and unmanned systems can generate operational effects without exposing large numbers of personnel to danger. This may make retaliation more politically acceptable and therefore more credible.

Autonomy can also impose operational costs. Defensive systems may use algorithms to detect incoming missiles, drones or aircraft and recommend or initiate responses. If these systems are reliable and their employment conditions are clearly defined, they can reduce the prospect that an adversary will achieve a quick victory. The strategic message becomes: aggression will encounter a persistent, adaptive and difficult-to-suppress defence.

Escalation Dynamics

The most serious challenge is compressed decision time. Autonomous systems can identify and respond to threats faster than human institutions can verify information, consult political leaders or establish whether an incident was deliberate. In a crisis, this may generate a “use-or-lose” mentality. Commanders may fear that delaying action will allow an adversary’s autonomous systems to destroy their own sensors, communications or retaliatory forces.

Machine-speed operations can therefore create pressure for pre-delegation. Political and military leaders may authorise automated responses in advance because human approval would be too slow. Yet pre-delegation carries significant risks. An algorithm may misinterpret a civilian aircraft, a training exercise or a cyber intrusion as an attack. A technical malfunction could trigger a chain of responses that neither side intended.

Autonomous warfare also creates the possibility of machine-to-machine interaction. One state’s defensive algorithm may classify the activation of another state’s autonomous system as hostile. The second state may then respond automatically, producing reciprocal escalation. Unlike human decision-makers, algorithms do not possess political intuition, historical memory or an inherent preference for restraint. They optimise according to programmed objectives and available data. If the data are incomplete or manipulated, the resulting decision may be technically rational but strategically disastrous.

Strategic Stability

Autonomous warfare will have its most consequential impact on strategic stability when it interacts with nuclear forces. AI-enabled systems may improve early warning, intelligence analysis and the protection of nuclear assets. They could help identify suspicious activity and strengthen command-and-control resilience. In this respect, autonomy may reduce uncertainty and support more informed decisions.

The opposite is also possible. AI-enabled surveillance and autonomous strike systems could threaten mobile missiles, submarines, command centres and communications networks. If one state believes that its nuclear deterrent is becoming vulnerable, it may adopt more aggressive readiness postures or delegate greater authority to military commanders. The combination of improved detection, persistent tracking and rapid attack could generate fears of a disarming first strike.

This danger is not limited to actual technical capability. Perception also does matter. A state may respond to what it believes an adversary can do, even if the adversary’s systems are not as effective as assumed. Strategic competition could consequently become unstable through exaggerated assessments of AI-enabled counterforce capabilities. The combination of advanced intelligence, strike systems and missile defence may challenge the traditional assumption that retaliation remains assured after a first strike.

Autonomous systems may also blur the boundary between conventional and nuclear operations. An attack on dual-use command-and-control infrastructure by conventional autonomous weapons could be interpreted as preparation for a nuclear attack. If a state cannot distinguish between an anti-conventional operation and an anti-nuclear operation, it may escalate rapidly. Maintaining clear separation between nuclear and conventional assets, preserving human decision authority and establishing crisis communication channels will therefore become increasingly important.

Implications for India and Regional Security

For India, autonomous warfare is directly relevant to a security environment characterised by contested borders, maritime competition, terrorism, cyber threats, and the possibility of simultaneous pressure from multiple directions. Autonomous systems can enhance surveillance along difficult terrain, improve maritime domain awareness and support the protection of critical infrastructure. They can also strengthen deterrence by denial by making surprise incursions, drone attacks and limited aggression more difficult to execute successfully.

However, technology alone cannot provide deterrence. India would require an integrated architecture combining sensors, secure communications, electronic warfare, cyber resilience, air defence, space-based support and trained human operators. Autonomous platforms must remain connected to a wider command-and-control system that can function even when communications are degraded, or networks are attacked.

Concluding Thoughts

The transition to algorithm-assisted autonomous warfare will not change the basic concept of strategic deterrence. It will mandate a more controlled version of it. One that accounts for machine-speed decision cycles and distributed, ambiguous chains of responsibility. It will also have to cater for an adversary whose calculations are also based on software architectures. Autonomy will create an additional layer of deterrence, one based on persistent surveillance, rapid response, distributed force structures, denial of objectives and the ability to impose costs at machine speed.

As autonomous capabilities continue to grow, policymakers will have the important task of adapting and finding balance during this transition. In autonomous warfare, deterrence will depend not just on cutting-edge technologies but also on ensuring these systems operate within clear, transparent guidelines, robust command structures, well-rounded legal frameworks, and internationally accepted norms. The goal isn’t to slow technological progress, but to ensure that humans, who are ultimately responsible for warfare, still have the power to choose peace.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References: –

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (2019). Artificial intelligence and national security: Indian perspectives. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Rajaraman, V. (2014). Robot soldiers: Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare. Resonance, 19(11), 1037–1048.

Horowitz, M. C. (2016). The ethics & morality of robotic warfare: Assessing the debate over autonomous weapons. Political Science Quarterly, 131(2), 331–351.

Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Peldán Carlsson, M. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Su, F., Wan, W., Saalman, L., & Chernavskikh, V. (2025). Pragmatic approaches to governance at the artificial intelligence–nuclear nexus. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Boulanin, V., Saalman, L., Topychkanov, P., Su, F., & Peldán Carlsson, M. (2020). Artificial intelligence, strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Johnson, J. (2020). Artificial intelligence, drone swarming and deterrence. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(5), 1–24.
Horowitz, M. C. (2019). When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapons, deterrence, and stability. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(5), 764–788.

May 12, 2026May 12, 2026

813: BEHIND ENEMY LINES: THE DEADLY ART OF COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Article published in the May 26 edition (volume 1, Issue 9) of the Business Standard BLUEPRINT Magazine

On April 3, a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle was shot down over Iran’s rugged Zagros Mountains. The two-man crew ejected safely, but their recovery triggered one of the most complex CSAR operations in recent history. What followed was not a simple rescue; reportedly, the U.S. deployed a package of more than 150 aircraft. It was a massive, multi-domain effort. It involved fighters, tankers, electronic warfare platforms, and special operations forces. All the elements worked in concert in an active enemy-threat environment. The extraction operation was costly. Few aircraft were damaged, platforms were lost or abandoned, and crews faced sustained ground fire in a contested environment.

The incident has thrust Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) back to the centre of a fierce debate over whether the principle of “leaving no man behind” remains viable in highly contested, peer-level environments. CSAR, by definition, involves locating, supporting, and extracting isolated personnel from hostile territory while under fire. The risks to aircrews operating in dense air defence networks, drone-saturated battlespaces, and irregular threat environments have grown dramatically. This has made the personnel recovery both more essential and more perilous than at any point in recent decades.

CSAR Complexity

CSAR operations involve locating the downed crew, authenticating, and then extracting them. Unlike peacetime search and rescue, the process takes place in a hostile environment. In an environment where the adversary is alert, armed, and converging towards the same location as the rescue force. The fundamental difficulty stems from the tactical reality that, the moment an aircraft goes down in enemy territory, the adversary knows where the crew has landed. The downed aviator’s greatest assets are speed of recovery and the element of surprise. Both erode with every passing minute.

The rescue force must fly into the same threat environment that just destroyed the aircraft it is trying to recover from — often without knowing precisely what brought it down or whether that threat is still active. The helicopter crews executing the final pickup, flying low and slow in a hover over a precise location the enemy also knows, are among the most exposed personnel in modern warfare.

A CSAR package must simultaneously suppress enemy fighters, neutralise SAM systems, jam enemy radar and communications, provide airborne command and control, extend loiter time through aerial refuelling, and insert pararescue teams capable of parachuting or fast-roping (slithering) into the recovery zone, providing emergency medical treatment, and fighting their way out if necessary. Orchestrating this package, at night, often in radio silence, against an alerted adversary, is a feat of operational complexity that few military organisations can reliably execute.

The potential capture of aircrew is a significant, high-stakes consideration in military operations. Captured aircrew pose a multi-faceted threat. Adversaries can utilise captured aircrew to leverage concessions during negotiations. They may be coerced into making statements or appearing in the media, undermining the friendly nation’s public support for the war. Aircrew may possess knowledge of sensitive mission objectives, technology, or intelligence, which they could be forced to reveal. These sensitivities drive military decision-making to prioritise personnel recovery and, at times, accept higher risk to avoid capture, such as risking additional assets for rescue operations.

Combat Search and Rescue: A Global Survey

The First Rescue. The first recorded rescue took place in 1915. A British RNAS Commander Richard Bell-Davies landed his single-seat aircraft behind enemy lines in Bulgaria. He retrieved his downed wingman despite approaching enemy troops. That act established the founding principle of combat rescue.

The United States. America didn’t invent combat search and rescue, but systematised it. The U.S. converted this wartime necessity into a formal doctrine. The Korean War highlighted the helicopter’s primacy in CSAR as nearly 1,000 personnel were recovered from behind the enemy lines. The Vietnam War was the crucible. Reportedly, over 3,800 recovery missions saved approximately 3,900 lives, at the cost of 71 rescue aircraft and 45 crewmen. During this war, the core package concept emerged. This includes suppression aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, airborne command-and-control aircraft, tankers, and helicopters carrying pararescuemen. The Gulf War validated the CSAR doctrine. The full-strike package concept against sophisticated air defences was validated during the 1999 Kosovo War. The April 2026 Iran operation represents the most demanding CSAR execution since Vietnam.

Britain: The Falklands Lesson. The RAF CSAR lineage runs back to Channel rescues in 1940. The Falklands War imposed the harshest test on the British CSAR mechanism, operating 8,000 miles from home. The extraction capability was lost with the sinking of the ship SS Atlantic Conveyor, along with the onboard Chinook helicopters. The lesson that emerged was that CSAR depends entirely on pre-positioned assets. Loss of these assets mid-campaign is catastrophic.

Israel: Forged in Continuous Conflict. The Israel Air Force has the most combat-tested CSAR doctrine. It has been shaped by over five decades of continuous conflict. The fundamental restructuring took place during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It included dedicated rescue helicopters with fighter escort, pre-planned extraction corridors, and an emphasis on SEAD as a prerequisite. The spirit of CSAR is aptly conveyed in their phrase “we will not abandon our soldiers in the field”.

France: Africa as the Laboratory. France’s CSAR doctrine was built through near-continuous operations in Africa since decolonisation — Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Sahel. It has a relatively small but genuinely capable CSAR force. The Caracal helicopter, with aerial refuelling, terrain-following radar, and special forces integration, forms the core of capability. Operation Serval in Mali demonstrated France’s credible CSAR across vast, severe terrain.

Russia. Compared to Western forces, Russia does not have dedicated CSAR units. Russian combat search and rescue (CSAR) capability utilises a mix of air and ground forces. Helicopters like the Mil Mi-8 are used for extraction. They are often escorted by armed platforms such as the Kamov Ka-52. Spetsnaz teams provide ground support.

The Universal Pattern/Lesson. CSAR is the direct determinant of aircrew morale and operational aggression. The air forces that invest in dedicated recovery capability demonstrate measurably different aircrew behaviour. The institutional promise embedded in CSAR is not a humanitarian sentiment. It is a force multiplier. Every air force that has learned this lesson has learned it the hard way — usually over the loss of aircrew who ejected into hostile territory and waited for a recovery that never came. Across every air force and every conflict, the same pattern recurs. CSAR capability is almost always inadequate. It improves through the painful experience of early failures.

India: CSAR Challenges

The Indian Air Force’s CSAR history spans seven decades of conflict in some of the world’s most demanding terrain — the defining characteristic being that India has repeatedly demonstrated the operational requirement for CSAR capability while repeatedly discovering the institutional gap between that requirement and available resources.

The 1947-48 Kashmir War saw the IAF’s earliest combat rescue operations. Dakota transport aircraft were used to evacuate wounded from forward airstrips, which were under Pakistani fire. The 1962 Sino-Indian War saw IAF helicopter units flying Alouette IIIs at altitudes above 14,000 feet in the North East Frontier Agency and Ladakh. They conducted casualty evacuations at the limits of their performance.

The IAF’s Garud Commando Force was raised in 2004. This was the most significant value addition to the CSAR capability. Garuds train for heliborne insertion in hostile environments. Armed helicopters with survivability systems serve as the extraction platform. The combat helicopters provide air cover as escorts. India’s two-front threat scenario makes CSAR capability development not merely desirable but operationally essential.

Way Ahead: Building a Credible CSAR Capability

The following recommendations are based on the specific threat environment India faces. High-altitude Himalayan terrain, a nuclear-armed peer adversary to the west, and a rising competitor to the north.

Dedicated CSAR Squadron. The CSAR demands a dedicated squadron with a specific mandate. No dedicated unit means no dedicated training, no dedicated equipment procurement cycle, and no institutional memory. A dedicated unit with a fixed order of battle is essential. CSAR specialism should be considered a career path rather than an additional duty. Without a dedicated unit, every other recommendation is aspirational.

Acquire a Purpose-Built CSAR Helicopter. Not all the helicopters are specifically equipped for the CSAR role. A CSAR helicopter needs specific systems such as terrain-following radar, an aerial refuelling probe, integrated defensive aids, and a hoist system. A specially equipped platform, in meaningful numbers, would offer a credible organic recovery capability.

Raise and Train a Pararescue Cadre. Aircraft are necessary, but so are the pararescuemen. The Garud Commando Force of the Indian Air Force already has CSAR listed among its roles. The logical step is to develop within Garud a dedicated personnel recovery element, trained specifically in high-altitude medicine, combat casualty care, evasion assistance, and the mechanics of survivor authentication.

Develop High-Altitude CSAR SOP. No air force in the world has more operational experience of high-altitude aerial combat than the Indian Air Force. The Kargil war highlighted the peculiarities of operations in the Himalayan terrain. The IAF should develop an area-specific CSAR doctrine for each prevailing terrain type.

Integrate SEAD Planning into Every CSAR Package. The clearest lesson from the past is that sending recovery assets into an unsuppressed threat environment compounds losses rather than preventing them. Every CSAR planning process must include a suppression-of-enemy-air-defences element as a prerequisite, not an afterthought. This requires coordination between the CSAR element, fighter escort squadrons, and electronic warfare assets.

Accelerate the Unmanned CSAR Programme. The ongoing Indian programme to develop an unmanned CSAR is a strategically sound idea. An autonomous platform capable of locating survivors via Emergency Locator Transmitters, navigating to 20,000 feet, and operating in GPS-denied environments addresses the specific CSAR requirements. However, unmanned systems cannot replicate the pararescueman’s ability to provide emergency medical care, authenticate survivors under ambiguous conditions, or fight through a compromised extraction. The unmanned programme should be developed as a complementary capability.

Invest in SERE Training. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training is the other half of the CSAR equation. The downed aircrew’s own decisions in the hours after ejection determine whether a recovery is possible. The SERE training programme should be made compulsory for all aircrew. It should be periodically reviewed, upgraded, and stress-tested against the specific threat scenarios.

Concluding Thoughts

Each of the recommendations above costs money. Developing a dedicated squadron, purpose-built platforms, a trained pararescue cadre, and a genuine SEAD integration framework requires substantial expenditure and investment. However, it is still worth it as an effective Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) capability is a powerful force multiplier for any air force. When pilots and aircrew are confident they will be rescued no matter what happens, they perform far more effectively and aggressively in combat.

In the Indian context, this assurance becomes even more critical. India is likely to face high-intensity, short-duration conflicts in highly contested, geographically challenging terrain such as the Himalayas and deserts. The suggested elements of the process exist in some form. They need to be reviewed, enhanced, integrated and formalised in a time-bound manner. CSAR is not merely an auxiliary or secondary function; it is an essential operational necessity. Investing in CSAR is therefore not about saving isolated personnel alone, but about preserving combat effectiveness and the will to fight.

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References:

(April 6, 2026). Risky rescue of US crew downed in Iran relied on dozens of aircraft and subterfuge, Trump says. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/7d8cfb6d0fd400abdc71f8c9d67408fe

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Operations in Russia, (August 3, 2025). https://en.iz.ru/en/1930757/2025-08-03/ministry-defense-showed-footage-search-and-rescue-operations-mi-8psg-helicopter-crew

“The U.S. launched an air armada to rescue the F-15 crew in Iran”. (06 April 2026). https://www.axios.com/2026/04/06/iran-f15-rescue-caine-trump

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). GlobalSecurity.org. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/csar.htm

Medicine, N. A. Combat Search and Rescue in Highly Contested Environments: Proceedings of a Workshop—in Brief. https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/25156/chapter/1

RAND Corporation, “Combat search & rescue in a contested environment: Implications for future operations”.

Galdorisi, G., & Phillips, T, “Leave no man behind: The saga of combat search and rescue”, Zenith Press, 2009.

“Personnel recovery operations (AFDP 3-50)”. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force, 2019.
“Allied joint doctrine for personnel recovery (AJP-3.7)”. NATO Standardisation Office, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2016.
Air Force would like to call a drone for crew rescue – sUAS News. https://www.suasnews.com/2019/05/air-force-would-like-to-call-a-drone-for-crew-rescue/

May 3, 2026

807: PRE-EMPTION AND NUCLEAR SIGNALLING IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Article published in the May 26 edition of

The News Analytics Magazine

The Iran war began with Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 and culminated in the far larger Operation Epic Fury of 28 February 2026. During this war, the joint US-Israel strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure will be studied in war colleges for decades because of what they represent conceptually. It represents the operational normalisation of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear programmes. Preventive operations against a proliferating adversary, once theoretical, have now become an operational reality.

The February 2026 campaign crossed every threshold that its predecessors had approached but not breached. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in the opening wave. IRGC leadership was decapitated. The key Iranian nuclear installations at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan were struck again, along with command architecture, missile production, and air defence systems. Yet catastrophic escalation has not followed, and the international system has absorbed it so far. This absorption is the strategic fact that changes everything.

Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo (From Osirak to Epic Fury)

The Cold War theory of deterrence rested on the foundational proposition that nuclear weapons created a protective envelope. They deter direct use of military force. This proposition has gradually eroded. Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor established what became known as the Begin Doctrine, i.e. no hostile neighbour would be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons, regardless of international law or diplomatic cost. The 2007 strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar facility extended the precedent. The Stuxnet cyber operation against Natanz in 2010 took it into the covert domain. Yet these attacks remained exceptional and limited, with denial. These attacks were not against a near-nuclear power with a ballistic missile arsenal and a functioning deterrence architecture. The 2025–2026 campaign is different in kind and degree. Iran possesses missiles capable of reaching Israel and American bases across the region. Striking it was pre-empting a perceived near-nuclear power while deliberately managing the risk of escalation to general war.

New Nuclear Signalling Paradigm

The new nuclear signalling paradigm consists of three distinct features. The first one is that deterrence is communicated through action rather than doctrine. Second, escalation is managed by targeting discrimination rather than abstention; third, the nuclear threshold is maintained through real-time reinforcement rather than assumed stability.

Legitimisation of Pre-emption. A doctrine that cannot be justified is a doctrine that cannot be sustained. It was publicised that Iran’s programme had reached an irreversible breakout proximity. The strikes were legitimised as a necessary preventive measure. This is the first lesson of the new paradigm. Pre-emption in the nuclear age requires strategic communication as much as operational capability.

Management of Escalation. The February 2026 strikes targeted enrichment infrastructure, command architecture, and IRGC leadership of Iran. Civilian infrastructure was not attacked, signalling limited objectives. Iran’s retaliation consisted of missile barrages against Israeli cities and US Gulf bases, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides imposed costs on the other without crossing the threshold that would have made retreat impossible. This “controlled chaos” demonstrates that even in direct war between a nuclear power, a presumed nuclear power, and a threshold state, escalation can be managed if both sides retain the discipline and interest to do so.

Holding the Nuclear Threshold. Iran did not cross into nuclear use partly because weaponisation was incomplete, but also because the American strategic umbrella was made explicit in the weeks before the strikes — through repositioned assets, presidential statements, and back-channel communications that made the consequences of nuclear first use unambiguous. Extended deterrence did not merely exist; it was actively performed. The threshold was not held not because deterrence was passive but because it was continuously and visibly reinforced at the moment it was most needed.

Global Implications. The normalisation of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear infrastructure has far-reaching implications. The lesson for the near-nuclear-status states is that the period between “developing” and “possessing” can become an operational trigger point. A not-yet-complete enough-to-deter-nuclear programme is in great danger of adversary attack. For the non-proliferation regime, the damage is structural. The NPT relies on IAEA verification as the mechanism for distinguishing between civilian and military nuclear development. Military strikes that bypass this mechanism hollow out the regime’s legitimacy.

The Indian Calculus

India occupies a position of distinctive complexity in this new landscape. It is a nuclear-armed state with a declared No First Use doctrine, bordered by two nuclear-armed adversaries whose own postures diverge sharply from each other and from India’s own.

China’s nuclear doctrine, while historically minimalist, is in visible transition. It is rapidly expanding its ICBM silos, developing a more survivable sea-based deterrent, and progressively blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear delivery systems in its missile forces. These developments point toward a more assertive posture. China has not adopted preemption as declared policy. But its conventional military assertiveness means that the relevant Indian concern is not Chinese nuclear pre-emption but Chinese conventional operations that generate military pressure in the space below the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan presents a fundamentally more direct and disturbing challenge in this context. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is ambiguous, creating uncertainty about escalation thresholds. The Pakistani military’s institutional identification with its nuclear programme, the domestic political dynamics that any Pakistani government would face after absorbing a pre-emptive strike, and the genuine ambiguity about tactical thresholds all point toward escalation risk substantially higher than what obtained in the Iran case. India cannot assume that the Iran paradigm (i.e., strike, absorb limited retaliation, and manage to a ceasefire) would replicate in South Asia with the same level of containment.

Doctrinal Imperative for India

India’s No First Use doctrine has moral clarity, a stabilising function in crisis management, and diplomatic value in the international community. It remains strategically sound and needs to be retained. But the NFU must be backed by a more explicit, operationally developed conventional deterrence capability and posture. The conventional deterrence posture should credibly signal that India can impose unacceptable costs on an adversary without resorting to nuclear first use. The Iran war demonstrates that pre-emption works when the pre-emptor has overwhelming conventional capability, credible backing, and a carefully constructed legitimising narrative. India must develop all three elements to deter the conditions that would make preemption appear necessary.

Simultaneously, India must develop protective infrastructure for its strategic assets (Critical military infrastructure, command-and-control nodes, and Weapon delivery systems). The investment in survivability, dispersal, hardening, and redundancy for India’s strategic assets is a strategic necessity and priority.

Concluding Thoughts

The operating rules of the Nuclear age are being rewritten. The new paradigm will shape the deterrence calculations globally for decades. The line between war and peace is no longer fixed; it is actively managed, contested, and increasingly blurred. For a country with India’s strategic geography, adversary configuration, and developmental ambitions, adapting to these developments is essential.

The Iran war has normalised pre-emption. Escalation control below the nuclear threshold is now a practised art form. Deterrence is to be earned, not just declared in the doctrine. The question India must now answer is whether its doctrine, force structure, survivability investments, and strategic communication are credible enough to meet the new paradigm.

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References: –

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