PRAHAAR, meaning “strike,” is India’s first comprehensive National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, released by the Ministry of Home Affairs on 23 February 2026. The eight-page document consolidates existing counter-terrorism practices into a formal, intelligence-led and proactive national framework. It declares “zero tolerance” for terrorism in all forms while explicitly avoiding any linkage of terrorism to a particular religion, ethnicity, nationality or civilisation. Its approach is based on both a whole-of-government and whole-of-society model.
The strategy is based on seven main pillars: the prevention of terrorist attacks; a quick and proportionate response; the pooling of domestic capabilities; respect for human rights and the rule of law; the reduction of conditions which lend themselves to terrorism; coordination and shaping of international efforts; and recovery and resilience via a whole-of-society approach. These pillars link together prevention, response, prosecution, de-radicalisation, international cooperation and post-attack recovery in one national framework. Together, they create a continuum from prevention and disruption through response and prosecution to recovery and long-term resilience.
The Seven Pillars of PRAHAAR
Prevention of Terror Attacks
Prevention is the foundation of PRAHAAR. It emphasises an intelligence-guided approach, with the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence so that threats can be neutralised before they materialise.
The Multi-Agency Center (MAC) and Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) under the Intelligence Bureau are identified as important platforms for sharing counter-terrorism intelligence between central agencies and State police. Prevention also covers online propaganda and recruitment, overground worker networks, terrorist financing, illegal arms networks, cryptocurrency and dark-web financing, border security and critical infrastructure.
The strategy recognises the changing technological character of terrorism, including drones, encryption and cyber-enabled operations. Power, railways, aviation, ports, defence, space and atomic-energy infrastructure are identified as areas requiring enhanced technological protection. Effective implementation will require close Centre-State intelligence coordination and continued technological modernisation.
Swift and Proportionate Response
PRAHAAR establishes a multi-layered response mechanism. The local police act as the first responders and are assisted by the specialised State counter-terrorism units and the National Security Guard (NSG) in the case of major attacks. The Central Armed Police Forces can also offer support, and it is the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the State police who carry out the investigations and prosecutions.
The Central, State and district authorities coordinate according to the Standard Operating Procedures and intelligence-sharing arrangements set out by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the principle of proportionality enables responses to be adjusted in accordance with the nature and extent of an attack, while allowing for rapid escalation if needed.
This framework seeks to strengthen national coordination without eliminating the federal character of India’s security architecture, particularly because policing remains a State subject.
Aggregating Internal Capacities
The third pillar focuses on strengthening security and law-enforcement institutions through modern equipment, technology, and weaponry; improved training in areas such as tactics and urban combat; standardised counter-terrorism structures and procedures across States; and identification of resource gaps.
An important aim is to reduce differences in the capabilities of the various states and to enhance interoperability among the agencies. Continued funding, the upgrading of technology, and efficient coordination between agencies are still major challenges in terms of implementation.
Human Rights and Rule of Law
Human rights and the rule of law are clearly included in the strategic framework of PRAHAAR. The anti-terrorism measures provided for in laws such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the new criminal codes are in line with the country’s commitment to the Protection of Human Rights Act, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The strategy places a strong emphasis on the use of legal actions, appeals, and supervision at all levels of the judiciary; it therefore seeks to combine effective counter-terrorism measures with respect for due process, although it remains difficult to maintain this balance when urgent security operations come into contact with broad anti-terror powers.
Addressing Conditions Conducive to Terrorism
PRAHAAR advocates combating radicalisation and terrorist recruitment by means of proportionate police responses, by using legal intervention when necessary, by engaging with community and religious leaders, with NGOs and moderate preachers, by involving youth and by providing de-radicalisation programmes in prisons.
It also identifies socio-economic factors (including poverty, unemployment, education, housing, employment opportunities, scholarships and women’s empowerment) as areas requiring attention in vulnerable communities.
This gives the strategy a preventive dimension beyond intelligence and security operations, with effectiveness depending on sustained community engagement and efforts to address radicalisation without stigmatising communities.
International Cooperation
Recognising the transnational aspect of terrorism, PRAHAAR advocates for the sharing of intelligence, the conclusion of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, the establishment of extradition arrangements, the creation of Joint Working Groups, the signing of MoUs and support for United Nations terrorist designations.
India also seeks cooperation through bilateral and multilateral forums to exchange best practices and build international consensus against state-sponsored terrorism, terrorist financing and safe havens.
The pillar reflects India’s broader effort to strengthen cooperation on financing, designations and technology-related threats.
Recovery and Resilience
The emphasis on counter-terrorism goes beyond prevention and response to include recovery and resilience. It is expected that civil administrations, professionals, NGOs, communities and private-sector partners should all help with the recovery after an attack, by providing reassurance, carrying out reconstruction and preparing for future threats.
The strategy also calls for technological investment and public-private partnerships to address emerging risks, including the misuse of information and communications technology for terrorism.
Comparative Analysis
China’s Counter-Terrorism Framework
India’s approach is very different from China’s counter-terrorism framework. China does not possess a single public strategy document analogous to PRAHAAR. Rather, its system is based on the 2015 Counter-Terrorism Law, the various amendments to it, the Criminal Law, the National Security Law, the local regulations, and the 2024 white paper, China’s Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism.
The central conceptual difference lies in how the threat is defined. PRAHAAR focuses on terrorism, including cross-border and technology-enabled threats, while China’s framework is organised around the “three evils”: terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Extremism is treated as an important ideological driver of terrorism, with particular attention to separatism and religious extremism in Xinjiang.
There are also differences between the two systems in terms of their institutional arrangements. PRAHAAR operates within a federal democratic system and makes it clear that the protection of human rights and access to judicial remedies are strategic principles. By contrast, China’s approach is more centralised and involves special security agencies as well as wide-ranging state-directed social management; while official Chinese documents emphasise law-based counter-terrorism and the protection of rights, international critics have pointed out issues relating to surveillance, coercive controls, and re-education measures, particularly in Xinjiang.
Their methods of prevention are also different: India focuses on intelligence fusion, the disruption of terrorist financing and logistics, countering online propaganda, securing the borders, and applying graded responses to cases of radicalisation. China, on the other hand, places more emphasis on de-extremification, ideological education, surveillance, and state-directed social management. In both cases, international cooperation, intelligence sharing, counter-financing and actions taken to prevent terrorist organisations from getting safe havens are included.
The 2026 U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy
PRAHAAR can likewise be compared with the 2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, which was issued by the Trump administration on 6 May 2026. Although both documents are formal statements of national policy, they differ in their threat priorities, operational focus, and methods of institutional approach.
PRAHAAR is a concise, principles-based approach that concentrates on intelligence-led prevention, proportionate responses, capacity building, human rights, de-radicalization and resilience. The U.S. strategy is a document of 16 pages based on the ideas of “America First” and “Peace through Strength” and lists narcoterrorists and transnational gangs, as well as legacy Islamist terrorist organisations with the capability of carrying out operations abroad, and violent left-wing extremists as its main categories of threat. It stresses the need to dismantle terrorist networks, disrupt their financing, and enhance burden-sharing among partners.
The different threat priorities reflect distinct national security environments. PRAHAAR is strongly influenced by India’s experience of cross-border terrorism and Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, while also addressing jihadist networks, radicalization and emerging technological threats. The U.S. strategy places greater emphasis on narcoterrorism, transnational gangs, legacy Islamist organizations and violent left-wing extremism.
There are also differences between the two approaches as to the balance they strike between preventive, societal, and operational measures. PRAHAAR includes community engagement, socio-economic interventions, de-radicalisation and whole-of-society resilience; the American strategy, on the other hand, places more emphasis on operational disruption, the destruction of terrorist networks, applying financial pressure and protecting the homeland. Abroad, India stresses multilateral cooperation, UN designations, extradition and intelligence partnerships, whereas the U.S. strategy focuses on partner capacity and burden-sharing.
Comparison Summary. China’s method places a greater emphasis on centralised preventive control and on dealing with extremism and separatism, whereas the 2026 U.S. strategy focuses on homeland protection, network disruption, narcoterrorism, and burden-sharing. Although all three approaches stress prevention, intelligence, and disruption, they differ in the way they define threats, organise authority, and in the balance they strike between security and rights as well as social management.
PRAHAAR: Strategic Significance and Limitations
PRAHAAR is an attempt to provide India’s counter-terrorism system with a coherent strategic framework; its importance consists in integrating intelligence-led prevention, rapid response, institutional capacity, rule-of-law safeguards, de-radicalisation, international cooperation and societal resilience.
The distinguishing feature of PRAHAAR is its effort to incorporate hard security, legal protections, preventive social measures, and societal resilience into one national framework. It combines intelligence-led prevention, rapid response, institutional modernisation, de-radicalisation, international cooperation, and recovery.
At the same time, its principal limitation is its brevity. At eight pages, it is primarily a principles and policy framework rather than a detailed implementation plan. It provides limited agency-specific deliverables, operational metrics, or measurable targets. Implementation will therefore depend on sustained funding, Centre-State cooperation, technological modernisation, and the development of measurable outcomes, particularly in areas such as de-radicalisation and societal resilience.
The true significance of PRAHAAR cannot be assessed simply on the basis of its stated principles, since it will depend upon the effectiveness with which those principles are put into practice through coordinated institutions, and the attainment of concrete results.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References: –
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2026, February 23). National counterterrorism policy & strategy: PRAHAAR. Ministry of Home Affairs – PRAHAAR PDF
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2026, August 12). PRAHAAR. Press Information Bureau. Press Information Bureau – PRAHAAR
Government of India. (1967). The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. India Code. India Code – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
Government of India. (1993). The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. India Code. India Code – Protection of Human Rights Act
Government of India. (2023). The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. India Code. India Code – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations – Universal Declaration of Human Rights
United Nations. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Treaty Collection – ICCPR
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2024, January 23). China’s legal framework and measures for counterterrorism. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. (2015). Counter-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China (as amended 2018).
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, August 31). OHCHR assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China.
Madhani, A. (2026, May 6). Trump’s new counterterrorism strategy makes targeting Western Hemisphere cartels the top priority. The Washington Post. The Washington Post – 2026 U.S. counterterrorism strategy
Tiwary, D. (2026, February 27). PRAHAAR: Why India’s new counterterrorism document is more intent than full-fledged strategy. The Indian Express. The Indian Express – PRAHAAR analysis
Article published in the Sep 26 edition of the “Blue Print” Magazine
Air power has become a crucial instrument of national security. Possessing credible, technologically advanced air power is no longer a luxury but a strategic imperative. India occupies a unique geopolitical position. It shares borders with two nuclear-armed neighbours. Both of whom present distinct and collusive security challenges. The increasing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region is further altering India’s security calculus. Newer technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), hypersonic missiles, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and space-based military capabilities have expanded the dimensions of aerial warfare.
Air power is essential to India’s security. As geopolitical tensions grow and military technology advances, India’s aerial capabilities will become a vital means of deterrence, power projection, and safeguarding national security. The extent to which the country modernises and integrates its aerial forces will significantly affect its ability to cope with the complicated geopolitical situation of the coming decades.
The Strategic Importance of Air Power. Air power constitutes a highly adaptable and lethal instrument of statecraft. It is characterised by its extensive reach, swift responsiveness, and ability to impose shock and influence through precise, non-contact means of applying force. Its effects can be activated or deactivated more easily than other instruments of national power. Although it provides a broad array of offensive capabilities, its utility extends beyond mere offensive operations. It also plays a vital role in deterrence, strategic positioning, and coercion, whether in wartime or peacetime. Unlike ground forces, air power can be deployed over great distances in just a short time and is therefore essential in times of crisis. In natural disasters, air power can provide rapid humanitarian assistance. It supports both military security and national resilience.
Geopolitical Challenges and Emerging Threats
India’s air power today sits at the centre of a far more complex security environment than at any point in the past two decades. The challenge is not only the classic two-front problem with China and Pakistan, but also the need to modernise fast enough to preserve deterrence. At the same time, air warfare is being transformed by drones, missiles, cyber, space, and networked targeting.
The China Challenge. China is India’s most significant long-term strategic challenge. The military standoff in eastern Ladakh since 2020 demonstrated that border tensions can escalate rapidly and require sustained military preparedness. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone extensive modernisation over the past two decades. China has also developed extensive military infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang. These include upgraded airbases, hardened aircraft shelters, extended runways, and logistics facilities that can support sustained air operations near the Indian border.
Pakistan and the Persistent Security Challenge. Pakistan relies on non-state actors funded and trained on its own soil to keep India in a state of unrest through disinformation, incitement and terrorism. It remains a security threat across the nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional dimensions simultaneously. The 2019 Balakot air strike and the recent Op Sindoor highlighted the growing role of air power in India’s strategy of punitive deterrence. India’s ability to conduct precision strikes deep inside hostile territory demonstrated a willingness to employ air power. However, the subsequent aerial engagement also emphasised the importance of superior situational awareness, electronic warfare, and beyond-visual-range combat capabilities.
The Rise of Drones and Autonomous Warfare. The rise of autonomous drones is one of the most significant developments in contemporary air warfare. Drones have moved from mere surveillance vehicles to versatile weapons. They can deliver precise strikes, conduct electronic warfare, and carry out reconnaissance and intelligence collection. In recent conflicts, it has been shown that relatively cheap drones can cause disproportionate damage to advanced military equipment. Swarm drone technology in particular poses considerable challenges for traditional air defence systems because it is hard to track and destroy multiple low-cost aerial targets at the same time. India is now encountering increasing drone-related threats on both its western and northern borders, and reports of drone-enabled smuggling, surveillance, and cross-border infiltration highlight the importance of having strong counter-drone capabilities.
Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare. Air operations now rely heavily on secure communication networks, satellite navigation, and data links. As aerial warfare platforms become more interconnected, they also become more susceptible to cyberattacks and electronic interference. Enemies could disrupt air operations by attacking communication systems, navigation networks, or mission-critical software. Electronic warfare can greatly reduce the effectiveness of the most advanced aircraft. Protection of digital infrastructure has become as important as protecting airbases. India must invest in secure communications, encrypted data links, and cyber defence capabilities.
Space as a Strategic Domain. Space has emerged as a critical component of air power. The term airpower has evolved into aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding into the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. They are providing capabilities including navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches, and space-based surveillance. The integration of space-based systems with air assets is expected to increase further. This will create opportunities for both offensive and defensive operations. However, increasing dependence on satellite-based systems also creates vulnerabilities. Anti-satellite warfare spans kinetic weapons such as missiles as well as non-kinetic systems including jammers, laser dazzlers and spoofing equipment. Denial of space-based systems directly affects air warfare.
The Indo-Pacific and Maritime Air Power. India’s strategic interests extend beyond its borders. The Indo-Pacific area is now the centre of global economic activity and strategic competition. It is seeing rising naval deployments, disputes over maritime routes, and a growing number of military cooperation agreements. Air power plays a vital role in protecting maritime interests by enabling long-range surveillance, conducting anti-submarine warfare, conducting maritime reconnaissance, and allowing rapid force deployment. The ability to monitor key sea lanes, respond effectively to humanitarian crises, and support naval operations confirms India’s status as a major security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.
Strengthening India’s Air Power
India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action. As the nature of warfare evolves, India’s approach to air power must keep pace. The future lies in building an integrated, technology-driven, and self-reliant aerospace ecosystem that can address conventional, asymmetric, and multidomain threats. Sustained investment in modernisation, indigenous innovation, joint military operations, and human capital will be essential for maintaining India’s strategic advantage.
Capability and Capacity Balance for Credible Deterrence. Warfighting capability and the capacity to sustain operations are both essential, combining quality and quantity. While India’s air power capabilities (in terms of reach, high-altitude operations, precision, standoff, and all-weather performance) have advanced significantly, it must also increase the numerical strength of fighter aircraft, combat enablers, long-range vectors, and drones. One of the Indian Air Force’s foremost priorities is to restore its fighter squadron strength. Bridging this gap requires the timely induction of new-generation aircraft (fighters and combat support aircraft), while ensuring modernisation plans are financially sustainable.
Enhancing Indigenous Defence Manufacturing. Self-reliance has become a strategic necessity. Relying on imported defence equipment creates vulnerabilities. India should develop its own technological abilities and increase its defence manufacturing capacity. It will reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. Indigenous development of radars, electronic warfare systems, missiles, drones, and aircraft components will strengthen India’s technological base, create jobs, and boost exports. As part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat effort in defence manufacturing, the aim is to enhance self-reliance by encouraging the domestic production of these systems. The initiative has sped up domestic defence production by involving more public sector enterprises, private industries, start-ups, and research institutions. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), academic institutions, and the private sector must work together to shorten development timelines and promote innovation.
Embracing Emerging Technologies. The adoption of emerging technologies. Technological advances are further reshaping the nature of air warfare. Precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, network-centric operations, satellite-enabled communications, artificial intelligence, and autonomous drones are all altering the battlefield. Autonomous drones and the idea of loyal wingmen are expected to transform aerial combat. India should also make investments in directed-energy weapons, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber-resilient command-and-control networks. These technologies can greatly increase operational effectiveness while reducing personnel risk. Air power assets depend heavily on technology. Turning technology into capability takes a long time. To stay ahead of the challenges, we need to invest in emerging technologies and think through their use in warfare. Impetus is also required for existing aviation-related programs such as fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers, stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and long-range vectors.
Airpower Utilisation in Grey Zone Scenario. Grey zone operations occur in a contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare. These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both of India’s adversaries resort to these operations regularly. Airpower can reinforce the nation’s course of action against grey zone warfare, with involvement in several direct and supporting roles. Besides offensive use, it can also be effectively utilised in many ways in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Applying airpower in these grey zone situations requires some reorientation, supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.
Conclusion
India’s air Power is at a crucial stage. Competing regional interests, technological progress, and changes in warfare have increased the strategic value of air power. As India faces challenges from both China and Pakistan and the Indo-Pacific region grows more important, it needs constant modernisation and strategic adjustment. India can ensure its air power remains capable of protecting its national interests in this increasingly uncertain and contested geopolitical environment by promoting innovation, supporting domestic research, and adopting multidomain warfare.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References: –
Fontanellaz A, “Operation Sindoor: The India-Pakistan air war”, Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaires (2026).
Jane’s, “Feature: China accelerates air combat modernisation”, Janes.com (2025, November 19).
The review was published in the IIRF Strategic Yearbook 2026
Co-authored with Rishi Athreya
The last year has been very eventful. The Global order continues to be in flux. It is increasingly becoming Realist and Anarchical. Global disarmament is clearly in tatters. World military expenditure reached $2887 billion in 2025, up 2.9 per cent in real terms from 2024. The top three military spenders—the USA, China, and Russia—spent a combined total of $1480 billion, or 51 per cent of the global total. India, the world’s fifth-largest military spender in 2025, increased its military spending by 8.9 per cent to $92.1 billion[1].
Immediate Neighbours
Continental neighbours are of relevance to India.
Nepal: Nepal has a new government. This is a change to the entire political order. India continues to provide development assistance to Nepal[2]. India has resumed land trade with China through the Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand, Shipki La Pass in Himachal Pradesh, and Nathu La Pass in Sikkim[3]. India continues to have close ties with Bhutan[4].
Bangladesh: Bangladesh elections have restored an elected government. The current Prime Minister, Tarique Rehman of the Bangladesh National Party, represents a change from the Awami League. This government creates an opportunity for India to restore ties that had dipped during the Yunus caretaker government[5]. Here too India continues to assist in the political, security, economic and cultural domains[6].
Pakistan: OP SINDOOR has changed the entire South Asian scenario. One result is Pakistan’s rapid military modernisation. Pakistan’s military spending increased by 11 per cent to $11.9 billion[7]. Further, Pakistan is acquiring advanced military hardware that brings it nearly on par with India. However, this is largely driven by borrowing and overseas support. Moreover, Pakistan is integrated into collective security with Saudi Arabia[8]. Pakistan continues to be a global hub of terror. Pakistan is a base of operations and/or target for numerous armed, non-state militant groups, some of which have existed since the 1980s. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, and Hizbul Mujahideen are the main anti-India groups[9]. Pakistan has a unique ability to chase with the hounds and run with the hares[10].
China: China remains active along its borders with India and neighbouring countries. China’s establishment of new administrative counties near the tri-junction of Xinjiang, Afghanistan, and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) must be understood not merely as an internal adjustment but as part of a geopolitical strategy with significant implications for India’s territorial sovereignty and regional security[11]. China is engaging in the Sinicisation of Tibet to reduce the legitimacy of the Tibetan Government in exile in India. Further, it is building dams on the rivers in Tibet to restrict water flow to India and increase the danger of flooding. These create threats that India would need to address[12].
Maritime Scenario: As a largely maritime nation, India faces vital challenges in this sphere[13]. India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and Vision MAHASAGAR, i.e. Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions[14]. The entire Indian Ocean Region remains important to India[15]. As part of its global strategy, China has been developing ports and other infrastructure in littoral countries of the Indian Ocean Region for many years. It has a maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region, including anti-piracy escort missions, port calls, and the deployment of research and survey vessels. India’s relations with regional countries are distinct from those with other countries[16]. India continues to have security links with several littoral states. It also has links in economic, developmental, humanitarian, and technological spheres[17]. The recent crisis in Iran has disrupted maritime security[18].
Iran Crisis
The attacks by the US on Iran commencing 28 Feb 2026, titled OP EPIC FURY, are a mark of the greatest watershed in the West Asia region in several decades. These attacks are the culmination of several decades of effort by the US, Europe, Oman, and the IAEA to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme. Notwithstanding various efforts, Iran remained nuclear-capable. The US and Israel claim to have attacked because they feared an Iranian strike[19]. Israel launched OP ROARING LION on Iran alongside the US. Besides removing nuclear installations, the objective was the overall degradation of Iran’s missile capability. Both the US and Israel expected a short operation of around 72 Hrs. Israel has, for over a year, been targeting Iran[20]. This has clearly been a miscalculation. There are fears of long-term strategic overreach by the US[21]. In response, Iran claims to have never started a war. It claims that starting with the coup in 1953, and later support for Iraq in the war, the US has been hostile to Iran. Iran claims that US bases in the region pose a threat to it. Iran condemns the destruction of their infrastructure. Further, it claims a legitimate right to defend itself[22]. Iran continues to claim readiness to respond to attacks, even as mediation continues[23].
Doubtful Planning: As pointed out in a RUSI Commentary, there has been poor planning by the US in anticipating the implications for maritime security, especially in the Strait of Hormuz. While the US and Israel deployed aerial power, they provided little maritime support. Iran enjoys a geographic advantage and operational readiness in the region[24]. As highlighted in an NMF Commentary, the maritime aspect is a serious casualty of the US-Iran conflict. The US has apparently damaged parts of the Iranian Navy assets using land-based air power. However, the IRGC Navy (Sepah), a distinct entity, has not been damaged. The US has assets through CENTCOM. However, these may not be deployable in the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman[25]. Any US naval asset deployed in the region becomes a soft target[26].
Hormuz Strait: Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz. While a few ships are selectively allowed, any ship deemed affiliated with the USA or Israel is not permitted. In response, the USA has blockaded the Strait and is stopping ships bound for Iranian ports[27]. Saudi Arabia has reportedly expressed concern to the US administration that its action may encourage the Iran-backed Houthis to attack and disrupt Red Sea shipping routes, as was the case from 2023 to 2025. Iran has said that it would threaten trade in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Gulf of Oman if the US “create[s] insecurity for Iran’s commercial vessels”, describing the US action as a “prelude to a violation of the ceasefire”[28]. Irrespective of a ceasefire being announced, the US claims that it is serving as a deterrent to Iran[29]. The Strait of Hormuz remains a flashpoint. The USA claims to be enforcing a blockade on Iranian ships[30]. However, Iran claims that its ships are crossing the Hormuz Strait[31]. At another level, Iran is treating US actions as piracy and terrorism[32].
Negotiations: Pertinently, the USA has released a statement claiming that there is ample legal justification for the attack on Iran. They claim that even after June 2025, hostilities between Iran, Israel and the USA continued. They also assert that negotiations with Iran failed[33]. Conversely, Iran claims that the attack was launched amid negotiations[34]. A day before the commencement of OP EPIC FURY, Iran released a statement that claimed that negotiations were going well[35].
Israel Factor: Iran considers the US a proxy for Israel[36]. A noteworthy point is that the USA has openly supported Israel[37]. In some ways, Israel is a major factor in the West Asian scenario. Israel and the US said that Pakistan’s agreement did not include Lebanon. Iran said any negotiations with the US would be “unreasonable” if the Israel–Hezbollah conflict were to continue[38].
GCC Countries: Iran’s strategy to cause a rift between the Arab states and their US and Israeli allies appears to have failed; rather, it had an opposite effect of unifying them in their opposition to Iran and improving their security bond with America and possibly with Israel further. At the High-level GCC summit in Jeddah on 28 April 2026, the six GCC members Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported American action. Emphasising the need to secure the Strait of Hormuz’s opening, which impedes the flow of one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies, the US must caution that any finalised deal must result in a permanent, long-term arrangement[39]. At a deeper level, the GCC Countries have a larger oil supply than Iran. Moreover, they have invested in Artificial Intelligence and technology. This gives them a clear edge over Iran, as well as China and the USA[40].
Russian Stance: Russia remains a major player in the region and globally. It is an active party in the war in Ukraine. It is also present geographically in the West Asian context. Russia is a continental neighbour of Iran. Their relationship has long been troubled, driven by pragmatic considerations. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed in 2025[41]. It is not a mutual defence agreement. Russia was quick to condemn the attacks on Iran. A key point was that these attacks occurred while Iran was engaged in negotiations, including on the nuclear issue. Russia claims this attack is akin to the 2003 attack on Iran, based on false claims of weapons of mass destruction[42]. Most recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Russia and met President Vladimir Putin. Russia commended Iran for facing the American aggression[43]. Russia appreciates India’s multi-pronged foreign policy and respects it unconditionally. However, it believes in the particularly privileged strategic partnership with Russia[44].
Sanctions: The USA has applied sanctions on China for buying and refining Iranian Oil[45]. These target independent “teapot” oil refineries in China, primarily in Shandong Province, because they continue to import and refine Iranian crude oil[46].
Talks and Mediation: Pakistan is mediating talks between the US and Iran, and issues under discussion include freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programme, reconstruction and sanctions, and a long-term peace agreement. On 11 April, talks were held in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. Both sides reported progress, but they reached no agreement. No further talks have been confirmed[47]. Pakistan has been facilitating talks between the USA and Iran. This is an example of Pakistan’s effective Perception Management. It has long been very effective in the Cognitive and Information domains.
Challenges for India: The recent crisis in Iran has once again posed a maritime challenge[48]. There is the targeting of civilians, of infrastructure and of commercial shipping. It also raises economic concerns, including energy, fertilisers, and food security[49]. The sinking of IRIS Dena by the US is a diplomatic incident with extensive consequences[50]. From India’s perspective, the issue has raised questions about whether the entire Indian Ocean could be seen as India’s sphere of influence. While India is not expansionist, deeper strategic challenges remain[51].
Multilateral Reactions. The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz has drawn the attention of multilateral organisations, especially the International Maritime Organisation, and the United Nations Security Council.
IMO Task Force: A major concern has centred on the safety of merchant mariners. The International Maritime Organisation has raised this issue[52]. France and the UK chaired a conference on the Strait of Hormuz Maritime Navigation Initiative. The conference brought together around fifty non-belligerent states[53]. The meeting underlined the international community’s determination to support freedom of navigation, uphold international law, and safeguard global economic stability and energy security. France and the United Kingdom confirmed that they are establishing an independent, strictly defensive multinational mission. It would protect merchant vessels, reassure commercial shipping operators, and conduct mine-clearance operations. Further planning is underway to implement this multinational force[54].
United Nations Resolution: the SC Resolution of 11 March 2026, which demanded that Iran stop the attacks on its neighbours[55]. The UN Security Council has failed to adopt a resolution aiming to boost security in the Strait of Hormuz as the critical shipping corridor remains largely closed to global trade and the transport of humanitarian aid, with war continuing to rage across the region. Bahrain submitted the text alongside Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Eleven countries voted in favour of the draft, which the permanent members vetoed. China and Russia voted in favour, while Colombia and Pakistan abstained. One concern of China and Russia was that the resolution was biased against Iran and failed to mention the role of the USA and Israel in initiating the attack[56].
UN Open Debate: The United Nations Security Council held a High-Level Open Debate on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain[57]. The Secretary-General highlighted the current disruption to global shipping caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. He mentioned the humanitarian effects, including in energy and food security. The SG also mentioned the dangers faced by seafarers and commercial vessels. Other issues raised were piracy, terrorism, and damage to critical maritime infrastructure. The Black Sea Initiative is cited as a successful example of a humanitarian navigational agreement, even during a war[58]. Several member nations raised broader concerns about commercial vessels, seafarers, economics, piracy, and shadow fleets[59]. China made a statement condemning the attack by Israel and the USA on Iran. China commended Pakistan’s mediation efforts. Further, China raised issues of UNCLOS, Piracy, and Ocean Governance[60]. China also expressed concern about the situation in Gaza and the humanitarian fallout. They believe that Israel is unnecessarily attacking Gaza, and the two-state solution is non-negotiable[61]. Russia continues to hold the USA and Israel responsible for the war in Iran. Further, they hold that in times of war, a coastal State under attack may limit navigation in its territorial waters for security purposes. Russia also raised concerns about energy, the economy, fertilisers, and food security[62]. The USA also lamented China and Russia vetoing the aforementioned resolution. The USA also mentioned the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The support by Iran of the Houthis in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is also condemned. They highlighted the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. A concern raised was around sea mines supposedly planted by Iran. Finally, the USA called for commercial shipping, maritime finance and insurance, humanitarian aid agencies, and militaries to come together to address this situation. The USA mentioned the need for an anti-piracy force in the Strait of Hormuz[63]. The Baltic states also share concerns about navigation in the Strait of Hormuz[64]. The UK condemned the veto on the UN resolution. They stressed the need to open the Strait of Hormuz and highlighted their joint efforts with France[65]. In this context, the IMO mentioned freedom of navigation without tariffs. They also said seafarers are being evacuated[66].
Ukraine War
The war in Ukraine continues unabated, with several consequences.
Military Spending: The main contributor to the global increase in military spending in 2025 was a 14 per cent rise in Europe to $864 billion. Spending by Russia and Ukraine continued to grow in the fourth year of the war in Ukraine. At the same time, ongoing rearmament by European NATO members drove the sharpest annual growth in spending in Central and Western Europe since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s military spending grew by 5.9 per cent in 2025 to $190 billion, bringing its military burden to 7.5 per cent of GDP. Ukraine, the seventh-largest spender in 2025, increased spending by 20 per cent to $84.1 billion, or 40 per cent of GDP. The USA made no new allocation for Ukraine in 2025[67].
Changing US Stance: The USA has reduced assistance to Ukraine. The European Union, the UK and NATO are picking up the tab[68]. Some argue Europe should emerge as a military bloc independent of the USA[69]. There are calls to use the European Defence Industrial Programme to build more weapons within Europe. Europe is described as a sleeping giant[70]. Ukraine, for its part, calls for more support from Europe and NATO. It links the broader European safety from Russia to the Ukrainian front. There is even a view that the USA is appeasing Russia to the detriment of Ukraine and even Europe[71].
Maritime Aspects: Russia, at another level, accuses Ukraine of armed attacks on civilian vessels flying the Russian flag or transporting Russian energy resources in different waterways around the globe. These concerns affect seafarers, energy, the environment, and trade. Russia claims that attacks are occurring on the coasts of countries supporting Ukraine, which raises questions about their complicity in these attacks. The Black and Mediterranean Seas, and the Bosphorus Strait, are mentioned as sites of these attacks. Russia suggests upholding UNCLOS 1982 to prevent future incidents[72]. On the other hand, the EU is concerned that Shadow Fleets support the Russian war economy[73]. Nordic countries also worry about Russia’s interference with the satellite navigation system in the Baltic Sea[74].
Minerals Deal: The US and Ukraine signed a deal granting the US access to Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth, including Critical Minerals[75]. This is supposed to give the US access to mining while recognising Ukraine’s ownership. This pact would make it difficult for the USA to recognise Russian sovereignty over Ukrainian territory and deter further territorial claims[76].
China Factor: Some view China as supporting Russia in the war in Ukraine. China has supplied military supplies, including Drones. China is also buying oil from Russia[77].
Sanctions: The USA has applied sanctions on both Iran and Russia. These are in response to Iran’s support for Russia in the Ukraine War[78].
Global Energy Scenario
Both wars are affecting the global supply of natural resources and their prices[79].
Oil: A major consequence of this crisis is the need to use alternative, often more expensive, sea routes[80]. Around 20% of global petroleum and 20% of liquefied natural gas traverse the strait each year. Pre-conflict, around 3,000 vessels used the strait each month. Their numbers now stand at around 5% of this level. This has pushed up global oil and gas prices (benefiting both Russia and, temporarily, Iran). Several Arab states were forced to cut or suspend oil production due to Iranian attacks[81]. Russia remains India’s leading supplier of Hydrocarbons[82].
Effect on Fertiliser: The sustained reduction in LNG production and/or shipments from the Gulf (Qatar supplies around 10% of globally traded natural gas) will affect worldwide nitrogen fertiliser production. Natural gas is both a key feedstock and the primary energy source for producing ammonia, the building block for all nitrogen fertilisers. Other ingredients include urea, Phosphate, and Sulphur. India is particularly affected by these shortages[83]. Fertiliser shortages also threaten major global food insecurity[84].
Alternative Energy Routes: Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have operational crude oil pipelines that could reroute flows to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. While additional capacity may exist in major pipelines to bypass the Strait, the logistics and supply chains needed to reroute and export substantial flows have not been tested under stress[85].
Maritime Insurance: Opening the Strait of Hormuz remains a grave issue. A deeper problem is whether commercial underwriters will insure vessels at reasonable rates. This would essentially need a political solution[86]. One suggestion is for India to have national Protection and Indemnity Clubs[87]. Most recently, the Government of India has approved this in principle[88].
Indian Energy Situation. India has made significant strides in energy and climate change.
Power Generation: India is successfully balancing the twin goals of meeting rising electricity demand and promoting sustainability. According to the International Energy Agency, 85% of the increase in global electricity demand over the next three years will come from emerging and developing economies. As one of the fastest-growing major economies, India plays a central role in the global energy transition. India’s share in global primary energy consumption is projected to double by 2035. Electricity generation has increased from 1,168 billion units (BU) in 2015–16 to an estimated 1,824 BU in 2024–25. Similarly, total installed capacity has grown from 305 gigawatts (GW) in 2015–16 to a projected 475 GW in 2024–25[89].
Multiple Energy Sources: India’s energy journey is no longer defined by a single source; it’s now drawing strength from solar parks, rooftop panels, hydrogen pilots, modernised nuclear frameworks, smart meters, and digital platforms. Milestones such as expanding renewable capacity, advancing the National Green Hydrogen Mission, strengthening DISCOMs, and building the India Energy Stack reflect a structured, forward-looking transition. Policy reform, infrastructure investment, technological innovation, and global cooperation support this transformation. As India moves toward its Net Zero 2070 commitment, the evolving energy mix shows that growth and sustainability can go hand in hand. India is redesigning how power is produced, delivered, and shared for a future that is secure, sustainable, and self-reliant[90]. India is increasing its use of renewable energy, and the country now ranks third globally[91].
Emerging Trends
Events over the past year point to a few emerging trends to watch in the coming years. The war in Ukraine remains a stalemate. The West Asia scenario got more complicated with the US-Israel attacks on Iran. This is also an asymmetric conflict and remains inconclusive. Both these conflicts show the chasm in NATO. While continental Europe is fighting against Russia in the Ukraine War, the USA has reduced its support. While the EU and even the UK offer diplomatic support to the USA in West Asia, this does not translate into military backing. Russia is the active party in the war in Ukraine. Iran has been supporting Russia. The USA sanctioned this. China has also been supporting Russia. Currently, both Russia and China are providing diplomatic support to Iran against the USA. The partnership agreement, while not necessarily military, has political objectives. While it may not be obvious, there are currently two powers, namely the USA and Russia, at war, where the other supports the adversary. China, while not a party to either war, is on the opposite side to the USA.
Both wars are linked in the maritime sphere. Discussing one leads to the other. There are concerns about maritime aggression by both the USA and Russia. Russia, for its part, accuses Ukraine of maritime hostility. China, while apparently concerned about the USA’s maritime belligerence in the Iran War, is itself confrontational in the South China Sea. The concerns of the UN and the IMO, supported by France and the UK, show that the Hormuz Strait has morphed from a military issue to a constabulary one. The IMO is taking positive steps to address humanitarian issues.
The Iran War is also in the Cognitive domain, with both sides making claims and counterclaims. While specific battles and incidents are a matter of detail, the underlying issue is around the legitimacy of the USA and Israel invading Iran. Moreover, there is the whole issue of whether Iran is justified or not in building up an arsenal, including nuclear weapons.
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[22] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), President Pezeshkian says Iran has never initiated war, https://irangov.ir/detail/479346
[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran, (21 April 2026), Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the US attack on an Iranian commercial vessel and the hostage-taking of Its crew and their families, https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/786655
[34] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), President Pezeshkian says Iran has never initiated war, https://irangov.ir/detail/479346
[35] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (27 Feb 2026), Significant Progress Made in Third Round of Iran–U.S. Talks in Geneva, FM Says, https://irangov.ir/detail/478575
[36] Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, (02 April 2026), Ibid
[37] US Department of State, (21 April 2026), Ibid
[41] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (02 Oct 2025), Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the entry into force of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2050909/
[42] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (28 Feb 2026), Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UNSC Briefing in connection with US and Israeli Strikes against Iran, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/28022026
[44] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (25 April 2026), Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova interview with an Indian news website Firstpost, April 25, 2026, https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/2100214/?lang=en
[59] United Nations, (27 April 2026), Immediately Restore Freedom of Navigation through Strait of Hormuz, Speakers Urge in Security Council Condemning Critical Waterway’s Use as ‘Bargaining Chip’, SC/16349, https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16349.doc.htm
[62] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (27 April 2026), Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at a UNSC Briefing on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain, https://russiaun.ru/en/news/27042026
[64] Permanent Mission of Iceland to the UN Statements, (27 April 2026), N5 Statement at the Security Council Open Debate on the Safety and Protection of Waterways in the Maritime Domain
[70] European Commission, (10 Feb 2026), Speech by Commissioner Kubilius at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament “Building a stronger European defence in light of an increasingly volatile international environment”, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_26_367
[72] Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, (27 April 2026), Ibid
[73] Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, (27 April 2026), EU Statement – UN Security Council: The Safety and Protection of Maritime Waterways
[82] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, (25 April 2026), Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova interview with an Indian news website Firstpost, April 25, 2026, https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/2100214/?lang=en
