867: CHINA’S DREAM: ROAD BLOCKS AND ROAD AHEAD

 

China’s rise is a long-term political and strategic project aimed at restoring the country’s position as a leading world power. Under President Xi Jinping, this ambition has been articulated through the concept of the Chinese Dream, i.e., the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In a 2012 speech, Xi linked national rejuvenation to the goal of building a modern socialist country by 2049 (the centenary year of the founding of the People’s Republic of China).

China’s approach is economic rise through the industrial route. The strategic question is whether China can convert its economic scale into comprehensive global power. That requires more than manufacturing dominance. It requires technological independence, diplomatic influence, military capability, secure borders and the ability to shape international rules. China’s challenge also includes pursuing its interests without creating a regional coalition determined to contain its rise.

The years 2035, 2047 and 2049 are important milestones. 2035 is an official modernisation milestone; 2049 is the stated centenary horizon for national rejuvenation; and 2047 can be treated as an analytical marker for assessing China’s regional and global ambitions, rather than a formally established deadline for world domination.

 

China’s Approach: Industrial Foundation of Strategic Power

China’s ambitions depend heavily on its manufacturing base. Industrial capacity provides employment, export revenue, technological learning and the ability to produce goods at enormous scale.

The original Made in China 2025 initiative focused on upgrading domestic industry and reducing reliance on foreign technology in strategic sectors. China’s subsequent industrial and economic plans have continued to emphasise advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, robotics and scientific self-reliance.

The 2035 objective is broader than simply producing more goods. Beijing wants China to become a technological power capable of designing, developing and manufacturing critical technologies rather than depending on foreign suppliers.

Yet industrial scale has limitations. Manufacturing leadership does not automatically produce technological independence, strong consumer demand, high household incomes or sustainable economic growth. China must also contend with demographic pressures, debt, property-sector difficulties and the challenge of shifting towards consumption-led growth.

 

Xi Jinping’s Global Initiatives

China’s global initiatives are designed to expand its influence through infrastructure, development finance, trade, security cooperation and international institutions.

The Belt and Road Initiative has helped Beijing build economic connections across Asia, Africa, Europe and other regions. The Global Development, Security and Civilisation Initiatives express broader Chinese ambitions to influence how international development, security and political diversity are discussed.

These initiatives are not identical, and countries participate for different reasons. Some seek investment, infrastructure and market access; others are attracted by China’s diplomatic support or preference for non-interference in domestic political affairs.

An important dimension of this approach is Beijing’s argument that no single political model is suitable for every country. China promotes its own system of governance, in which Communist Party leadership is central to political authority and national development.

This presents an alternative to the Western argument that liberal democracy, competitive elections and individual political freedoms should be central to legitimate governance.

However, an alternative model is not necessarily universally accepted. China’s ability to attract partners depends on whether its economic engagement delivers lasting benefits, whether its diplomacy addresses the concerns of smaller countries, and whether other governments trust its intentions.

 

Conflict of Interest with the USA

 The United States has increasingly treated China as both an economic competitor and a strategic challenger. American policy has included tariffs, export controls, investment restrictions and measures designed to limit Chinese access to sensitive technologies.

The broader strategic effect, however, is clear: Washington is attempting to limit certain Chinese capabilities while preserving or reshaping its own technological and industrial advantages.

Beijing has responded by emphasising self-reliance, domestic innovation and alternative supply chains. This creates a vicious circle: American restrictions increase China’s incentives to develop domestic alternatives, while China’s technological progress encourages further scrutiny from the United States. The result is a competition in which industrial policy, trade, technology and national security increasingly overlap.

 

Analytical Review

 One of the most provocative descriptions of China’s comparative position (vis-à-vis the USA) is that it is an economic heavyweight, a diplomatic lightweight and a military featherweight.

The phrase reflects the gap between the size of China’s economy and its capacity to translate that size into global leadership that is widely accepted by all. Yet, if taken literally, it fails to account for China’s rapid rise in its current diplomatic and military capabilities.

Economic Power. China is one of the largest economies in the world and plays a central role in manufacturing and trading. The country has considerable international influence due to its industrial capacity, its infrastructure, its technological development and its position within global supply chains.

Diplomatic Influence. China enjoys a great deal of influence via international organisations, trade ties, financing for infrastructure and through its partnerships with developing countries. Nevertheless, influence is uneven. Distrust among some neighbours, concerns about economic coercion and resistance to its maritime claims limit its ability to translate economic relationships into political support.

Military Power with Operational Constraints. China has invested heavily in its navy, air force, missile forces, space capabilities and nuclear deterrent. It is a major military power, not a featherweight. The more relevant question is how effectively it could use those capabilities in a particular conflict, especially far from the mainland or against an adversary supported by regional allies.

China’s challenge is therefore to integrate its economic, diplomatic, technological and military strengths into a coherent strategy. Its rivals, meanwhile, will seek to exploit the gaps between these different forms of power.

 

Road Ahead

 China’s long-term ambition is best understood as an effort to become a country with comprehensive national power: a modern industrial economy, technological self-reliance, a capable military, greater diplomatic influence and a stronger voice in international rule-making.

The road to that position is not guaranteed. China must address structural economic pressures, maintain innovation, manage its demographic transition and avoid turning regional neighbours into permanent strategic opponents. It must also decide how much economic disruption it is willing to tolerate in pursuit of territorial and security objectives.

The United States retains important advantages through its alliance network, advanced technology, financial system and global military reach. Japan, India, Australia and European powers also influence the strategic environment in which China operates. Other countries may welcome Chinese investment while remaining unwilling to accept Chinese political or military dominance.

The international system is therefore unlikely to be transformed by economic growth alone. Power will depend on the interaction of industrial capacity, technological leadership, alliances, institutional credibility and military effectiveness.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The China Dream is a long-term initiative aimed at national rejuvenation, with its targets for modernisation in 2035 and its milestone of the centenary in 2049 serving as official benchmarks against which Beijing’s achievements can be evaluated. 2047 may be used as a useful point for analysis, but it must not be mistaken for a verified deadline by which China will achieve global supremacy.

China has shown that economic development can change a country’s standing in the international arena. The next step is to determine whether that economic power can translate into solid diplomatic influence and reliable military deterrence without provoking a broader regional reaction.

Ultimately, China’s rise will be judged not only by the strength of its economy or armed forces, but also by its ability to manage disagreements, sustain partnerships and reassure other countries that its growing power need not come at their expense.

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 22 Oct 22. Full text of resolution on the report of the 19th Central Committee.
  1. García-Herrero, A., & Krystyanczuk, M. How does China conduct industrial policy: Analyzing words versus deeds. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 24, Article 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-024-00413-w
  1. Chen, K., Meng, Q., Sun, Y., et al. How does industrial policy experimentation influence innovation performance? A case of Made in China 2025. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 11, Article 40, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-02497-x
  1. Han, X., & Liu, W. Belt and Road Initiative. In Oxford bibliographies in geography. Oxford University Press, 12 Jan 23.
  1. Yu, H. Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Springer, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9633-9
  1. S. Department of Defense. Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual report to Congress, 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
  1. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 23 Dec 23. USTR initiates Section 301 investigation on China’s acts, policies, and practices related to targeting of the semiconductor industry for dominance.

 

863: IAF @94: A KALEIDOSCOPE THROUGH THE AIR MARSHAL’S LENS

 

Indian Air Force celebrates its 94th anniversary on October 8, 2026.

Good wishes to all air warriors on AF Day.

 

The IAF is celebrating under the theme “Indian Air Force – Infallible, Impervious and Precise.”

The IAF has evolved from its October 8, 1932, origins (when it had a few Westland Wapiti biplanes and a handful of pilots) into a modern, network-centric, multi-domain strategic force.

 

A compilation of links to some of the posts on the Indian Air Force (from the blog “Air Marshal’s Perspective”) is listed below: –

 

Articles/Writeups

  1. Evolution of IAF: Historic Perspective.

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/04/26/evolution-of-iaf-historic-perspective/

  1. IAF: Guardians of the sky (Article published in the Millennium Post.

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/10/08/indian-air-force-guardians-of-the-skies/

  1. IAF: Strategies – Past, Present and Future (Article published in the Gyan Chakra book on Military Strategy).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/06/26/iaf-strategies-past-present-and-future/

  1. Doctrinal Evolution of IAF.

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/04/25/doctrinal-evolution-iaf/

  1. Role of IAF in India’s policy of Punitive Deterrence (Article published on the “Life of Soldier” website.

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2025/10/01/753indias-policy-of-punitive-deterrence-against-state-sponsored-terrorism-pivotal-role-of-the-indian-air-force/

  1. IAF Flight Path @ 92 (Article published in the “News Analytics” journal)

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/10/07/518-indian-air-force-flight-path-92/

  1. IAF Challenges and Future Trajectory (Article Published in the “News Analytics” Journal).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/07/08/indian-air-force-challenges-and-future-trajectory/

  1. Indian Air Force @91

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/10/05/indian-air-force91/

  1. Aero India 2025: Key Solutions for the IAF Challenges (Article Published in the SP Aviation).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2025/02/11/595-aero-india-2025-and-key-solutions-for-iafs-challenges/

  1. Future Conflict Scenario: Implications for IAF (Part 1).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/03/15/future-conflict-scenarios-implications-for-iaf-part-1/

  1. Future Conflict Scenario: Implications for IAF (Part 2).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/03/16/future-conflict-scenario-implications-for-iaf-part-2/

 

Acquisitions/Capability Enhancement

  1. IAF Aerospace Capability Building (Article published in the USI Strategic Yearbook 2021).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/07/20/iaf-aerospace-capability-building-article-published-in-usi-strategic-year-book-2021/

  1. MRFA Acquisition for a future Ready IAF (Article published in the “Life of Soldier” Journal)..

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2025/02/02/591-transforming-indias-skies-the-mrfa-acquisition-for-a-future-ready-iaf/

  1. IAF’s Deterrence Capability (Summary of Aspects).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/10/05/inputs-iaf-deterrence-capability/

  1. Inputs to Questionnaire from Media bout IAF.

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/10/02/q-a-series-iaf-ai-powered-unmanned-platforms-space-ops-and-future-challenges/

  1. IAF Supporting Self-Reliance.

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2022/10/04/indian-air-force-always-supports-atmanirbharta-part-2/

  1. IAF supporting Atmanirbharta

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2022/09/23/indian-air-force-always-supports-atmanirbharta/

  1. Wings of Indigenisation: IAF-HAL Saga (Article published in the “Life of Soldier” journal).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2025/04/02/635-iafs-wings-of-indigenisation-the-iaf-hal-saga/

  1. ISTAR for IAF: Redefining Strategic Surveillance (Article published in the “Eurasian Times”)

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2025/07/09/698-the-istar-to-redefine-strategic-surveillance-for-the-indian-air-force/

  1. Women in IAF (Article published in the Air Force Association Journal).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/09/21/women-air-warriors-in-indian-air-force/

  1. Exercise Iniochos 2025: IAF on Broader Charioteer (Article published in “Eurasian Times”).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2025/04/01/634-exercise-iniochos-25-iaf-on-board-charioteer/

 

Podcasts and Talks

 

  1. Strategic Evolution of IAF (Talk on “Thus Spake General”).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/09/02/strategic-evolution-of-indian-air-force/

  1. IAF Challenges and Preparedness (Talk on News Time)

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/12/26/565chat-with-mr-dinesh-k-vohra-on-news-time-about-iaf-challenges-and-preparedness/

  1. Life in IAF (Chat with Gaurav).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/10/15/af-day-special-part-1-2/

  1. IAF Challenges (Chat with Gaurav).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2023/10/15/af-day-special-iaf-broader-issues-personal-beliefs-part-23-3/

  1. IAF Fighter Aircraft Strength (Chat on “DEF Talks”).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/06/18/def-talks-iaf-fighter-sqn-strength-and-rafales/

  1. IAF: Expectations and Capability Building (Chat on DEF Talks”).

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/05/21/def-talks-expectations-from-iaf-vis-a-vis-capability-building/

  1. IAF: Modernisation and Technology advancement (Chat on “VJTI Technovanja”)

https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/03/02/talk-on-modernisation-and-technology-advancement-in-iaf-during-technovanja-of-vjti/

 

Constructive remarks and value additions are most welcome

855: PRAHAAR 2026: INDIA’S NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY


PRAHAAR, meaning “strike,” is India’s first comprehensive National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, released by the Ministry of Home Affairs on 23 February 2026. The eight-page document consolidates existing counter-terrorism practices into a formal, intelligence-led and proactive national framework. It declares “zero tolerance” for terrorism in all forms while explicitly avoiding any linkage of terrorism to a particular religion, ethnicity, nationality or civilisation. Its approach is based on both a whole-of-government and whole-of-society model.

The strategy is based on seven main pillars: the prevention of terrorist attacks; a quick and proportionate response; the pooling of domestic capabilities; respect for human rights and the rule of law; the reduction of conditions which lend themselves to terrorism; coordination and shaping of international efforts; and recovery and resilience via a whole-of-society approach. These pillars link together prevention, response, prosecution, de-radicalisation, international cooperation and post-attack recovery in one national framework. Together, they create a continuum from prevention and disruption through response and prosecution to recovery and long-term resilience.

 

The Seven Pillars of PRAHAAR

  1. Prevention of Terror Attacks

Prevention is the foundation of PRAHAAR. It emphasises an intelligence-guided approach, with the rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence so that threats can be neutralised before they materialise.

The Multi-Agency Center (MAC) and Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) under the Intelligence Bureau are identified as important platforms for sharing counter-terrorism intelligence between central agencies and State police. Prevention also covers online propaganda and recruitment, overground worker networks, terrorist financing, illegal arms networks, cryptocurrency and dark-web financing, border security and critical infrastructure.

The strategy recognises the changing technological character of terrorism, including drones, encryption and cyber-enabled operations. Power, railways, aviation, ports, defence, space and atomic-energy infrastructure are identified as areas requiring enhanced technological protection. Effective implementation will require close Centre-State intelligence coordination and continued technological modernisation.

 

  1. Swift and Proportionate Response

PRAHAAR establishes a multi-layered response mechanism. The local police act as the first responders and are assisted by the specialised State counter-terrorism units and the National Security Guard (NSG) in the case of major attacks. The Central Armed Police Forces can also offer support, and it is the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the State police who carry out the investigations and prosecutions.

The Central, State and district authorities coordinate according to the Standard Operating Procedures and intelligence-sharing arrangements set out by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the principle of proportionality enables responses to be adjusted in accordance with the nature and extent of an attack, while allowing for rapid escalation if needed.

This framework seeks to strengthen national coordination without eliminating the federal character of India’s security architecture, particularly because policing remains a State subject.

 

  1. Aggregating Internal Capacities

The third pillar focuses on strengthening security and law-enforcement institutions through modern equipment, technology, and weaponry; improved training in areas such as tactics and urban combat; standardised counter-terrorism structures and procedures across States; and identification of resource gaps.

An important aim is to reduce differences in the capabilities of the various states and to enhance interoperability among the agencies. Continued funding, the upgrading of technology, and efficient coordination between agencies are still major challenges in terms of implementation.

 

  1. Human Rights and Rule of Law

Human rights and the rule of law are clearly included in the strategic framework of PRAHAAR. The anti-terrorism measures provided for in laws such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the new criminal codes are in line with the country’s commitment to the Protection of Human Rights Act, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The strategy places a strong emphasis on the use of legal actions, appeals, and supervision at all levels of the judiciary; it therefore seeks to combine effective counter-terrorism measures with respect for due process, although it remains difficult to maintain this balance when urgent security operations come into contact with broad anti-terror powers.

 

  1. Addressing Conditions Conducive to Terrorism

PRAHAAR advocates combating radicalisation and terrorist recruitment by means of proportionate police responses, by using legal intervention when necessary, by engaging with community and religious leaders, with NGOs and moderate preachers, by involving youth and by providing de-radicalisation programmes in prisons.

It also identifies socio-economic factors (including poverty, unemployment, education, housing, employment opportunities, scholarships and women’s empowerment) as areas requiring attention in vulnerable communities.

This gives the strategy a preventive dimension beyond intelligence and security operations, with effectiveness depending on sustained community engagement and efforts to address radicalisation without stigmatising communities.

 

  1. International Cooperation

Recognising the transnational aspect of terrorism, PRAHAAR advocates for the sharing of intelligence, the conclusion of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, the establishment of extradition arrangements, the creation of Joint Working Groups, the signing of MoUs and support for United Nations terrorist designations.

India also seeks cooperation through bilateral and multilateral forums to exchange best practices and build international consensus against state-sponsored terrorism, terrorist financing and safe havens.

The pillar reflects India’s broader effort to strengthen cooperation on financing, designations and technology-related threats.

 

  1. Recovery and Resilience

The emphasis on counter-terrorism goes beyond prevention and response to include recovery and resilience. It is expected that civil administrations, professionals, NGOs, communities and private-sector partners should all help with the recovery after an attack, by providing reassurance, carrying out reconstruction and preparing for future threats.

The strategy also calls for technological investment and public-private partnerships to address emerging risks, including the misuse of information and communications technology for terrorism.

 

Comparative Analysis

 

China’s Counter-Terrorism Framework

India’s approach is very different from China’s counter-terrorism framework. China does not possess a single public strategy document analogous to PRAHAAR. Rather, its system is based on the 2015 Counter-Terrorism Law, the various amendments to it, the Criminal Law, the National Security Law, the local regulations, and the 2024 white paper, China’s Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism.

The central conceptual difference lies in how the threat is defined. PRAHAAR focuses on terrorism, including cross-border and technology-enabled threats, while China’s framework is organised around the “three evils”: terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Extremism is treated as an important ideological driver of terrorism, with particular attention to separatism and religious extremism in Xinjiang.

There are also differences between the two systems in terms of their institutional arrangements. PRAHAAR operates within a federal democratic system and makes it clear that the protection of human rights and access to judicial remedies are strategic principles. By contrast, China’s approach is more centralised and involves special security agencies as well as wide-ranging state-directed social management; while official Chinese documents emphasise law-based counter-terrorism and the protection of rights, international critics have pointed out issues relating to surveillance, coercive controls, and re-education measures, particularly in Xinjiang.

Their methods of prevention are also different: India focuses on intelligence fusion, the disruption of terrorist financing and logistics, countering online propaganda, securing the borders, and applying graded responses to cases of radicalisation. China, on the other hand, places more emphasis on de-extremification, ideological education, surveillance, and state-directed social management. In both cases, international cooperation, intelligence sharing, counter-financing and actions taken to prevent terrorist organisations from getting safe havens are included.

 

The 2026 U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy

PRAHAAR can likewise be compared with the 2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, which was issued by the Trump administration on 6 May 2026. Although both documents are formal statements of national policy, they differ in their threat priorities, operational focus, and methods of institutional approach.

PRAHAAR is a concise, principles-based approach that concentrates on intelligence-led prevention, proportionate responses, capacity building, human rights, de-radicalization and resilience. The U.S. strategy is a document of 16 pages based on the ideas of “America First” and “Peace through Strength” and lists narcoterrorists and transnational gangs, as well as legacy Islamist terrorist organisations with the capability of carrying out operations abroad, and violent left-wing extremists as its main categories of threat. It stresses the need to dismantle terrorist networks, disrupt their financing, and enhance burden-sharing among partners.

The different threat priorities reflect distinct national security environments. PRAHAAR is strongly influenced by India’s experience of cross-border terrorism and Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, while also addressing jihadist networks, radicalization and emerging technological threats. The U.S. strategy places greater emphasis on narcoterrorism, transnational gangs, legacy Islamist organizations and violent left-wing extremism.

There are also differences between the two approaches as to the balance they strike between preventive, societal, and operational measures. PRAHAAR includes community engagement, socio-economic interventions, de-radicalisation and whole-of-society resilience; the American strategy, on the other hand, places more emphasis on operational disruption, the destruction of terrorist networks, applying financial pressure and protecting the homeland. Abroad, India stresses multilateral cooperation, UN designations, extradition and intelligence partnerships, whereas the U.S. strategy focuses on partner capacity and burden-sharing.

 

Comparison Summary. China’s method places a greater emphasis on centralised preventive control and on dealing with extremism and separatism, whereas the 2026 U.S. strategy focuses on homeland protection, network disruption, narcoterrorism, and burden-sharing. Although all three approaches stress prevention, intelligence, and disruption, they differ in the way they define threats, organise authority, and in the balance they strike between security and rights as well as social management.

 

PRAHAAR: Strategic Significance and Limitations

PRAHAAR is an attempt to provide India’s counter-terrorism system with a coherent strategic framework; its importance consists in integrating intelligence-led prevention, rapid response, institutional capacity, rule-of-law safeguards, de-radicalisation, international cooperation and societal resilience.

The distinguishing feature of PRAHAAR is its effort to incorporate hard security, legal protections, preventive social measures, and societal resilience into one national framework. It combines intelligence-led prevention, rapid response, institutional modernisation, de-radicalisation, international cooperation, and recovery.

At the same time, its principal limitation is its brevity. At eight pages, it is primarily a principles and policy framework rather than a detailed implementation plan. It provides limited agency-specific deliverables, operational metrics, or measurable targets. Implementation will therefore depend on sustained funding, Centre-State cooperation, technological modernisation, and the development of measurable outcomes, particularly in areas such as de-radicalisation and societal resilience.

 

The true significance of PRAHAAR cannot be assessed simply on the basis of its stated principles, since it will depend upon the effectiveness with which those principles are put into practice through coordinated institutions, and the attainment of concrete results.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2026, February 23). National counterterrorism policy & strategy: PRAHAAR. Ministry of Home Affairs – PRAHAAR PDF

  1. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. (2026, August 12). PRAHAAR. Press Information Bureau. Press Information Bureau – PRAHAAR
  1. Government of India. (1967). The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. India Code. India Code – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
  1. Government of India. (1993). The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. India Code. India Code – Protection of Human Rights Act
  1. Government of India. (2023). The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. India Code. India Code – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
  1. United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations – Universal Declaration of Human Rights
  1. United Nations. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Treaty Collection – ICCPR
  1. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2024, January 23). China’s legal framework and measures for counterterrorism. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. China’s Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism
  1. National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. (2015). Counter-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China (as amended 2018).
  1. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, August 31). OHCHR assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China.
  1. Madhani, A. (2026, May 6). Trump’s new counterterrorism strategy makes targeting Western Hemisphere cartels the top priority. The Washington Post. The Washington Post – 2026 U.S. counterterrorism strategy
  1. Tiwary, D. (2026, February 27). PRAHAAR: Why India’s new counterterrorism document is more intent than full-fledged strategy. The Indian Express. The Indian Express – PRAHAAR analysis
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