The answers are collated from open sources. Information warfare and propaganda are generally active, as in any other war. Bias in the answers cannot be ruled out.
MILITARY OPERATIONS
What were the major Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel, and how effective were they?
Iran launched multiple large-scale barrages across 2024–2026. The June 2025 Twelve-Day War saw Iran fire over 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 suicide drones. In the ongoing 2026 campaign, Iran has shifted to wider but smaller barrages targeting Israel, US bases, and infrastructure across Gulf states simultaneously. Israeli forces claim that their overall effectiveness has been low: the vast majority of strikes were intercepted, and physical damage and casualties were limited relative to the scale of launches. Saturation tactics strained interceptor inventories but failed to overwhelm allied defences due to Israeli pre-emptive strikes on launchers and continuous US augmentation.
What was the nature and scale of Israel’s retaliatory strikes inside Iran?
Israel’s retaliatory campaign has been the largest operation in IAF history. On day one alone, approximately 1,200 strike sorties were flown. Israel has struck over 1,700 military industrial assets across Iran, with thousands more remaining on target lists. The campaign has systematically worked through Iran’s entire missile production chain — from large IRGC-linked assembly facilities to smaller component manufacturers — alongside nuclear sites, air defence infrastructure, naval assets, and leadership targets, including Khamenei himself. Israel claims to have destroyed or disabled approximately 60–90% of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers and has achieved air superiority over most of Iran’s airspace within 24 hours of operations beginning.
What role did the US military play?
The US played a dual role — defensive and offensive. On the defensive side, US THAAD and Patriot batteries across Israel and Gulf states, alongside Aegis-equipped destroyers in the region, provided critical intercept capacity that prevented Israeli systems from being overwhelmed by volume. On the offensive side, the US struck three Iranian nuclear sites on 22 June 2025 and launched over 900 strikes in the opening phase of Operation Epic Fury on 28 February 2026. US tanker and intelligence support were essential enablers of Israel’s deep-strike campaign inside Iranian airspace.
What damage did Israeli strikes inflict on Iran’s air defence and nuclear infrastructure?
Reportedly, in the 2026 campaign, over 100 air defence systems and 120 detection systems were taken out within the first 24 hours, giving Israel air superiority over much of Iranian territory. Nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and the covert Minzadehei site have all sustained significant damage, with key facilities rendered inoperable; survivable elements remain, but reconstitution capacity is being systematically targeted.
AIR DEFENCE: TECHNOLOGY & LESSONS
What does the conflict reveal about large-scale ballistic missile attacks against layered air defence?
Several clear lessons have emerged. First, layered integration with ally support is highly effective but extraordinarily expensive — interceptor depletion is a genuine strategic vulnerability against an adversary willing to launch at scale. Second, offensive counter-strikes against launchers and command infrastructure are force multipliers that reduce the volume of incoming strikes more efficiently than additional interceptors alone. Third, early warning and space-based detection are operationally decisive — the side that detects first wins the intercept race. Fourth, directed energy weapons are now operationally necessary to address cheap drone swarms economically, as engaging low-cost drones with high-cost interceptors at scale is financially unsustainable.
How did Israel’s multi-layered air defence system perform against Iranian strikes?
As claimed by Israel, the performance has been outstanding by any historical standard — the combined system achieved interception rates of approximately 80–95% across successive Iranian barrages. The Arrow system engaged ballistic missiles at high altitudes, David’s Sling handled medium-range threats, including MRBMs, at the edge of its design envelope, and the Iron Dome addressed shorter-range rockets and drones. Both David’s Sling and Arrow exceeded their design parameters in operational performance. Some ballistic missiles and drones penetrated — causing fatalities, including in Beit Shemesh — but damage and casualties were dramatically lower than the volume of attacks would suggest. The critical vulnerability exposed is not interception technology but the depth of the interceptor stockpile: Iran’s ambition to grow its ballistic missile inventory from approximately 2,000 to 10,000 poses a potential saturation threat that no allied interceptor stockpile can sustainably address without directed-energy alternatives.
How did the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems perform, and what role did US THAAD and Patriot play?
All three Israeli systems performed well against the threat categories they were designed for, collectively achieving approximately 95% interception rates under sustained multi-wave attack. David’s Sling and Arrow both operated at or beyond their design envelopes against Iranian MRBMs. US THAAD and Patriot systems provided essential additional intercept depth; THAAD alone is reported to have expended approximately 25% of its available stockpile in the 2025 phase, continuing heavy use in 2026. Without US augmentation, Israeli interceptor inventories would have been depleted far more rapidly.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
The answers are collated from open sources. Information warfare and propaganda are generally active, as in any other war. Bias in the answers cannot be ruled out.
ORIGINS & CAUSES
What were the root causes of the Iran-Israel conflict, and how did the US get drawn in?
The conflict’s deepest roots go back to a single transformative moment: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. The new regime did not merely dislike Israel — it wrote hostility toward it into its founding ideology, framing Israel as the “Little Satan” and an instrument of American imperialism in the region. What followed over the next four decades was a methodical Iranian effort to turn that ideological enmity into strategic reality: a nuclear programme advancing toward weapons capability, a large and growing ballistic missile arsenal, and the “Axis of Resistance” — a network of proxy forces positioned to threaten Israel from multiple directions simultaneously. For Israel, this combination eventually crossed the threshold from threat to existential danger.
The United States did not enter this conflict in a single decisive moment. Still, it drew in gradually — first as Israel’s primary partner in air defence, then as the guarantor of global non-proliferation norms that Iran was visibly eroding, and finally as a direct combatant when the Trump administration judged that Iran’s military weakening after the 2025 campaign had opened a window for military action.
How did the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack reshape the broader confrontation?
October 7 set off a chain of events whose full strategic consequences Tehran almost certainly did not anticipate. The immediate result was the Gaza war — but what mattered more in the longer run was what Israel did in the wars that followed. Through 2024, Israel systematically degraded Hamas. More consequentially, between September and November 2024, it decapitated Hezbollah’s entire senior leadership in Lebanon — a blow that reverberated far beyond Lebanon itself. With Hezbollah broken, the Assad regime in Syria lost a critical pillar of support and collapsed in December 2024. By early 2025, the proxy buffer Iran had spent three decades carefully constructing — the forward deterrence that was supposed to keep any direct conflict away from Iranian territory — had been stripped away, component by component. Iran found itself exposed, facing Israel and the United States without the defensive depth its strategy had always assumed. October 7 was, in retrospect, proved to be a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions for Tehran.
How did Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” strategy contribute to the escalation?
The Axis of Resistance was Iran’s answer to a fundamental strategic problem: how does a state threaten a powerful adversary without inviting direct retaliation on its own territory? The answer was proxy warfare — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias scattered across Iraq, each providing Iran with deniable reach and the ability to keep Israel under constant pressure from multiple fronts. After October 7, these forces launched coordinated barrages designed to overwhelm Israeli responses and demonstrate the axis’s power. Instead, they invited precisely the attrition campaign Israel had been preparing for — and one by one, the pillars of the network were destroyed. By the time direct Iran-Israel exchanges began in 2025, the axis had been reduced to survival mode: capable of rhetorical solidarity and occasional harassment strikes, but unable to mount the kind of coordinated strategic response that might have deterred Israeli action. Iran’s forward deterrence had been hollowed out. It was left to face its most powerful adversaries essentially alone.
PRIMARY GOALS & REGIME CHANGE
What are the primary goals of the US and Israeli operation?
Operation Epic Fury (USA) / Roaring Lion (Israel), launched on 28 February 2026, was built around four core US military objectives: dismantling Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and the industrial infrastructure that produces it; annihilating Iran’s navy and closing off its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz; permanently denying Iran a nuclear weapons capability; and degrading the IRGC command structure along with the proxy networks it funds and directs. Israel’s stated ambitions went further. Netanyahu framed the campaign not merely as the neutralisation of specific military capabilities but as the elimination of the “existential threat” posed by the Ayatollah regime — working down through Iran’s entire defence industrial chain, from the large IRGC-linked missile assembly plants to the smaller component suppliers that feed them. Trump, in his characteristic register, publicly framed the operation as delivering “freedom for the people of Iran” and ending the activities of the “number one state sponsor of terror.”
Is “regime change” an official objective?
Not in so many words. Pentagon briefings have been careful to frame the campaign in terms of discrete military objectives — missiles, the navy, nuclear sites, proxy networks — rather than the fate of the Iranian government. But the gap between the stated military objectives and the unstated political ones is not hard to read. Trump and senior officials have spoken of toppling the clerical regime and called on Iranians to “seize their destiny.” The deliberate targeting and assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei on the opening night of operations is not the kind of act a government undertakes when its goals are purely military. Analysts have consistently treated it as a calculated step toward regime collapse. Israel, by most serious assessments, holds regime change as a strategic objective — an expansion of the goals it set in the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. The real endgame, as analysts have described it, is what they call “strategic disarmament”: the permanent elimination of Iran’s ability to project power through missiles, nuclear latency, and proxy networks. Whether the regime itself survives that process in some diminished form or collapses entirely appears to be a secondary concern.
IRANIAN LEADERSHIP POST-KHAMENEI
Who is leading Iran following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei?
Ali Khamenei was killed on 28 February 2026 in the opening strikes of Operation Epic Fury — the first sitting Supreme Leader to be assassinated in the history of the Islamic Republic. The immediate aftermath saw an interim three-person leadership council assume power: President Masoud Pezeshkian, Guardian Council member Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, and Judiciary head Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i. The Assembly of Experts convened from 3 to 8 March and on 9 March unanimously elected Mojtaba Khamenei — the slain leader’s son — as his successor. He is 56 years old, deeply embedded in the IRGC, and regarded by those who know the Iranian system as a hardliner in his father’s mould, with no apparent inclination toward the kind of accommodation with the West that a less ideologically committed successor might have offered. The IRGC, meanwhile, holds de facto dominant power over security and decision-making in the vacuum the assassination created. Both Trump and Israel have already declared the appointment unacceptable. Israel has gone further — it has described Mojtaba Khamenei as a potential future target.
GLOBAL ENERGY MARKETS
How will the war affect global energy markets?
The short answer is: badly, and possibly for a long time. Analysts have described the energy disruption as the worst shock to global markets since the 1970s oil crisis. The immediate trigger was Iran’s partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow waterway through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supplies and a significant share of LNG shipments pass every day. Within days of the closure, Brent crude surged from around $70 to over $110 per barrel, crossing $100 on 8 March 2026 for the first time in four years. European natural gas prices nearly doubled. Asian LNG costs spiked sharply. Tanker rates across the board soared as shipping companies rerouted or halted transits. Israeli strikes on Iran’s South Pars gas field and IRGC threats against Gulf oil infrastructure added a further layer of anxiety to already strained markets. The vulnerability is not evenly distributed. Around 80% of Asia’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Countries like Vietnam, Pakistan, and Indonesia hold emergency oil reserves estimated at less than 20 days — a dangerously thin buffer if the closure is prolonged. The International Energy Agency responded by releasing 400 million barrels from strategic reserves worldwide, a significant intervention that nonetheless covers only approximately four days of normal global demand.
RUSSIA AND CHINA
8. What are Russia’s and China’s positions?
Both countries have condemned the strikes in strong diplomatic language while doing very little that would concretely change the situation on the ground — a posture that has revealed, more clearly than any diplomatic formulation, how conditional their partnerships with Iran actually are.
Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov called the strikes “a deliberate, premeditated, and unprovoked act of armed aggression.” Putin expressed personal condolences over Khamenei’s death and called for an immediate ceasefire and return to diplomacy. Behind this public stance, however, Moscow has offered Tehran no direct military assistance. The reason is straightforward: Russia’s military is fully committed to Ukraine, and it has no interest in a confrontation with the United States over Iran. Russia’s bilateral strategic partnership treaty with Iran pointedly lacks a mutual-defence clause — a detail that matters enormously now. What Russia has reportedly done, behind the scenes, is share sensitive intelligence with Iran, including the precise locations of US warships and aircraft in the region — an allegation Putin publicly denied when Trump confronted him with it. Russia is also, it should be noted, a beneficiary of the conflict: elevated oil prices driven by Strait of Hormuz disruption directly ease the financial pressure of Western sanctions on Moscow.
China’s public position has been one of unambiguous condemnation. Beijing called the killing of Khamenei “a grave violation of Iran’s sovereignty” that “tramples on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter” and demanded an immediate halt to military operations. In practice, China’s support for Iran has been limited to diplomatic messaging, the supply of missile spare parts, and reported discussions on anti-ship missile systems — nothing that approaches direct military involvement. China abstained from a UN Security Council resolution condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf states, a studied ambiguity that reflects its desire to maintain working relationships with Gulf energy exporters even while criticising the US-Israeli campaign. Beijing’s longer game appears to be positioning itself as the indispensable post-conflict mediator and regional stabiliser. This power was not a party to the destruction and can therefore broker what comes after.
IMPACT ON REGIONAL ALLIES
9. What has been the impact on regional allies and the balance of power?
Iran’s decision to widen its retaliation beyond Israel has produced a strategic result it almost certainly did not intend. By striking across nine countries — hitting US military installations and civilian infrastructure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE — Iran exposed Gulf states to direct attack at a scale they had not previously experienced. The effect has been paradoxical: governments that had carefully maintained public neutrality or quiet distance from the conflict have been pushed, covertly but unmistakably, toward the US-Israeli security umbrella. Intelligence-sharing with Israel is deepening. Security cooperation is expanding. Israeli defence exports to Gulf countries are growing. All of this is happening beneath the surface of public statements that continue to call for restraint and de-escalation. Iran’s proxy network, meanwhile, has been largely absent from the 2026 fighting — weakened by prior Israeli degradation, struggling to reconstitute, and capable of offering little more than solidarity gestures. The cumulative effect has been a significant and durable shift in the regional balance of power: Iran militarily diminished, its forward deterrence dismantled, and its neighbours moving — quietly but unmistakably — in the opposite direction.
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Electronic warfare (EW) encompasses all strategies and technologies used to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, including radio waves, microwaves, infrared, visible light, ultraviolet light and X-rays. The spectrum is an integral part of various military operations and serves as the backbone for communication, navigation and targeting.
Contemporary combat isn’t just about deploying and using weapons; it is also about disrupting communications, radars, and navigation systems. EW works quietly in the background, manipulating the invisible waves that are essential to modern warfare. It represents the clash of invisible forces that can determine the outcome of conflicts.
EW tactics have evolved from niche techniques to core elements of military strategy. Their significance has increased alongside technological advancements and the growing availability of affordable tools, making engagement in spectrum warfare more feasible. EW has rapidly emerged as a crucial yet often underestimated element of contemporary warfare. This shift has led militaries to rethink their electronic strategies.
Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare aims to deny the enemy the use of the Electronic spectrum, while ensuring that friendly forces can operate freely within it. EW includes proactive actions, such as jamming, deceiving, and electromagnetic attacks. It also includes protective measures, such as electronic shielding and countermeasures. EW can be carried out from the air, land, sea, or space, using both manned and unmanned systems. EW is built on three main pillars.
Electronic Attack (EA – Electronic Attack) or Electronic Counter Measures (ECM – Electronic Counter Measures). Electronic attack techniques seek to disrupt, deceive, or destroy the enemy’s electronic systems. For instance, high-power microwave systems can render electronics inoperable from a distance, effectively disabling drones or missiles. Electronic Jamming is done by emitting radio frequency signals to saturate enemy receivers and hinder or prevent their ability to receive or transmit information. Spoofing is sending false signals to the enemy to confuse or deceive their electronic systems.
Electronic Protection (EP – Electronic Protection) or Electronic Counter Measures (ECCM – Electronic Counter Measures). EP/ECCM is actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, equipment or weapon systems from any effect of own or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum. EP utilises techniques like encryption, frequency hopping, or anti-jamming technologies. Modern EP utilises adaptive algorithms that automatically adjust frequencies to minimise interference.
Electronic Support (ES) or Electronic Support Measures (ESM). ESM is Actions taken to search for, intercept, identify and locate sources of intentional or unintentional electromagnetic energy. This pillar often feeds into broader intelligence operations, enabling predictive strikes. The primary technique is Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), a form of information gathering that involves intercepting signals.
Terrestrial and airborne EW. EW capabilities are traditionally categorised into two distinct categories: terrestrial and airborne. Each has its respective advantages and disadvantages, making it imperative for militaries to use both. Ground EW capabilities were traditionally used to intercept and jam enemy radio and radar signals. Terrestrial EW sensors and jammers have their limitations. Variance in the terrain in which they operate hinders their effects. Airborne EW is primarily employed to intercept, decrypt, and disrupt communications, radars, and other command and control (C2) systems over huge areas. However, these capabilities are limited by aircraft endurance. Modern-day military operations also rely on satellite-based EW capabilities, including for broad area surveillance and early-warning, communications, and C2.
Effects. On a tactical level, EW can degrade the enemy’s situational awareness by disrupting their communications. Deception techniques, such as inserting false data into sensors or communications systems, can mislead enemy forces. Attacks against airborne, ground-based, and space-based enemy sensors can blind air defences, delay decision cycles, creating windows for kinetic strikes. The integration of AI has made these operations quicker and more accurate, affecting the decision-making cycle.
EW in Recent Conflicts
Strategic Doctrines of Major Powers. EW doctrines adopted by global powers vary due to their differing goals and priorities. NATO focuses on integrated and interoperable EW systems due to its philosophy of collective security. Chinese doctrine advocates achieving information dominance by leveraging EW in a networked environment. Russia employs an EW strategy of strategic flexibility by integrating EW with hybrid warfare. These divergent methods used by the global powers highlight EW’s role as a force multiplier tailored to their respective geopolitical contexts.
Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict highlighted the critical role of EW in modern warfare. Azerbaijan tried to overwhelm the Armenian defences with precision strikes using the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. Armenia countered them with the Russian Polye-21 EW systems. These systems disrupted the Azerbaijani drone signals and command and control (C2) for several days. However, drone swarms ultimately were able to saturate the defences. The conflict exposed the EW’s vulnerability to massed aerial attacks and highlighted the need for integrated EW counter-drone systems.
Syrian Civil War. Syria has been pronounced as the “most aggressive EW environment on Earth.” Russian forces jammed the U.S. and NATO communications, disrupting their operations. In 2020, Turkey’s Koral EW system neutralised Syrian air defences, blinding their radars and enabling drone incursions. Pro-government “electronic armies” employed cyber-EW hybrids to target opposition networks. The conflict highlighted EW’s dual-use in hybrid warfare.
Russia-Ukraine War. The Russia-Ukraine War represents EW’s maturation in peer-level conflict. Russia positioned extensive EW systems, including jammers and aerial decoys, to disrupt Ukrainian and NATO surveillance radars. Ukraine captured a few of these assets for allied analysis and development of appropriate countermeasures. Reportedly, Russian EW systems have caused significant Ukrainian drone losses, primarily through GPS scrambling and radio-control link jamming. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s targeting of Russian EW assets has been a priority to enable counteroffensives. Both sides have been adapting dynamically.
These wars demonstrate EW’s potential to break the asymmetry, where superior Electronic spectrum control increases the effectiveness of kinetic strikes. Future forces must prioritise resilient, AI-augmented EW systems to dominate this invisible battlefield.
Future Trajectory
Trends. Three trends have amplified EW’s importance. First, systems (military and civilian) are far more networked. Precision-guided munitions, networked sensors, and satellite-enabled navigation make modern systems efficient but also vulnerable. Second, the commercial space and telecom sectors have proliferated capabilities, including small satellites and broadband networks, creating numerous new targets and vectors for disruption. Third, inexpensive technologies (software-defined radios, low-cost drones, and portable jammers) lower the cost of mounting effective EW attacks, allowing smaller actors to impose outsized effects.
AI and Automation. AI-driven EW systems can rapidly detect, analyse, and jam signals, reducing response times. Machine learning is also used to predict and counter enemy EW tactics. The AI integration is propelling the EW market growth amid geopolitical tensions.
Miniaturisation. Smaller, less expensive EW systems, such as those on drones, enable even non-state actors to disrupt advanced militaries.
Cyber-EW Convergence. EW increasingly overlaps with cyber warfare, targeting networked systems. For example, hacking into radar systems can complement traditional jamming.
Space as a Battleground. Satellites, critical for communication and navigation, are vulnerable to EW attacks like signal jamming or spoofing. China and Russia have demonstrated anti-satellite EW capabilities.
Resilience Needs. Militaries are investing in spectrum-agile systems, low-probability-of-intercept communications, and redundant networks to counter EW threats. Trends include dual-use technologies and cybersecurity enhancements.
Future Outlook. Military forces will face a myriad of challenges in the area of electronic warfare as the underlying technologies continue to advance quickly. Emerging challenges, such as spectrum congestion, the threat of cyber intrusions, and the development of countermeasures, will introduce new challenges. Advances in quantum, photonic, and space-based technologies will drive the growth of EW. Quantum computing will enable precise navigation without reliance on GPS, while implementations of post-quantum cryptography will secure communications against future threats. By 2030, we anticipate that quantum technology will disrupt EW with unbreakable encryption and more realistic battlefield simulations. We will see notable effects of AI, machine learning, offensive cyber capabilities, and directed energy weapons on the EW systems.
Conclusion
Emerging technologies are really shaping the development of EW strategies. The impact of electromagnetic denial or deception is expected to grow stronger as battlefield systems become increasingly automated and equipped with advanced sensors. Militaries need to enhance their resilience and adaptability in the realm of electronic warfare. Investing in AI, quantum technologies, and integrating across different domains—like combining EW with cyber and kinetic operations—will be key to success in the future. Training and doctrines will also need to evolve, making the invisible just as important as the visible. Moving forward, it will take technical solutions, creative operational ideas, and teamwork across military, industry, and civil sectors to stay effective and safe.
Recent conflicts have underscored the importance of investing in electronic warfare (EW) and spectrum management strategies, which are just as vital as traditional firepower in achieving battlefield success. As new technologies like quantum computing and AI become more common in warfare, embracing innovative EW techniques has become more important than ever, helping us stay ahead and be prepared.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
John R. Hoehn, Defence Primer: Electronic Warfare, Congressional Research Service, 2022.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, When Facing Electronic Warfare in Ukraine, Small Drones Quantity Is a Quality, Breaking Defence, 2023.
Russia’s jamming of US-supplied rocket systems complicates the war effort in Ukraine, Alex Marquardt, Natasha Bertrand, and Zachary Cohen, Ukraine, CNN, May 6, 2023.
Bennett, A. The Role of Electronic Warfare in Modern Military Operations, Military Review, 2021.
Drew, K. Adapting to the Invisible Battlefield: The Evolution of Electronic Warfare, Journal of Military Strategy, 2020.
Friedman, N, The Chessboard of Electronic warfare: Strategies and Capabilities. U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2022.
Burgener, M, Electronic Warfare in the Age of Drones: Nagorno-Karabakh in Retrospect. The International Journal of Drone Policy, 2021.
Gottfried, G. The Electronic Battlefield of the Syrian Civil War: A new wave of War? Middle East Journal of International Affairs, 2020.
Hollis, A., The Resurgence of Electronic Warfare in the Modern Conflict. Military Review, (2021).
Johnson, L, The Development of Electronic Warfare Strategy in modern conflicts. Armed Forces & Society, 2023.
Shari, S, Turning the Tide: The Role of Electronic Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War. Eurasian Security Studies, 2023.
