ROCKING THE BOAT DURING THE STORM: AD COMMAND

 

Year 2020 has been very eventful for the entire world. It started with the pandemic spreading and creating a turmoil worldwide. While the world was struggling to deal with the calamity and the associated economic repercussions, China created a global situation with its aggressive behaviour following its policy of expansionism and opportunism. This is resulting in emergence of new world order, new alliances, and changes in economic and diplomatic dealings.

Closer at home the country is dealing with multiple fronts. Besides the spread of pandemic and economic woes it has to deal with aggressive behaviour of two hostile neighbours. Situation at the borders is tense and could go in any direction.

In this prevailing scenario changes are taking place in the organisational structure of defence forces. The year started with formation of the post of CDS and Department of Military Affairs. A time bound plan has been enunciated for formation of theatre commands with the aim to increase jointness amongst the three services. It was announced that formation of AD command would be the first step towards this direction. Some reports have also appeared in the media stating that it is likely to be declared on the AF day on 08 Oct.

Following questions arise about this process:-

  • Is it really required?
  • What benefits will accrue out of it?
  • Do the benefits if any outweigh the cost/effort?
  • Is the time right?
  • Has it been considered, deliberated and discussed adequately?

These questions must be under consideration before the final decision is taken. My personal opinion on these issues is as follows:-

  • Change should not be for the sake of change. One should not fix something which is not broken.
  •  AD is much more than umbrella provided by Surface to air weapons.
  • In the last four decades the AD capability has increased manifold. From point defence it has become fully networked, covering the entire land mass (including island territories) following the strategy of Active Defence.
  • For Active Defence strategy to work the AD operations have to be enmeshed with overall air plans. AD as a separate function cannot be isolated from Air warfare.
  • Multi role, swing role and now Omni role platforms can achieve much more – even in same mission. Separating them as role wise platform would be gross underutilisation of their capability.
  • Strategic assets like AWACS and AEW&C are limited in number and can perform additional tasks besides those related to AD.
  • Organisational structures and procedures do exist for integration of all AD sensors / weapons owned by the services, paramilitary and even civil organisations. With networking and automation the process would become easier.
  • Gains if any that will accrue out of such a change will not outweigh the cost and effort. The issue needs to be deliberated at length and in depth, considering all the repercussions in the short and long run.
  • Last and most important is that time is not right for implementing and making changes right now.  These changes should not be made in a hurry. Even when decided the implementation should be in a phased manner.

There are areas which need to be addressed on higher priority for better integration. In my personal opinion these would be:-

  • All the existing AD assets (sensors and weapons) need to be integrated with the AD network.
  • Requirement of AD assets of various stake holders needs to be reviewed and rationalised.
  •  In the priority list further enhancement of operational capability at our island territories (both on the eastern and western sea board) would be on the top priority.
  •  Capability enhancement and integrated approach in the cyber and space domain would be higher in the priority list.
  • Integration of functions like training, logistics, maintenance & repair, communications and network centricity etc. could be pursued at a faster pace.

Theatre commands and maybe AD command could be thought of in the long run provided the situation and circumstances change i.e. economically we are stable and can afford adequate resources and the security scenario is calm enough to implement changes.

Bottom line being do not rock the boat when in a storm. Even when you rock it do it after in depth analysis and in a gradual manner.

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30 Replies to “ROCKING THE BOAT DURING THE STORM: AD COMMAND”

  1. Makes sense. The Services need to overcome turf issues and work towards integrating all assets. Makes Command and Control easier and curbs wastage of effort.

  2. Truly candid and to the point. Maybe you would be in a better position to comment whether we (IAF) had acquiesced to this proposal on the premise that the C in C of the AD Command would always be an Air Force officer. If at all this was done for fear of losing out on the command structure of other theatre commands then maybe some introspection would be required.

  3. I agree that decisions with far reaching consequences must be taken after wide consultations and deliberations. National good with best integration of all resources should be the desired outcome and shouldn’t degenerate to turf warfare. A disclaimer here – I am not a AD expert being from the armoured corps. This article has provided me the right perspective to have better comprehension.

  4. A well analysed article.
    I agree that it is not an opportune time to introduce organisational changes. AD Command and the Theatre Commands cannot & must not be established as a knee jerk reaction to similar organisations in our neighbourhood. As the Air Marshal says, DO NOT ROCK THE BOAT IN A STORM, lest it topples!

  5. Spot on analysis. It is prudent to consider all factors more importantly ‘what has necessitated this change’. As very rightly brought out by AM Khosla, do not rock the boat in the middle of a storm.

  6. Point well driven. In complete agreement, except as under…

    Should we not refrain from using the term “Theatre Command”? In the Indian context, we should consider, *if at all* , only “Joint Commands”.

    The prime reason for retaining the IAF as an independent Service stems from two interlinked reasons, the first is economy. As a nation, we have been unable to equip the IAF to a minimum desirable level, even for the northern enemy alone. ‘Theatres’ will need manifold increase in capital outlay.
    Secondly, and this is relevant with the present day force levels, is the need to have uniformity of control over all IAF assets to enable exercising the most crucial Principle of War for any Air Force anywhere : Flexibility.

    …Just my tuppence

  7. Timely blog ‘Not to rock the Boat during a Storm’. Though the reasons stated for this are in brief, they are very relevant, especially in decisions of this nature. There is a need to pause and move towards this change in a very well thought out and incremental manner.

  8. Anil you hit the nail on the head. Is there a need to change and if so is this the right time. It is always a pleasure to read your articles and listen to your opinion on various issues being discussed on electronic media.

  9. Agree with you. The formation of an AD Command needs to be deliberated at length, before it is even considered for implementation, if at all! The basics of flexibility & indivisibility of airpower will be poorly served by having a dedicated AD Command, with the present state of our air assets; our geo-political troubles; our economy; and the state of our defence-industrial complex. Yes, rocking the boat is NOT wise, more so during a storm.

  10. Too young to comment on but as a defense aspirant & college student got opportunity to read wonderful views. You’ve rightly put up the points sir.

  11. Agreed in toto. This idea of an AD Command is going the rounds for sometime. It appears to more of a turf war issue , and now with the creation of the CDS, expand the forces to fit the image/ post maybe ! Cost – benefit analysis in this proposal is grossly negative. Priority is to raise more number of mountain divisions, more aircraft carriers and atomic submarines, and raise the full complement of authorised numbers of Indian Airforce squadrons.

  12. Well analysed. While there is a need to integrate resources towards a common goal; same needs to be achieved by better understanding between the services , of other’s operational requirement.

    There needs to be a cross exchange of officers to understand other force’s point of view. In my service experience I found poor understanding and response of services at higher command levels. They often operated from a position of mistrust. Examples galore.

    Field formations were more responsive while command and force headquarters were less cooperative. Field commanders are not sure if the other service will pull is weight in an operational emergency, in the required time frame, where every action is cleared at command or force HQ level. These are often far removed from the scene of action for a fair evaluation of the other’s emergent needs.

    Integration is needed at all levels. Officers need to be serve with other services at appropriate levels. Some of the Army officers, for example, may be given in opportunity to fly in IAF operational machines for a first hand view of the capability and limitations while IAF officers may serve with army field formations.

    Once that trust and understanding is built the requirement of theatre command will be a non issue. Integration of capability for better utilisation of previous resources will serve the purpose.

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