Category: Weapons

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700: INDIA EYES AIR-LAUNCHED LORA MISSILE: TO ENHANCE LONG-RANGE PRECISION CAPABILITY

 

My article published on “The EurasianTimes” website on 10 Jul 25

 

Recent news reports suggest that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is considering the acquisition of the Israeli Air-Launched Long-Range Artillery (LORA) missile. The interest in AIR LORA, reported in early July 2025, follows the IAF’s successful deployment of the Rampage missile during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, which underscored the need for advanced stand-off weapons capable of penetrating sophisticated enemy air defences.

Designed by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Air LORA, which can strike targets up to 400–430 kilometers away, would enable Indian combat aircraft to launch high-impact strikes from well beyond the range of most enemy air defence systems. This capability is crucial for maintaining safety while degrading enemy targets within hostile territory.

 

The AIR LORA Missile: Capabilities and Specifications

Air LORA is not just a rehashed missile placed under a jet’s wing. It represents a marriage of ballistic missile technology and air-launched precision warfare. It is a quasi-ballistic missile that follows a depressed trajectory compared to traditional ballistic missiles. This makes it harder to intercept and allows for greater flexibility in targeting. One of its most attractive features is its fire-and-forget capability, which enables a pilot to disengage immediately after launch. Additionally, the missile can receive mid-course updates, allowing operators to redirect it mid-flight, a significant advantage in dynamic combat situations.

The AIR LORA, a derivative of the ground-launched Long-Range Artillery (LORA) missile, is a supersonic air-launched ballistic missile designed to deliver precision strikes against high-value targets at extended ranges. Its Key features include:-

      • Range: 400–430 kilometers.
      • Speed: Supersonic, travelling at approximately Mach 5.
      • Accuracy: Circular Error Probable (CEP) of less than 10 meters.
      • Warheads: Both blast-fragmentation and deep-penetration types, with a total weight of up to 570 kilograms.
      • Weight and Dimensions: 1,600 kg total missile weight; 5.2 meters in length.

The missile’s navigation system relies on a combination of GPS and Inertial Navigation System (INS), augmented by anti-jamming technology to ensure accuracy even in contested environments. Unlike some precision-guided munitions that require active seekers, AIR LORA’s seeker-less design reduces complexity and cost while maintaining a high degree of accuracy. It can be equipped with either blast fragmentation or deep-penetration warheads, making it versatile for targeting a range of assets, from airbases and command centers to naval vessels and hardened bunkers.

 

Analytical Perspective

Deep-Strike Capability. With the LORA missile integrated into its air combat platforms, India could reach deep into enemy territory without entering contested airspace. Targets that would traditionally require multi-aircraft sorties or high-risk approaches could be neutralised with a single long-range missile fired from safe standoff distances. This capability is particularly significant given India’s border challenges. Being able to strike enemy military infrastructure from Indian airspace would drastically reduce operational risks and improve the tempo of offensive operations.

Flexibility. The missile is compatible with several IAF platforms. This cross-platform flexibility means the IAF could potentially integrate the system into multiple platforms, ensuring distributed lethality and redundancy across its fleet. A single Su-30 MKI can carry up to four AIR LORA missiles, enabling a single sortie to deliver devastating strikes against multiple targets.

Complementing India’s Missile Arsenal. India already possesses an array of precision-guided long-range strike systems, such as BrahMos (Supersonic cruise missile with 300–500 km range), SCALP-EG (Used with Rafale, range of ~500 km), Pralay (Short-range ballistic missile (~500 km), and Rampage (Air-to-ground missile used successfully in recent operations). Air LORA would not replace these systems but augment them, filling a critical capability gap, specifically in air-launched ballistic precision strikes.

Industrial Impact. One of the defining features of this potential procurement is the Make in India element. IAI and Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2023 for joint production and technology transfer related to LORA and other defence systems. This partnership not only facilitates technology transfer but also positions India as a potential exporter of advanced missile systems in the future. If the Air LORA deal moves forward, it could be manufactured in India under license, aligning with the country’s goals of defence indigenisation and strategic autonomy. Local production of AIR LORA could reduce costs, enhance supply chain resilience, and create jobs, further boosting India’s defence manufacturing ecosystem.

Cost Effectiveness. The estimated unit cost of Air LORA ranges from $1 1million to $5 million, depending on the configuration and payload. While not inexpensive, it is competitively priced compared to similar long-range missile systems, particularly when factoring in its precision and survivability.

Challenges and Concerns. Air LORA marks a significant advancement in capability, but it faces certain operational and logistical hurdles. Integrating and testing it on Indian platforms will demand extensive flight trials. Its resistance to electronic warfare and survivability in contested environments still need thorough evaluation. Additionally, its cost-effectiveness compared to other indigenous systems, such as BrahMos or the developing Long-Range Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LRLACM), warrants careful consideration. Despite these challenges, Air LORA’s operational advantages appear to outweigh the potential risks.

 

Conclusion

With its range, speed, and accuracy, Air LORA is not just another missile; it is a tool for deterrence, rapid escalation dominance, and strategic messaging. India is exploring the LORA (Long-Range Artillery) missile to complement its BrahMos missile, thereby enhancing its strategic and tactical capabilities. Unlike BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile with a low-altitude, high-speed trajectory, LORA is a quasi-ballistic missile with a lofted trajectory, offering greater flexibility in targeting and evading defences. LORA’s lower cost makes it an economical option for mass deployment. It has potential for export under India’s “Make in India” initiative, thereby fostering domestic production and enhancing global market competitiveness. Additionally, LORA’s larger payload capacity enables it to deliver heavier warheads, increasing its destructive power. Integrating LORA into Indian Air Force jets diversifies the missile arsenal, providing a versatile, high-impact option for various combat scenarios. This strategic addition would strengthen India’s defence capabilities, ensuring a balanced mix of speed, cost-efficiency, and firepower alongside BrahMos. The potential induction of the air-launched LORA missile into India’s arsenal could significantly enhance its strategic depth and offensive precision.

 

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Despite BrahMos, India Explores LORA Missile For Its Fighters Like Su-30 MKI; Why LORA When IAF Has BrahMos?

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. “Indian Air Force Eyes Israeli Air LORA Ballistic Missile for Enhanced Strike Capabilities: Report.” Moneycontrol, 4 July 2025.
  1. “India Eyes Israeli Air LORA Missile After Rampage Strikes: Deep-Strike Capability Gets Boost.” Defence Security Asia, 4 July 2025.
  1. “IAF Plans Supersonic Firepower Upgrade: Eyes Israeli Air LORA Missile after Rampage Success.” The Times of India, 3 July 2025.
  1. “IAF Eyes Supersonic LORA Missiles from Israel to Hit High-Value Targets Deep Inside Enemy Territory.” The Economic Times, 5 July 2025.
  1. “What Are Game-Changer Air LORA Missiles? Report Claims Indian Air Force Planning to Procure These from Israel.” The Week, 3 July 2025.
  1. Indian Defence Review. (2025). Regional Security Dynamics and India’s Missile Capabilities.
  1. Israel Aerospace Industries. (2025). LORA missile system: Technical specifications.
  1. Swarajya Magazine. (2025, July). IAF wants Israel’s AIR LORA missile after the Rampage missile’s success in Operation Sindoor against Pakistan.
  1. The Print (2025, July). Indo-Israeli defence ties bolstered by talks on the AIR LORA missile deal.
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697: OPERATION SPIDER’S WEB – UKRAINE’S AUDACIOUS DRONE STRIKE: LESSONS FOR INDIA

 

My article was published in the Jul 25 issue of

the News Analytics Magazine 

 

 

On June 1, 2025, Ukraine executed one of the most daring and innovative military operations of the Russo-Ukrainian War, codenamed Operation Spider’s Web. This covert drone assault targeted Russia’s strategic long-range aviation assets, striking five air bases deep within Russian territory. The operation, meticulously planned by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), showcased a masterful blend of low-cost technology, human ingenuity, and strategic deception. By leveraging inexpensive drones smuggled into Russia and launched from disguised trucks, Ukraine inflicted billions of dollars in damage, destroyed or damaged a significant portion of Russia’s bomber fleet, and shattered the notion that rear military bases are safe havens. This article explores the operation’s nuances, implications for modern warfare, and lessons for India.

The Genesis. The SBU supposedly began planning the operation in late 2023. The goal was clear: degrade Russia’s ability to conduct long-range missile strikes by targeting its irreplaceable strategic bombers. The operation’s “Spider’s Web” codename reflected its intricate design and broad geographical scope, spanning five Russian oblasts across multiple time zones. The SBU’s approach combined commercially available drone technology, open-source software, and covert logistics to create a low-cost yet devastating strike capability.

 

Planning and Deception: A Modern Trojan Horse.

The operation’s success hinged on meticulous planning and deception. Ukrainian operatives smuggled 117 first-person view (FPV) drones into Russia over time. These low-cost drones were concealed in shipping containers disguised as wooden sheds and loaded onto trucks driven by unsuspecting Russian contractors. The drivers, instructed via mobile phones to park near target air bases, were unaware of the drones’ presence. This tactic, reminiscent of the mythical Trojan Horse, allowed Ukraine to position its weapons deep inside enemy territory without arousing suspicion.

The SBU established a nerve center for the operation near a regional office of Russia’s FSB intelligence service in Chelyabinsk, adding a layer of audacity to the plan. Ukrainian operators used Russia’s domestic 4G/LTE networks to pilot the drones remotely, embedding control signals within civilian data traffic to evade detection. The drones were equipped with ArduPilot, an open-source autopilot software, enabling pre-programmed flight paths and precise targeting of vulnerable aircraft components, such as fuel tanks and wings. Some reports suggest AI-assisted machine vision may have enhanced strike accuracy in the drones’ terminal phase, though this remains unconfirmed.

The targets were carefully selected: five air bases—Belaya, Dyagilevo, Ivanovo Severny, Olenya, and Ukrainka—housing Russia’s Long-Range Aviation fleet. These bases, located up to 4,300 kilometers from Ukraine, were critical to Moscow’s strategic bombing campaigns. The operation’s timing, coinciding with Russia’s Military Transport Aviation Day, was likely chosen to maximise psychological impact.

 

Execution: A Coordinated Strike across Time Zones

On June 1, 2025, Operation Spider’s Web unfolded with surgical precision. At dawn, 117 drones were launched simultaneously from their hidden truck-based platforms, targeting aircraft at the five air bases. The drones, flying in the “air littoral”—a low-altitude zone below traditional radar coverage—evaded Russia’s air defences, which were ill-equipped to counter small, low-flying threats.

The strikes were devastating. Satellite imagery and Ukrainian footage confirmed significant damage, particularly at Belaya Air Base in Eastern Siberia, where seven bombers were destroyed on the tarmac. According to Kyiv, the operation destroyed or damaged over 40 aircraft, including Tu-95s, Tu-160s, Tu-22M3s, and an A-50 airborne early-warning jet, representing roughly one-third of Russia’s long-range strike fleet and $7 billion in hardware. NATO estimates suggest 10 to 13 aircraft were destroyed, with over 40 damaged. Russian sources downplayed the losses, but independent analysts confirmed the operation’s unprecedented scale.

The attack on Belaya, 4,300 kilometres from Ukraine, marked the farthest Ukrainian strike of the war, underscoring the operation’s geographical reach. The SBU released four minutes of drone footage showing strikes on Tu-95 wings and Tu-22M3 fuselages, highlighting the precision of the attack. Russia’s Defence Ministry admitted attacks in Murmansk and Irkutsk but claimed no casualties and minimal damage, a narrative contradicted by satellite imagery and Ukrainian reports.

Operation Spider’s Web was not just a military success, but a strategic and symbolic triumph for Ukraine. The operation also had broader implications. As The New York Times noted, it marked a “defining moment in the evolution of modern warfare.” Using inexpensive drones to destroy high-value assets challenged traditional military doctrines, which assume rear bases are secure. The “air littoral” concept gained prominence as drones exploited gaps in conventional air defences. This strategy, replicable by other nations or non-state actors, could reshape how air forces protect their assets, forcing them to harden, disperse, or treat runways as front lines.

 

Indian Experience

On June 26–27, 2021, India faced its first terrorist drone attack at the Jammu Air Force Station. Two low-flying drones, likely modified quadcopters (possibly DJI Matrice 600 Pro), dropped IEDs with 1–1.5 kg of RDX, launched from Pakistan near the LoC. The first explosion damaged a building roof in the high-security technical area; the second detonated harmlessly on the ground. Two IAF personnel sustained minor injuries, with no critical assets harmed and attributed to Lashkar-e-Taiba, with possible Jaish-e-Mohammad and ISI involvement. This incident highlighted the potential threat of low-cost, high-impact drone attacks and prompted India to bolster its counter-drone systems, including DRDO’s laser technology and jammers.

The attacks exposed vulnerabilities to small, low-altitude drones, previously used only for smuggling. It mirrored global trends seen in ISIS and Hamas tactics. The incident prompted India to bolster counter-drone systems, including DRDO’s laser technology and jammers. This attack marked a strategic shift, highlighting drones’ low-cost, high-impact potential.

 

Lessons from Operation Spider’s Web for India

Ukraine’s method of smuggling kamikaze drones into Russia to strike distant targets reveals new possibilities for attacks using smuggled weapons, even outside of wartime. Consider the potential for sabotaging critical infrastructure during peacetime or assassinating key leaders and commanders with micro kamikaze drones during public events, travel, or other vulnerabilities. This threat demands robust defence systems, tailored to its unique nature and scale. Operation Spider’s Web provides vital insights for India to modernise its military strategy, advance technological innovation, and prepare for evolving warfare, especially amid regional security threats.

Emerging Threats. India’s porous borders with Pakistan are vulnerable to low-altitude drone attacks. Adversaries could deploy similar tactics to target air bases, forward posts, or critical infrastructure like dams, refineries, or cities, using inexpensive drones operated by terrorist groups or state actors.

Defence Strategies. To counter these risks, India must implement robust defences. Install counter-drone systems at strategic installations and enhance homeland security with drone surveillance and interception in key areas. Develop rapid-response units to neutralise drone threats. Disperse aircraft and assets across multiple sites to mitigate swarm attack risks, and invest in fortified shelters, decoy systems, and rapid repair facilities.

Network Security. India’s 5G expansion offers military integration potential but risks adversary exploitation. Strengthen cybersecurity to safeguard 5G infrastructure and establish secure, encrypted military communication networks.

Adopt Cost-Effective Drones. Accelerate indigenous drone programs under Make in India, focusing on affordable, scalable systems. Expand public-private partnerships to develop FPV drones with open-source software for rapid deployment in border conflicts.

Enhance Precision and AI. Integrate AI and machine vision into drones to precisely target high-value assets like missile sites—partner with tech firms to develop AI algorithms for real-time target identification in diverse terrains.

Drive Innovation. Create innovation hubs within the Indian Armed Forces and collaborate with academia through hackathons to develop next-generation warfare tools, ensuring adaptability in modern conflicts.

 

Conclusion

Operation Spider’s Web is pivotal in military history, showcasing drone warfare’s transformative power in redefining modern conflicts. Through a sophisticated blend of deception, technology, and precision, Kyiv delivered a strike that echoed beyond Russia’s airfields, proving no target is truly secure in the drone era. This operation holds critical lessons for India. Deploy advanced counter-drone systems at strategic sites and simulate Ukraine-style drone attacks in war games. Train Special Forces for covert drone missions and boost indigenous drone production under Make in India, prioritising swarm technology and AI. Secure 5G networks for military operations and update doctrines to embed drone warfare, focusing on asymmetry, deception, and precision. Push for global regulations to curb drone use by non-state actors. These measures will strengthen India’s defence framework, ensuring a strategic advantage in 21st-century warfare.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Axe, David. “Ukraine’s Drones Just Redrew the Map of Modern Warfare.” The Daily Beast, June 5, 2025.
  1. Barnes, Julian E., and Eric Schmitt. “Ukraine’s Audacious Drone Strike Hits Russian Air Bases, Signals New Phase in War.” The New York Times, June 2, 2025.
  1. Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, and Marc Santora. “How Ukraine Pulled Off a Surprise Drone Attack 4,300 Kilometres Into Russia.” The New York Times, June 3, 2025.
  1. Hambling, David. “Operation Spider’s Web: Ukraine’s Drone Swarm Redefines Asymmetric Warfare.” Forbes, June 4, 2025.
  1. Kofman, Michael, and Rob Lee. “Ukraine’s Drone Strike on Russian Airfields: Strategic Implications.” War on the Rocks, June 6, 2025.
  1. Lendon, Brad. “Ukraine’s Deep Drone Strike: What It Means for Russia’s Air Force.” CNN, June 3, 2025.
  1. Mitzer, Stijn, and Joost Oliemans. “Operation Spider’s Web: Counting the Cost of Ukraine’s Drone Assault.” Oryx, June 4, 2025.
  1. Rogoway, Tyler. “Ukraine’s Drone Blitz on Russian Air Bases: A New Era of Warfare.” The War Zone, June 2, 2025.
  1. Tisdall, Simon. “Ukraine’s Drone Strike Shatters Russia’s Illusion of Safety.” The Guardian, June 5, 2025.
  1. Tucker, Patrick. “Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web: A Case Study in Drone Warfare.” Defence One, June 7, 2025.
  1. Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Ukraine’s Drone Strikes and the Future of Strategic Warfare.” CSIS Briefs, June 8, 2025.
  1. Harding, Luke, and Andrew Roth. “Russia’s Air Force Reels After Ukraine’s Drone Strike.” The Financial Times, June 4, 2025.
  1. Reynolds, Nick. “The Air Littoral: How Ukraine Exploited Russia’s Blind Spot.” The Conversation, June 6, 2025.
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693: BUNKER BUSTERS: HITTING FAR AND DEEP

 

My Article was published on “The Eurasian Times” website on 02 Jul 25.

In an era where military targets are increasingly buried deep underground, the development and deployment of bunker-busting weapons have become critical to global security strategies. The United States’ GBU-57/A Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) represents cutting-edge solutions to neutralise fortified, subterranean infrastructure. The GBU-57/A saw its first combat use against Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2025. Drawing inspiration from the GBU-57 and driven by India’s regional security requirements, the DRDO has reportedly intensified efforts to develop a bunker-busting weapon based on the Agni-5 missile.

 

The GBU-57/A: America’s Bunker-Buster

The GBU-57/A MOP, developed by Boeing for the U.S. Air Force, is the largest conventional bomb in the U.S. arsenal, weighing 30,000 pounds (13,600 kg) and carrying a 5,300-pound (2,400-kg) explosive warhead. Designed to destroy deeply buried and hardened targets, such as nuclear facilities and command bunkers, the MOP can penetrate up to 60 meters (200 feet) of moderately hard material, like 5,000-psi concrete, or 130 feet of rock before detonating. Its precision is ensured by a GPS and inertial navigation system (INS), coupled with a smart fuse that optimises detonation depth for maximum destruction. The MOP is exclusively deployed by the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, with each bomber capable of carrying two bombs.

First Combat Use: Operation Midnight Hammer (June 22, 2025). The MOP’s combat debut occurred during Operation Midnight Hammer on June 22, 2025, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz. Seven B-2 bombers dropped 14 MOPs, 12 on Fordow, a uranium enrichment facility buried 80–90 meters under a mountain, and two on an underground section of Natanz, located about 20 meters below the surface. The strikes were complemented by 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from a U.S. Navy submarine, targeting surface infrastructure at Isfahan. The operation aimed to degrade Iran’s nuclear program, particularly Fordow, which was designed to withstand conventional attacks. U.S. officials, including General Dan Caine, claimed significant damage, with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noting “very significant” destruction to Fordow’s underground infrastructure. However, there are conflicting reports about the extent of damage.

Strategic Implications and Limitations. The MOP’s use against Iran underscored its role as a deterrent against adversaries with deeply buried facilities, such as North Korea and China. However, its limitations are notable. The MOP’s penetration depth is constrained by target composition. The reliance on B-2 bombers also exposes vulnerabilities to advanced air defences, and the risk of nuclear material release from struck facilities raises environmental and geopolitical concerns.

 

India’s Solution: A Missile-Based Bunker Buster

India’s DRDO is developing a bunker-busting missile based on the Agni series of surface-to-surface missiles. Unlike the nuclear-capable Agni-5, which has a range of over 5,000 km, this variant prioritises payload over distance, carrying a 7,500-kg (7.5-tonne) warhead with a reduced range of about 2,500 km. This design compensates for India’s lack of a strategic bomber, such as the B-2, by providing a cost-effective, missile-based solution.

The missile reportedly reaches hypersonic speeds (Mach 8–20), making it highly effective at evading ballistic missile defence systems. Equipped with advanced guidance systems, it achieves exceptional accuracy. Its 7,500-kg warhead, significantly larger than the GBU-57’s 2,400-kg payload, delivers potentially greater destructive power, though penetration depth varies based on warhead design and target material. The warhead can penetrate 80–100 meters of reinforced concrete or soil, targeting fortified underground structures like command centers, missile silos, and nuclear storage facilities.

 

Comparative Analysis: GBU-57/A vs. Agni-5 Variant

Delivery Mechanism. The GBU-57/A is deployed by B-2 stealth bombers, which use stealth technology to infiltrate defended airspace. However, the B-2 can carry only two Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) and remains vulnerable to advanced air defence systems. In contrast, the Agni-5 missile platform delivers its payload at hypersonic speeds, evading ballistic missile defences (BMD). With a 2,500-km range, it allows stand-off strikes, minimising exposure of manned aircraft to enemy defences.

Payload and Penetration. The GBU-57/A, weighing 30,000 pounds with a 5,300-pound explosive payload, can penetrate up to 60 meters of concrete or 130 feet of rock. However, deeper targets often require multiple strikes, as demonstrated in Operation Midnight Hammer. The Agni-5 Variant, carrying a 7,500-kg warhead, is designed to penetrate 80–100 meters, potentially outperforming the GBU-57 in depth capability. Its larger payload may increase its destructive power, although its performance has yet to be proven in combat.

Strategic Flexibility. The GBU-57/A is combat-proven but constrained by limited stockpiles, high costs, and its dependence on U.S. B-2 bombers, which restrict its use to U.S. operations or allied missions with U.S. support. Conversely, the Agni-5 Variant provides a cost-effective, independent solution. Its dual warhead options and missile-based delivery enhance versatility and resilience against regional BMD systems, offering greater strategic flexibility.

 

Analytical Perspective

Strengthened Deterrence. India’s Agni-5 missile, equipped with bunker-busting capabilities, is tailored to address regional threats. It provides a powerful conventional option to pre-emptively neutralise enemy targets. With the ability to strike deeply fortified underground sites, the Agni-5 helps India effectively counter strategic imbalances.

Controlled Escalation. These conventional deep-strike weapons offer a key advantage: they minimise escalation risks. While delivering destructive power comparable to nuclear strikes, they avoid the political, moral, and strategic consequences of nuclear weapons. This creates a new, intermediate step in the escalation ladder, providing policymakers with flexible response options during conflicts.

Strategic Impact in Modern Warfare. Deep-strike conventional weapons represent a shift in 21st-century warfare. They combine strategic-level impact with tactical precision, enabling deterrence, retaliation, and offensive strikes without the risks associated with nuclear conflict. By blurring the lines between conventional and strategic weaponry, these advancements challenge traditional arms control frameworks. Nations may now face increased pressure to enhance underground defences against non-nuclear threats, potentially sparking a new arms race focused on subterranean resilience.

 

Conclusion

The GBU-57/A MOP and India’s conventional Agni-5 variant represent the pinnacle of bunker-busting technology, designed to neutralise the growing threat of fortified underground facilities. The MOP’s combat use against Iran’s Fordow and Natanz facilities on June 22, 2025, demonstrated its power but also its limitations, as advanced bunker designs and limited stockpile size constrained its impact. India’s Agni-5 variant, with its hypersonic speed, 7,500-kg warhead, and dual configurations, offers a versatile, missile-based alternative, tailored to regional threats.

 

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3X Bigger Payload Than GBU-57, Why India’s “Bunker Buster” Missile Would Do A Better Job Than U.S. B-2 Bombers?

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. Berbera, A. (2025, June 23). US launches massive strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities with B-2 bombers and MOPs. Defence News.
  2. Boeing. (n.d.). Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). Boeing Defence, Space & Security.
  3. CNN. (2025, June 24). U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities: What we know. CNN International.
  4. Cordesman, A. H. (2025). The Strategic Implications of U.S. Bunker Buster Strikes on Iran. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  5. Defence Research and Development Organisation. (2024). Annual report 2024: Advancements in missile technology. DRDO, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
  6. Hindustan Times. (2025, July 10). DRDO’s new Agni-5 variant: A conventional bunker buster for regional deterrence. Hindustan Times.
  7. International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025, June 25). Statement by Director General Rafael Grossi on U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. IAEA.
  8. Janes. (2025). GBU-57/A Massive Ordnance Penetrator: Technical specifications and operational use. Jane’s Defence Equipment & Technology.
  9. Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance. (2024). China’s HQ-19 and regional ballistic missile defence systems. MDAA.
  10. The Times of India. (2025, March 15). Mission Divyastra: India tests Agni-5 with MIRV technology. The Times of India.
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