Anil Khosla – Page 4 – Air Marshal's Perspective

September 1, 2026

844: AIR DOMINANCE IN A DRONE AGE

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of “Life of Soldier” Magazine

Air power is entering a period of structural transformation. For decades, air superiority was largely defined by advanced fighter aircraft’s ability to defeat enemy aircraft, suppress air defences, and provide freedom of action to other elements of the joint force. The emergence of inexpensive unmanned aerial systems (UAS), autonomous technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), electronic warfare and increasingly networked sensors is challenging that model.

The transformation is not simply about drone proliferation. It is about the emergence of a different architecture for warfare in which crewed and uncrewed platforms, sensors, weapons, communications networks and decision-support systems operate as an interconnected combat ecosystem.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated the operational value of relatively inexpensive drones for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, targeting, precision attack, battle-damage assessment and battlefield communications. At the same time, the increasing use of drones in massed attacks has exposed the economic and operational limitations of traditional air-defence concepts.

For air forces, the strategic challenge is therefore two-sided. They must develop the means to exploit unmanned systems. At the same time, they have to protect their own forces and infrastructure from increasingly capable autonomous and semi-autonomous threats.

Autonomous Combat Ecosystem

The traditional air forces were organised around platforms. Fighter aircraft, bombers, airborne early-warning aircraft, tankers and transport aircraft each performed specialised missions. Their effectiveness depended heavily on their individual capabilities and the quality of the personnel operating them.

The drone age is accelerating a shift toward network-centric and distributed operations. A future combat aircraft may simultaneously function as a sensor, command node, communications relay and weapons platform. An uncrewed aircraft operating ahead of it may extend its sensor coverage. Another one may perform electronic warfare. A third may act as a decoy, while a fourth carries weapons. Ground-based radars and space-based sensors can contribute additional information to the same operational picture.

The objective is not necessarily to replace expensive crewed aircraft with drones. Rather, it is to create a force mix in which high-end platforms are supported and amplified by larger numbers of lower-cost autonomous or remotely operated systems. Such an approach could increase the number of sensors, weapons and potential targets available to a commander without proportionally increasing the number of pilots placed at risk.

Future Air Superiority Models

The future air-superiority model is likely to consist of several overlapping components rather than a single dominant capability.

The Manned-Unmanned Team. Advanced crewed aircraft will increasingly function as command-and-control nodes for uncrewed systems. Instead of sending a pilot into every high-risk environment, commanders can distribute risk among a mixture of platforms. This would allow expensive crewed aircraft to remain focused on missions requiring human judgement while autonomous systems provide additional mass.

Distributed Air Power. Future air forces will need to operate despite attacks on bases, runways and communications infrastructure. Dispersal, mobility and rapid reconstitution will therefore become increasingly important. The relevant question will not simply be whether an air force can generate sorties under ideal conditions. It will be whether it can continue generating combat power after its infrastructure has been attacked.

Persistent Sensing. Small unmanned platforms can provide persistent surveillance at relatively low cost. When integrated with ground, maritime, space and airborne sensors, they can contribute to a continuous picture of the battlespace. This creates a paradox for conventional military operations: greater visibility can improve targeting, but it also makes concealment increasingly difficult. Camouflage, deception, emissions control and mobility will therefore become more important, even as sensor technology improves.

Information and Electronic Superiority. Air superiority increasingly depends on the ability to sense, communicate and coordinate. An aircraft with excellent aerodynamic performance that cannot maintain communications or trust its sensor information may be comparatively less effective. Electronic warfare will therefore become an integral component of air combat rather than a specialist supporting function. The battle for the electromagnetic spectrum will increasingly accompany the battle for physical airspace.

Air Defence Against Swarms

Drone swarms represent one of the most difficult challenges for contemporary air defence because they combine low cost, numbers, flexibility and uncertainty. A conventional air-defence architecture may be highly effective against a limited number of sophisticated threats yet struggle economically when confronted by large numbers of inexpensive UAS. The problem is fundamentally one of cost-benefit comparison.

This makes layered defence essential. The first requirement is detection. Traditional radar must increasingly operate alongside electro-optical, infrared, acoustic and other sensing technologies. The objective is to build a multi-sensor picture that can identify small, slow-moving objects.

The second requirement is automated classification. A large raid can generate more tracks than human operators can efficiently evaluate. AI-assisted systems may therefore become essential for filtering sensor data and prioritising potential threats.

The third requirement is a response mechanism. Different threats require different responses. Expensive interceptors may be used against high-value, sophisticated targets. Low-cost defensive systems can address simpler threats.

Electronic warfare provides another layer. Other technologies, including directed-energy systems, may eventually augment the defensive options where operational conditions permit.

The key principle is that air defence against swarms cannot depend upon a single weapon. It must be an integrated system of sensors, command networks, electronic warfare and multiple classes of interceptors.

Adaptation Trends

Air forces worldwide are fundamentally redesigning how they conceive, plan, and execute air operations. Air forces are increasingly adapting their force structures around three major developments: distributed operations, manned-unmanned teaming and rapid technological adaptation.

Distributed operations seek to reduce dependence on a small number of vulnerable air bases and command nodes. A concentrated air force may possess extremely capable aircraft but still face operational paralysis if its runways, fuel infrastructure, command centres or communications nodes are disabled. Aircraft, sensors, logistics and command functions need to be dispersed across a wider geographical area. This complicates an adversary’s targeting problem and increases the force’s resilience. The concept is particularly relevant in an era of long-range precision weapons.

Manned-unmanned teaming is another trend. A future fighter may coordinate multiple uncrewed systems rather than operating alone. These platforms could undertake sensing, communications, electronic warfare, decoy and other missions while keeping human decision-makers at an appropriate level of control. This approach effectively increases the combat mass available to each crewed platform.

The third transformation is the increasing importance of software and data. Aircraft increasingly depend on digital mission systems, secure communications, electronic warfare databases and AI-enabled decision support. The ability to update these capabilities rapidly can become a strategic advantage.

This creates a different procurement philosophy. Rather than treating an aircraft as a fixed capability acquired for several decades, air forces increasingly need platforms that can accept frequent software, sensor and weapons upgrades.

Analytical Perspective

Extent of Autonomy. Autonomy is likely to be a defining feature of future air warfare, but it should not be confused with the complete removal of humans from the kill chain. The more consequential development is the creation of autonomous combat ecosystems in which machines perform increasingly complex supporting tasks while humans retain command authority over critical decisions. AI can process enormous quantities of sensor data, identify patterns, prioritise potential threats and provide recommendations to operators. Autonomous systems can maintain formations, navigate contested environments, coordinate movement and respond to changing conditions within pre-established parameters. The military advantage comes from speed. Modern battlespaces can generate more information than human operators can absorb. A system that can process multiple sensor feeds simultaneously may identify an emerging threat far faster than a human-centred process.

New Vulnerabilities. Autonomy also creates new vulnerabilities. A sophisticated autonomous system depends upon software, communications, navigation and data. These dependencies create opportunities for cyber-attack, electronic warfare and deception. An adversary may attempt to corrupt the information an autonomous system relies on rather than physically destroying the platform. The future contest will therefore involve not only physical survivability but also algorithmic and informational survivability. Military organisations will need confidence that autonomous systems can continue operating when communications are degraded, GPS or other navigation services are disrupted, and sensor information becomes incomplete or contradictory. The most resilient systems may therefore be those that can operate with degraded connectivity while retaining clear human-defined constraints and mission objectives.

The Industrial Scalability. The drone age is making industrial capacity a key part of military power. A traditional air force measures strength through the number and sophistication of aircraft in its inventory (Quantity and Quality). Future conflicts would require scalability: the ability to rapidly manufacture autonomous systems, replenish losses, update software, produce sensors, and maintain secure communications. Modular design, commercial technology, software-defined systems and rapid manufacturing could allow air forces to shorten development cycles.

The Continuing Role of the Fighter. The rise of drones should not be interpreted as the end of the fighter aircraft. High-performance crewed aircraft continue to provide capabilities that autonomous systems cannot easily replicate across every mission. Human judgement, flexibility, situational awareness and the ability to respond to unexpected circumstances remain important. The change is that the fighter may no longer operate as an isolated platform, but as part of a networked ecosystem. Integrating the fighter into a wider ecosystem would make it more valuable, not less relevant.

Concluding Thoughts

This transformation highlights several important aspects.

Mass is once again a strategic necessity; even though high-end capability matters, affordable mass can impose excessive operational and economic costs on the opponent.

Resilience is as important as performance. Networks, bases and command systems must be capable of absorbing disruption.

Software and data are becoming combat capabilities rather than merely supporting functions.

Neutralising the swarm’s ability to coordinate is more important than physically destroying every individual drone.

Air defence must evolve from a capability to merely intercept platforms to disrupting the networked operating systems.

Human-machine integration will define command and control. The objective should not be unrestricted autonomy but the intelligent allocation of tasks between humans and machines.

Bottom Line

The future of air dominance will consequently be determined less by individual platforms and more by the ability to integrate manned aircraft, autonomous systems, sensors, networks, electronic warfare and air defence into a resilient force.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References: –

Dhakate S, “Synergistic applications of autonomous UCAVs, swarm robotics and cloud computing in future air warfare”, Journal of Defence Studies, 17(4), (2023).

Khosla, A. “Wings of dominance: The future of air warfare. Air Marshal’s Perspective”. (2026, June 26).

Upadhyay, A. “Counter UAS technologies for India: A prognosis”. Journal of Defence Studies, 16(4). (2022).

Sharma, A. “Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS): Future of warfare”. Journal of Defence Studies, 16(4). (2022).

Khosla, A. “India’s tryst with combat drones: SP’s Aviation, 8 (2025).

Khosla, A. “Air power and war endurance in the Indian context”. CLAWS Journal, 16(2), 30–48. (2023).

Scharre, P. “Army of none: Autonomous weapons and the future of war”. W. W. Norton. (2018).

Ansari, H. Z. “Unmanned combat aerial vehicles: Some ethical considerations for the defence applications of AI”. Journal of Defence Studies, 16(4). (2022).

Palkar, D., & Pande, D. “Rethinking ‘air power’ for the governance of unmanned aerial vehicles in India”, Journal of Defence Studies. (2023).

RAND Corporation. “Countering small unmanned aircraft systems”. RAND Corporation. (2022).

August 29, 2026August 28, 2026

843: RUSSIA’S INNOVATION: CONVERTING AIR DEFENCE ASSETS INTO OFFENSIVE FIREPOWER

Russia is increasingly finding new ways to expand its ballistic-missile arsenal without relying entirely on purpose-built systems such as the Iskander-M. According to Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Directorate (DIU), Russia has modified up to 17 S-400 launchers to fire RM-48U missiles against ground targets.

The modified launchers have reportedly been organised into five specialised missile groups deployed in Russia’s Bryansk and Rostov regions. Their emergence highlights a broader Russian effort to turn existing air-defence hardware and missile stocks into additional offensive capabilities.

At first glance, 17 launchers may seem relatively small. But their significance lies less in the number than in what they represent: Russia is creating another layer of ballistic strike capacity by repurposing weapons and equipment originally intended for air defence.

From Interceptor to Strike Missile

The RM-48U is essentially a ground-attack adaptation of missiles from the 48N6 family associated with the S-300 and S-400 air-defence systems. Instead of intercepting aircraft or other aerial targets, these missiles can now hit ground targets.

The conversion gives Russia a way to extract additional military value from an existing inventory. Older air-defence missiles that might otherwise remain in storage, require expensive maintenance or reach the end of their service life can potentially be refurbished and adapted for a different role.

The concept itself is not entirely new. Russia has previously used S-300 and S-400 air-defence missiles in ground-attack roles. What matters about the RM-48U development is the apparent effort to institutionalise that conversion rather than rely on improvised battlefield use. Ukrainian officials have confirmed the existence of specially modified S-400 launchers intended for these missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence assesses that the RM-48U is substantially cheaper than the purpose-built 9M723 ballistic missiles used by the Iskander-M system. Russia is also reported to hold a stockpile of roughly 400 RM-48U missiles.

A Cost-Effective Advantage

The most obvious advantage is cost, which makes the RM-48U attractive for sustained missile campaigns. Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence says Russia is using RM-48U missiles partly because they are significantly cheaper than the 9M723 ballistic missiles employed by the Iskander-M system. Ukrainian intelligence estimates Russia held around 400 RM-48Us in mid-2026, while production reportedly continued at roughly 50 missiles per month, with more than 480 planned for production during 2026.

A country conducting large-scale strikes does not need to attack every target with its most expensive or scarce missile. Purpose-built ballistic missiles such as the Iskander’s 9M723 are valuable assets, and using them against every target would place greater pressure on Russia’s stockpile and production capacity.

The RM-48U provides another option. Russia can therefore use a mixed arsenal: more capable or expensive missiles for some targets while employing converted air-defence missiles for others. The result is a larger pool of weapons that can contribute to a ballistic strike campaign.

Seventeen Launchers

The figure of 17 does not mean that the number of missiles is limited to 17. A launcher can fire, reload, and fire again. The real limitations are more likely to be missile availability, reload procedures, logistics, supply chain, and operational tempo rather than the headline figure of 17 launchers.

Russia reportedly possesses around 400 RM-48U missiles, making the size and replenishment of the missile stockpile more important for understanding the programme’s potential scale than the number of launchers.

If production and employment rates continue to rise, the missile stockpile becomes the key factor. Russia is simultaneously working to replenish that stockpile, meaning the conversion programme is not necessarily limited to older missiles already sitting in warehouses.

The modified launchers have reportedly been grouped into five specialised missile units positioned in Bryansk and Rostov oblasts, locations that provide practical reach toward Ukrainian territory.

Scalability with Existing Ecosystem

Another advantage is the existing launcher architecture. Russia already operates the S-400 system at scale. Its military-industrial sector can manufacture new launchers and modernise existing equipment. Ukrainian intelligence has identified Almaz-Antey and MKB Fakel among the principal companies associated with the S-400 system. In contrast, the Avangard Moscow Machine-Building Plant and AviaTek in Vyatka are identified as manufacturers of RM-48U missiles.

This means Moscow does not have to create an entirely new missile-launching ecosystem. The basic architecture already exists: launch vehicles, transport and handling equipment, personnel, logistics and command structures associated with the S-400 family. Modifying selected launchers to support the ground-attack mission can therefore be considerably more straightforward than developing a completely new operational missile system.

This is an important feature of Russia’s wartime adaptation. Rather than treating its enormous legacy inventory as obsolete, Moscow is looking for ways to turn existing stocks into new capabilities.

Augmentation of Missile Capability and Capacity

The RM-48U should not be viewed as a replacement for the Iskander-M. Russia still prioritises production of 9M723 missiles for Iskander-M, and Ukrainian Defence Intelligence has reported that Russia can produce more than 200 cruise and ballistic missiles of various types per month. Its estimates put monthly 9M723 production at around 60 missiles, with July production reportedly reaching 65.

The more logical interpretation is that Russia is attempting to expand the depth of its ballistic arsenal. A military does not necessarily need one weapon system to perform every task. It can be more effective to create several overlapping categories of missiles, each with different costs, capabilities and levels of availability.

The RM-48U fits neatly into that strategy. Instead of allowing older 48N6-family missiles to remain stranded in storage, Russia can convert them into offensive weapons. Instead of consuming an Iskander missile for every ballistic-strike requirement, Russian forces can draw on a second pool of missiles. And instead of developing an entirely new launcher, they can modify part of an existing S-400 infrastructure. The result is additional capacity without requiring every element of the system to be newly developed.

A Broader Look at the Russian Adaptation

The conversion of S-400 launchers illustrates a broader feature of Russia’s war effort: the attempt to squeeze additional combat value from existing inventories while expanding new production. The strategic importance of the RM-48U programme is therefore not simply that Russia has 17 modified launchers. It is that Russia appears to be building a second echelon of ballistic strike capability.

The missiles may be cheaper than Iskanders, the launchers are derived from an existing system, the missile stockpile is substantial, and production is continuing. The same basic concept could potentially be applied to large inventories of older air-defence weapons.

For Ukraine, this complicates defence against Russian missile attacks. The more diverse Russia’s strike arsenal becomes, the harder it is to predict which missile types will be used in a particular attack and how rapidly Russia can replenish weapons after a major strike.

Concluding Thought

The RM-48U programme should be seen not as Russia giving up on the Iskander, but as an attempt to expand its ballistic-missile stock. Instead of keeping the air-defence systems, Moscow is turning them into an offensive reserve. Although the 17 altered launchers are the obvious aspect of this initiative, the more significant point is the fundamental principle that when missiles already in existence can be refurbished and then combined with the modified launchers and used against ground targets, weapons which were originally intended to defend Russia’s airspace can be made into a further source of offensive capability.

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References: –

1. Defence Express, “Russia has up to 17 S-400 launchers adapted to fire RM-48U missiles at Ukraine”, 27 Aug 26.

2.Center for Strategic and International Studies, “S-400 Triumf. Missile Threat” 06 Jul 26.

3.Dotsenko, A, “Kyiv under S-400 fire: How Russia has turned air defence missiles into a weapon of terror and why they keep coming”, Ukrainska Pravda, 09 Aug 26.

4.Ukrainska Pravda, “Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence provides Ukrainska Pravda with data on Russia’s missile stockpiles and production rates”, 20 Aug 26.

5.Critical Threats Project, “Russian offensive campaign assessment”, American Enterprise Institute, 20 Aug 26.

6.Bronk, J, “Analysis of Russia’s use of converted surface-to-air missiles as an additional ballistic-strike capability”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2026.

August 28, 2026August 27, 2026

842: OPERATION SINDOOR REVISITED

Operation Sindoor was a multi-domain, mostly non-contact military operation India carried out in the early hours of 7 May 2025. In the first phase, India carried out attacks on nine terrorist facilities associated with groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan and in illegal Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. When the situation escalated, phase two was carried out with strikes being launched at military targets in Pakistan. Hostilities continued for about 88 hours before a ceasefire agreement was reached on 10 May.

Former CDS Gen Anil Chauhan (retired) delivered a talk on “Operation Sindoor and its Aftermath” on 25 August 2026. This talk is significant from an analytical perspective.

Analytical Perspective and Takeaways

Military power serves as an instrument of political policy; the armed forces set their own military objectives based on the political aim. The military plans accordingly. This matters because it shows that Sindoor was designed as a limited, controlled operation rather than an open-ended war.

Political direction and freedom of action. The clear political directive was to send an unambiguous message that India will not tolerate cross-border terrorism. Therefore, the directive was that the action should be unthinkable, with no political pressure for immediate action, and carried out without failure and with suitable evidence. Clear intent and operational autonomy are ideal for the military.

Tactical Shift and evolution of India’s retaliatory doctrines (to preserve surprise and prevent operational predictability). Unlike the land route used post-Uri (2016) or the high-altitude/large-force air engagements used post-Pulwama/Balakot (2019), Operation Sindoor employed a “third option”: leveraging the lower airspace. Low-altitude operations kept the conflict threshold controlled, maximised surprise, and delivered high mission assurance without triggering immediate full-scale escalation. It was not about what weapons India possessed. It was about how those weapons were employed against the adversary’s surveillance and air-defence architecture. In military terms, this illustrates the importance of operational creativity over simply having superior hardware.

Redefining the area below the nuclear threshold. The operation has shown that India is capable of carrying out precise conventional strikes at targeted terrorist infrastructure within a carefully controlled time frame which remains below the nuclear escalation threshold, thus countering the ‘stability-instability paradox’ which adversaries rely upon.

The fact that the strike hit the Kirana Hills has important strategic implications since it was not intended to target Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure; if an intentional strike had been made on a nuclear-related facility, it might have been seen as an attempt to attack Pakistan’s strategic deterrent and would therefore have led to a very different escalation scenario.

Skardu as a possible target. Skardu was a possible target but had to be changed to Bholari due to weather constraints. This shows India had multiple military options, rather than a single predetermined strike package. It also demonstrates the resilience and flexibility of IAF capability and planning.

On 10 May 2025, Pakistan pleaded for a ceasefire. India responded in its own time. This indicates that the aim was not merely to retaliate and jump at the first diplomatic opportunity. Instead, India chose to achieve its military objectives before agreeing to end the operations. This is an ideal example of aligning the military end-state with the political objectives.

Preparedness creates political choices. Peacetime shapes the options available during a crisis. If a military lacks long-range precision weapons, drones, ISR, electronic warfare, air defence and integration, political leaders have fewer options when a crisis occurs. Therefore, Sindoor resulted from years of military modernisation and capability development.

Multi-Domain Operation. It was India’s genuine multi-domain operation, involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with cyber and information-warfare elements. The integration achieved during the operation validated the direction India had taken toward jointness.

Operation Sindoor was a controlled demonstration of India’s ability to calibrate force and capability to punish aggression without necessarily allowing every confrontation to become a full-scale war. The major lesson is that modern warfare is increasingly about precision, information, speed, networking and decision superiority rather than simply manpower or territorial capture.

Pakistan’s post-operation adjustments include reorganising its military command (by setting up a new CDF post) and seeking security agreements (the Mecca joint defence agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), showing it is changing its approach.

Strategic Implications

The above analysis underscores a permanent shift in India’s strategic doctrine. It indicates a pairing of firm political intent with evolving, technologically driven military execution. By adapting tactics every time (i.e. from ground raids to high-altitude strikes and now low-altitude/loitering assets), India maintains operational unpredictability while establishing clear redlines against cross-border terrorism.

Operation Sindoor is still going on. Although the official line since 10 May 2025 has been that a ceasefire or pause was agreed upon after Pakistan asked for it, the operation has not officially ended. By keeping it going in this way, India indicates that it sees its position following the Pahalgam incident (the “new red line”, the change from a policy of deterrence to one of declaring a willingness to take direct action) as a continuing stance, not as a single, one-off punitive operation which has now finished.

Discussed these aspects with Vishnu Som of NDTV on the Program “Left Right and Centre”.

Link to the discussion:-

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