823: Wings of Dominance: The Future of Air Warfare

 

Q1.  What is the new balance of air power in the world today? Are fighter jets still the focus of warfare, or are drones beginning to take their place?

Fighter jets remain the backbone of air power, and that is not about to change. What has changed fundamentally is the ecosystem around them. A modern fighter operates in a networked environment comprising long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, and space-based ISR.

Drones are taking over the missions that are too risky, too repetitive, or too economically unjustifiable to warrant a manned sortie. They are not replacing the manned aircraft.

The prevailing trend favours a combination of manned and unmanned systems. Manned aircraft are focusing on contested, high-end missions that require judgment, adaptability, and versatile payloads. Concurrently, unmanned systems are being employed in persistent, attritable, and mass-effect roles.

The adaptation to this hybrid model is no longer merely a tactical requirement; it has become a strategic necessity.

 

Q2.  Russia’s Su-57 and the US F-35 embody different philosophies — one emphasises air combat, the other network-centric warfare. Whose future will it be?

The Su-57 seems to reflect the traditional Russian emphasis on kinematic performance and super-manoeuvrability.

The F-35 is claimed to be built around sensor fusion and battlespace awareness. It is advertised as capable of detecting, classifying, and engaging the threat at beyond-visual-range distances through a data architecture spanning an entire networked force.

Future aerial combat is progressing towards a network-centric model. Contemporary air engagements are increasingly determined by the priority of achieving information and decision dominance, rather than by performance alone.

Compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline is now as critical as speed or manoeuvrability. This is fundamentally a problem of decision architecture, not merely of technology.

The sixth-generation programmes are pushing emerging platforms toward multi-domain integration.  Fusion of air, space, cyber, and electronic warfare into a single operational architecture will make the network-centric model more definitive.

 

Q3.  China already has the J-20. Has India delayed the AMCA too long, or is it still possible to turn the situation around?

It is a fact that India’s timeline has slipped. The J-20 has been operational for nearly a decade. China is already iterating toward a sixth-generation capability, as evidenced by the prototypes that emerged publicly in late 2024.

AMCA is still working through prototype development. The gap is significant and widening. Reversal of the trend is a realistic necessity.

India can recover lost ground in fighter development if the programme is properly resourced, executed and politically backed.

A significant structural shift is also underway with the Ministry of Defence opening AMCA prototype development to private consortia rather than relying exclusively on the public-sector model.

The window to close the capability gap exists. It will not remain open indefinitely, and the margin for complacency on programme management is close to zero.

 

Q4.  In the wars to come, will Artificial Intelligence and Loyal Wingman drones be more important than pilots?

The pilot does not become less important. His job changes, and in some respects becomes more demanding, not less.

Manned-unmanned combat air teams would have one crewed aircraft effectively commanding a tactical formation of attritable unmanned assets, absorbing risk that would otherwise fall on the manned platform, carrying missiles, jammers, decoys, or forward reconnaissance payloads.

What AI is changing is the speed and volume of decision-making below the human threshold.

AI-enabled satellites and sensors, capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets, can push that picture directly to the shooter over tactical data links, rather than routing it back through a ground station first. That is what compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. However, human intervention cannot be removed from the kill chain.

As of now, the human crew retains authority over decisions that carry lethal and political consequences, while AI absorbs the burden of processing, prioritising, and routing information faster than any human can.

So, AI and unmanned teaming will unquestionably become more important than they are today. But the human crew would remain relevant and in control.

The pilot of 2040 will be managing a far more complex battle picture, commanding a digital wolfpack rather than flying a single aircraft.

 

Q5.  If India has the opportunity to purchase the F-35 or the Su-57, should we go ahead and purchase them, or stick to developing our own aircraft?

These are not competing choices, and treating them as such leads to a false dilemma.

The IAF’s squadron strength shortfall is real, immediate, and strategically significant. The Rafale has helped close that numerical gap, but has not closed it.

Further, there is a case for qualitative enhancement by the induction of fifth-generation aircraft.

The F-35 carries substantial geopolitical weight, end-use restrictions, and software dependency. Cost, delivery timelines, extended supply chains, Transfer of technology and trust deficit are other factors to be taken into account.

Russia has been a trusted partner, willing to share its technology to a certain extent and accepting Make in India. The Su-57 also raises several concerns besides the factors listed above. India had earlier walked out of the co-development program mainly due to concerns related to cost and technology sharing.

Neither platform offers a clean, dependency-free solution. The importance of self-reliance in defence production is a common lesson emerging from recent wars. The Indigenous program (AMCA) is some time away and urgently needs a technology infusion.

The logical answer is to plug the gap pragmatically by expanding the Rafale order and carefully reassessing the induction of fifth-generation aircraft, while protecting AMCA’s funding and schedule as a non-negotiable national priority.

The near-term interim acquisition and the long-term indigenous programme must be advanced concurrently. The contract should be negotiated in a manner that boosts the indigenous programme rather than undermining it.

 

Q6.  Is engine technology still India’s biggest weakness today?

The answer is YES. The Tejas Mark 1A flies on the American GE F404. AMCA’s initial squadrons will likely depend on an imported engine in the ninety-kilonewton class. The latest news is that negotiations for the GE 414 engine for AMCA have hit rough weather due to a 300 per cent cost increase.

India still does not have a proven indigenous engine anywhere near the ninety to one hundred ten kilonewton range required for a credible fifth or sixth-generation fighter. The Kaveri programme, running since the mid-1980s, is the most visible illustration of how difficult this problem is. High-performance turbofan technology demands a combination of high-temperature metallurgy, single-crystal turbine blade manufacturing, precision tolerances, and decades of iterative test data that very few nations have accumulated.

Urgent need of the hour is a deal that includes a degree of co-production and technology transfer for engine manufacturing in India. Co-production extends the supply chain into India, but it does not give India the ability to independently design, test, and certify a clean-sheet high-thrust engine. Engine independence remains the single weakest link in the self-reliance story.

 

Q7.  Will the export of fighter jets become an increasingly important geopolitical tool?

Fighter exports are already an important geopolitical tool, and their leverage is intensifying rather than diminishing.

Fighter exports create decades of dependency for the buyer. The seller retains influence over the buyer’s operational readiness (by supplying spares, software updates, weapons integration, training pipelines, and maintenance protocols). This dependency lasts for the life of the platform (often 30 to 40 years after the sale).

India’s own indigenous push is a deliberate effort to reduce exposure to precisely this kind of dependency.  India’s active promotion of the Tejas and its indigenous missile systems in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Gulf reflects a clear understanding that defence exports are as much an instrument of foreign policy as of industrial economics. Future fighter sales will be negotiated as much on reliability of supply and strategic alignment as on cost or raw capability.

 

Q8.  What are India’s greatest achievements and biggest challenges in defence self-reliance?

Tejas moving from a deeply troubled programme to a credible inducted fighter is, to a certain extent, an achievement.  The development of indigenous rotary-wing platforms (Dhruv, Rudra, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand) demonstrates that the industrial capacity extends beyond fast jets. The Astra beyond-visual-range missile and the continued maturation of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile represent genuine capability in the weapons domain. The missile and space programs are doing comparatively well.

Perhaps most significantly, India’s defence production turnover has grown substantially over the past decade. The country has moved from being almost exclusively an arms importer to a growing exporter, which is a structural shift that would have seemed improbable fifteen years ago.

The challenges are equally tangible. Squadron strength remains well below the sanctioned forty-two. Force multipliers, tankers, airborne early warning and control platforms are inadequate in numbers for a force that needs to project across two frontiers simultaneously. Engine technology remains unresolved.

The achievements prove India can build technically demanding systems. What remains unproven is whether it can build them at the pace and scale that the threat environment now demands.

 

Q9.  How will the Indian Air Force look in 2040, compared to today?

By 2040, assuming the squadron strength target is met or even meaningfully mitigated, the IAF should be a genuinely different force, operating on a different conceptual basis.

AMCA should be in serial production, forming the high-end backbone alongside an upgraded Rafale fleet and a substantially modernised Su-30MKI. The Tejas Mark 2 and the twin-engine deck-based fighter should round out the order of battle, bringing the indigenous content of the combat fleet to a level inconceivable at the beginning of this decade.

Loyal Wingman and unmanned systems would be standard formation elements rather than experimental adjuncts.

AI-assisted Space-based ISR would be integrated into the network.

The UCAV and other Unmanned platforms will significantly enhance airpower capabilities.

If the present trajectory and pace are sustained, by 2040 the IAF should be more networked, more integrated with the space and cyber domains, and far less dependent on foreign supply chains than anything currently in service.

 

Q10.  If you had to identify one defining trend in air warfare over the next twenty years, what would it be?

The shift from platform-centric to weapon-centric airpower operating in a networked environment. The idea that the decisive factor in air combat is increasingly not which aircraft you fly, but how fast you can sense, decide, and act across a distributed force. Ada result:

The sensor-to-shooter timeline will get shortened further.

Space-based satellites with onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing the targets will push that picture directly to the shooter.

Manned and unmanned systems will operate as a single collaborative entity rather than parallel fleets.

Mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum, with digital and cognitive dimensions layered on top, would become essential.

Stealth, hypersonics, manoeuvrability, drone swarms, and directed energy technologies/capabilities would follow this shift.

The air forces that adapt to it early will hold the operational advantage in 2040 and beyond. The ones that keep procuring better individual platforms while neglecting the architecture around them (i.e. modern equipment running on an outdated decision framework) will find themselves technologically current but operationally lagging.

 

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819: STRATEGIC COST OF INCREMENTAL MILITARY MODERNISATION

 

Article published in the June 26 edition of the “Life of Soldier” Journal.

 

 

 

India stands at a strategic crossroads. The security environment around the country is becoming more volatile and technologically complex. China has transformed itself into a technologically advanced military power with integrated command structures, space capabilities, cyber warfare assets, and a rapidly expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan continues to rely on asymmetric warfare while modernising selective military capabilities with external assistance. Beyond conventional threats, the future battlefield is increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, electronic warfare, drones, cyber-attacks, and information operations.

India’s approach to defence modernisation has been phased. Each of the previous wars (1962, 1965, 1971, and the Kargil war) has triggered reactive reforms and acquisitions. In future wars, India may not have time to correct deficiencies once the conflict begins. The prevailing environment necessitates military modernisation. Delay can result in strategic vulnerability. The real question is whether India can continue with incrementalism. The danger is the widening gap between the speed of emerging threats and the pace of Indian military adaptation.

 

Threats and Challenges

Warfare is shifting towards integrated domains. India will face a multidimensional threat landscape in future.  China’s military is undergoing a most consequential transformation over the last few decades. It is not simply acquiring more equipment, but fundamentally restructuring its doctrine, organisation, and technological base to fight and win multi-domain, network-centric conflicts at speed. Over the past few decades, Beijing has invested systematically in long-term capability building. It has reorganised command structures, accelerated indigenous defence production, invested heavily in modern technology, and created military civil fusion mechanisms.  The People’s Liberation Army is no longer merely a manpower heavy force. It is evolving into a networked military capable of coordinated operations across all domains. Besides the China challenge, India faces persistent tensions with Pakistan and growing maritime competition in the Indian Ocean Region.

For India, the challenge is further compounded by its geography and terrain. The country must prepare for high-altitude warfare in the Himalayas and maritime security in the Indian Ocean.  It also has to deal with the urban counterterrorism within its borders. Future conflict scenarios may involve simultaneous pressure along land borders, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion.

 

Slow Procurement Cycles

Incremental Military Modernisation. Incremental modernisation generally focuses on replacing legacy systems rather than redesigning military capability for future warfare. Buying a few squadrons of aircraft or upgrading selected artillery units cannot substitute for integrated transformation.  Incrementalism is not inherently wrong when resources are constrained, and industrial maturity is modest. However, it ceases to be prudent when it becomes a permanent default setting that systematically defers the harder choices. India must therefore recognise that procurement reform is not merely an administrative issue. It is a strategic imperative.

Indian Procurement System. One of the most persistent problems in India’s defence preparedness has been the prolonged procurement cycle. India’s procurement system has emerged from legitimate concerns over transparency, accountability, and financial scrutiny. Defence acquisition in India moves through the tedious process of approvals, technical evaluations, trials, negotiations, financial clearances, and bureaucratic reviews. It takes years or sometimes even decades. Fear of allegations, audit pressures, and political controversy has often discouraged timely decision-making. Bureaucratic caution has become embedded within the acquisition culture.

Strategic Consequences. Slow procurement cycles have strategic consequences: –

    •  Deterrence Weakening. Adversaries assess not only a nation’s current capabilities but also the speed at which it can adapt and replenish its military power. A country perceived as institutionally slow may invite coercive pressure.
    •  Cost Escalation. Deferred decisions result in increased costs due to Inflation and the need for technological upgrades. The evolving operational requirements further raise the acquisition costs over time. Resorting to emergency purchases is expensive.
    • Doctrinal Gaps. As long as procurement and force‑structure decisions move slowly, doctrinal thinking tends to lag behind technology. New concepts such as multi‑domain operations, joint convergence, and effects‑based targeting remain aspirational rather than institutionalised.
    • Loss of Confidence. Acquisition delays undermine confidence in indigenous systems. Services become reluctant to rely on them due to repeated delays. This creates a situation in which imports remain attractive and appear more capable and reliable.

 

Non-negotiable Imperatives.

Speedy Decision-Making as a Strategic Capability. Modern warfare rewards nations that can make decisions quickly under uncertainty. Strategic agility has become as important as military strength itself. Decision-making speed has a major impact on national security. It has a direct bearing on how quickly and efficiently threats are identified, forces mobilised, technologies integrated, and crises managed. India’s democratic process involves consultation, institutional checks, and political consensus-building. The challenge lies in ensuring that these processes do not become obstacles to strategic responsiveness. The issue is not merely about making faster purchases. It is about cultivating a strategic culture that is proactive, anticipates future challenges, and accepts calculated risk.

Indigenous Capability and Strategic Autonomy. The key to strategic autonomy is the building of indigenous capability. A country that depends on imports for critical defence systems is vulnerable in conflict. Relying on imports of parts, ammunition, sensors, or systems limits flexibility in a crisis. Recent global events have demonstrated that supply chains can be easily disrupted by geopolitical tensions, sanctions, or competing national priorities.

Self-reliance Challenge. The self-reliance challenge is very much both institutional and technological.  Institutionally, indigenous capability requires continuity of investment, realistic timelines, collaborative development, and stable operational requirements. The armed forces prioritise capability enhancement as they cannot compromise on operational readiness.  On the other hand, the industry requires sustained orders and predictable policy frameworks to build a long-term production plan. The challenge is to balance these imperatives.

Phased Capability Development. Abandoning indigenous development in favour of imports perpetuates dependence. At the same time, the minimum deterrence value cannot be compromised. The solution lies in phased capability development. Imports may be necessary in selected areas to fill in the urgent gaps. However, every foreign acquisition should strengthen domestic ecosystems through technology partnerships, local manufacturing, research collaboration, and supply chain development.

 

Recommendations.

Several priorities stand out: –

    • Speed needs to be embedded into the DNA of decision‑making. The approach of “risk‑avoidance‑through‑inaction” should be replaced by the culture of “action‑with‑risk”. National security decision-making requires deeper integration of technological expertise, geopolitical analysis, and long-term planning.
    • Procurement process must be re‑engineered for continuous capability enhancement flow rather than episodic projects. Instead of treating each acquisition as a discrete event, India should move toward a “production‑readiness” model, in which the industrial ecosystem is treated as a continuous provider of enhancements and variants.
    • Procurement systems must become faster, more transparent, and technologically adaptive. Acquisition processes should support iterative upgrades and modular capability development.
    • A more coherent indigenous‑capability strategy must be crafted. Accepting that not every system can be built domestically, prioritising critical technologies that underpin strategic autonomy, and investing heavily in test, evaluation, and certification infrastructure so that indigenous systems mature faster. It also means accepting that some indigenous platforms will initially under‑perform and planning for iterative upgrades rather than expecting a single “game‑changer” project to solve the problem.
    • Defence industrial policy must prioritise the creation of an effective ecosystem. Private industry, start-ups, academic institutions, and public-sector organisations must operate within integrated innovation frameworks.
    • Modernisation should be aligned with the actual threat environment. Military planning should focus on jointness and cross-domain integration.
    • India must invest consistently in emerging technologies. The countries that innovate faster, adapt quicker, and integrate technology more effectively will dominate future warfare.
    • Strategic ambitions require support from the budgetary allocations. Fiscal constraints will always exist. They need to be offset by smart spending, through prioritisation, indigenisation dividends, and public-private partnership models. Roll-over of multi-year funding commitments reduces uncertainty and enables production planning.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The cost of the military modernisation delay can’t be calculated solely from the percentage of ‘legacy’ equipment. It is characterised by a reduction in deterrence value, strategic options, operational readiness, and technological opportunities. Incremental modernisation may be viable in more sedate and favourable strategic conditions. It is unfeasible in the rapidly changing geopolitical environment and the speedy development of military technologies.

India cannot afford strategic complacency. The challenge before India is to modernise faster while building indigenous capabilities. India has the intellectual talent, industrial potential, and operational experience to achieve it. The question is not whether India can afford incremental modernisation, but whether it can afford the consequences of allowing strategic delays.

 

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References

Bajwa, P. S., “India’s defence procurement: Challenges and the way forward”. United Service Institution of India. 2023.

Bitzinger, R. A. (2021). “Modernising China’s military: Problems, progress, and prospects”. RAND Corporation.

Cohen, S. P., & Dasgupta, S. (2010). “Arming without aiming: India’s military modernisation”. Brookings Institution Press.

Dahiya, R., & Behuria, A. K. (Eds.). (2012). “India’s neighbourhood: Challenges in the next two decades”. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Government of India, Ministry of Defence. (2023). “Defence acquisition procedure 2020 (amended)”. Department of Military Affairs.

Gupta, A. (2019). “Building an arsenal: The evolution of regional power force structures”. Praeger.

Kapila, S. (2021). India’s defence modernisation: Structural constraints and strategic imperatives. Journal of Defence Studies.

Khosla, A. (2024, November). “India’s aerospace modernisation: Challenges and imperatives”. Air Marshal’s Perspective. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla

Ladwig, W. C. (2020). “Indian military modernisation and conventional deterrence in South Asia”. Journal of Strategic Studies.

Sawhney, P., & Wahab, G. (2014). “Dragon on our doorstep: Managing China through military power”. Aleph Book Company.

Tatsumi, Y., & Weston, J. (2019). “Conventional deterrence in the second nuclear age”. Stimson Center.

785: HIGHLIGHTS & ANALYSIS: DEFENCE BUDGET 2026–27

 

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman presented the Indian Defence Budget for the Financial Year 2026 on 27  February 1, 2026.

 

 

Overall Defence Allocation: A Record Increase

India’s defence spending for FY 2026–27 has been set at approximately ₹7.85 lakh crore, marking a roughly 15% increase over the previous year’s allocation (FY 2025–26: ₹6.81 lakh crore).

Defence remains one of the top-funded ministries in the budget, reflecting strategic priority. This is one of the largest-ever defence outlays in absolute terms.

Defence spending is now close to 1.99%–2.0% of India’s projected GDP, reversing the recent downtrend in the defence-to-GDP ratio.

Maintaining near-2% of GDP aligns India with many major powers and signals sustained political backing for defence preparedness.

 

 

Strategic Drivers Behind the Budget

The Budget is the first after Operation Sindoor.

Rising tensions with China and Pakistan, and an evolving security environment, have pressured India to enhance deterrence and capability.

 

Capital vs Revenue Expenditure: Modernisation Takes Priority

Capital allotment is ₹2.19 lakh crore, up around 22%.

Supports next-gen fighter jets, drones, submarines, and emergency arms post-Operation Sindoor.

Central allocations within this include ₹63,733 crore for aircraft & aero engines and ₹25,023 crore for strengthening the naval fleet.

Also, ₹0.29 lakh crore for DRDO (up from ₹0.27 lakh crore) and ₹0.07 lakh crore for Border Roads Organisation (BRO).

Emergency Procurements: Significant funds are earmarked to replenish stockpiles (ammunition, spares, and fuel) depleted during Operation Sindoor.

This shows a strong push to modernise armed forces, including fighter jets, aeroengines, naval platforms, and unmanned systems, all of which are vital to addressing future capability gaps.

 

 

Revenue Expenditure (Operations & Pensions)

Revenue expenditure (payroll, maintenance, operations) remains the bulk of the budget, including ₹1.71 lakh crore for pensions and other recurring costs.

Revenue Expenditure: 3.6546, 57% (20.17% for sustenance/ops + 26.40% for pay/allowances) ₹1.58 lakh crore for operations, maintenance, stores, and spares. Up 17.24% from FY 2025-26 BE, emphasising operational readiness.

Pensions: 1.712, 84% for over 34 lakh pensioners via SPARSH system. Up 6.56% from FY 2025-26 BE. Other (Civil Organisations, ECHS, etc.) 0.29 (approx.)3.64%Includes ₹0.12 lakh crore for Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS), up 45.49% from FY 2025-26 BE and over 300% from FY 2021-22.

Agnipath Scheme: Allocation for the scheme surged by 51% (to ₹15,173 crore), signalling the maturing of the new HR model for the armed forces.

 

 

Boost to Self-Reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat)

This budget reflects a strategic shift towards self-reliance (Aatmanirbhar Bharat), with 75% of capital acquisitions earmarked for domestic industries, including private sector involvement.

It also includes provisions for emergency procurements post-Operation Sindoor, enhanced R&D, and the development of border infrastructure.

Customs Duty Exemptions: Basic Customs Duty (BCD) is waived on raw materials and components imported for the manufacture and maintenance of aircraft parts, as well as for Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO).

Impact: This is designed to lower input costs for Defence PSUs and private players, thereby turning India into a regional hub for aircraft maintenance.

The defence budget-linked allocation supports indigenous manufacturing and R&D.

DRDO & iDEX: The R&D budget increase supports next-gen tech like swarm drones, AI-enabled electronic warfare (EW), and hypersonic missiles.

The budget reinforces India’s technology and production push in semiconductors, deep-tech systems, and defence industrial corridors.

This dovetails with broader reform goals,  reducing import dependence while strengthening domestic defence firms.

 

Border Infrastructure (BRO)

Reflecting the tense multi-front reality (China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) saw its capital budget hiked to ₹7,394 crore. This will accelerate “last-mile connectivity” projects like the Shinku La tunnel and strategic airfields in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.

 

Intelligence and Internal Security Buildup

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) received a 63% increase in funding, one of the most significant boosts for internal security.

This reflects recognition that modern defence is not just about external threats but also about internal threat management, cyber, intelligence, counter-terrorism, and hybrid warfare.

 

 

Analysis and Implications

The budget effectively balances immediate tactical needs (post-Op Sindoor replenishment) with long-term structural shifts (domestic MRO and 75% indigenous procurement).

This budget signals a proactive stance on national security, with the sharpest hikes in capital (21.84%) and revenue (17.24%) outpacing pensions (6.56%), indicating a pivot from legacy costs to future capabilities.

The emphasis on domestic procurement (75% of capital acquisitions) aligns with the Aatmanirbhar Bharat initiative, potentially boosting local industries, job creation, and ancillary sectors like aerospace and electronics.

Post-Operation Sindoor, allocations for emergency arms, drones, and border infrastructure (via BRO) address immediate threats from Pakistan. At the same time, long-term R&D investments (DRDO hike) aim to counter broader challenges from China.

Economically, the 2% GDP share remains below global peers like the US (3.5%) or Russia (4%), but the absolute increase to ~$86 billion positions India as a top (fourth-highest) global spender.

Overall, this allocation enhances India’s deterrence credibility, fosters innovation, and supports regional stability, though sustained execution will be key to realising these goals.

 

Strategic Takeaways

The most significant increase in defence spending in recent years

Focus on modernisation & capital acquisition.

Alignment with security imperatives post-Operation Sindoor

Growth of the domestic defence ecosystem & R&D push.

 

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