military capability – Page 16 – Air Marshal's Perspective

July 4, 2024January 4, 2025

491: PRACHAND: THE HIMALAYAN GRIFFIN

My Article published on the Chanakya Forum

In mid-June, news channels and strategic community circles were abuzz with the news that the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, had issued an RFP for the procurement of 156 Light Combat Helicopters (90 for the Indian Army and 66 for the Indian Air Force). LCH is the first indigenous Multi-Role Combat Helicopter designed and manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). “Prachand” (which means “fierce” in Hindi), the name given to India’s LCH, reflects the helicopter’s aggressive and powerful capabilities. It stands out with its ground attack and aerial combat capability, setting it apart from other helicopters in the market. Other attack helicopters and armed helicopters (held in the Indian armed forces inventory) are severely limited in operating at high altitudes and are best suited for operations in lower terrains.

HAL has thus far manufactured 15 limited-series Prachand helicopters (10 for the IAF and 5 for the IA), already in service from 2021 onwards. The new procurement order will enhance the operational capability of the Indian defence forces and further boost India’s drive for self-reliance. Reviewing the aircraft (features, performance, capabilities, and roles) and the project (development, production capabilities, Indigenous content, etc.) will be worthwhile.

Development Project. The need for such a helicopter was felt by the Indian armed forces during the Kargil conflict in 1999 when they were required to dislodge intruding Pakistani forces entrenched at altitudes around 18,000 feet. HAL started developing the LCH in the early 2000s, unveiling its plan to build the LCH in 2006. The Indian government sanctioned the project in the same year. The first flight on a prototype on 29 March 2010 was followed by an extensive test programme on four prototypes. The LCH became the first attack helicopter to land in Siachen at altitudes as high as 15,800 feet (4,815 metres). The LCH received a certificate of basic configuration in October 2015 and achieved initial operational clearance in August 2017.

Induction. The LCH was developed to meet the requirements of the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. In August 2017, limited-series production began for 15 aircraft. In January 2019, after completing all weapon integration tests, HAL declared the LCH ready for operational induction. On November 19, 2021, the LCH was formally handed over to IAF, starting the process of full-scale induction. On October 03, 2022, the LCH was formally inducted into the IAF and was officially named ‘Prachand’. By November 2022, the IA had begun receiving its LCH. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has now given preliminary approval to acquire 156 more Light Combat Helicopters.

Features. The LCH, an attack helicopter derived from a weaponised version of the HAL-manufactured Dhruv helicopter ‘Rudra’, is a light and agile machine with a unique feature that sets it apart from any other combat helicopter in the world: its ability to operate at high altitudes. This is a significant advantage, as it allows the LCH to operate effectively in the mountainous terrain of the Himalayas, a crucial area for India’s defence strategy. The helicopter possesses modern stealth characteristics, robust armour protection, advanced weapon systems, and electronic warfare systems. Its performance characteristics and features are as follows, showcasing its unique and impressive capabilities:

- Performance. The LCH is designed for high-altitude operations, with a service ceiling of about 6,500 meters (21,300 feet), the highest among all attack helicopters worldwide. It has a maximum Take-off Weight of around 5,800 kg and can carry 700 kg of payload. The helicopter can cruise at 260km/h and achieve a maximum speed of 268km/h. With a range of 550 km with weapons, it can fly for about 3 hours, showcasing its impressive performance capabilities.

- Armament. The LCH has a chin-mounted and twin-barrel M621 20mm cannon on a Nexter THL-20 turret, integrated with the Helmet Mounted Sighting System. Its modular design allows it to be armed with various weapons, including air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, rocket pods, iron bombs, cluster bombs, and grenade launchers. This versatility in carrying different weapons makes the LCH suitable for various missions, from air-to-air combat to ground attack. It has four hardpoints capable of carrying a combination of multiple weapons. It is also equipped with a Forges de Zeebrugge-built FZ231 rocket launcher capable of carrying 70mm rockets, MBDA air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation missiles, and Helina anti-tank guided missiles (Dhruvastra).

- Engine: The helicopter is powered by two HAL/Turbomeca Shakti turboshaft engines, each of which can generate approximately 1000kW and has a Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system (FADEC). The French Turbomeca and HAL jointly developed the Shakti engine, which was also fitted on the Dhruv and Rudra helicopters.

- Advanced Technology (Sensors and Avionics): The helicopter features a glass cockpit, a composite airframe structure, and a state-of-the-art sensor suite, enhancing operational efficiency and durability. The glass cockpit accommodates two crew members in tandem. It has an Integrated Avionics Display System (IADS), multi-function displays, a target acquisition and designation system (TADS) with FLIR (laser range finder and a designator), a helmet-mounted sight and a digital video recorder to capture battlefield footage for debriefing. The sensors fitted on the helicopter include a charge-coupled device camera, a forward-looking infrared camera and a laser designator. The two cameras capture the enemy’s location and position. The targeting system features an electro-optical pod, helmet-mounted sight display (HMSD), and a laser range finder and designator for precise targeting and engagement. The LCH is also equipped with a data link for network-centric operations.

- Survivability: The helicopter has numerous features to increase its survivability, including stealth features to reduce radar and infrared signatures. It has systems like Radar warning receivers (RWR), missile approach warning systems, laser warning systems, and chaff and flare dispensers for self-protection. The helicopter also has engine exhaust Infra-Red Suppression Systems (IRSS). The IRSS enhances aircraft resilience against IR-guided missiles by diminishing the missile lock-on distance and facilitating the superior functioning of IR jammers and flares. It has several other protection features, such as armour protection, self-sealing fuel tanks, a digital camouflage system, and crashworthy landing gear to enhance its survivability in hostile environments. The pressurised cabin of the helicopter offers protection from Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) attacks.

- Versatility and Agility: The features above allow LCH to perform numerous roles under all weather and day-night conditions. Its narrow fuselage and advanced aerodynamics provide high agility, making it difficult to detect and target. The specially designed hinge-less rotor makes it highly agile due to its immediate response to flight control commands.

Roles and Tasks. The LCH meets the requirements of modern warfare and has the capability parameters to operate under varied conditions. Equipped with advanced systems and various weapons, it can perform multiple combat and support roles. In attack roles, it can undertake missions like the destruction of enemy air defence (DEAD), anti-tank warfare, battlefield air support, interdiction, and counter-surface force operations. It is capable of battlefield reconnaissance and target acquisition. It can also be used to escort convoys and provide aerial coverage. The LCH can track and attack slow-moving aerial targets and remotely piloted aircraft. It is also effective in counter-insurgency operations in jungle and urban environments.

Capability Enhancement. The LCH’s versatility and offensive potential are at par or better than most attack helicopters operating globally. Its presence itself deters adversaries. The induction of the Light Combat Helicopter adds unique capability to India’s combat potential. The LCH is noted for its capability to operate at high altitudes up to 6,500 meters, making it particularly suitable for operations in mountainous regions like the Himalayas along India’s northern and northeastern borders. This versatility, along with advanced avionics and weaponry, makes the LCH a force multiplier, significantly enhancing the combat capabilities of the Indian armed forces. It is a potent platform with day and night ground attack and aerial combat capability. It is a game changer, reflecting its multiple capabilities and strategic importance. It offers strategic flexibility through rapid deployment, allowing quick responses to emerging threats. The helicopter’s data link will mesh into the IAF’s networked environment.

Self-reliance and Challenges. Being an Indigenous platform developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the LCH reduces reliance on foreign military technology and supports India’s defence industry. With the Indian thrust on indigenisation, the LCH is being developed under a public-private partnership model, with the active participation of the private sector. There is still much left to be achieved regarding self-reliance. The LCH reportedly has an indigenous content of 45% by value, which is likely to progressively increase to more than 55%. The development of indigenous engines is the foremost challenge. Developing an aircraft engine is tough and expensive; it requires considerable investment in R&D and sustained effort over many years. These helicopters are on one of the government’s positive indigenisation lists. The list bans importing weapons, systems, and ammunition. Integration of Indigenous Anti-Tank Guided Missiles is another challenge. Helina/Dhruvastra, a helicopter version of the Nag missile, has already been tested on ALH (Rudra) and is in the process of integration with LCH. Next on the list is the challenge of production rate. The new order of 156 LCH aircraft will likely take 5 to 6 years to complete.

The induction of an additional 156 LCH is a significant development. The LCH’s high-altitude operational capability, advanced avionics, versatile armament, and Indigenous development make it a crucial asset for India’s defence forces. Its ability to operate in challenging terrains and perform multiple combat roles effectively positions it as a game changer in modern warfare, particularly in India’s unique geographic and strategic challenges.

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

Link to the article on Chanakya website: -https://chanakyaforum.com/prachand-the-himalayan-griffin/

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

References:-

Air Chief Marshal Fali H Major (retd), “Why India’s Light Combat Helicopter could be a game changer”, DailyO, 28 Feb 2020.

Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd), “Rotary Wing Platforms: India’s Great Indigenisation Story”, Indian Defence Review, Issue Vol. 38.1, Jan-Mar 2023, 13 Apr 2023.

“Ten reasons why indigenously-built Light Combat Helicopter is a game changer for the Indian Air Force”, India News Network, 04 Apr 2022.

Rahul Singh, “Govt to buy 156 light combat helicopters from HAL at ₹50k-cr”, Hindustan Times, 18 Jun 2024.

D Raghunandan, “India’s Combat Helicopter: Re-discovering Self-reliance?”, NEWSclick, 14 Oct 2022.

Lt Gen (Retd) BS Pawar, “Induction of ‘Prachand’ Light Combat Helicopter: Impact on Operations At High Altitudes”, Bharat Shakti, 13 Jan 2024.

“HAL Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)”, Air Force Technology, 18 Apr 2024.

Ministry of Defence, “Indigenously Designed and Developed Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) inducted into Indian Air Force”, Press Release, 03 OCT 2022.

Gordon Arthur, “India advances light attack helicopter program with large tender”, Air Warfare, 21 Jun 2024.

Huma Siddiqui, “MoD Issues RFP for 156 Prachand Helicopters to HAL for IAF and Army”, Financial Express, 20 Jun 2024.

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

June 26, 2024January 4, 2025

489: COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD

My Article published in the Indus International Research Foundation Year Book 2024.

“Air power is not only a fascinating subject, but its theory and practice also constitute a very demanding profession, and even a lifetime’s study and devotion is inadequate to unravel its mystique or fully understand its imperatives.”

– Air Cmde Jasjit Singh

Air power is a revolutionary force that transformed the fundamental nature of war in less than a century. The concept of air power is often considered one of the most essential elements in modern military operations, but it can also be the least understood aspect for various reasons. Aviation technology advances open up many new possibilities for air power applications. Developing, maintaining, and operating a modern air force is resource-intensive. Balancing budget constraints with the need for cutting-edge technology and capabilities is a complex task. The effective integration of air power with surface forces can be challenging. Joint operations require seamless communication, coordination, and a shared understanding of each other’s roles, tasks, and core competencies. These complexities make it challenging to understand the potential of air power and the nuances of its application for both the practitioners of air power and those affected directly or indirectly by it. Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, the three airpower prophets from military aviation’s earliest years, articulated their airpower theories that shaped military aviation for decades. While it is good always to remember the basics, it is worthwhile to revisit and review them, especially with the ongoing and urgent debate about proposed organisational changes.

Continue reading “489: COMBAT AVIATION: MOST ESSENTIAL, LEAST UNDERSTOOD”

June 12, 2024January 4, 2025

487: RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR: PHASE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH LONG-RANGE WEAPONS

Article published in the inaugural issue of the News Analytics Journal

Introduction

The Russia–Ukraine war, now in its third year with no end in sight, has had a profound and complex impact on every aspect of warfare and international engagement. It has brought issues related to the new emerging world order, multilateralism, collective security, nuclear deterrence, economic sanctions, information warfare, and food and energy security to the forefront. Understanding the intricate implications of this war on international relations and military operations is of utmost importance.

Several questions are intriguing to the strategic community and military analysts. For instance, there is a debate over whether Russia has deployed its full military might and failed, as the West has criticised it for its lack of capabilities. Alternatively, is Russia adopting a more nuanced approach to using force and the resulting destruction? The war, which is still fiercely ongoing, has reached a phase of engagement with long-range vectors and drones, with Ukraine’s retaliation and Russian punitive action. There seems to be no end in sight for the conflict. Despite these debates, an analysis of geopolitical aspects, international reactions, and the conduct of military operations can yield valuable insights.

Genesis

On the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine voted in favour of independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum. Russian President Boris Yeltsin accepted the vote, and Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus set up a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In December 1994, after the end of the Cold War, Ukraine, Russia, the UK, and the US agreed to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders in exchange for Ukraine abandoning the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union. In May 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed a friendship treaty. It settled a fundamental disagreement and allowed Russia to retain ownership of most ships in the Black Sea fleet (based in Ukraine’s Crimea) in exchange for Moscow paying Kyiv a modest rent to use the port of Sebastopol. Moscow also remained Kyiv’s most important commercial partner, with Ukraine dependent on Russian oil and gas.

Ukraine, perceiving the CIS as a potential tool for Moscow’s influence, maintained a cautious stance and showed an apparent inclination towards the West, actively seeking ties with the US-led NATO military alliance. This oscillation between the Eastern and Western blocs was an essential characteristic of Ukraine’s foreign policy. In 2005, Ukraine reiterated its desire to join the EU, along with NATO. In 2008, at a summit in Bucharest, NATO leaders agreed that Ukraine had a future in the alliance, sparking Moscow’s ire. In 2014, Russia sent its Special Forces to take control of strategic sites on Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. In March 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty absorbing Crimea into Russia. The annexation provoked the worst diplomatic crisis between the West and Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. In April 2014, a pro-Russian rebellion erupted in Ukraine’s industrial eastern areas. Pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk declare their regions to be independent. Ukraine and its Western allies accused Russia of instigating the uprising and pouring in arms and troops to bolster the self-proclaimed republics. The clashes became a full-blown conflict in May 2014.

Perspective: Relevant Aspects of Present Conflict

On 24 Feb 22, Russia invaded Ukraine, calling it an extraordinary military operation. The Russian narrative is that “The US-led West (the USA, NATO and EU) is the aggressor, using Ukraine against it as a pawn, not honouring its commitment and expanding the NATO westwards, bringing it to the Russian doorstep, and compelling Russia into taking this drastic action”. On the other hand, the Western narrative is that “Russia is the aggressor, trying to rebuild its lost empire, with Ukraine being the victim, and the West is supporting the democratic rights of the victim country”.

Russian Objectives. Officially, Russia stated its objectives of the “special military operation” as “demilitarisation, denazification and assurance about the neutral status of Ukraine (i.e., not joining NATO).” This operation, also known as the ‘Russian-Ukrainian War ‘, was justified by Russia citing a call for help from the Donbas region for its liberation from Ukraine. An undeclared objective is also to consolidate the Russian hold on Crimea.

Military Power Comparison. There is a significant disparity between the strength of Russia’s and Ukraine’s defence forces. Russia is the number two military power globally. The Russian Air Force is ranked second, whereas the Ukrainian Air Force is ranked 27^th globally. Numerically, the Russian Air Force is about 8 – 10 times the size of the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian army is 3 to 6 times that of the Ukrainian military compared to the army’s strength and equipment.

Orchestration of Operations. The operations were initiated by Russia with hybrid warfare using disruption (cyber-attacks) and destruction (using surface-to-surface and air-delivered long-range vectors). A fair amount of air superiority was achieved in the initial stages. The surface operations were three-pronged, with attacks from North, East and South. In the North, the advance was towards Kyiv and Kharkiv, intending for regime change at the capital. In the east, advances towards Donbas, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol were obviously to liberate the Donbas area and create a Russia-friendly corridor. In the south, addressing Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Snake Island was to consolidate hold on Crimea and deny sea access to Ukraine.

Phase I of The War. In this phase, the Russian intention was to take over the capital with swift action and bring in a regime change. Surface forces advanced towards Kyiv on two axes, with the third axis being by the air domain. The Russian Special Forces took over the Hostomel airport (25 Km from Kyiv) to pump in combatants, equipment and supplies. However, the helicopters and the heavy-lift transport aircraft could not land due to vulnerability from shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, failing the overall plan.

Phase II of the War. The Russian forces reorganised a few weeks into the war, and concentration shifted from northern to eastern and southern areas. The operations in this phase were like urban guerrilla warfare, with Russian forces surrounding the cities and Ukrainian forces employing defensive, hit-and-run tactics. What stands out in the entire operation is that the Russians did not utilise the full potential of the airpower despite the significant disparity between the forces of the two countries.

Russian Referendum. In late September 2022, Russia held referendums in four areas of Ukraine – Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. On 30 September 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the takeover of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia in an address to both houses of the Russian parliament. As far as Russia is concerned, this marked the completion of its special operations in Ukraine.

Achievement of Objectives. So far, Russia has been able to create a ‘friendly corridor’ in its eastern region, a term used to describe the areas under Russian control that serve as a buffer zone between Russia and Ukraine. The Russians have considerably reduced the Ukrainian combat potential by destroying most of its military bases and selective defence industry. Russia has also consolidated its hold on Crimea, ending its water and power blockade. In addition, it has stalled the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO for the time being.

Application of Military Power. The Russians followed a delicate approach and did not use the full potential of their military power. The Western media criticise them for their poor planning, tactics, and training, poor performance of weapons and equipment and the lack of synergy between defence forces. One of the reasons for the self-imposed restraint could be to avoid too much destruction and collateral damage, keeping in mind the public opinion (domestic and worldwide) and long-term problems of insurgency, revolution, and resistance. For the same reason, Russia has not jumped into information warfare. The second reason could be to conserve its military power for a more significant threat in the future.

Western Aid to Ukraine: Gradually Enhancing its Offensive Capability.

Defence and security links between Ukraine, NATO members and other allies and partners started soon after Ukraine’s independence in 1991. They intensified when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 but primarily took the form of training and the bilateral provision of non-lethal military equipment. After the commencement of the Russia-Ukraine war on 24 February 2022, bilateral military assistance has been significantly stepped up, with many allies supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. In addition to massive funds, the West gave Ukraine equipment to defend itself. These included anti-tank missiles and drones to stem Russian ground advances. Much more important were the Air Defence systems that prevented the Russian Air Force from using Ukrainian skies with immunity.

During the initial part of the war, the U.S. and Western allies were hesitant to provide long-range offensive and more sophisticated weaponry to Ukraine over fears of an escalation of the war. Either Russia would see it as an escalation from NATO, or Ukraine itself could escalate the conflict by striking targets within Russia. As the conflict in Ukraine has evolved, so have the types of weaponry being provided.

While maintaining the high priority of air defence and the supply of ammunition, the West has gradually enhanced Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Ukraine has been pleading for weapons that can strike more profoundly and deeper behind the front lines. Initial aid packages had limited-range howitzers for use at the frontline. Later, the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS—with 77km range rockets) was added to the package. This was a significant boost for the Ukrainian military, allowing it to target Russian forward area ammunition dumps and weapons storage facilities. After that, a 150 km range Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) was included. It put within reach all of Russia’s supply lines in the east of the country as well as part of Russian-occupied Crimea. Late last year, the U.S. began to supply Ukraine with the older medium-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) armed with wide-spreading cluster munitions that can travel up to 160 Km. Now, the U.S. is leaning toward sending the longer-range version of the missile with a 300 km range.

These weapons, along with drones, provide Ukraine with the capabilities to strike deep farther inside the Russian-held territory. Kyiv has already embarked on a drone attack on oil and energy facilities inside mainland Russia and an attack on a Russian military airfield in Crimea. It also struck the province of Tatarstan earlier, marking Ukraine’s most profound attack inside Russia so far. It has also continued its attack on Russia’s fleet in the Black Sea. Russian punitive strikes with long-range missiles and hypersonic weapons follow these attacks.

Current Phase and the Future Prospects of the War.

Overall, the pace of the war has slowed down with periodic fluctuations. Russia is trying to hold onto the so-called liberated territories, while Ukraine is trying counteroffensives. Ukraine cannot sustain the war on its own and needs economic and military aid from the West. Both countries, besides economic suffering, have suffered losses of men, materials and equipment in the two-plus-year-long war. However, they cannot accept backtracking now. Acceptance of the loss of Ukrainian territory would be seen as a defeat for the US-led West (including NATO and EU countries). Loss of occupied territory back to Ukraine would be considered a defeat for Russia. So, the stalemate continues, and there is no honourable exit possibility for either.

The prevailing domestic situation in both countries is an aversion to further loss of human life. The West is encouraging Ukraine to continue and is enhancing its offensive capabilities with stand-off weapons. Russia is responding to the Ukrainian counter-offensive attacks with punitive strikes using long-range weapons and missiles. This engagement phase with long-range stand-off weapons, drones, and missiles will be long-drawn. The war is, in the broader sense, between the Eastern and Western blocs. So far, due consideration has been given to the escalation control. However, a miss calculation by either side could be catastrophic for the involved countries, the region, and the world.