698: THE ISTAR TO REDEFINE STRATEGIC SURVEILLANCE FOR THE INDIAN AIR FORCE

 

My article was published on “The EurasianTimes” website

on 06 Jul 25.

 

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is set to significantly enhance its surveillance and precision strike capabilities with the procurement of three Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) aircraft under a project worth Rs 10,000 crore. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, granted the “Acceptance of Necessity” (AoN) for this initiative on July 3, 2025, as part of a broader Rs 1.05 lakh crore defence modernisation package.

These advanced platforms integrate cutting-edge sensors, communication systems, and artificial intelligence to deliver real-time intelligence, enabling precise battlefield surveillance and strike coordination.  The IAF aims to induct three state-of-the-art ISTAR aircraft, blending global aviation platforms with indigenous sensor technology developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The induction would position India among a select group of nations with elite air-to-ground surveillance capabilities.

Understanding ISTAR: A New Class of Airborne Intelligence. ISTAR is not a single system, but an integrated suite of advanced sensors and processing systems mounted on a long-range, high-endurance aircraft. It combines multiple intelligence disciplines, electro-optical, radar, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT), to provide commanders with a comprehensive battlefield picture. Unlike conventional reconnaissance or surveillance aircraft, ISTAR systems go beyond just collecting data. They analyse and fuse it in real-time using AI and advanced analytics, enabling actionable intelligence to be delivered to frontline units and command centers with speed and precision.

 

The Strategic Imperative for ISTAR

In the rapidly evolving landscape of modern warfare, information superiority is a critical determinant of success. ISTAR aircraft serve as force multipliers by providing real-time intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities. Equipped with advanced sensors, these platforms offer commanders actionable data, enabling precise decision-making in complex battle environments. For the IAF, operating in a volatile geopolitical region marked by ongoing tensions, ISTAR aircraft are indispensable for monitoring enemy movements, tracking high-value targets, and coordinating precision strikes from stand-off ranges.

The urgency for such capabilities was underscored by pivotal events, including the 2019 Balakot airstrike, which highlighted the need for enhanced situational awareness, and the 2020 Chinese aggression along the Line of Actual Control, which exposed gaps in real-time battlefield intelligence. The ISTAR program aligns with India’s broader strategic objectives, including the “Make in India” initiative, which emphasises self-reliance in defence technology. By integrating indigenous sensor systems with globally sourced aircraft platforms, the IAF aims to bolster its operational effectiveness while fostering domestic innovation, positioning India as a formidable player in military aviation.

 

ISTAR Program

The forthcoming ISTAR project, valued at Rs 10,000 crore, involves acquiring three aircraft from global aviation manufacturers, likely Boeing or Bombardier, which will be fitted with indigenous sensor and electronic systems developed by DRDO’s Centre for Airborne Systems (CABS). These systems, already tested for efficacy, represent a significant leap in India’s defence technology capabilities. The following are relevant aspects of the ISTAR program.

Operational Parameters. The aircraft will operate at a minimum ceiling of 40,000 feet with an endurance of at least eight hours, ensuring sustained surveillance over vast areas. This high-altitude capability allows the platforms to maintain a broad operational footprint.

Sensor Suite. The aircraft will feature:-

    • Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) with a range of ≥200 km, enabling high-resolution imaging of ground targets, even through cloud cover or darkness.
    • Ground-Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) with a range of ≥150 km, capable of detecting and tracking moving objects on the battlefield.
    • Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Sensors for day/night operations in complex terrains, providing visual and thermal imaging for target identification.
    • Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) algorithms for image intelligence, automatic target recognition, and change detection, enhancing the speed and accuracy of data analysis.

Communication Systems. The platforms will be equipped with high-data-rate line-of-sight (LOS) and satellite communication (SATCOM) links, facilitating seamless data sharing with other assets, including satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and ground-based command centres. This connectivity is critical for integration with the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), enabling real-time coordination across multiple domains.

Ground Segment. The program includes two fixed and four transportable ground exploitation systems for processing and disseminating data, ensuring actionable intelligence reaches commanders swiftly.

Platform. The aircraft are likely to be based on modified commercial jets, such as the Bombardier Global Express or Airbus A319, tailored for military applications. These platforms offer a balance of range, endurance, and payload capacity, making them ideal for ISTAR missions.

The IAF expects delivery within 60 months (five years) from contract signing, with DRDO’s prior testing of sensor systems expediting integration. A 1:32 scale model of the indigenous ISTAR platform, based on a pre-owned Airbus A319, was showcased at Aero India 2023, underscoring India’s commitment to blending global and domestic technologies.

 

Strategic Significance

The ISTAR aircraft will revolutionise the IAF’s approach to network-centric warfare, enabling real-time, multi-faceted intelligence that enhances precision and reduces collateral damage. By integrating with the IACCS, these platforms will create a cohesive operational picture, coordinating assets across air, ground, and space domains. This capability is particularly critical in India’s regional context, where operations like Operation Sindoor against Pakistan require rapid, calibrated responses without breaching hostile airspace.

Globally, the ISTAR program would position India among an elite group of nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel, with advanced air-to-ground surveillance capabilities. The platforms will enhance India’s deterrence posture, providing the ability to monitor and neutralise threats with unparalleled accuracy. The emphasis on indigenous sensor development also aligns with India’s self-reliance goals, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and positioning the country as a potential exporter of defence technology.

 

Challenges

Despite its promise, the ISTAR program faces several challenges. Addressing these challenges will be critical to ensuring the program’s success and operational readiness by 2030.

Vulnerability. ISTAR platforms are high-value targets for adversaries. For instance, Indo-Russian BrahMos missile variants are being developed to counter similar enemy platforms, highlighting the need for robust defensive measures, such as electronic countermeasures and stealth features.

Procurement Delays. Past delays due to bureaucratic hurdles and disagreements between the DRDO and the IAF underscore the importance of streamlined processes. The ongoing global tendering for aircraft platforms requires careful vendor selection to ensure compatibility with DRDO systems.

Integration Complexity. Seamlessly integrating indigenous sensors with global platforms demands rigorous testing and validation to avoid operational bottlenecks.

Cybersecurity. The reliance on real-time data sharing necessitates robust cybersecurity protocols to protect against hacking and data breaches.

Human Capital. Operating and maintaining ISTAR systems requires a cadre of highly trained analysts, technicians, and mission planners.

 

Conclusion

The IAF’s ISTAR aircraft program represents a bold step toward redefining India’s military capabilities in the 21st century. By combining advanced global platforms with cutting-edge indigenous technology, the program addresses urgent operational needs while advancing India’s self-reliance in defence. Expected to be operational by 2030, the three ISTAR aircraft are expected to provide the IAF with unmatched surveillance and strike coordination capabilities, positioning India among an elite group of nations with advanced ISTAR systems. Despite challenges, including procurement delays and platform vulnerabilities, the program’s strategic importance cannot be overstated. As India navigates a complex security landscape, the ISTAR aircraft will serve as a linchpin of its network-centric warfare strategy, ensuring operational superiority and reinforcing its stature as a global military power.

 

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References and credits

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. Press Trust of India. (2025, June). “IAF’s ISTAR Aircraft Acquisition Gets Nod, Rs 10,000 Crore Project to Boost Surveillance.” The Times of India.
  1. Singh, R., & Sharma, A. (2023). “Aero India 2023: DRDO Showcases Indigenous ISTAR Model.” Defence News India.
  1. Kumar, V. (2024). “India’s Push for Network-Centric Warfare: The Role of ISTAR.” Strategic Analysis Journal, 48(3), 215–230.
  1. Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2025). Annual Report 2024–25. New Delhi: MoD Publications
  1. Gupta, S. (2021). “Lessons from Balakot: The Need for Advanced Surveillance Platforms.” Indian Defence Review, 36(4), 45–52.
  1. DRDO Newsletter. (2024, August). “CABS Advances Indigenous Sensor Suite for ISTAR Aircraft.” DRDO Publications.
  1. Jane’s Defence Weekly. (2023). “India’s ISTAR Program: Balancing Global Procurement and Indigenous Innovation.”
  1. Bharat Rakshak. (2022). “Evolution of India’s Airborne Surveillance Capabilities.”
  1. Business Today. (2025). Rare global league: ₹10,000 crore I-STAR project to put India in elite club of airborne battlefield intel.
  1. India Defence Analysis. (2024). DRDO’s SCA/ISTAR Aircraft Plans for Indian Air Force.
  1. GlobalSecurity.org. (n.d.). ISTAR – Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.

686: CHAT WITH MEHNAAZ NADIADWALA

 

I had an interesting conversation with Mehnaaz Nadiadwala about various subjects related to Defence, Security, Geopolitics and the Indian Air Force.

 

If ever I come across a time machine, I will relive my life in the Indian Air Force.

 

 

 

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666:GPS INTERFERENCE INCIDENT INVOLVING IAF AIRCRAFT OVER MYANMAR

 

My article was published in Issue 4 (May 25) of the SP Aviation journal.

 

On March 28, 2025, a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck Myanmar, claiming over 3,649 lives and injuring more than 5,000 people. In response, India launched Operation Brahma, a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) mission, to deliver critical supplies, medical teams, and rescue personnel to the affected regions. The IAF deployed six military transport aircraft, including C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster, to ferry 625 metric tons of aid to cities such as Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw, and Mandalay.

 

The Incident

The first reported incident of GPS spoofing occurred on March 29, when a C-130J aircraft, carrying 15 tons of relief material from Hindon Airbase to Yangon, experienced navigation anomalies in Myanmar’s airspace. Subsequent flights reported similar issues, with sources indicating that most of the six aircraft involved in the operation encountered GPS spoofing on multiple sorties. After the initial incident, IAF pilots were briefed to anticipate such challenges, enabling them to prepare for and mitigate the risks on subsequent flights.

The IAF later clarified that a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issued by Mandalay International Airport highlighted the possibility of degraded GPS availability. The NOTAM warned of potential navigation issues in Myanmar’s airspace, and IAF crews were trained to operate under such conditions. Despite the disruptions, all missions were completed successfully, with no reported accidents or deviations from the planned routes. This underscores the professionalism and preparedness of the IAF pilots, providing reassurance about their capabilities in challenging situations.

 

GPS Spoofing

GPS spoofing is a form of electronic warfare where false signals are broadcast to deceive a receiver, causing it to calculate an incorrect position. Unlike GPS jamming, which blocks signals entirely, spoofing manipulates data to mislead navigation systems, potentially directing an aircraft off course. The technique exploits the weak signal strength of GPS satellites, which can be overpowered by stronger, fraudulent signals generated from ground-based or airborne platforms. GPS spoofing is increasingly common in conflict zones, where state and non-state actors deploy electronic warfare to disrupt adversaries.

Modern military aircraft, however, are equipped with additional navigation systems, such as INS, which uses gyroscopes and accelerometers to track position independently of external signals. The IAF’s prompt switch to INS ensured safe navigation, but the incident highlighted the vulnerability of GPS-dependent systems in contested environments.

 

Attributability

Myanmar’s complex political landscape provides critical context for the incident. Since the military coup in 2021, the country has been embroiled in civil conflict, with the junta facing resistance from ethnic insurgent groups and pro-democracy forces. The region is also a geopolitical flashpoint, with major powers like China, India, and the United States vying for influence. China, in particular, has made significant strategic inroads in Myanmar, including infrastructure and military cooperation investments.

Some reports speculated that the spoofing may have been linked to Chinese-enabled systems, given Beijing’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities and presence in the region. The proximity of the interference to the Coco Islands, where China is suspected of developing surveillance and electronic warfare facilities, fueled these suspicions. However, attributing responsibility is difficult due to a lack of definitive evidence.

Other potential actors include non-state militant groups or regional adversaries seeking to cause disruption as a geopolitical signal. Myanmar’s airspace, described as a conflict zone, is particularly susceptible to such interference, with GPS spoofing reported as a common tactic in similar environments globally. Investigating spoofing in foreign airspace is nearly impossible due to limited access and jurisdictional constraints. Myanmar’s junta’s lack of transparency, restricted internet access, and communication controls further complicate any efforts to investigate the incident.

 

IAF Response and Mitigation

The IAF’s response to the GPS spoofing incidents was swift and effective. The pilots’ training in handling navigation anomalies allowed them to transition seamlessly to INS, ensuring the safe completion of all missions. The pre-emptive NOTAM from Mandalay International Airport also played a crucial role, enabling crews to anticipate and prepare for degraded GPS availability. This response highlights the IAF’s operational resilience in such challenges.

On April 14, the IAF clarified that its crews were well-equipped to operate in environments with compromised GPS signals. The statement avoided directly referencing spoofing, focusing instead on the successful execution of Operation Brahma and the robustness of IAF protocols. This measured response likely aimed to avoid escalating tensions in an already volatile region while highlighting India’s operational resilience.

The incident has sparked discussions within India’s defence establishment about enhancing countermeasures and navigation redundancies. Recommendations include installing real-time interference detection systems, conducting regular audits of navigation vulnerabilities, and advocating for international standards to counter GPS spoofing. The urgent need for global cooperation against electronic warfare is also underscored.

 

Broader Global Implications

The Myanmar incident is part of a global surge in GPS interference, with similar cases reported near the India-Pakistan border, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Spoofing has affected civilian and military aircraft globally, with notable cases like the 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines crash linked to GPS disruption and widespread interference in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

For military operations, GPS spoofing poses risks beyond navigation errors, including compromised mission security and potential airspace violations. The Myanmar incident underscores the need for robust countermeasures, such as encrypted navigation systems and alternative positioning technologies like Galileo or India’s NavIC. This highlights the importance of preparedness in electronic warfare and the need for robust countermeasures.

Civilian aviation also faces growing risks, as commercial aircraft rely heavily on GPS for navigation, raising concerns about passenger safety. To enhance resilience, the aviation industry is exploring solutions like multi-constellation receivers, which integrate signals from multiple satellite systems, and ground-based navigation aids.

Geopolitically, the incident highlights the challenges of operating in contested regions. It underscores the need for diplomatic efforts to establish international norms against electronic warfare, though enforcement remains difficult in conflict zones.

 

Lessons Learned and Mitigation Measures

The Myanmar GPS spoofing incident offers several lessons for India and the global aviation community. First, it emphasises the importance of pilot training and redundant navigation systems, which proved critical in averting disaster. Second, it highlights the need for real-time intelligence sharing among allies to map and counter interference trends. Groups like OPSGROUP, which tracks aviation risks, could play a pivotal role in this effort.

Technologically, the incident underscores the urgency of developing spoofing-resistant navigation systems. Advances in quantum positioning, which relies on atomic clocks, and machine learning-based anomaly detection could reduce dependence on vulnerable GPS signals. India’s investment in NavIC, a regional navigation system, offers a potential alternative, though its coverage remains limited compared to GPS.

There is also a case for a global ban on GPS spoofing, similar to existing prohibitions on laser attacks against aircraft. While such measures face resistance from states with advanced electronic warfare programs, they could set a precedent for protecting peaceful humanitarian missions. Regional cooperation, particularly within ASEAN, could also address the region’s airspace vulnerabilities, though political instability poses challenges.

 

Conclusion

The GPS spoofing of IAF aircraft during Operation Brahma was a stark reminder of modern aviation’s evolving threats. While the IAF’s preparedness ensured the mission’s success, the incident exposed the fragility of GPS-dependent systems in conflict zones. As electronic warfare becomes more sophisticated, nations must invest in resilient technologies, robust training, and international collaboration to safeguard military and civilian operations. The incident reinforces India’s role as a responsible regional power capable of overcoming adversity to deliver aid. Still, it also signals the need for vigilance in an increasingly contested digital landscape.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

  1. India Today. “Cyber-attack on IAF aircraft involved in Myanmar quake relief op, say defence sources.” April 13, 2025.
  1. The Hindu. “Frequent GPS interference, including ‘spoofing’, near India’s border with Pakistan, Myanmar.” December 28, 2024.
  1. The Print. “Operation Brahma: IAF aircraft flying into earthquake-hit Myanmar faced GPS spoofing.” April 14, 2025.
  1. First post. “Indian Air Force aircraft faced massive cyber attacks in Myanmar airspace during aid mission: Report.” April 13, 2025.
  1. India Sentinels. “What is ‘GPS spoofing’ that the Indian Air Force’s transport aircraft faced in Myanmar airspace?” April 14, 2025.
  1. The Times of India. “IAF jet cyber-attack: IAF jet on Myanmar relief operation faced cyber-attack in the air.” April 14, 2025.
  1. ANI News. “IAF issues clarification on GPS spoofing incident during Myanmar relief operations.” April 14, 2025.
  1. Rediff.com. “IAF jets faced ‘GPS spoofing’ during Myanmar relief mission.” April 13, 2025.
  1. The Economic Times. “IAF planes faced GPS spoofing in Myanmar’s airspace while carrying relief materials for quake victims: Sources.” April 13, 2025.
  1. Mathrubhumi English. “IAF aircraft face GPS spoofing over Myanmar during quake relief mission.” April 13, 2025.
  1. Eurasian Times. “U.S.-Supplied C-130J, C-17 Come ‘Under Attack’ Over Myanmar; What Happened With IAF Aircraft?” April 14, 2025.
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