ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY

 

• The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military.

 

• The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare.

 

• The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.

 

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES

 

 

• The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”

 

• The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.

 

• The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.

 

NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

 

 

• Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity.

 

• The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion of its nuclear forces.

 

• In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates that the PRC possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023—on track to exceed previous projections.

 

• DoD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that year, which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military by 2049.

 

• The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies are intended for peaceful purposes.

 

• The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW).

 

• The PRC is fielding the DF-5C, a silo-based liquid-fueled ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead with a multi-megaton yield. The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its current JIN class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from PRC littoral waters.

 

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

 

 

• The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise oncerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use.

 

• The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations.

 

• The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications.

 

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY

 

 

• The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats.

 

• Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the theater.

 

• In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed ADIZ.

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS

 

• The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its sovereignty.

 

• Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”

 

• During 2022, the PRC conducted multiple coercive actions against the Philippines in the SCS, including cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel, executing dangerous maneuvers in close proximity to Philippine vessels; and reportedly reclaiming several unoccupied land features in the SCS, which the Philippines noted contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award.

 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

 

• In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The PLA’s increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self- declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan.

 

• At the 20^th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as an option.

 

• The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States.

 

PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR

 

• Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the region.

 

• Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against S. and Allied aircraft have included lasing; reckless maneuvers; close approaches in the air or at sea; high rates of closure; discharging chaff or flares in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other actions.

 

• The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of the road, and increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential for loss of life.

THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE

 

• CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national rejuvenation.

 

• The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its foreign policy This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion— and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests.

 

• In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas through participation UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. The also PLA restarted in-person military diplomacy in 2022 that was suspended due to COVID-19.

PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS

 

• The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. If realized, a global PLA military logistics network could disrupt S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve.

 

• Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

 

• In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s Ream Naval The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.

 

• The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and The SSF also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and ICBM launches.

 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE

 

• The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine that are most applicable to the PRC’s goal of strengthening its whole-of-government approach to countering a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.

 

• Western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience.

 

RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION

 

• The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.

 

• The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment.

 

• In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 1 percent, continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position as the second-largest military spender in the world.

 

DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY

 

• China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers.

 

• China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring missile capabilities that improve target-selection and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures.

 

• In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed and manufactured aircraft carrier, featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting devices. The carrier will be able to deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.

 

ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION

 

• The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to information and advanced technologies.

 

• There have also been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by PRC nationals, naturalized S. citizens or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. citizens, for their efforts to illegally acquire information and technology to advance PLA modernization.

DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2022

 

• In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and DoD requests for communication. The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely continued in 2023.

 

• The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States, combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.

 

• DoD is committed to re-opening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition does not veer into conflict. DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include ensuring crisis communications channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and avoiding misperceptions.

 

COMING UP: DETAILED ANALYSIS WITH INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.