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797: HYPERSONIC WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE 2.0:  NEW STRATEGIC CALCULUS

 

Paper published in the April 2026 edition of “The News Analytics” Journal

 

Hypersonic weapons are weapons capable of sustained flight at Mach 5 or higher. Existing missile defence systems do not cater for this new threat. Their speed and manoeuvrability demand a new approach to early warning and subsequent neutralisation. These weapons are emerging as highly valued systems for militaries worldwide.  Their rapid development marks a turning point in military technology and strategic thought. These weapons are giving a new meaning to deterrence and stability.

Hypersonic Weapons. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) can also reach hypersonic speeds. However, they travel through space in a predictable parabolic arc.  Their trajectory becomes predictable, and long-range radars can track them. On the other hand, the characteristics of hypersonic weapons include sustained high speed, increased manoeuvrability, and a high-altitude trajectory (in the upper atmosphere – higher than cruise missiles but lower than the apogee of ballistic missiles). These attributes of hypersonic weapons are blurring the line between ballistic and cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons are classified into two categories: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). HGVs are carried and launched from ballistic missiles. Post-separation, they glide through the upper atmosphere at extreme speeds following a controllable trajectory. HCMs sustain hypersonic flight within the atmosphere using advanced scramjet engines. Hypersonic weapons can alter their trajectory. This adds to the complexity of detecting, tracking, and intercepting them. High speed also compresses decision-making time. It shortens the window for assessing the threat and making a decision on counteraction.

Speed and Manoeuvrability: A Strategic Game-Changer. Hypersonic missiles are commonly depicted as a “game changer and the unprecedented capabilities of these weapons portend a revolution in missile warfare. It is considered that the speed, accuracy, and manoeuvrability of hypersonic boost-glide weapons will fundamentally change the character of warfare. Developments in hypersonic propulsion will revolutionise warfare by enabling faster strikes. With unmatched speed, these weapons will likely hit over-the-horizon targets in a fraction of the time. This claimed speed advantage is ostensibly accompanied by near-immunity to detection, rendering hypersonic weapons “nearly invisible” to existing early warning systems. Together, these capabilities will significantly compress decision and response times.

 

Missile Defence 2.0: Adapting to the Hypersonic Age

Missile Defence in the Pre-Hypersonic Era. Existing defences are primarily designed to counter ballistic missiles. They rely on layered architectures that include early-warning launch detection, long-range radar-based trajectory tracking, and interception. The destruction could occur during the boost, midcourse, or terminal phases.  These systems operate on the logic of predictability. However, these systems are not optimised for low-flying targets that manoeuvre frequently and have little warning time.

Hypersonic Threat Mitigation. A comprehensive missile defence strategy is required to provide an integrated and practical capability to counter ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats. The speed of hypersonic weapons leaves little time to compute a fire-control solution, communicate with command authorities, and complete an engagement to intercept them actively. Anti-Hypersonic defence would require a combination of disruptive data links and sensors, space-based tracking sensors, and innovative interception methods. Some passive defensive measures against traditional missiles are also effective against hypersonic weapons; these include deception, dispersal, hardening, concealment, etc.

Missile Defence 2.0. To counter hypersonic threats, defence developers are exploring what might be called Missile Defence 2.0. This concept emphasises integration, speed, and adaptability. One key area is sensor networks. Future defences rely on constellations of space-based infrared and tracking satellites that can track hypersonic weapons throughout their flight. Methods of interception also need to evolve. Instead of relying solely on kinetic weapons, multiple new interceptors may be required to neutralise the threat. Artificial intelligence would be essential for data fusion from multiple sensors. Another element of Missile Defence 2.0 is layered resilience rather than perfect protection, recognising that no defence will be impenetrable.

Hypersonic Race

The United States, China, and Russia are competing to develop these weapons. They would be fielding a wide array of hypersonic systems in the coming decades. The development of short-, medium-, and long-range variants of these weapons by major powers is resulting in an arms race. These technologies are changing the nature of warfare, and they have the potential to destabilise the global security environment.

USA. The U.S. has pursued both hypersonic weapons technologies since the early 2000s. It has sought to develop longer-range systems capable of reaching deep into an adversary’s territory to attack defended, hardened, and time-urgent targets. The Department of Defence (DOD) is developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program and through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs.

Russia. Russia is reportedly the first nation to deploy a hypersonic missile. It characterises these weapons as a centrepiece of its security strategy and has extensively tested at least three distinct hypersonic systems. Russia’s HGV, known as Avangard, is equipped with a nuclear warhead and deployed on SS-19 long-range land-based ballistic missiles. Avangards reportedly feature onboard countermeasures and can manoeuvre in flight to evade ballistic missile defences. Russia has successfully fielded the Zircon and Kinzhal hypersonic weapons, and it has launched the air-launched Kinzhal hypersonic missiles (with a speed of Mach 10 and a payload of 480kg) against Ukraine.

China. China has made a significant effort to match Russian and U.S. capabilities. It has invested heavily in the hypersonic research, development, test, and evaluation programs in the past decade. China is also investing heavily in hypersonic development infrastructure and weapon systems, reportedly outpacing the United States in testing these technologies. China has developed an HGV known as the DF-ZF, previously referred to as the WU-14. China is also developing the DF-41 long-range intercontinental ballistic missile, which could carry a nuclear hypersonic glide vehicle.

India. India has been investing in hypersonic weapon development. In Sep 2020, India successfully tested the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV). HSTDV is a hypersonic unmanned scramjet demonstration aircraft. In addition to the HSTDV program, India is continuing its research and development efforts across various aspects of hypersonic technology (propulsion systems, materials science, and guidance systems). In July 2025, India reportedly conducted a successful test of a hypersonic cruise missile capable of reaching Mach 8 under Project Vishnu. Reportedly, the project aims to develop the Extended Trajectory-Long Duration Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM), a weapon system that will fundamentally enhance India’s strategic capabilities.

Great Power Competition and Technological Asymmetry. The development of hypersonic weapons has the potential to create a new form of asymmetry. In technologically advanced states, having these weapons gives them an edge in overcoming opponents’ defences. On the other hand, smaller or less tech-savvy states find it difficult to keep up. This creates a growing divide between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This asymmetry is reshaping the strategic calculus. Major powers may become aggressive, while weaker states may double down on asymmetric strategies such as cyber operations or unconventional warfare.

Implications for Deterrence Stability. The most concerning aspect of hypersonics is their impact on deterrence stability. During the Cold War, stability was based on the philosophy of “Mutually Assured Destruction”.  However, now with reduced reaction time, the risk of miscalculation has increased dramatically. The shift is taking place from ‘Launch on Warning’ to ‘Launch on Uncertainty’. States may get tempted to launch their own weapons at the first sign of a perceived threat. This “crisis instability” is compounded by Strategic Ambiguity: most hypersonic vehicles can carry either a conventional or nuclear payload, leaving an adversary to guess the stakes of an incoming strike.

 

Conclusion

Technology is a good gadget, but a destructive weapon. Hypersonic weapons signify a significant advancement in military technology. These weapons are even more powerful than traditional ballistic ones because of their incredible speed and agility. Many countries are actively working on developing and testing them. At the same time, Missile Defence 2.0 is evolving to counter this new threat. It includes advanced sensors, smarter interceptors, and a robust architecture to provide better protection.  The proliferation of hypersonic weapons could have significant implications for the global security landscape. Their speed and manoeuvrability could reduce decision-making time in crises, increasing the risk of miscalculation. The development of hypersonic weapons is also starting a new arms race, as countries seek to maintain or gain military superiority in this field.

 

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References:-

  1. “Hypersonic missiles: What are they and can they be stopped?”, Partyard Defence, May 10, 2019. https://partyardmilitary.com/hypersonic-missiles-what-are-they-and-can-they-be-stopped/
  1. “Hypersonic Technology”, Drishti IAS, 10 Oct 21. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/hypersonic-technology-2
  1. “Russia, China, the U.S.: Who Will Win the Hypersonic Arms”, IEEE Spectrum, Dec 2020. https://spectrum.ieee.org/russia-china-the-us-who-will-win-the-hypersonic-arms-race
  1. Air Marshal Anil Khosla, “Hypersonic Long Range Weapons”, Air Marshals’ Perspective, 10 Nov 2021. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/11/10/hypersonic-long-range-weapons/
  1. Air Marshal Anil Khosla, “Countering Hypersonic Weapon Threat: A Difficult But Manageable Problem”, Air Marshals’ Perspective, 07 Jun 2024. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2024/06/07/countering-hypersonic-weapon-threat-a-difficult-but-manageable-problem/
  1. Tom Karako and Masao Dahlgren, “Complex Air Defence Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat”, A Report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defence Project, February 2022.
  1. Rylie White, “An Emerging Threat: The Impact of Hypersonic Weapons on National Security, Crisis Instability, and Deterrence Strategy”, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
  1. David Roza, “Why Hypersonic Missiles’ Greatest Strength Also Makes Them Vulnerable”, Air and Space Forces Magazine, Dec 2023.
  1. Col Mandeep Singh, “Countering Hypersonics”, Indian Defence Review, Jan 2024.
  1. Economic Times. (2025, July 16). Why India’s new hypersonic missile may outrun Israel’s Iron Dome and Russia’s S-500 and shift the balance in Asia.
  1. Aroor, Shiv. “India’s Hypersonic Missile Ambitions: DRDO’s Project Vishnu and the Road Ahead.” India Today.
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796: THE RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER: AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW

 

The Rules-Based International Order (RBIO) refers to the framework of multilateral institutions. It includes legal norms, treaties, and agreed principles that govern interstate relations.  Its foundational architecture was constructed between 1944 and 1948 (at Bretton Woods, San Francisco, and Geneva). It rests on several interlocking pillars, namely, the United Nations system and its Charter, the Bretton Woods financial institutions (IMF and World Bank), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (later the WTO), international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a constellation of specialised agencies addressing everything from civil aviation to maritime law.

 

RBIO: Core Principle and Architecture. The core logic of the RBIO is that states conduct their international relations according to agreed-upon rules, irrespective of their relative power. Sovereignty of every nation is respected. Disputes are resolved through negotiation, arbitration, or settlement rather than force. The architecture has four distinct dimensions.

    • The security dimension is embedded in the UN Charter. It prohibits the use of force except in self-defence or with Security Council authorisation.
    • The economic dimension is based on open trade. The IMF and the World Bank provided financial stability and development assistance.
    • The legal dimension encompasses international humanitarian law, the law of the sea (UNCLOS), diplomatic immunity conventions, and the human rights law.
    • The normative dimension consists of shared expectations about sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and the illegitimacy of territorial conquest by force.

 

Strengths and Achievements. The RBIO’s achievements between 1945 and roughly 2000 were genuinely significant. It presided over the longest period without a great-power war in modern history. It managed the decolonisation of Asia and Africa without a general war. It provided the framework within which the Cold War was conducted without becoming a hot war. The NPT successfully limited nuclear proliferation far below what analysts predicted in the 1960s. The WTO oversaw the greatest expansion of international trade and the associated reduction in poverty in human history. The UN system provided a forum for diplomatic management of crises. For smaller states, the RBIO provided something particularly valuable: the principle of sovereign equality. A small state in the RBIO has the same legal standing as a large one, the same right to vote in the General Assembly, the same protection from invasion under the UN Charter, and the same access to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This was not merely formal; it genuinely constrained the behaviour of large states in ways that pure power politics would not have.

 

Erosion and Challenges. The RBIO has been under sustained pressure since at least the early 2000s, and that pressure has intensified dramatically in the past decade. Several forces are driving its erosion simultaneously.

    • Great-power revisionism is the most fundamental challenge. China and Russia (both permanent Security Council members) have concluded that the order serves American interests more than those of the others. Both powers have made clear that they regard the RBIO as an American instrument of hegemonic management rather than a genuinely neutral framework of rules.
    • American ambivalence has further eroded its credibility. The United States has repeatedly violated RBIO in pursuit of its interests. It has been invading countries without Security Council authorisation. The Trump administration’s explicit scepticism of multilateral institutions, its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, and UNESCO, and its transactional approach to alliances have all signalled American willingness to instrumentalise or abandon the RBIO framework.
    • Institutional dysfunction has made the order less capable of responding to its own violations. The UN Security Council’s veto mechanism, designed as a great-power concert that would enforce collective security, has been paralysed by great-power competition: Russia and China routinely block action on issues where Western powers seek Council authorisation. In contrast, Western powers do the same in reverse.

 

The RBIO and India

India’s relationship with the RBIO is historically complex and strategically consequential. India benefited to some extent from the RBIO in the process of decolonisation.  India has also been a persistent critic of it, particularly during the Cold War, when the “rules” appeared to serve the interests of the superpowers more than those of the newly independent Global South.

India’s founding foreign policy framework (non-alignment) was, in significant part, a rejection of the Cold War RBIO’s demand that states choose sides. India insisted on the right to conduct its foreign policy according to its own interests rather than as a subordinate within one of the blocs. This instinct has evolved into the contemporary period as “strategic autonomy”, i.e., India’s resistance to formal alliances, its simultaneous maintenance of relationships with multiple powers, and its selective engagement with multilateral institutions.

India’s current RBIO stance is sophisticated and deliberately ambiguous. India rhetorically endorses the RBIO — particularly its sovereignty and non-interference norms, which protect smaller states from great-power coercion — while simultaneously resisting specific RBIO rules that constrain its own behaviour or that it regards as serving others’ interests. India’s approach is therefore not revisionist in the Chinese or Russian sense. It is not seeking to dismantle the order.  

The erosion of RBIO creates specific dilemmas for India. On the one hand, the weakening of sovereignty norms and the normalisation of great-power unilateralism expose India to greater pressure from China. China’s revisionist approach to the LAC boundary and its behaviour in the South China Sea both challenge the RBIO norms. On the other hand, India is uncomfortable with the RBIO in its current American-led form, which it regards as selectively enforced and structurally weighted toward Western interests.

India’s preferred outcome — a reformed, more genuinely multipolar RBIO in which India has a larger voice commensurate with its growing power and population — is articulated through its push for permanent UN Security Council membership, its leadership of the Global South within forums like the G20 and BRICS, and its consistent advocacy for “development-first” norms within multilateral economic institutions. Whether this reformist vision is achievable in the current environment of great-power competition and norm erosion is one of the central strategic questions India will face in the decade to 2037.

 

The RBIO and the Pre-emption Paradigm

The US-Israel strikes on Iran illustrate the RBIO’s erosion in its most acute form. The strikes bypassed the UN Security Council, the NPT verification mechanism, and the IAEA inspection framework — three of the order’s most important institutions for managing nuclear proliferation. They were conducted without Security Council authorisation. They targeted a sovereign state’s domestic infrastructure. And they were widely accepted by the Western strategic community as legitimate, demonstrating that the gap between formal RBIO rules and the actual standards that major powers apply to their own behaviour has become operationally significant.

For India, this creates a specific doctrinal implication. If the RBIO’s formal rules no longer reliably constrain great-power behaviour in the nuclear domain, India cannot base its security planning on the assumption that those rules will protect its own nuclear infrastructure from pre-emptive attack. For that matter, they will also not prevent adversaries from conducting sub-conventional operations against Indian interests. The RBIO cannot substitute credible deterrence, but remains valuable as a diplomatic framework.

 

Repercussions.

The RBIO is neither dead nor fully effective. It is structurally weakened and being selectively enforced. It is still functioning in domains where great-power interests converge sufficiently to sustain it. What has changed is the normative credibility of the order, i.e. the shared expectation that rules apply equally to the powerful and the weak. That expectation, never fully realised, has been further eroded by a decade of great-power unilateral action. The result is an international environment in which rules provide guidance and legitimacy only to the major powers, when convenient.

For India, navigating this environment requires exactly the combination of strategic autonomy, credible conventional deterrence, selective multilateral engagement, and coalition-building that its foreign policy has historically pursued — but pursued now with greater urgency, greater resources, and greater strategic coherence than the drift of recent years has always provided.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:

  1. Ruggie, J. G. (1982). International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. International Organisation, 36(2), 379–415.
  1. Bailey, S. D., & Daws, S. (1998). The procedure of the UN Security Council (3rd ed.). Clarendon Press.
  1. Steil, B. (2013). The battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the making of a new world order. Princeton University Press.
  1. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (1968). Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
  1. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international order. International Security, 43(4), 7–50.
  1. Kagan, R. (2017). The twilight of the liberal world order. Brookings Institution.
  1. Haass, R. (2017). A world in disarray: American foreign policy and the crisis of the old order. Penguin Press.
  1. Narlikar, A. (2013). India Rising: Responsible to whom? International Affairs, 89(3), 595–614.
  1. Tellis, A. J. (2001). India’s emerging nuclear posture: Between recessed deterrent and ready arsenal. RAND Corporation.
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795: SPECTRA: THE INVISIBLE SHIELD OF THE DASSAULT RAFALE

 

Survivability in a modern aerial combat environment depends on mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum. This mastery in the Dassault Rafale is provided by a single sophisticated system called SPECTRA (Système de Protection et d’Évitement des Conduites de Tir du Rafale). It is a state-of-the-art, fully integrated electronic warfare suite developed jointly by Thales Group and MBDA.

 

Unlike external EW pods that compromise aerodynamics and radar cross-section, SPECTRA is embedded directly within the Rafale’s airframe. Sensors are distributed across the fuselage, wing roots, wingtips, and tail sections. This creates an all-aspect awareness bubble with no blind spots. This “smart skin” philosophy means the system is not an add-on but is a core nervous system. It is networked directly with the aircraft’s RBE2 AESA radar, OSF infrared search-and-track system, and mission computer to produce a single, fused tactical picture for the pilot.

 

360-Degree, Multi-Spectral Coverage. SPECTRA’s defining capability is its ability to detect, classify, and respond to threats across the full electromagnetic spectrum simultaneously. It monitors radar emissions from enemy SAM batteries and airborne fire-control radars, detects the heat signatures of infrared-homing missiles, and identifies laser rangefinders and target designators — all in real time, from any direction. This matters immensely in modern contested airspace where multiple weapons create an overlapping defensive envelope. A system that addresses only one spectral dimension leaves the aircraft exposed to the others. SPECTRA addresses all three simultaneously, with sensors capable of detecting threats at ranges that provide the pilot with a meaningful reaction time.

 

The Architecture: Key Components. The system’s effectiveness flows from four tightly integrated subsystems working in concert:

    • The DDM NG (Détecteur de Départ Missile Nouvelle Génération) is MBDA’s next-generation missile approach warning system. It uses advanced infrared and ultraviolet sensors with wide-angle coverage to detect missile launches at long range — including from low-observable platforms — with sub-degree angular resolution. Critically, it can detect non-radiating passive threats that older UV-based systems miss.
    • The Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) passively scans for hostile radar emissions. It identifies and geolocates emitters using techniques such as interferometry and time-difference-of-arrival. It compares signals against an extensive, field-reprogrammable threat library capable of distinguishing an S-400 battery from an airborne AESA fire-control radar, and assigning threat priority accordingly.
    • The Laser Warning System (LWS) detects when laser rangefinders or weapon designators are illuminating the Rafale, providing precise bearing data to cue the appropriate countermeasure.
    • The Phased Array Jammer (JAM NG) is the most potent and secretive element. Using active electronically scanned array technology, it directs precisely shaped jamming energy toward specific emitters — applying noise jamming, false target generation, or range deception — without broadcasting the aircraft’s position. This targeted approach is far more effective and far harder to counter than legacy brute-force jammers.

 

Data Fusion. SPECTRA is not just an assembly of sensors. Its strength lies in its data fusion capability. A central management unit continuously merges raw signals received from multiple sensors (RWR, DDM NG, and LWS). The CMU assesses threat lethality, trajectory and urgency. It then presents the crew with a prioritised, actionable threat picture. In practice, this means that if the RWR detects a fire-control radar and the DDM NG simultaneously observes a launch from the same bearing, the system doesn’t merely alert the pilot — it identifies the optimal countermeasure (chaff for radar-guided threats, flares for infrared seekers, or active jamming), and can execute it automatically within milliseconds. Pilots retain full manual override, but the cognitive burden during high-G combat manoeuvring is dramatically reduced. Equally significant is SPECTRA’s offensive contribution: by passively geolocating enemy radars without emitting, it allows the Rafale to prosecute SEAD missions or precision strikes without activating its own radar — preserving the aircraft’s electromagnetic silence and complicating the adversary’s situational picture.

 

Constant Evolution. SPECTRA has demonstrated the Rafale’s ability to penetrate contested airspace without dedicated SEAD escorts. SPECTRA is designed for longevity. Its modular architecture permits continuous software and hardware updates.  Its threat libraries can be refreshed easily to address new radar types, advanced IR seekers, and low-probability-of-intercept systems. The new standards introduced in the system have improved its jamming performance and AI-assisted threat recognition.  The future enhancements include capabilities to counter stealth-detecting low-frequency radars and future hypersonic threats.

 

For air forces like India’s, operating in environments bracketed by advanced Chinese and Pakistani integrated air defence systems, it is not merely a defensive feature. It is a strategic enabler.

 

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