Category: Military Capability

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845: BANGLADESH’S STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

 

Taken together, Bangladesh’s move toward acquiring Chinese J-10CE fighters and its stated willingness to consider joining the Mecca Pact are strategically significant for India. However, neither development alone means Bangladesh has become a Chinese or Pakistani military ally. The more important issue is the direction of Bangladesh’s strategic relationships and whether these moves eventually develop into a broader China-Pakistan-Bangladesh security architecture.

 

China’s Push for the J-10CE to Bangladesh

China is not simply “giving” Bangladesh fighter jets. Dhaka is moving toward purchasing Chinese J-10CE multirole fighters, with reports of a draft arrangement for roughly 20 aircraft, though earlier reports mentioned up to 24. The overall package has been reported at around $2.2–2.3 billion, including aircraft, weapons, training, infrastructure, spares and support. The agreement is not yet a completed, delivered contract, so final numbers, price and delivery schedules remain subject to approval. The deal serves both Bangladeshi and Chinese interests.

Bangladesh’s Motivations.

Fleet Modernisation: Bangladesh needs to replace or augment an ageing fighter fleet, particularly its F-7s and other legacy aircraft.

Capability at a Manageable Cost: The J-10CE offers a substantial jump in capability, including AESA radar, modern beyond-visual-range (BVR) weapons, networked avionics and electronic-warfare capabilities, at a lower acquisition and operating cost than many Western alternatives.

Existing Chinese Ecosystem: China is already Bangladesh’s dominant defence supplier, with Chinese-origin aircraft, ships, tanks, missiles and other systems in service. A new Chinese fighter therefore fits relatively easily into an existing logistics, training and maintenance ecosystem.

Strategic Diversification: The acquisition also fits Dhaka’s broader “Bangladesh First” approach, in which it seeks to maximise strategic autonomy by maintaining relationships with China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, the Gulf and Western markets rather than relying exclusively on one partner.

China’s Motivations

For Beijing, the deal is about more than selling airframes.

Long-term Strategic Dependence: A fighter fleet creates a relationship that can last decades. Aircraft, missiles, spare parts, simulators, training, maintenance, upgrades and technical support can progressively tie Bangladesh’s air force to Chinese systems and standards.

Expansion of China’s Defence Footprint: Bangladesh would become another important Chinese defence customer in South Asia, strengthening Beijing’s military-industrial presence around the Bay of Bengal and along India’s eastern periphery.

Export-Market Validation: Pakistan is currently the principal established foreign operator of the J-10 family. A Bangladeshi purchase would provide China with another reference customer and strengthen its pitch to other prospective buyers.

Strategic Gains: A friendly state operating Chinese equipment near India can complicate Indian planning and give Beijing greater influence.

The key point is therefore that the strategic value of the J-10CE deal lies not only in the aircraft’s combat capability but in the long-term Chinese military ecosystem that could develop around it.

 

Bangladesh and the Mecca Pact

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, establishes a collective-defence framework under which an armed attack on one member is treated as an attack on all. It has consequently been compared with NATO-style collective defence, although publicly available information on its precise command structure, accession procedures and operational obligations remains limited.

Bangladeshi officials have said Dhaka would consider joining if formally invited. Politically and diplomatically, it appears possible, but it is not yet an imminent or settled decision. Bangladesh has expressed openness to the idea, but it has not committed to accession.

The Mecca Pact has greater potential political significance because it would move Bangladesh beyond defence procurement into a formal security relationship involving Pakistan. For Dhaka, potential benefits of joining the pact could include: 

    • Stronger defence and security relationships with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey.
    • Possible access to Turkish defence technology and training.
    • Deeper Gulf economic and energy relationships.
    • Additional diplomatic leverage through strategic diversification.

However, membership would also create complications. Bangladesh has traditionally pursued a non-aligned or balancing foreign policy and depends simultaneously on India for geography, connectivity and trade; China for defence and investment; Gulf countries for employment and remittances; and Western markets for exports.

Joining a mutual-defence framework that includes Pakistan would therefore represent a much more consequential foreign-policy decision than purchasing Chinese aircraft.

Most importantly, the Mecca Pact should not automatically be interpreted as a Bangladesh-Pakistan military alliance directed against India. Dhaka would retain its own interests, and actual obligations would depend on the final terms of membership and the circumstances of any future conflict.

 

India’s Concerns

The J-10CE would give the Bangladesh Air Force a modern BVR air-combat capability, including AESA radar and advanced air-to-air missiles. This would narrow the qualitative gap between Bangladesh and India in specific areas, particularly along India’s eastern approaches.

The J-10CE purchase alone does not fundamentally change the India-Bangladesh military balance. A fleet of roughly 20–24 aircraft would still leave Bangladesh’s overall air power considerably smaller than India’s, and combat effectiveness depends on much more than the aircraft themselves: pilot training, sortie generation, airborne early-warning and control, air defence, tankers, C4ISR and supporting infrastructure all matter.

The concern grows when the fighter purchase is considered alongside Bangladesh’s potential political alignment with a Pakistan-inclusive defence framework, and China’s growing hold on Bangladesh through the supply of defence equipment. The combination, not any single development, matters.

However, the more important issue is Bangladesh’s dependence on China.  A future combination of J-10CE, Chinese missiles, Chinese radars, UAVs, air-defence systems, naval systems, training, and maintenance would increase China’s institutional and technological influence over the Bangladesh Armed Forces.

Operating the same aircraft family as Pakistan could also make future technical cooperation, training or interoperability easier. However, this should not be assumed to mean that Bangladesh and Pakistan will automatically operate as a unified military force.

Bangladesh occupies a strategically important position between much of India’s mainland and the Northeast. Joining the Mecca Pact could be more consequential for India. This could represent an evolution from the traditional China-Pakistan strategic axis toward a looser, more complicated regional network, with Bangladesh as an additional node.

The consequence to the Bay of Bengal and India’s Northeast would be particularly relevant. Such an arrangement could complicate India’s eastern security environment. Deep defence relationships, technical dependence, intelligence cooperation, infrastructure access and military interoperability can themselves create strategic leverage for China.

 

India: Watch and Act

Several indicators will reveal whether these developments remain limited to procurement and diplomatic diversification or become strategically more serious. India should keep a close watch on: –

    • Final J-10CE contract, number of aircraft, delivery schedule, weapons package, sensors, data links, training arrangements and financing.
    • Expansion of the Chinese ecosystem with particular attention to Chinese AWACS, SAMs, ISR systems, UAVs, radar networks and other supporting capabilities. These could matter more strategically than the fighters themselves.
    • Chinese access to Bangladeshi infrastructure. Any future arrangements involving airbases, ports, logistics facilities, intelligence installations or sustained Chinese military access would represent a substantially more serious development.
    • Pakistan-Bangladesh military cooperation. Joint exercises, intelligence sharing, training arrangements or institutional defence agreements would indicate whether the political relationship is translating into operational cooperation.
    • Mecca Pact negotiations, accession process or a formal memorandum.

India’s response matters because excessive pressure on Dhaka could become counterproductive. A better approach would be to compete without confrontation. India should focus on: –

    • Stronger mutually acceptable defence-industrial cooperation.
    • Maritime cooperation.
    • Border-management mechanisms.
    • Economic and transport connectivity.
    • Energy cooperation.
    • Disaster-relief mechanisms.
    • Continued military-to-military engagement;
    • Sustained political dialogue.

At the same time, India should strengthen its own eastern capabilities rather than assume Bangladesh will remain strategically neutral indefinitely. This means continued attention to the Eastern sector.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The strategic concern is not whether Bangladesh acquires Chinese fighter aircraft. It is whether the agreement sets the stage for greater Chinese involvement. The situation grows more complicated if Bangladesh joins a security agreement that also includes Pakistan. If both happen, the consequences for India would be much more serious.

These developments should be seen as part of a strategic trend, not as an urgent military crisis. The right course of action is neither complacency nor panic. New Delhi should strengthen its military position in the east, watch how China and Pakistan cooperate on defence matters, and remain politically and economically engaged with Bangladesh.

 

Shared these thoughts with Kartikeya Sharma on News 9.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. Ahmed, I. (2026, July 23). Recalibrating foreign policy: Implications of Tarique Rahman’s China visit. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

 

  1. (2026, August 7). Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan pledge mutual defence. Reuters.

 

  1. com, Draft deal takes shape for Bangladesh’s potential purchase of Chinese J-10CE jets. bdnews24.com. (2026).

 

  1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Message to the nation by the Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister on the signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. (2026b, August 10).

 

  1. Rehman, I. (2021). China’s influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and resilience in four countries. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

 

  1. (2026a, August 7). Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan pledge mutual defence. Reuters.

 

  1. (2026b, August 25). Bangladesh could consider joining Mecca pact, testing foreign ties. Reuters.

 

 

  1. (2026c, August 25). Bangladesh in talks to buy Chinese J-10CE fighter jets. Reuters.

 

 

  1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). SIPRI arms transfers database.

 

10.          The Business Standard. (2026). Bangladesh set to buy 20 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets for $2.3b—The Business Standard.

 

 

 

 

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842: OPERATION SINDOOR REVISITED

 

Operation Sindoor was a multi-domain, mostly non-contact military operation India carried out in the early hours of 7 May 2025. In the first phase, India carried out attacks on nine terrorist facilities associated with groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan and in illegal Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. When the situation escalated, phase two was carried out with strikes being launched at military targets in Pakistan. Hostilities continued for about 88 hours before a ceasefire agreement was reached on 10 May.

 

Former CDS Gen Anil Chauhan (retired) delivered a talk on “Operation Sindoor and its Aftermath” on 25 August 2026.  This talk is significant from an analytical perspective.

 

Analytical Perspective and Takeaways

  • Military power serves as an instrument of political policy; the armed forces set their own military objectives based on the political aim. The military plans accordingly. This matters because it shows that Sindoor was designed as a limited, controlled operation rather than an open-ended war.
  • Political direction and freedom of action. The clear political directive was to send an unambiguous message that India will not tolerate cross-border terrorism. Therefore, the directive was that the action should be unthinkable, with no political pressure for immediate action, and carried out without failure and with suitable evidence. Clear intent and operational autonomy are ideal for the military.
  • Tactical Shift and evolution of India’s retaliatory doctrines (to preserve surprise and prevent operational predictability). Unlike the land route used post-Uri (2016) or the high-altitude/large-force air engagements used post-Pulwama/Balakot (2019), Operation Sindoor employed a “third option”: leveraging the lower airspace. Low-altitude operations kept the conflict threshold controlled, maximised surprise, and delivered high mission assurance without triggering immediate full-scale escalation. It was not about what weapons India possessed. It was about how those weapons were employed against the adversary’s surveillance and air-defence architecture. In military terms, this illustrates the importance of operational creativity over simply having superior hardware.
  • Redefining the area below the nuclear threshold. The operation has shown that India is capable of carrying out precise conventional strikes at targeted terrorist infrastructure within a carefully controlled time frame which remains below the nuclear escalation threshold, thus countering the ‘stability-instability paradox’ which adversaries rely upon.
  • The fact that the strike hit the Kirana Hills has important strategic implications since it was not intended to target Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure; if an intentional strike had been made on a nuclear-related facility, it might have been seen as an attempt to attack Pakistan’s strategic deterrent and would therefore have led to a very different escalation scenario. 
  • Skardu as a possible target. Skardu was a possible target but had to be changed to Bholari due to weather constraints. This shows India had multiple military options, rather than a single predetermined strike package. It also demonstrates the resilience and flexibility of IAF capability and planning.
  • On 10 May 2025, Pakistan pleaded for a ceasefire. India responded in its own time. This indicates that the aim was not merely to retaliate and jump at the first diplomatic opportunity. Instead, India chose to achieve its military objectives before agreeing to end the operations. This is an ideal example of aligning the military end-state with the political objectives.

 

  • Preparedness creates political choices. Peacetime shapes the options available during a crisis. If a military lacks long-range precision weapons, drones, ISR, electronic warfare, air defence and integration, political leaders have fewer options when a crisis occurs. Therefore, Sindoor resulted from years of military modernisation and capability development.
  • Multi-Domain Operation. It was India’s genuine multi-domain operation, involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with cyber and information-warfare elements. The integration achieved during the operation validated the direction India had taken toward jointness.
  • Operation Sindoor was a controlled demonstration of India’s ability to calibrate force and capability to punish aggression without necessarily allowing every confrontation to become a full-scale war. The major lesson is that modern warfare is increasingly about precision, information, speed, networking and decision superiority rather than simply manpower or territorial capture.
  • Pakistan’s post-operation adjustments include reorganising its military command (by setting up a new CDF post) and seeking security agreements (the Mecca joint defence agreement between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), showing it is changing its approach.

 

Strategic Implications

The above analysis underscores a permanent shift in India’s strategic doctrine.  It indicates a pairing of firm political intent with evolving, technologically driven military execution. By adapting tactics every time (i.e. from ground raids to high-altitude strikes and now low-altitude/loitering assets), India maintains operational unpredictability while establishing clear redlines against cross-border terrorism.

Operation Sindoor is still going on. Although the official line since 10 May 2025 has been that a ceasefire or pause was agreed upon after Pakistan asked for it, the operation has not officially ended. By keeping it going in this way, India indicates that it sees its position following the Pahalgam incident (the “new red line”, the change from a policy of deterrence to one of declaring a willingness to take direct action) as a continuing stance, not as a single, one-off punitive operation which has now finished.

 

Discussed these aspects with Vishnu Som of NDTV on the Program “Left Right and Centre”.

Link to the discussion:-

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841: Indegenous Jet Engine: Single Most Technical Vulnerability

 

Inputs to the journalists on the subject

 

Q1. Has dependence on foreign engines been a major constraint in building more fighter jets?

Yes, the trend is becoming more pronounced. The Tejas program exemplifies this clearly. India has undertaken the design and manufacturing of the aircraft; however, its domestically developed Kaveri engine failed to meet the necessary performance standards, resulting in dependence on GE’s F404 engine. More recently, delays in F404 deliveries have delayed the handover of completed Tejas Mk1A aircraft.

The problem is therefore not just cost or foreign exchange. It creates a bottleneck in the production chain. The dependence also extends into future programmes. Tejas Mk2 is planned around the GE F414, while the initial AMCA configuration is also expected to rely on a foreign engine.

India has displayed the capability to design and build airframes, integrate avionics and weapons, and increase its manufacturing capacity. However, the most important component (the engine) continues to be a bottleneck. The reliance on foreign engines has become a major constraint and a strategic weakness.

 

Q2. Is it critical for India to end this dependence?

It is strategically important for long-term military autonomy, operational readiness, and industrial self-reliance. Foreign dependence brings about several risks, such as vulnerability to interruptions or delays in supply (as was the case with the F404 engines), the possibility of the supplier country exercising leverage, greater lifecycle costs for spares and upgrades and for maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO), export restrictions (since engine OEM approvals are usually required), and a restricted capacity to fully optimise or upgrade the aircraft on one’s own.

 However, India cannot realistically wait for a completely indigenous engine before expanding its fighter fleet. The IAF needs aircraft now, so foreign engines remain necessary for programmes such as Tejas Mk1A and Mk2.

The more important objective is to ensure that future Indian fighters cannot be held hostage by the availability, pricing or export-control decisions of another country. This matters particularly because India expects a very large requirement for fighter engines.  GTRE estimated a need for roughly 1,100 engines through 2035. For AMCA and subsequent programmes, India therefore needs access to the underlying technology, not merely an Indian factory assembling a foreign-designed engine.

 

Q3. What are the advantages of securing access to engine technology possessed by only a handful of countries?

The list of nations that can genuinely design a modern high-thrust military jet engine remains limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, with China having made still-contested progress. India has been exploring major partnerships with companies such as Safran and Rolls-Royce for high-thrust fighter propulsion. In August 2026, Reliance Industries and Rolls-Royce also announced a partnership to explore co-developing and manufacturing an engine for the AMCA programme.

Modern fighter engines involve high-temperature materials, turbine blades, coatings, cooling systems, compressors, combustion processes, digital controls, and precision manufacturing. Only a small number of countries have the full range of technological knowledge needed for such engines, and accessing these technologies through a co-development programme would be advantageous.

Strategic Autonomy. India would have much greater control over the availability, modification and upgrading of its fighters. It reduces the risk of export restrictions, supply interruptions, political pressure, unexpected price increases, and dependence on foreign approval for upgrades. It would give India the freedom to design future fighters. The engine constrains an aircraft designer. If you control the propulsion system, you can optimise the aircraft around your own requirements rather than designing around what a foreign engine supplier offers.

Faster Technological Learning. This may actually be more valuable than the first indigenous engine itself. India needs to learn how to design and manufacture the core technologies of an advanced turbofan. Once that knowledge exists domestically, subsequent engines can evolve rather than start from scratch. The Kaveri programme generated valuable expertise but did not achieve the required fighter performance. A genuine technology partnership could help India bridge precisely those gaps.

Aerospace Ecosystem. A successful engine programme would build capabilities in Superalloys, single-crystal blades, coatings, precision manufacturing, sensors, FADEC, testing, metallurgy, and additive manufacturing. Those technologies have applications beyond fighter engines, including UAVs, missiles, helicopters and civil aerospace.

Export Potential. If India eventually owns sufficient intellectual property and manufacturing capability, it could export engines or aircraft without needing permission from a foreign engine designer for every major modification. That would transform India from primarily an aircraft buyer/manufacturer into an aerospace technology power.

Bottom Line

India’s dependence on foreign suppliers is perhaps the single biggest technological vulnerability in its aerospace ecosystem, and developing an indigenous engine is a non-negotiable priority. As India considers these offers, the question is whether these companies will share the deepest layers of their process knowledge.

 

Link to the quoted article on the subject

https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2026/08/27/rolls-royce-safran-vie-for-indias-next-generation-fighter-engine/

 

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