696: INDO-US DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION: INTEREST-BASED TO LONG-TERM STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

 

My article published on the IIRF website on 10 Jul 25.

 

Indo-US relations have undergone a remarkable transformation over the past seven decades. From initial Cold War-era suspicions to the present-day strategic embrace, the evolution of ties between the world’s two largest democracies has been driven by changing geopolitical realities and converging interests. Defence and security cooperation has emerged as one of the strongest pillars of this relationship. Defence cooperation has deepened through foundational agreements like LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA, fostering interoperability and intelligence-sharing. Joint military exercises, arms trade, and collaboration in emerging defence technologies further solidify ties. Driven by shared concerns over regional security, maritime stability, and countering China’s assertiveness, the partnership is evolving beyond transactional engagements. As both nations align their strategic interests, Indo-U.S. defence cooperation is poised to shape the geopolitical landscape, reinforcing a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific.

 

Historical Evolution of Indo-US Relations

The relationship between India and the United States has undergone significant transformations over the decades, shaped by shifting geopolitical realities, economic imperatives, and strategic interests. From the early years of Indian independence to the present, the two nations have moved from a period of mutual scepticism to an era of deepening cooperation. The recent shift in Washington’s attitude toward New Delhi, characterised by greater strategic alignment, stems from historical developments, economic interdependence, and evolving security challenges, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-US relations were primarily defined by ideological differences in the immediate aftermath of India’s independence in 1947. During the Cold War, India adopted a policy of non-alignment, refusing to join either the Western or Soviet blocs formally. While the United States viewed India as a democratic counterweight to communist China, Washington was frustrated by New Delhi’s reluctance to integrate into the Western-led order fully. Instead, the US deepened ties with Pakistan, a key Cold War ally, supplying Islamabad with military and economic aid. This alliance created long-term strains in Indo-US relations, as India perceived American support for Pakistan as an endorsement of its regional rival.

Despite this friction, moments of cooperation emerged, particularly in times of crisis. In 1962, during the Sino-Indian War, the US provided military aid to India, recognising the common threat posed by China. However, relations soured again in the 1970s when India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, prompting Washington to impose sanctions. The Cold War period was thus marked by oscillations between limited engagement and estrangement, with strategic considerations dictating the extent of bilateral ties.

The post-Cold War era brought a significant recalibration of Indo-US relations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, India lost a crucial economic and military partner, prompting a shift toward economic liberalisation and global integration. The US, recognising India’s growing economic potential, gradually moved to strengthen ties. However, nuclear non-proliferation remained a contentious issue, particularly after India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Washington responded with sanctions, but a pragmatic realisation of India’s strategic importance led to a thaw in relations by the early 2000s.

A significant turning point came with the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2008, which marked a shift in Washington’s stance on India’s nuclear program. The agreement brokered under the George W. Bush administration effectively recognised India as a responsible nuclear power outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework. This deal ended decades of nuclear estrangement and laid the groundwork for deeper strategic cooperation.

The rise of China as a geopolitical competitor further cemented Indo-US ties in the 2010s. Successive American administrations, from Barack Obama to Donald Trump and Joe Biden, increasingly viewed India as a critical partner in maintaining a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. This alignment has been evident in India’s inclusion in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alongside the US, Japan, and Australia to counter China’s assertiveness in the region. Defence cooperation has expanded, with India emerging as a major buyer of American military hardware and the two countries signing key agreements for intelligence sharing and logistical cooperation.

The most recent shift in Washington’s attitude toward India stems from several factors. First, the US sees India as an indispensable partner in its strategic competition with China, particularly after the 2020 border clashes between India and China in Ladakh. Second, economic ties have strengthened, with India emerging as a key destination for American investment, particularly in technology and defence manufacturing. Third, there is growing recognition in Washington that a strong India is beneficial and essential to US interests in maintaining a multipolar Asia.

 

From Transactional Interests to Strategic Partnership

Initially, Indo-US interactions were largely transactional, focused on immediate political or economic needs. The Cold War saw limited cooperation, with the US favouring Pakistan as a strategic ally and India maintaining its non-alignment stance with a tilt towards the Soviet Union. Economic considerations also played a role, with the US mainly viewing India as a developing country rather than a strategic partner.

The shift from a transactional relationship to a strategic partnership began with India’s economic liberalisation in the 1990s, which opened doors for deeper economic and defence engagements. The 2005 Civil Nuclear Agreement was a turning point, signifying trust and long-term commitment from both sides. Regular high-level diplomatic dialogues, including the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue and Quad engagements, have strengthened confidence.

Military cooperation has also expanded significantly, with India emerging as a Major Defence Partner of the US. Beyond defence, the Indo-US partnership has developed into intelligence sharing, cyber security collaboration, and joint military exercises, reinforcing mutual trust. Both nations have also aligned on regional security concerns, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where they work together under frameworks such as QUAD to counter China’s growing influence.

Technology transfer and co-development initiatives, such as the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), mark another dimension of the growing strategic partnership. While challenges remain, including India’s concerns about strategic autonomy and US legislative constraints, the trajectory points towards more profound engagement.

Today, Indo-US ties are no longer limited to immediate interests but are rooted in a long-term vision for regional stability, economic growth, and defence cooperation. This evolution signifies a paradigm shift in bilateral relations, establishing India and the US as key strategic allies in the 21st century and providing a reassuring outlook for the future of global security.

 

Importance of Defence and Security Cooperation

Defence and security cooperation is central to Indo-US relations, providing stability in an increasingly volatile global environment. The US sees India as a crucial player in countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, while India values US support for its defence modernisation efforts. This cooperation extends beyond traditional military engagements, including joint efforts in counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, cyber security, and regional security frameworks.

One of the primary motivations for enhanced Indo-US defence collaboration is the growing geopolitical uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific. The US and India share deep concerns about China’s aggressive territorial claims, expansionist policies, and military assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Both nations are united in their aim to maintain a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific region by strengthening defence ties, ensuring maritime security and protecting critical trade routes.

Defence and security cooperation are also crucial to India’s military modernisation. India has been steadily reducing its dependence on traditional defence suppliers like Russia and diversifying its acquisitions through partnerships with the US. Advanced weapons systems, missile technology, and intelligence-sharing agreements have significantly enhanced India’s military capabilities, improving its readiness to tackle emerging security threats. The US, in turn, benefits by strengthening an essential ally in South Asia, ensuring stability in a strategically vital region.

Cyber and space security have also emerged as new frontiers for Indo-US defence collaboration. With the rise of cyber threats, both nations have prioritised securing their critical infrastructure, enhancing cyber defence mechanisms, and sharing expertise in combating cyber warfare. Similarly, space security initiatives, including satellite technology sharing and joint space missions, are becoming integral to bilateral defence engagements.

Another vital component of Indo-US security ties is the interoperability between their armed forces. Regular joint military exercises, such as Malabar, Yudh Abhyas, and Vajra Prahar, enhance operational coordination and foster a better understanding of each other’s military doctrines. These exercises help improve response capabilities during crises and enable seamless cooperation in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions.

    • LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement). Signed between India and the United States in 2016, LEMOA allows their armed forces to access each other’s bases for refuelling, replenishment, and logistical support on a case-by-case basis. It enhances operational flexibility, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, by facilitating extended deployments and joint exercises. While it does not imply automatic basing rights, LEMOA strengthens strategic cooperation, improves military readiness, and enhances interoperability between both nations’ armed forces.
    • COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement). COMCASA, signed in 2018, enables secure, real-time communication between the U.S. and Indian military assets. It grants India access to encrypted communication systems, ensuring compatibility with advanced U.S. platforms like P-8I maritime patrol aircraft and C-17 transport planes. COMCASA enhances joint operations and situational awareness by improving intelligence-sharing and battlefield coordination. However, concerns over data security and sovereignty initially delayed its acceptance, highlighting the complexities of deepening Indo-U.S. military cooperation.
    • BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). This agreement, finalised in 2020, facilitates the sharing of advanced geospatial intelligence between India and the U.S. It provides India with precise satellite imagery, digital maps, and classified geospatial data crucial for accurate targeting and surveillance. It enhances India’s missile systems, navigation, and military planning, especially in countering regional threats. BECA complements other foundational agreements, reinforcing Indo-U.S. defence ties and boosting India’s strategic capabilities in modern warfare and intelligence operations.

Overall, the deepening defence and security cooperation between India and the US reflects their shared commitment to regional stability, democratic values, and mutual security interests. As both nations continue to align their strategic objectives, this partnership is expected to play a crucial role in shaping the future of global security dynamics.

 

Emerging Areas of Collaboration (Counterterrorism)

Counterterrorism remains a key focus area in Indo-US defence cooperation, with both nations actively collaborating on intelligence sharing, cyber security, and counter-radicalisation initiatives. The United States has consistently supported India’s stance on cross-border terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of major attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2019 Pulwama attack.

Both countries have institutionalised counterterrorism cooperation through platforms like the India-US Counterterrorism Joint Working Group and the Homeland Security Dialogue. These mechanisms facilitate information exchange, sharing of best practices, and capacity-building initiatives.

Cyber security is also an integral component of counterterrorism cooperation, with both countries working to prevent terrorist organisations from using digital platforms for propaganda and recruitment. Efforts to combat terror financing, monitor radicalisation trends, and enhance border security measures further strengthen this collaboration.

India and the US also engage in joint counterterrorism exercises, ensuring security forces are prepared for potential threats. Given the rising global terrorist threats, particularly from groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, this partnership remains vital for regional and global security.

 

Bilateral vs. Multilateral Engagements

While Indo-US defence cooperation has a strong bilateral component, multilateral frameworks like the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which includes Japan and Australia, further enhance strategic coordination. The QUAD has gained significance as a forum to ensure a free and open maritime domain.

Multilateral engagements help both nations coordinate efforts in maritime security, intelligence sharing, and defence cooperation with like-minded partners. Exercises like Malabar, which now includes Japan and Australia, exemplify this shift towards multilateralism. Additionally, initiatives such as ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) serve as platforms to address regional security challenges collaboratively.

Through bilateral agreements, India and the US continue to deepen military cooperation, but multilateral engagements ensure that this collaboration extends beyond just two nations, forming a broader regional security architecture. The combination of bilateral and multilateral strategies strengthens India’s role as a regional security provider and aligns with the US’s objective of a stable Indo-Pacific region.

 

Challenges and Divergences

Despite strong defence ties, challenges remain, including India’s historical dependence on Russian military equipment, trade disputes, and differing strategic priorities on global issues like Iran and Russia-Ukraine tensions. India’s reliance on Russian arms presents an obstacle to full integration with US defence technology, as interoperability concerns and CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act) sanctions remain points of contention. Additionally, trade disputes over tariffs and market access create occasional friction.

Strategic divergences also persist, particularly regarding India’s approach to global conflicts. While the US has taken a firm stance against Russia following the Ukraine conflict, India has pursued a more balanced policy, maintaining its longstanding ties with Moscow while engaging with Western powers. Similarly, India’s energy needs and strategic interests in Iran sometimes clash with US-imposed sanctions, complicating diplomatic engagements.

Another challenge is India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy. While India seeks closer ties with the US, it remains cautious about entering alliances that could limit its independent decision-making. This has sometimes led to differing approaches to security issues, including military operations and geopolitical alignments in the Indo-Pacific. Balanced engagement requires careful diplomacy to align mutual interests while respecting national priorities.

The growing presence of China in the region is both a common concern and a point of divergence. While India and the US seek to counter China’s assertiveness, India’s economic ties with China remain significant. Additionally, India has sometimes preferred regional solutions rather than fully aligning with US-led initiatives, leading to occasional policy differences.

Addressing these divergences requires continued diplomatic engagement, trust-building measures, and greater alignment on global security policies to ensure a more seamless and effective partnership. Through dialogue, trade negotiations, and strategic frameworks, both nations can work towards mitigating challenges and strengthening their long-term defence and security cooperation.

 

The Road Ahead

The future of Indo-US defence and security cooperation looks promising, with an increased focus on defence co-production, intelligence sharing, and maritime security. Both nations are expected to deepen their military collaboration through emerging technologies, strategic dialogues, and multilateral engagements.

As China’s military and economic influence continues to rise, Indo-US strategic cooperation will likely become more robust. Maritime security will remain a key engagement area, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The QUAD, consisting of India, the US, Japan, and Australia, will play an increasingly significant role in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific. Joint naval patrols, information sharing, and coordinated responses to regional threats will further enhance maritime security.

Defence co-production and technology transfer are expected to gain momentum under initiatives like the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Co-development of advanced weapon systems, including drones, missiles, and next-generation fighter aircraft, will strengthen India’s defence manufacturing capabilities while providing the US with a reliable defence partner in Asia. India’s growing indigenous defence industry, supported by US expertise, will reduce dependency on traditional suppliers and foster innovation.

Cyber security and space security will emerge as critical areas of bilateral cooperation. As cyber threats become more sophisticated, both nations will enhance collaboration on cyber intelligence sharing, securing critical infrastructure, and countering cyber warfare tactics. Space security initiatives will include joint satellite surveillance, GPS navigation cooperation, and space situational awareness programs to protect satellites from potential adversarial threats.

Intelligence sharing and counterterrorism cooperation will remain vital in addressing global security challenges. Indo-US collaboration in tracking terror networks, disrupting financing mechanisms, and countering radicalisation efforts will be further strengthened. The US has consistently supported India’s concerns regarding cross-border terrorism and has played a role in sanctioning groups that pose a threat to Indian security.

Economic and trade ties will also complement defence relations. As India modernises its military, US defence firms will have increased opportunities for investment and collaboration. Defence offsets and Make-in-India initiatives will encourage joint ventures, enabling India to become a major defence exporter in the future.

Despite substantial progress, challenges remain. Differing geopolitical priorities, trade disputes, and regulatory barriers may create hurdles in expanding defence cooperation. However, sustained diplomatic engagement, trust-building measures, and strategic dialogues will help mitigate these challenges.

Overall, the Indo-US defence and security partnership is set to grow, with a shared vision for regional stability and global security. By embracing new technologies, deepening military ties, and strengthening multilateral collaborations, both nations are poised to shape the future of global security dynamics together.

 

Conclusion

Indo-US defence and security cooperation has evolved significantly from an interest-based arrangement to a long-term strategic partnership. With a solid foundation, both nations can navigate global security challenges together, ensuring a stable and secure Indo-Pacific region. As military, intelligence, and technological collaborations deepen, trust and interoperability between both nations will continue to grow. The strategic alignment between India and the US will be crucial in addressing common threats, promoting regional stability, and fostering an open and rules-based international order. While challenges exist, the commitment of both nations to a shared vision ensures that Indo-US defence ties will only strengthen in the years to come.

 

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References:-

  1. Tellis, Ashley J. “India as a Leading Power: A Strategy for U.S.–Indian Relations.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.
  1. Pant, Harsh V., and Julie M. Super. “India-US Relations under Modi: The Strategic Logic Underlying the Modi Government’s Approach.” International Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 1, 2017, pp. 133-146.
  1. Kugelman, Michael. “US-India Defence Ties: Beyond Arms Sales.” The Diplomat, 2019.
  1. Chaudhuri, Rudra. “Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947.” South Asian History and Culture, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2015.
  1. Joshi, Shashank. “US-India Military Ties: Strengthening the Partnership.” Survival, Vol. 60, No. 6, 2018, pp. 43-52.
  1. Mukherjee, Rohan. “The India–US Security Relationship: The Balance Sheet after Two Decades of Engagement.” International Politics, Vol. 59, 2022, pp. 1090-1115.
  1. Stimson Center. “U.S.-India Strategic Partnership: Expanding Horizons.” 2023.
  1. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The U.S.-India Security Partnership: Progress, Challenges, and Future Prospects.” 2021.
  2. RAND Corporation. “The India-US Defense Relationship: Enhancing Cooperation for Regional Stability.” 2020.
  1. Brookings Institution. “The Next Phase of US-India Relations: Security, Trade, and Technology.” 2022.
  1. Council on Foreign Relations. “The Road Ahead: India and the United States as Major Defense Partners.” 2021.
  1. Observer Research Foundation (ORF). “India and the US: A Strategic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific.” 2022.
  1. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Defence Industrial Cooperation between the U.S. and India.” 2023.
  1. The Diplomat. “Why the India-U.S. Defence Partnership is Vital in the Indo-Pacific.” 2023.
  1. India Today. “India-US Defence Cooperation: From Arms Sales to Joint Exercises.” 2023.

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694: THE TRUMP-MUNIR MEETING: TRANSACTIONAL DIPLOMACY OR A GEOPOLITICAL QUID PRO QUO?

 

My article was published on the Indus International Research Foundation website on 30 Jun 25.

 

On June 18, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump hosted a rare and controversial meeting with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, at the White House. The two-hour lunch, which took place without any representatives from Pakistan’s civilian leadership, triggered widespread geopolitical debate. The phrase “you scratch my back, I scratch yours” has surfaced in online discourse. While the meeting was presented as a gesture of gratitude for Pakistan’s role in de-escalating recent India-Pakistan tensions, the circumstances, tone, and implications of the event go far beyond mere diplomacy. Potential fallout of this bizarre engagement could signal a reconfiguration of regional alliances and a confirmation of Trump’s transactional diplomacy.

 

Analytical Perspective

Context: Post-War De-escalation and Unorthodox Diplomacy. The Trump–Munir meeting comes just weeks after a volatile conflict between India and Pakistan that erupted in early May 2025. For several tense days, both nations exchanged missile and drone attacks, raising fears of a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed neighbours. In the June 18 lunch, Trump publicly credited General Munir for helping to prevent a full-blown war between India and Pakistan. This approach reflects Trump’s foreign policy style, which prioritises deal-making, personal connections, and pragmatic alliances over institutional norms or long-term strategic planning.

Unprecedented Format. This was not an ordinary diplomatic meeting. For the first time, a U.S. president hosted a foreign military leader at the White House without including any civilian government officials from that country. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar were conspicuously absent. Their exclusion drew immediate criticism from both within Pakistan and abroad, highlighting the enduring imbalance between Pakistan’s military and civilian institutions. By engaging directly with Munir, Trump sent a clear message that he considers the Pakistani military, and not its elected leadership, as the country’s true center of power. This is not a new perception, but such overt validation from a major global power (that champions and supports democratic values worldwide) is rare and diplomatically risky.

Pakistan: Military Strengthened, Civilian Leadership Marginalised. In Pakistan, the reaction was mixed. Supporters of the military celebrated the meeting as a diplomatic win and a sign that General Munir is elevating Pakistan’s global profile. However, many others viewed the event as a glaring example of the country’s persistent “military-first” governance model. Political commentators and opposition figures criticised Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for being sidelined and described the episode as humiliating. Some accused the military of bypassing civilian institutions in foreign policy and seeking direct international legitimacy. The episode has further strained civil-military relations within Pakistan, with fears that the military is consolidating even more power at the expense of democratic norms and constitutional roles.

Undermining Civilian Institutions. The overt exclusion of Pakistan’s civilian leadership from a meeting of this magnitude may set a dangerous precedent. It sends a signal, not just to Islamabad but to other nations, that direct engagement with military leaders is not only acceptable but perhaps preferable. This undermines the principle of democratic civilian oversight and can weaken global efforts to promote governance reforms in countries with fragile democratic institutions.

U.S.–Pakistan Rapprochement. Just months ago, U.S.–Pakistan relations were marked by scepticism, primarily due to lingering mistrust over Islamabad’s historical links to extremist groups, as well as its close ties to China. However, this meeting suggests a dramatic shift. Trump praised Pakistan’s intelligence services for capturing the perpetrator of the 2021 Kabul airport bombing, a symbolic gesture indicating renewed U.S. trust in Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. Pakistan’s military, in its official statement, highlighted that the conversation also covered trade, economic cooperation, cryptocurrencies, artificial intelligence, energy resources, and rare-earth minerals. These are key sectors for a future-oriented partnership, suggesting that both parties are looking beyond traditional military and security cooperation.

The Iran Angle. An equally important but more understated aspect of the meeting was its potential connection to rising tensions in the Middle East, specifically between Israel and Iran. Trump reportedly remarked that “Pakistan knows Iran very well,” and indicated that Islamabad could play a key role in future diplomatic or covert operations involving Tehran. This is particularly significant as the U.S. appears to be exploring regional support for managing, or possibly confronting, Iran. Given Pakistan’s geographic proximity, historical ties to Iran, and deep intelligence networks, it is plausible that Washington sees Islamabad as a useful intermediary or asset in this context. For Trump, such a partnership would align with his transactional style: if Pakistan helps the U.S. manage Iran, the U.S. could reciprocate by offering economic or political rewards to Pakistan.

 

Strategic Implications

Transactional Realignment, Not Strategic Partnership. While the meeting suggests a thaw in U.S.–Pakistan ties, the underlying dynamic appears transactional rather than strategic. Trump is known for valuing short-term gains and personal relationships over long-term institutional alliances. In this case, the “mutual back-scratching” attitude reflects a deal-based mindset: Pakistan helps with Iran’s intelligence sharing, and the U.S. acknowledges its role and discusses potential economic partnerships. Such diplomacy can deliver quick results, but it often lacks the staying power that is based on democratic values or mutual trust.

Potential Iran Confrontation Strategy. By engaging Pakistan now, the U.S. could be preparing for a broader containment strategy against Iran. If tensions between Israel and Iran re-escalate into direct conflict, the U.S. may look to regional partners for logistical support, intelligence sharing, or diplomatic mediation. Pakistan, with its strategic location and regional experience, becomes a valuable partner in this context. However, such an alignment carries risks. Iran and Pakistan share a border, and any overt Pakistani support for U.S. actions against Iran could destabilise Baluchistan and strain Islamabad’s internal security.

India: Strategic Alarm. In India, the Trump–Munir lunch was met with alarm and criticism. Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh labelled the event “an embarrassment” for Pakistan’s civilian government. Indian officials were quick to reject Trump’s claim of him helping avert war, insisting that the May ceasefire was a direct call from Pakistan, asking for a ceasefire with no U.S. involvement. Shashi Tharoor,  senior Congress leader, reminded observers about Pakistan’s past harbouring of Osama bin Laden and cautioned the U.S. against viewing Pakistan as a trustworthy long-term partner. The general sentiment in Indian strategic circles is that the meeting signifies an unbalanced U.S. approach that undermines democratic institutions in the region and encourages military dominance in Pakistan.

 

Conclusion

The Trump–Munir meeting represents a symbolic moment in U.S.–Pakistan relations and South Asian geopolitics. It highlights Trump’s characteristic deal-making style, the enduring dominance of Pakistan’s military in foreign affairs, and the shifting focus of U.S. strategic interests toward rapid, transactional engagements. For the U.S., this may be a way to quickly regain influence in South Asia and prepare for broader conflicts in the West Asia. For Pakistan, it is a short-term diplomatic victory that risks further marginalising civilian institutions. For India, this is a cause for concern and a call to monitor the shifting U.S. priorities closely. The long-term consequences will depend on whether this meeting marks the beginning of a more profound realignment or is simply another small move in the ever-evolving saga of geopolitical chess.

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The Trump-Munir Meeting: Transactional Diplomacy Or A Geopolitical Quid Pro Quo?

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

  1. The Guardian. (2025, June 19). The thawing of relations between Pakistan and the US raises eyebrows in India.
  1. Times of India. (2025, June 19). ‘Must be an embarrassment’: Defence secretary’s jibe at Shehbaz Sharif over Trump–Munir lunch; warns of China-Turkey nexus.
  1. India Times. (2025, June 18). Donald Trump hosts General Asim Munir for a White House lunch, credits him with ending the India–Pakistan war; here’s what we know.
  1. Dawn News. (2025, June 18). The military confirms that General Munir meets with Donald Trump to discuss strategic cooperation and regional stability.
  1. Al Jazeera. (2025, June 19). US-Pakistan talks signal shifting alliances in South Asia amid tensions with Iran.
  1. Reuters. (2025, June 18). Trump thanks Pakistan Army chief for avoiding war with India, eyes trade ties. Retrieved from
  1. NDTV. (2025, June 20). India rejects US mediation claims, stating that the ceasefire was a bilateral agreement reached between the parties.
  1. BBC News. (2025, June 18). Trump meets General Munir: What it means for Pakistan’s democracy.
  1. “Trump Hosts Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir at White House, Discusses India-Pakistan Tensions.” Hindustan Times, June 19, 2025.
  1. “Unorthodox White House Lunch: Trump and Munir Talk Trade and Peace.” The News International, June 19, 2025.
  1. “Trump’s Transactional Diplomacy: A Look at His Foreign Policy Style.” Foreign Affairs, January 202

692: UNFINISHED RUSSIAN OBJECTIVE: REGIME CHANGE IN UKRAINE

 

My article was published on the Indus International Research Foundation website on June 30, 2025.

 

Since Russia launched its special military operation on February 24, 2022, its primary strategic objective was widely understood to be the overthrow of Ukraine’s government and the installation of a pro-Russian regime. This goal has proven elusive, rooted in Moscow’s desire to reassert influence over its neighbour and prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West. Over three years into the conflict, Russia has not been able to achieve regime change. There are possibly multifaceted reasons behind it, encompassing military, political, economic, societal, and informational dimensions.

 

Analytical Perspective

Strategic Miscalculations: Flawed Assumptions. At the heart of Russia’s failure lies a cascade of flawed assumptions.  Before launching the invasion on 24 February 2022, Moscow wrongly believed that the Ukrainian society was deeply fractured along ethnic and linguistic lines. Secondly, the Zelensky government lacked legitimacy and would collapse under pressure. Lastly, NATO and the West would not intervene decisively. These assumptions led Russia to pursue an audacious plan aimed at rapidly occupying Kyiv, decapitating Ukraine’s leadership, and presenting the world with a fait accompli. However, Russian intelligence had gravely underestimated both the unity and the resilience of Ukrainian society. When the war began, the anticipated internal collapse did not materialise; instead, Ukraine mobilised as a unified nation.

Ukrainian Resilience and National Unity. One of the most critical factors thwarting Russia’s ambitions has been the extraordinary resilience of the Ukrainian people and their government. From the outset, Ukraine’s people displayed unwavering resolve. Ukrainian society mobilised rapidly, with civilians joining territorial defence units, volunteering in humanitarian efforts, and supporting the military. The war has forged a stronger national identity, with polls consistently showing overwhelming support for Zelenskyy’s government and rejection of Russian influence. This societal cohesion has made installing a pro-Russia regime more difficult, as any pro-Russian government would face relentless resistance and lack legitimacy.

Russian Military Miscalculation: Collapse of the Hostomel-Kyiv Blitz. Russia’s regime-change ambitions were staked on the success of a swift airborne operation. Russian forces did seize Hostomel Airport, located just outside Kyiv, to establish an air bridge for further troops. However, Ukrainians were able to repel the assault, destroying incoming aircraft and delaying Russian reinforcements. With the Hostomel plan thwarted, Russian ground forces were left advancing slowly on narrow roads with overstretched supply lines and inadequate logistics. Russians had to change their strategy and the plan at an early stage.

Western Support. The unprecedented scale of Western support for Ukraine has been a pivotal factor. NATO countries, led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, have provided Ukraine with billions of dollars in military, financial, and humanitarian aid. Advanced weaponry, including HIMARS rocket systems, ATACMS missiles, Patriot air defences, and Leopard tanks, has enabled Ukraine to counter Russian offensives and launch successful counterattacks. Beyond material support, Western intelligence-sharing and training programs have enhanced Ukraine’s operational effectiveness. On the other hand, sanctions on Russia, targeting its energy exports, financial systems, and military-industrial complex, have dented Moscow’s ability to sustain the tempo of the war.

Geopolitical and Terrain Challenges. Ukraine’s geography has posed significant challenges for Russia’s regime change ambitions. Over 600,000 square kilometers of Ukraine is Europe’s second-largest country, with diverse terrain ranging from open steppes to dense urban centers. Controlling such a vast area requires substantial manpower and resources. Urban warfare, particularly in cities, favours Ukrainian defenders, who benefit from local knowledge and fortified positions. Russia’s territorial gains have been concentrated in eastern and southern regions, such as parts of Donbas, and Crimea, but these areas represent only a fraction of Ukraine. Stretching its forces across multiple fronts has diluted Russia’s ability to consolidate control or advance toward Kyiv, the political heart of Ukraine.

Russian Internal Constraints. Russia’s domestic challenges have further undermined its war effort. The invasion has strained Russia’s economy, with sanctions disrupting trade, freezing foreign reserves, and limiting access to critical technologies. While high energy prices initially cushioned the blow, long-term economic decline and inflation have eroded public support for the war to an large extent. Political dissent, though suppressed, persists among some of Russia’s factions. These internal pressures have constrained Russia’s ability to escalate the war or sustain a long-term occupation of Ukraine.

Alienating the Ukrainian Population. Russia’s offensive and punitive tactics have obliterated any chance of winning Ukrainian support for a pro-Russian regime. Deliberate attacks on infrastructure have fuelled hatred toward Russia and unified Ukrainians against Moscow’s agenda. The Kremlin’s narrative about “denazifaction” of Ukraine has not resonated well with Ukrainians.  The absence of a viable pro-Russian political base in Ukraine has left Russia with no credible allies to prop up a pro-Russian government.

Dominance in the Information War. Ukraine has done well in the information domain, maintaining global sympathy and domestic morale. Russia, by contrast, has maintained a low-key approach to control the narrative. Its state-controlled media dominates domestically but has little sway abroad. This information asymmetry has reinforced Ukraine’s legitimacy while undermining Russia’s ability to justify regime change.

The Evolution of the Conflict. As the war has evolved into a protracted struggle, Russia’s initial goal of regime change has become increasingly unattainable, and Moscow has pivoted to territorial objectives. The limited military operation has evolved into a long-drawn-out slug match, with Ukraine periodically launching counter-offensives and Russia resorting to punitive action with long-range weapons. The prospect of a frozen conflict or negotiated settlement looms, but both sides are sticking to their terms.

 

Conclusion

Russia’s inability to achieve regime change in Ukraine results from a confluence of factors: Ukrainian unity and resolve, Russian strategic miscalculations, continued Western support, geographical challenges, and Moscow’s internal constraints. These elements have transformed the conflict into a grinding stalemate, with Ukraine’s government not only surviving but emerging as a symbol of resistance. As the war continues, Russia’s prospects for overturning Ukraine’s leadership remain dim.

 

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Unfinished Russian Objective: Regime Change In Ukraine

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