Pic Courtesy Internet: Modern Diplomacy
Approximately 24 years after independence, Indian scientists at BARC were authorised to detonate an indigenously designed nuclear device.
India conducted nuclear tests for the first time in May 1974.
24 Years later nuclear tests were conducted again on 11 & 13 May 1998.
It is 24 years TODAY from the last nuclear test.
Ukraine war has thrown up debate about some of the nuclear aspects.
Nuclear Tests by India
Pokharan I
- The test was codenamed ‘Smiling Buddha’ and conducted on May 18, 1974.
- It is believed that the actual yield was around 8-12 Kilotons of TNT.
- It took nearly two-year preparation for India to conduct this test.
- The highlight of the test was that India had managed to avoid detection by the United States and other intelligence agencies.
- It was the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation that was not a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
- India faced a series of sanctions from nations like the United States which said that such tests can lead to nuclear proliferation.
Pokharan-II
- The tests were initiated on 11 May 1998, under the assigned code name Operation Shakti, with the detonation of one fusion and two fission devices. On 13 May 1998, two additional fission devices were detonated.
- The tests achieved their main objective of (assessed) yield up to 200 kilotons.
- These tests also resulted in a variety of sanctions against India by several major countries including Japan and the United States.
Relevant aspects have re-emerged during the Ukraine war.
Nuclear Deterrence.
- According to deterrence theory, nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the threat of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction. Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces.
- Military interventions around the world in the recent past, make one believe that nuclear weapons provide nuclear deterrence only against the enemy’s nuclear weapons.
- During the Russian special military operation against Ukraine, Russia put her nuclear forces on full alert (special combat readiness) and gave a very stern warning against any third-party intervention.
- In this case, nuclear deterrence is proving to be effective even in the non-nuclear realm.
Nuclear Arms Race.
- When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, there were thousands of former Soviet nuclear warheads, as well as hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers, left on Ukraine’s territory.
- In 1992, Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol and it joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state in 1994. The transfer of all nuclear material took some time, but by 2001, all nuclear weapons had been transferred to Russia to be dismantled and all launch silos decommissioned.
- The question being asked is if Russia would have invaded Ukraine if it still had those nuclear weapons.
- This thought process may encourage many countries to desire for acquisition of nuclear power and enhancement of nuclear power by those already in possession of it.
Nuclear Policy
- In June 2020, Russia reviewed its policy on the use of its nuclear arsenal.
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- Deterrence. The policy outlines that Russia considered nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, her strategy is defensive by nature and is aimed at maintaining the nuclear forces’ potential at the level sufficient for nuclear deterrence.
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- Existential Threat. It also guarantees the protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, and deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.
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- Escalate to de-escalate. The document also suggests that Russia might escalate to the use of nuclear weaponry if it faces losing a conventional conflict.
- The question remains unanswered, as to what exactly is an existential threat? And what are the situational conditions for nuclear escalation?
- Similarly, China’s Active defence policy is also vague, wherein China decides what is the level of threat to it and when to take pre-emptive military action, and the level of action.
- A vague policy works for strategic coercion by keeping the enemy guessing.
- However, it can result in a disaster by wrong interpretation or miscalculation.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons.
- The Ukraine war has once again triggered the debate about the efficacy of tactical nuclear weapons.
- A vague definition of a tactical nuclear weapon is that it is a weapon with a smaller warhead that causes localised devastation. These weapons could be of various sizes, and their impact would depend on whether they explode at ground level or above the Earth’s surface.
- Unanswered questions remain:-
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- How do you classify a nuclear weapon to be tactical?
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- How do you ascertain whether the incoming projectile has a conventional or a nuclear (tactical/heavy-caliber) warhead?
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- How does one control the escalation level in such a scenario?
- Hope human beings do not learn the answers the hard way.
Tidbits
Prevailing Destructive Power
As compared to Hiroshima, Washington’s biggest test blast was 1,000 times as large, and that of Moscow was 3,000 times.
The combined capability of existing nuclear weapons is to destroy the earth many times over.
Dreadful Scenario
How long before these so-called tactical nuclear weapons fall in the hands of irresponsible terrorists/non-state actors?
Question
Considering the prevailing situation, is it the right time to revisit/review India’s nuclear policy?
Suggestions and value additions are most welcome
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.