russia – Air Marshal's Perspective

October 13, 2026

866: CHINA: ONE DREAM, SIX STRATEGIC CHALLENGES, TWO KEY EVENTS

China’s rise is not simply an economic success story. It is also a long-term political and strategic project to restore the country’s position as a leading world power. Under President Xi Jinping, this ambition has been articulated through the concept of the Chinese Dream (the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation).

In a 2012 speech, Xi linked national rejuvenation to the goal of building a modern socialist country by 2049 (the centenary year of the founding of the People’s Republic of China). Beijing’s official development framework also identifies 2035 as a major milestone for technological advancement, economic strength and military modernisation.

The strategic question is whether China can convert its economic scale into comprehensive global power. That requires more than manufacturing dominance. It requires technological independence, diplomatic influence, military capability, secure borders and the ability to shape international rules.

Rejuvenation: Reclaiming Historical Greatness

The Chinese Communist Party views national rejuvenation as a response to a history of foreign interference and territorial losses. It considers restoring national pride through economic development a source of political legitimacy.

This vision also stems from outstanding sovereignty disputes. The most important example is Taiwan. Beijing considers Taiwan to be part of China. It has not ruled out using force to achieve unification; at the same time, Taiwan has its own government, elected by its citizens, and rejects Beijing’s claim to authority over the island.

In the South China Sea, China’s wide-ranging maritime claims overlap with those of a number of Southeast Asian countries, and on the Himalayan frontier its boundary dispute with India is still not resolved; at the same time, its relations with Japan are complicated by matters concerning the East China Sea, historical resentments and competing security interests.

These disputes should not all be described as a single programme of territorial conquest. They differ in their legal histories, strategic importance and diplomatic context. Nevertheless, they show how the pursuit of national rejuvenation can collide with neighbouring countries’ sovereignty and security concerns.

China’s Six Challenges

Although China is facing a variety of geopolitical challenges, six relationships in particular have the potential to hinder its rise. These are also referred to as “six wars China has to fight”. This reflects the intensity of strategic competition, but it should not be taken to mean China will actually go to war with six countries.

Taiwan. Taiwan is the most dangerous potential flashpoint because it combines sovereignty claims, military planning, advanced technology and the interests of the United States and its regional partners. A conflict could disrupt semiconductor production, maritime trade and global financial markets. It could also trigger a wider military confrontation. China can apply military, diplomatic, economic and information pressure without immediately resorting to invasion. Taiwan’s resilience, defensive capabilities, and the credibility of external support will shape Beijing’s calculations.

South China Sea. The South China Sea is vital to international shipping, fisheries, energy exploration and regional security. China seeks to protect its maritime interests and strengthen its presence, while other claimant states resist actions they consider inconsistent with their sovereignty and maritime rights. Coast guard operations, military deployments, island infrastructure and maritime law enforcement can all generate friction. A collision or miscalculation could escalate a limited incident into a wider crisis.

India. China and India are both major powers with unresolved border disputes and competing interests in Asia. The relationship involves trade, infrastructure, regional influence, and security competition. Although both countries want to avoid another serious border crisis, deep distrust remains. India’s strategic partnerships, military modernisation, and growing economic ambitions make it a key factor in China’s long-term calculations. At the same time, China remains an important economic and diplomatic actor for India. The relationship is therefore neither simply a military rivalry nor a straightforward contest for regional dominance. It combines competition with selective opportunities for cooperation.

Japan. Japan’s proximity to Taiwan, its maritime interests and its alliance with the United States place it at the centre of East Asian security. Disputes in the East China Sea, concerns about Chinese military activity and tensions surrounding Taiwan have encouraged Japan to strengthen its defence posture. Japan is also a significant technological and industrial power. Its economic and security partnerships with the United States and other regional states complicate China’s efforts to establish a dominant regional position.

Mongolia. Mongolia occupies a sensitive geographic position between China and Russia. Its economic dependence on its two large neighbours creates strategic constraints, while its pursuit of diversified international relationships gives it room to manoeuvre. China has strong interests in Mongolian minerals, energy, transport links and trade. Nevertheless, there is no sound basis for treating Mongolia as an inevitable military opponent of China. Its significance lies more in regional access, resource security and the balance between Chinese and Russian influence than in the likelihood of a direct war.

Russia. China and Russia have expanded cooperation in trade, energy, and diplomacy, and have opposed aspects of US-led international influence. Their relationship is strategically important, but it is not a formal alliance with identical interests. Historical mistrust, geographic asymmetries and competition for influence in parts of Eurasia remain relevant. Russia can provide China with energy and diplomatic support, yet Beijing must also account for the risks of secondary sanctions, instability near its borders and excessive dependence on any single partner. For these reasons, Russia belongs in an assessment of China’s strategic relationships.

Timelines & Influencing Events

The years 2035, 2047, and 2049 are important milestones. 2035 is an official modernisation milestone; 2049 is the stated centenary horizon for national rejuvenation; and 2047 can be treated as an analytical marker for assessing China’s regional and global ambitions, rather than a formally established deadline for world domination.

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party is scheduled for October 2026. Official statements identify party governance and discipline as the primary topics, alongside a review of the economic situation and policy priorities. The meeting’s policies are expected to reflect Beijing’s priorities in economic restructuring, technological self-reliance, national security, and long-term political governance.

In the United States, the congressional midterm elections on 3 November 2026 will determine the makeup of the House of Representatives and part of the Senate. The outcome may affect trade policy, defence spending, aid to Taiwan, export controls and the political room available for negotiations with Beijing.

Domestic politics in Beijing and Washington could influence the next phase of strategic competition. Neither event should be interpreted as a trigger for military action. Chinese strategic decisions depend on multiple factors, including military readiness, economic conditions, domestic stability and the expected response of the United States and its partners.

Concluding Thoughts

The China Dream is a long-term initiative aimed at national rejuvenation, with its 2035 modernisation targets and the 2049 centenary milestone serving as official benchmarks against which Beijing’s achievements can be evaluated. 2047 may be a useful point for analysis, but it must not be mistaken for a verified deadline by which China will achieve global supremacy. Economic development can change a country’s position in the international arena, but the next step is to determine whether that economic power can translate into solid diplomatic influence and credible military deterrence without provoking a broader regional reaction.

Taiwan, the South China Sea, India, Japan, Mongolia and Russia represent different dimensions of that challenge—not six inevitable wars, but six distinct strategic relationships requiring different approaches.

Ultimately, China’s rise will be judged not only by the strength of its economy or armed forces, but also by its ability to manage disagreements, sustain partnerships and reassure other countries that its growing power need not come at their expense.

The decisive question is not whether China can become powerful by 2047 or 2049. It is whether China can turn its growing power into a stable international position without making the rest of the world increasingly determined to resist it.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References: –

The 2012 Chinese Dream speech, National Museum of China. (n.d.). The Chinese Dream.

https://www.neac.gov.cn/seac/c103372/202201/1156514.shtml

State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (n.d.). Major targets in 14th Five-Year Plan. https://english.www.gov.cn/w/14thfiveyearplan/
U.S. Department of Defense. (2024). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual report to Congress. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615417/-1/-1/0/2024-CMPR-FACT-SHEET.PDF
Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Shambaugh, D. (2013). China goes global: The partial power. Oxford University Press.
Congressional Research Service. Taiwan: Background and U.S. relations (IF10275), 05 Aug 2026.

https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF10275.html

Permanent Court of Arbitration. The South China Sea arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China): Award, 12 Jul 2012. https://pca-cpa.org/en/documents/publications/pca-award-series/
Noorani, A. G. India–China boundary problem 1846–1947. Oxford University Press, 2011.

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198070689.001.0001

Westcott, S. P. Armed coexistence: The dynamics of the intractable Sino-Indian border dispute. Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7450-1
Government of Japan. National security strategy of Japan, 2022.

https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou.html

President of Mongolia. Press release on the Third Neighbour Trade Act legislative bill. 30 Jul 2018 https://president.mn/en/2018/07/30/press-release-on-third-neighbour-trade-act/
U.S. Department of Defense. (2024). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual report to Congress. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615417/-1/-1/0/2024-CMPR-FACT-SHEET.PDF

May 13, 2026

814: RUSSIA’S RS-28 SARMAT ADDS A NEW CHAPTER IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MODERNISATION

News. Russia successfully test-launched the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk region) on 12 May 26. The missile followed its planned profile and struck its designated target (at Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula) approximately thirty minutes after launch. Strategic Missile Forces commander Sergei Karakayev reported that all specified technical characteristics had been validated. Putin described the test as a “major event and unconditional success” and congratulated the defence ministry, scientists, engineers, and the thousands of workers whose collaborative effort brought the programme to this milestone.

Missile. The Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau produces the RS-28 Sarmat. It is a silo-launched, three-stage, liquid-fuelled super-heavy ICBM (35.3 metres in length and approximately 208 tonnes in launch weight). It is claimed to be the largest ballistic missile ever constructed. Its payload capacity is ten tonnes, and it can carry a variety of warheads (including multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and, reportedly, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Its operational flexibility significantly exceeds that of its predecessor.

Capability. Among the Sarmat’s most strategically significant attributes is its capacity to approach targets via non-standard flight trajectories. Unlike conventional ICBMs that follow northern polar arcs, the Sarmat is capable of fractional orbital bombardment, i.e. flying a depressed, sub-orbital trajectory over the South Pole to reach targets in North America. This gives it the ability to approach from directions that existing American missile defence interceptor networks, positioned primarily in Alaska and California and oriented toward northern approach corridors, are not designed to engage. Putin has noted that the missile can travel on both ballistic and suborbital trajectories, with a maximum range reportedly exceeding 35,000 kilometres.

Feature Enhancement. The missile has a shorter boost phase than its predecessor. This reduces the window for tracking by the space-based infrared sensors. It is a meaningful enhancement for the missile’s survivability. The Sarmat is also claimed to be more accurate than the Voyevoda. Putin has stated that the Sarmat’s destructive potential substantially exceeds that of any comparable Western system.

Strategic Implication. The successful launch carries significant strategic implications. The R-36M2 Voyevoda, a Soviet-era heavy ICBM, had been the backbone of Russia’s silo-based deterrent for decades. The Sarmat is intended to replace it, and it represents the most consequential upgrade to Russia’s nuclear triad in the post-Cold War period. Putin announced that Russia would deploy the first Sarmat-equipped regiment for combat duty before the end of 2026. It is claimed to be designed to penetrate both existing and prospective ballistic missile defences. This capability is important for Russia to maintain credible second-strike deterrence.

Race. The Sarmat is one of six next-generation strategic weapons that Putin unveiled in March 2018, presenting them as Russia’s response to the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the subsequent development of American missile defence infrastructure. From Moscow’s perspective, a credible and penetrating nuclear second-strike capability is the foundation of strategic stability. The assurance that no adversary can neutralise Russia’s deterrent through a disarming first strike and expect to intercept the surviving response. The Sarmat is engineered specifically to preserve that assurance against all foreseeable developments in missile defence technology.

Timing. The test comes at a time of considerable significance in the current global landscape. The New START treaty (the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms limitation agreement between Russia and the United States) expired in February 2026. Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, citing what it described as the fundamentally changed strategic environment resulting from Western military support for Ukraine. The absence of any active treaty framework means that both sides are now free to expand and modernise their arsenals without the notification and inspection. The Sarmat’s development and operational deployment will proceed in this unconstrained environment.

Domestic Significance. Domestically, the test carries political weight as well as military significance. It arrives days after Russia’s Victory Day commemorations. It demonstrates the continued vitality of Russia’s defence industrial and scientific base under sustained international sanctions and economic pressure. It affirms the country’s standing as a nuclear superpower capable of fielding world-leading weapons systems.

Global Interest. Internationally, the Sarmat’s deployment will be watched closely in capitals around the world (from Washington to Beijing and from New Delhi to Brussels). For NATO’s strategic planners, it represents a genuine generational upgrade to Russia’s land-based deterrent. It will force them to recalibrate their threat assessments and defence postures. For countries in the Global South, it is a reminder that the nuclear dimension of great-power competition remains very much alive and is, if anything, intensifying.

Concluding Thought. Russia’s strategic modernisation programme has always been driven by the conviction that a strong nuclear deterrent is the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The Sarmat’s successful test and approaching operational debut confirm that this conviction remains the organising principle of Russian defence policy. It also proves that Russia retains both the industrial capacity and the scientific expertise to give it material form.

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October 7, 2025October 6, 2025

756: HYBRID WAR IN THE BALTICS: AT RISK – CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Article Published in the Oct 25 Issue of The News Analytics Journal.

Hybrid operations, unlike traditional warfare, bridge martial coercion with non-military measures like sabotage, cyberattack, disinformation, interference in elections, energy blackmail, and weaponised migration. These processes are intentionally vague, cheap but high-impact, allowing state / non-state actors to destabilise their competitors without crossing transparent thresholds.

The Russian hybrid war strategy has been a security concern for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They are improperly exposed to geography, population, and history relative to Russia. But the danger does not end there in the Baltics: Poland, Finland, and Germany are also at risk from shared energy and digital infrastructure, political interdependence, and disinformation.

Critical infrastructure, notably submarine cables, energy supplies, and digital networks, has also been a key target. With an assault upon such an asset requiring minimal effort but with the ripple effect containing security, economic, and psychological consequences, at least 11 North and Baltic Sea underwater cables have been severed since 2023, both demonstrating the technical possibility and the deniable nature of such an act. This article examines hybrid war strategy across the Baltic states, quantifying regional resiliency and defining policy measures to be taken in defence of their infrastructure.

Hybrid Threats and Activities

Hybrid war threatens Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania seriously, attacking the cohesion of society, infrastructure, and democratic procedures using methods of sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and disruptions of energy supplies. These are intended to destabilise the Baltic States without triggering traditional war, exploiting vulnerabilities in linked systems.

Information Warfare and Propaganda. Disinformation works extremely well in hybrid warfare, often used through AI-generated content, deepfakes, and tailored social media campaigns on Telegram, TikTok, and local networks. All are designed to produce narratives around specific strategic interests, and linguistic or cultural minorities are the target to be manipulated into divisions. For example, messages can utilise themes of discrimination, nostalgia for the past, or suspicion of international coalition-building. Cultural projects, including patronage of institutions that advance other narratives, can build dual information spaces that undermine social cohesion. Classic cases such as the 2003 Lithuanian presidential foreign-linked funding scandal illustrate how external actors exploit political weaknesses. Current disinformation operations are more likely to derogate support for active conflicts, destabilise international partnership trust, and amplify societal fault lines.

Subversion and Sabotage. Low-tech sabotage can be thoroughly debilitating to social cohesion and infrastructure. For example, the 2024 arson assault on a Vilnius storage facility disclosed weakness in key logistics networks. Likewise, the demolition of historic monuments across regions has been utilised as a means of stirring ethnic or cultural tensions. Deployment of incendiary devices transported through logistics networks in attacks also demonstrates the capabilities for covert disruption. Attacks on key infrastructure, e.g., submarine cables carrying transatlantic communications, financial transactions, and military communications, are conventionally attributed to an accident but cause concern about intentional sabotage. These attacks highlight the asymmetric benefits pursued through precision disruption, taking advantage of vulnerabilities in interdependent systems.

Cyberattacks. Cyber war is a key component of a hybrid strategy, and organisations often conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on government buildings, energy organisations, and public services. For instance, in 2022, a cyberattack on a Baltic energy organisation disconnected thousands of customers’ services. In showpiece events, as for the 2023 Vilnius NATO Summit, cyberattacks were conducted on public websites and ministries to cause embarrassment and instability.

Espionage. Espionage is used to support these activities, with nationals being said to be recruited to collect intelligence or conduct minor sabotage operations. These activities are intended to erode confidence and destabilise institutions by taking advantage of insider access or local dissatisfaction.

Energy Security Risks. Energy infrastructure is the main target in hybrid warfare as well, and physical and cyberattacks are employed to discredit confidence in alternative energy sources. Diversification policies like Baltic connection to the EU power grid in 2024 or construction of LNG terminals and pipelines have mitigated these risks. Nevertheless, ongoing attacks on critical infrastructure are employed to point towards the long-term problem of safeguarding energy networks against hybrid methods.

Organised Migration. Organised waves of migration, such as the 2021 EU border crisis, demonstrate that humanitarian crises can be manipulated for strategic motives. Migrants from war-torn areas were redirected to border areas, swamping indigenous governments and challenging regional security responses. Such crises are intended to challenge global coalitions and politicise public discussion of migration and security, exerting pressure on governments and societies.

Military Intimidation and Amplification of Support for Hybrid Operations. A display of military strength in strategic regions can serve to enhance hybrid strategies by providing the context of a credible threat. Mass movements, mimicking rapid penetrations into extensive areas of terrain or clandestine activities in border regions, increase tensions and augment the impact of clandestine operations. They capitalise on geographical proximity and cultural ties to vulnerable areas, thereby enhancing the perceived threat of escalation.

Election Interference. Election interference is a popular hybrid method that employs cyberattacks, the leakage of sensitive information, and disinformation as tools to influence public opinion. Social media mobilisation campaigns predicated on the amplification of controversial issues—whether nationalist feelings or ethnic grievances—can influence closely fought elections. They seek to de-legitimise the democratic institutions and undermine those governments amenable to confronting strategic interests.

Preparedness and Reactions of the Baltic States

Despite the seriousness of the threat, the Baltic States have largely been resilient. They have come a long way in countering such vulnerabilities with modernisation, social integration, and neighbourhood cooperation. Investments in energy diversification, for instance, Lithuania’s terminal for liquefied natural gas and Baltic disconnection of old energy grids in 2024, have been curtailing reliance on the outside world. Nevertheless, critical infrastructure such as underwater cables, energy networks, and democratic systems is an attractive target for low-cost, deniable assaults.

Societal and Institutional Resilience. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) is hosted by Estonia. Cyber defence and information warfare coordination are instead functions of Lithuania’s National Cyber Security Centre and Latvia’s Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Civil defence institutions—such as Estonia’s 15,000-strong National Guard—facilitate rapid mobilisation in times of crisis.

Energy Independence. Integration of the Baltic States’ power grid with European grids, the Świnoujście terminal in Poland, and the Klaipėda LNG terminal are achievements of energy security. These steps limit Moscow’s influence and bolster NATO’s strategic depth.

Integration of Russian speakers. Rights of citizenship have been granted, investments made in learning the Russian language, and the recognition of cultural identities. These steps reduce alienation, but existing tensions between policies of integration and nationalist explanations that emphasise linguistic homogeneity.

Interagency Coordination. Interagency coordination is weak. Border control, crisis management, and intelligence exchange often do not operate in a coordinated manner. Latvia’s border guards, for example, have been criticised compared to more advanced Estonian and Nordic counterparts. NATO and American surveillance capabilities compensate to some extent, but reform at the national level remains to be accomplished.

Strengthening Baltic Defences against Hybrid Threats

Strengthening Baltic defences against hybrid threats involves building inclusive integration, establishing a Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE), protecting critical infrastructure, modernising electricity laws, enhancing transparency, and strengthening regional and international cooperation. The following are recommendations:

Facilitate Inclusive Integration. Enlarge programmes to provide equal civic, economic, and political opportunities to cultural and language minorities to build national unity in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Envision a Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE). Design an integrated system among the defence, cybersecurity, energy, and communications sectors to develop national resilience in the context of hybrid threats, tailored to Baltic priorities and imperatives.

Guard Critical Infrastructure. Prioritise the protection of submarine communications cables and offshore energy installations, taking advantage of regional cooperation in protecting these critical networks.

Modernise Legal Frameworks. Encourage the modernisation of international treaties, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to counter hybrid threats to maritime and critical infrastructure, with the Baltic States coordinating regional action.

Increase Transparency in Deployments. Clearly inform Baltic citizens of regional defence measures to reassure them while dissuading potential aggressors, highlighting national sovereignty.

Upgrade Specialised Forces. Upgrade the Baltic special forces and civilian defence units with assistance from premier intelligence and surveillance capabilities in cooperation with allied countries.

Upgrade Regional Exercises. Regularly conduct exercises such as BALTOPS and Baltic Sentry, which include cyber, maritime, and information warfare exercises, to attain greater readiness and interoperability of the Baltic forces.

Launch Multilingual Campaigns. Develop multiple-language communication strategies to address different communities, counter fake information, and foster social cohesion across Baltic communities.

Enhance Monitoring and Reaction. Collaborate with national cyber units and regional allies to track disinformation in real-time, quickly discredit fakes, and possess a Baltic-led reaction.

Enhance Intelligence Sharing. Enhance Baltic States and European and Indo-Pacific partner cooperation to enhance early warning and reaction to hybrid threats.

Advance Global Norms. Advance global norms to safeguard crucial infrastructure such as submarine cables and cyberspace, and make the Baltic States leaders in securing the global commons.

Conclusion

Defending Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania against hybrid war is not a regional security problem, but ensuring democratic nations and preserving resilience in a conflict-filled environment that insinuates informational, digital, and physical space. By investing in societal cohesion, infrastructure security, and regional cooperation, the Baltic States can put the solution to hybrid threats and ensure long-term stability.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

Financial Times, “Russia’s Hybrid Playbook Targets NATO’s Weak Spots”, Dec 2024.
Financial Times, “Why Underwater Cables in the Baltic Sea Are Vital and Vulnerable”, Jun 2025.
Reuters, “Baltic Governments Strengthen Cyber Defence Amid Hybrid Threats”, Apr 2025.
Chivvis C. S, “Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare and What Can Be Done About It”, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.
European Council on Foreign Relations, “Russian Influence and Hybrid Strategies in the Baltic Sea Region”, Policy Brief, 2023.
Kasekamp A, “Baltic Security Strategy Report”, Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), 2019.
Åtland K, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare and the Baltic States: An Assessment of Threats and Responses”, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 36(2), 123–145, 2023.
Bērziņa I, “The Baltic States’ Response to Russian Hybrid Threats”, Defence Studies, 22(3), 345–367, 2022.
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Clark, D. & Hakala, E, “Submarine Cable Security in the Baltic Sea: Vulnerabilities and NATO’s Role”, NATO Review, 15(4), 1–12, 2023.
Galeotti M, “Hybrid War and Little Green Men: How It Works and How to Counter It,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 29(3), 401–423, 2016.
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