AIRPOWER IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

Article Published in “Destination India” May 2024

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Airpower is a decisive factor and a game-changer in the art of warfare. The application of airpower, although it looks simple is a complex process. During a war, the major roles of airpower include shaping the environment, offensive force application, and synergising operations with surface forces. It also plays a vital role during peace and the transition from peace to war. Airpower in the Indian context has evolved since its genesis, reflecting changes in technology, doctrine, and strategic priorities. Some key aspects of the evolutionary process including the past, present and future are deliberated in the succeeding paragraphs.

 

Genesis & Early Years. The Indian Air Force was established in British India as an auxiliary air force of the Royal Air Force on 8 Oct 1932, with four Westland Wapiti biplanes and five Indian pilots. The then Royal IAF (RIAF) grew in size during World War II to ten squadrons. In the early years of the IAF, the primary focus was on providing air support to British and Commonwealth ground forces. During World War II, the IAF played a significant role in the Burma campaign in halting the advance of the Japanese army, by providing air cover and support for ground troops. IAF evolved initially in a tactical role primarily to support surface and maritime wars. Indian Air Force (IAF) of independent India came into being with meagre resources of seven squadrons (six fighter squadrons and one transport squadron).

 

Participation in the Wars. Post-Independence Four wars took place in the first two and half decades. Almost immediately after Independence, India, and Pakistan clashed over the future of Kashmir. IAF carried out air operations including airlift of troops and supplies, photo-reconnaissance, bombing, strafing, and interdiction. The air power usage was tactical and reactionary to the emerging situations. In the 1962 War with China, despite a clear combat edge, the fighter component of the Indian Air Force was not used. There was a general reluctance to use offensive air power due to the perceived fear of escalation of conflict. In the 1965 war with Pakistan, air superiority in specific terms was not contested by either side. IAF gave a good account in the skies and in support of surface forces, to help them stop the Pakistani offensive. In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, IAF actively engaged the enemy air force achieving complete air superiority over the eastern wing of Pakistan. IAF carried out all air campaigns in parallel, including close air support and air cover to the Indian Army, attacks against Pakistani Air Force bases, assistance to the Indian Navy in maritime operations, offensive attacks on enemy armour, and strategic bombing. IAF played a pivotal role in the victory, leading to the liberation of Bangladesh. Kargil Operations in 1999, demonstrated once again the impact of air power in achieving objectives. Air power was employed in a very innovative way at high altitudes. A game-changer shift took place on 26 February 2019, when India decided to use offensive air power by carrying out deep strikes against terrorist targets in Pakistan, beyond the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The myth about the use of air power being escalatory in nature was broken.

 

Power Projection Abroad. During 1987-90 IAF was involved with operations in Sri Lanka and Maldives. IAF established an “air bridge” between mainland India and Sri Lanka for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Although combat aircraft were not used, IAF helicopters provided fire support for the army. In 1988, IAF undertook Operation Cactus, wherein, it flew at least a battalion of paratroopers, more than 1000 Miles away to Maldives when rebels attempted to overthrow the government. In these operations, the IAF demonstrated its ability to project forces on short notice.

 

Growth, Modernisation and Expansion. The decade of the 1950s saw the induction of aircraft and support systems, both in quantity and quality, into the IAF.  During this period, the IAF acquired its first jet fighters and transport aircraft and India began to develop its own indigenous aircraft and weapons systems. IAF shifted its focus to defending India’s borders and air space, and its capabilities started developing beyond the limited scope of the support role. In the period from 1980 to 2000, the IAF modernised itself with advanced aircraft, weapons, and sensors, and expanded its capabilities to include strategic airlift.

 

Current Modernisation. The present decade is witnessing an all-around capability development of IAF with new platforms, weapons and systems. This is being spurred by the combination of rapid capability enhancement and the belligerent attitude of our adversaries. A Multi-pronged approach is being adopted to deal with the current and future challenges. Self-reliance is being encouraged and supported while maintaining the minimum deterrence value, by procurement from abroad. The inventory is also being diversified with inductions from the USA, France and Israel, besides Russia. India has become the largest defence market for the USA with the recent inductions of C-17 aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft, P-8i maritime recce aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, and Chinook heavy lift aircraft, UAVs and weapons. Besides these other two major inductions are the S-400 AD system from Russia and the Rafale fighter aircraft from France.

 

Strategic Transformation. Originally the IAF had formed purely for the requirements of the British interests of its Empire, its roles and responsibilities were limited to tactical applications of air power. Post-independence also the application of air power continued to remain tactical. It was only in 1971 that the IAF carried out strategic effect-based operations with air campaigns in parallel. In the first decade of this century, the IAF inducted airborne early warning, and aerial refuelling capability leading to an increase in strategic reach along with conventional deterrence. The IAF started transforming from a tactical air power to a strategic one to become a multi-spectrum air force. The capability development is being matched with doctrinal adaptation.

 

Doctrinal Adaptation. IAF formally formulated and published its first doctrine in 1995. This was the basic doctrine covering characteristics of air power, assets, tasks, and campaigns, the role of technology, combat support operations, force multipliers and the importance of a network-centric environment. The doctrine was reviewed in 2012, and this version went on to establish a connection between airpower and national security. It brought out the greater role of air power in the full spectrum of nation-building, national security, and aerial diplomacy. IT included contribution to sub-conventional operations, the enabling characteristics of air power such as air mobility, helicopter support for Special Forces operations, casualty evacuation, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) etc. The latest version published in 2022, proposes a larger regional role for IAF, beyond territorial defence. It elucidates a peacetime strategy constituting sovereignty protection, deterrence, air diplomacy, and nation-building, and a No War, No Peace (NWNP) strategy, based on kinetic as well as non-kinetic responses. It advocates the shift from air power to aerospace power and stresses greater space exploitation for the achievement of national objectives. The doctrine also elaborates on multi-domain operations, and the importance of battle-space transparency, combat networking, cyber and information warfare, electronic warfare, techno-logistics, administration and human resource management, and training.

 

Future Focus / Trajectory

 

Investment in Technology.  Air Force is a technology-intensive service and converting technology into capability is a time-consuming process. To stay on top of the challenges, there is a need to invest in emerging technologies and ideate about their utilisation in warfare. Some of the future technologies that are impacting the air war include Quantum computing, Hypersonic weapon systems, Artificial Intelligence., Robotics, Nanotechnology, Unmanned platforms, Drones and swarm technology, Network-centric environment / Internet of things/system of systems etc.

 

Unmanned Platforms. The use of unmanned platforms and systems is growing in warfare. This shift is expected to continue as technology advances and the capabilities of unmanned systems improve further. Drones of various sizes and capabilities are taking over the tasks of conventional platforms. Their utilisation is spread across the entire spectrum of threats ranging from sub-conventional, and conventional to long-range attacks. Investment in drones and anti-drone systems is also a need of the hour.

 

Loyal Wing Man Concept. Both man and unmanned platforms have their respective advantages and disadvantages. The thought process for the next generation of platforms is to harness the advantages of both and develop networked systems, wherein, both can work in an integrated manner. Research is going on in many countries on the “Loyal wingman” concept. HAL in India is also working on the CATS (Combat Air Team System) program on similar lines.

 

Hypersonic Weapons. The development of hypersonic weapons is likely to have a significant impact on air strategy. Hypersonic weapons provide new opportunities for rapid response and long-range strike capabilities with precision. They also pose new challenges in terms of protection and air defence.  The high speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons will require the development of new air defence strategies, as traditional air defence systems may be unable to detect or intercept these weapons. This could lead to the development of new technologies, such as directed energy weapons or advanced sensors, to counter the threat posed by hypersonic weapons. Also, protective infrastructure would be required which can withstand the destructive power of these weapons.

 

New Domains of Warfare. The domains like cyber, space, electronics and information are coming into the influence of warfare. China’s formation of a Joint Strategic Support Force (JSSF) as a separate service, with defensive and offensive capabilities, in above mentioned four domains, indicates future challenges, that require reorientation to deal with them.

 

Grey Zone Operations.  Grey zone operations are operations in the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare.  These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both the adversaries of India are resorting to these operations regularly. Air power besides offensive use can also be effectively utilised in many ways, in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Various aspects of grey zone operations need to be deliberated from the point of view of airpower involvement. A certain amount of reorientation would be required in the application of airpower in these grey zone situations supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

 

Space-Based Capabilities.  The term airpower has changed to aerospace power with the aerial warfare envelope expanding to the domain of space. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. In Grey zone warfare the involvement of space-based equipment and systems is on an even larger scale. Space-based systems are becoming increasingly important in air warfare, providing capabilities such as navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches and space-based surveillance.  The integration of these systems with air assets is expected to continue, providing new opportunities for offensive and defensive operations.

 

Self-Reliance, Indigenisation and Make in India. Indian Air Force has always encouraged the development of indigenous defence production capability and it is one of its key result areas. It has played an important role in creating an aerospace ecosystem in India and has been operating indigenously built aircraft and also aircraft built in India under licence production. This has given impetus to indigenous industry in the past and will continue to support it in future. The important thing to remember is that while supporting self-reliance the minimum level of deterrence capability needs to be maintained at all times. Also, the balance between quality and quantity needs to be ensured.

 

The IAF should continue to prioritise modernisation efforts, including the acquisition of advanced aircraft, weapons systems, and sensors. This will enable the IAF to maintain a technological edge over potential adversaries and respond effectively to emerging threats. The IAF should concentrate on new areas of capability development, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cyber warfare, and space-based systems. These capabilities will enhance its ability to conduct a wide range of operations, from intelligence gathering to precision strikes. The IAF should work closely with the surface forces to develop joint operations capabilities, with emphasis on joint conceptualisation, planning, command and control systems, and integrated training exercises. The IAF should continue to be proactive in its role of providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, both domestically and internationally. Overall, the IAF should strive to maintain a balance between traditional air power capabilities and emerging areas of strategic importance. This will enable the IAF to meet its primary mission of defending India’s air space and national security interests, while also contributing to the broader role of nation-building, regional stability and humanitarian assistance.

 

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References and credits

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  1. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/closing-gap-doctrinal-capability-appraisal-iaf-plaaf/
  2. https://airpowerasia.com/2020/06/15/air-power-transformational-challenges-india/
  3. Aerospace strategy: An idea whose time has come. By Air Mshl D Choudhury, AVSM, VM, VSM (Retd).
  4. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-01_Issue-1/04-F-Goulter-Pant.pdf
  5. https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2MB.pdf
  6. Basic Doctrines of the Indian Air Force 1995, 2012 and 2022.
  7. https://theprint.in/opinion/iaf-doctrine-leverages-air-power-it-also-has-the-first-no-war-no-peace-strategy/1379156/
  8. https://capsindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Bhashyam-Kasturi.pdf
  9. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/

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TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS (2019-2023)

Pics Courtesy Internet

 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), recently published its fact sheet about trends in international arms transfer covering the last five-year period i.e. 2014-23 and compared it with data from the previous five years of 2014-18. The gist of it is as follows:-

 

The global volume of international arms transfers decreased marginally, by 3.3 per cent.

 

Imports of major arms by states in Europe increased by 94 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

 

There were overall decreases in arms transfers to all other regions, but states in Asia and Oceania and the Middle East continued to import arms in much larger volumes than those in Europe.

 

Nine of the 10 biggest arms importers in 2019–23, including the top 3 of India, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, were in Asia and Oceania or the Middle East.

 

Ukraine became the fourth biggest arms importer globally after it received transfers of major arms from over 30 states in 2022–23.

 

Arms exports by the United States, the world’s largest arms supplier, rose by 17 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while those by Russia fell by more than half (–53 per cent).

 

France’s arms exports grew by 47 per cent and it moved just ahead of Russia to become the world’s second-largest arms supplier.

 

 

THE EXPORTERS (2019–23)

 

SIPRI has identified 66 states as exporters of major arms in 2019–23.

 

The five largest exporters of arms during that period—the USA, France, Russia, China and Germany—accounted for 75 per cent of all arms exports.

 

US and French arms exports rose between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while Russian, Chinese and German arms exports fell.

 

The USA and states in Western Europe together accounted for 72 per cent of all arms exports in 2019–23, compared with 62 per cent in 2014–18.

 

USA

 

The USA’s arms exports grew by 17 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and its share of total global arms exports rose from 34 per cent to 42 per cent.

 

The USA delivered major arms to 107 states in 2019–23, which was more than the next two biggest exporters combined.

 

The volume of arms exported by the USA in 2019–23 was 282 per cent higher than that of France, the second biggest arms exporter globally.

 

In 2019–23 the largest share of US arms exports went to states in the Middle East (38 per cent).

 

US arms exports to states in Asia and Oceania increased by 14 per cent overall between 2014–18 and 2019–23, with the region account- ing for 31 per cent of all US arms exports in 2019–23.

 

Three states in the region were among the 10 largest recipients of US arms in 2019–23: Japan accounted for 9.5 per cent of all US arms exports, Australia for 7.1 per cent and South Korea for 5.3 per cent.

 

A total of 28 per cent of US arms exports went to states in Europe in 2019–23, which was up from 11 per cent in 2014–18. US arms exports to the region increased by just over 200 per cent between the two periods. Ukraine accounted for 4.7 per cent of all US arms exports and 17 per cent of those to Europe.

 

Deliveries of combat aircraft typically make up a significant part of the USA’s total arms exports. It delivered 420 combat aircraft in 2019–23. Of these, 249 were advanced F-35 aircraft, which were delivered to a total of 10 states and accounted for 24 per cent of all US arms exports. The USA has many pending arms export deliveries, including a total of 1071 combat aircraft, of which 785 are F-35s.

 

France

 

France narrowly overtook Russia to become the world’s second largest exporter of major arms in 2019–23.

 

France delivered major arms to 64 states in 2019–23, but India was by far the largest recipient, accounting for 29 per cent of French arms exports.

 

The bulk of France’s arms exports in 2019–23 went to states in Asia and Oceania (42 per cent of arms exports) and the Middle East (34 per cent).

 

France has been trying to expand its arms sales to other European states for many years; however, its exports to European states in 2019–23 accounted for only 9.1 per cent of its total arms exports. More than half of its European arms exports (53 per cent) went to Greece, mostly made up of transfers of 17 Rafale combat aircraft.

 

A sharp rise in deliveries of Rafale combat aircraft accounted for most of the growth in French arms exports in 2019–23. France exported 23 Rafales in 2014–18. This increased to 94 in 2019–23, representing just under one third (31 per cent) of French arms exports in the period. A further 193 Rafales were on order for export as at the end of 2023. However, most of the aircraft France has already delivered (96 out of 117) and those on order (178 out of 193) are for states outside Europe—Egypt, India, Indonesia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

 

This highlights the challenge France still faces in selling its major arms to European states, especially in the context of the strong competition from the USA. Notably, 8 out of the 10 European states that preselected or ordered combat aircraft in 2019–23 opted for US F-16s or F-35s, with only Croatia and Greece opting for the Rafale.

 

Russia

 

Russia’s arms exports fell by 53 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and it accounted for 11 per cent of total global arms exports. It delivered major arms to 41 states in 2019–23.

 

In 2019 the annual volume of Russian arms exports was at a similar level to that in each of the preceding 20 years. However, the export volumes in 2020, 2021 and 2022 were at much lower levels than in 2019, and in 2023 the volume was 52 per cent lower than in 2022. Another indication of the decline of Russia as a global supplier of arms is that whereas 31 states received major arms from Russia in 2019, only 14 did in 2022 and that number fell to 12 in 2023.

 

States in Asia and Oceania received 68 per cent of total Russian arms exports in 2019–23, while Middle Eastern and African states received 13 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.

 

Just under two-thirds of Russian arms exports went to three states in 2019–23: India (34 per cent), China (21 per cent) and Egypt (7.5 per cent).

 

India was also the largest recipient of Russian arms in 2014–18, but exports to India decreased by 34 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while exports to China decreased by 39 per cent and to Egypt by 54 per cent.

 

Algeria and Vietnam were the third and fourth largest recipients of Russian arms in 2014–18; however, exports to Algeria (–83 per cent) and Vietnam (–91 per cent) dropped significantly between the two periods.

 

The low volume of pending deliveries of major arms from Russia suggests that Russian arms exports are likely to remain well below the level reached in 2014–18, for at least the short term.

 

China

 

China accounted for 5.8 per cent of total global arms exports in 2019–23. Its arms exports decreased by 5.3 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

 

The bulk of Chinese arms exports (85 per cent) went to states in Asia and Oceania, followed by states in Africa (9.9 per cent). China delivered major arms to 40 states in 2019–23, but well over half of its arms exports (61 per cent) went to just one state—Pakistan.

 

Others

      • Germany. Arms exports by Germany made up 5.6 per cent of the global total in 2019–23. They were 14 per cent lower than in 2014–18. States in the Middle East received the largest share of all German arms exports in 2019–23 (39 per cent), followed by states in Asia and Oceania (28 per cent) and Europe (25 per cent).

 

      • Italy accounted for 4.3 per cent of the world’s arms exports in 2019–23. Its arms exports were 86 per cent higher in 2019–23 than in 2014–18. A total of 71 per cent of Italian arms exports went to the Middle East.

 

      • The 4 other suppliers making up the top 10 arms exporters in 2019–23 were the United Kingdom, Spain, Israel and South Korea. Arms exports by the UK (–14 per cent), Spain (–3.3 per cent) and Israel (–25 per cent) all decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23, while arms exports by South Korea increased by 12 per cent.

 

THE IMPORTERS (2019–23)

 

 

SIPRI has identified 170 states as importers of major arms in 2019–23. The top five arms importers—India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Ukraine and Pakistan— received 35 per cent of all arms imports in the period.

 

States in Asia and Oceania accounted for 37 per cent of all arms imports in 2019–23, followed by states in the Middle East (30 per cent), Europe (21 per cent), the Americas (5.7 per cent) and Africa (4.3 per cent).

 

Asia and Oceania

 

Arms imports by states in Asia and Oceania decreased by 12 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, mainly because of a sharp drop in Chinese arms imports.

 

However, it remained the region with the highest volume of arms imports and 6 of the world’s 10 largest arms importers in 2019–23 were in Asia and Oceania: India, Pakistan, Japan, Australia, South Korea and China.

 

The main suppliers to the region were the USA, with a 34 per cent share of regional imports, Russia (19 per cent) and China (13 per cent).

 

India

 

India’s tensions with Pakistan and China largely drive its arms imports.

 

India’s arms imports increased by 4.7 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, making it the world’s biggest arms importer in 2019–23 with a 9.8 per cent share of all arms imports.

 

Russia remained India’s main supplier, but its share of Indian arms imports has shrunk from 76 per cent in 2009–13 to 58 per cent in 2014–18 and then to 36 per cent in 2019–23.

 

India has instead looked to Western suppliers, most notably France and the USA, and its own arms industry to meet its demand for major arms. This shift is also visible in India’s new orders, many of which are placed with Western suppliers, and its arms procurement plans, which seemingly do not include any Russian options.

 

Pakistan. Arms imports by Pakistan grew by 43 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 and accounted for 4.3 per cent of the world total, making it the fifth largest arms importer globally. Pakistan continued to strengthen its arms procurement relations with China: 82 per cent of its arms imports came from China in 2019–23, as against 69 per cent in 2014–18, and 51 per cent in 2009–13.

 

Africa

 

Imports of major arms by African states fell by 52 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, which was mainly due to decreases in the arms imports of the two largest importers in the region, Algeria (–77 per cent) and Morocco (–46 per cent).

 

The main suppliers to Africa in 2019–23 were Russia, accounting for 24 per cent of African imports of major arms, the USA (16 per cent), China (13 per cent) and France (10 per cent).

 

East Asia, Oceania and South East Asia

 

Arms imports by states in East Asia (–6.1 per cent), Oceania (–10 per cent) and South East Asia (–43 per cent) decreased between 2014–18 and 2019–23.

 

China.  China’s arms imports fell by 44 per cent and accounted for 2.9 per cent of the global total in 2019–23. Most Chinese arms imports (77 per cent) came from Russia. The drop in Chinese imports is due to China’s growing ability to design and produce its own major arms. Its arms imports will probably decrease further as it develops this capacity.

 

Japan and South Korea are expanding their military capabilities, mainly because of tensions with China and North Korea. Japan (+155 per cent) and South Korea (+6.5 per cent) increased their arms imports between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The USA is the main supplier to both states, accounting for 97 per cent of Japan’s arms imports and 72 per cent of South Korea’s. The two states are investing heavily in long-range strike capabilities. The USA supplied 29 combat aircraft to Japan and 34 to South Korea in 2019–23. Japan also ordered 400 long-range land-attack missiles from the USA in 2023 (see box 2). These will, for the first time, give Japan the capability to reach targets deep inside China or North Korea.

 

Taiwan’s arms imports dropped by 69 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23 despite heightened tensions with China. However, major deliveries are planned to take place over the next five years, including deliveries of 66 combat aircraft, 108 tanks and 460 anti-ship missiles. All these planned deliveries are from the USA, which supplied over 99 per cent of Taiwanese arms imports in 2019–23.

 

Australia was the eighth largest arms importer in 2019–23 after its arms imports dropped by 21 per cent. However, in 2023 it reached an agreement with the UK and the USA to import at least six nuclear-powered submarines.

 

Arms imports by South East Asian states fell by 43 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. However, tensions, mainly with China, continue to drive arms acquisitions by many states in the subregion. For example, arms imports by the Philippines (+105 per cent) and by Singapore (+17 per cent) increased between the two periods. In addition, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

 

Europe

 

Arms imports by states in Europe were 94 per cent higher in 2019–23 than in 2014–18.

 

Ukraine received 23 per cent of the region’s arms imports in 2019–23. It was, by far, the largest arms importer in Europe and the fourth largest in the world.

 

The UK, which accounted for 11 per cent of European arms imports, and the Netherlands (9.0 per cent) were the next biggest arms importers in the region.

 

A total of 55 per cent of European arms imports came from the USA in 2019–23, compared with 35 per cent in 2014–18. The next largest suppliers to the region were Germany and France, which accounted for 6.4 per cent and 4.6 per cent of European arms imports respectively.

 

West and Central European States. Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 increased the demand for arms in West and Central European states. For example, by the end of 2023, these states had a total of 791 combat aircraft and combat helicopters on order for import. After it launched the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia began a campaign of missile attacks against Ukraine. In response, many West and Central European states supplied air defence systems to Ukraine and several placed new import orders for them or accelerated existing procurement processes. In 2023 Poland ordered 12 air defence systems from the USA, and Germany ordered a single but particularly high-value system from Israel. In 2022–23 Austria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia ordered air defence systems from Germany, while Finland and Slovakia ordered Israeli systems, and Lithuania and the Netherlands ordered Norwegian systems. In addition, some states ordered missiles for domestically produced systems or to arm newly acquired imports or their existing systems. For example, in 2023 Poland and Norway ordered missiles from the UK and the USA, respectively, for their new systems, while Germany ordered 500 missiles and Romania 200, all from the USA, for their existing systems.

 

The Middle East. Arms imports by states in the Middle East were 12 per cent lower in 2019–23 than in 2014–18. Three of the top 10 arms importers in 2019–23 were in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. The USA accounted for 52 per cent of Middle Eastern arms imports. The next biggest suppliers were France (12 per cent), Italy (10 per cent) and Germany (7.1 per cent).

 

The Gulf Region. Saudi Arabia was the world’s second-largest arms importer in 2019–23, with an 8.4 per cent share of all arms imports. Its arms imports fell by 28 per cent after peaking at their highest point ever in 2014–18. The USA supplied 75 per cent of Saudi Arabian arms imports in 2019–23, which included the delivery of 67 combat aircraft and hundreds of land-attack missiles.

 

Qatar was the third largest arms importer in the world, with a global share of 7.6 per cent, as its arms imports increased by 396 per cent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. Its main suppliers in 2019–23 were the USA, which accounted for 45 per cent of Qatari arms imports, France (25 per cent) and Italy (15 per cent). Qatar’s arms imports in the period included 36 combat aircraft from France, 36 from the USA and 25 from the UK, as well as 4 frigates from Italy. Iran’s arms imports have been at a very low level relative to those of other arms importers in the Gulf region since around 1993. In 2023 Iran placed by far its largest import order for major arms in 20 years, for 24 combat aircraft from Russia.

 

IsraelBetween 2014–18 and 2019–23, arms imports by Israel rose marginally (+5.1 per cent). The USA accounted for 69 per cent and Germany for 30 per cent of Israeli arms imports. Imported weapons, in particular combat aircraft received from the USA over several decades, have played a major role in Israel’s military actions against Hamas and Hezbollah. At the end of 2023 the USA rapidly delivered thousands of guided bombs and missiles to Israel, but the total volume of Israeli arms imports from the USA in 2023 was almost the same as in 2022. By the end of 2023, pending deliveries of major arms to Israel included 61 combat aircraft from the USA and 4 submarines from Germany.

 

Arms imports and the war in Ukraine

 

At least 30 states supplied major arms to Ukraine after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, mostly as military aid, meaning that Ukraine was by some distance the world’s largest arms importer in the year 2023.

 

The USA supplied 39 per cent of Ukrainian arms imports in 2019–23, followed by Germany (14 per cent) and Poland (13 per cent).

 

To broaden Ukraine’s military capabilities, suppliers began to deliver long-range systems in 2023. For example, Poland and Slovakia donated 27 surplus combat aircraft, and France and the UK supplied missiles with a range of 300 kilometres. During the year, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway also started to prepare for the delivery of over 50 surplus combat aircraft.

 

Russia relies primarily on its industry for its major arms. However, in 2022–23 it imported flying bombs from Iran and ballistic missiles from North Korea, the latter in violation of a United Nations arms embargo on North Korea.

 

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References and credits

SIPRI

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SPEED RACE: HYPERSONIC WEAPONS

 

Pic Courtesy: Internet

 

Hypersonic weapons are the new entrants in the armoury.

 

They have a major impact on the conduct of warfare.

 

I new arms race has started.

 

 

To read the article, please click on the link below:-

 

SPEED RACE: HYPERSONIC WEAPONS

 

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