Inflatable decoy (Pic: Courtesy – Reddit)

China regards deception as a key component of military planning, and PLA leaders continue to emphasise on the widespread use of deception.

 

This is particularly evident at the tactical level, where the PLA actively employs wide variety of deception measures.

Decoys

One of the primary methods of battlefield deception for PLA ground forces is the use of decoys.

 

PLA decoys simulate a wide range of equipment including ballistic missile launch vehicles, tanks, aircraft, artillery, and other various types of military vehicles and equipment including small maritime vessels.

 

The PLA uses two types of decoys: inflatable and solid.

 

Inflatable Decoys

PLA use of inflatable decoys appears to be widespread as they are cheap and easy to use and transport.

 

An inflatable tank weighs only 35 kilograms, can be folded to fit in a soldier’s backpack, and takes just four minutes to inflate.

 

Inflatable decoys are standardised to match the size and colour of real equipment.

 

PLA also uses camouflage coatings for inflatable decoys that mimic stone and metal.

 

Solid Material Decoys

Solid material decoys look more authentic than inflatable decoys because of fixed shape.

 

Solid decoys maintain nearly the exact shape of the impersonated vehicle.

 

Solid decoys are also fast and easy to assemble.

 

Some decoy units are even designed to fool infrared sensors by utilizing heat to imitate the infrared signature of a missile launch. Some of the decoys also circulate hot water to mimic the infrared signature of a vehicle in use.

 

Many of these decoys are mobile and can be interspersed and move in tandem with real equipment.

PLA Rocket Force Deception Measures

 

With its mission to ensure nuclear deterrence, as well its responsibility to operate ballistic missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), also places great emphasis on deception.

 

The PLARF has its own special engineering and camouflage units, which undertake a wide variety of disguise and camouflage activities.

 

In addition to using decoys, the PLARF often disguises its equipment as civilian vehicles to help avoid detection. DF-21 ballistic missile launchers are often disguised as ubiquitous blue fuel trucks, and DF-10 launchers are disguised as common cargo trucks.

 

The PLA even goes so far as to add company names and contact numbers to disguised vehicles in order to increase the level of realism.

 

The PLA also disguises military trains as ordinary passenger trains to enable them to transport military equipment with less chance of detection.

 

Another tactic used by the PLARF to confuse enemy reconnaissance is to employ an entire unit of fake troops. When the real unit moves or changes its launch position, the fake unit will also move at the same time to cause confusion.

 

To ensure authenticity, fake units are equipped with the same special-purpose vehicles as the real unit.

 

The PLARF also places old and obsolete equipment in the open to distract enemy reconnaissance efforts, while real equipment is camouflaged and hidden in areas that are harder to observe, such as mountainous terrain and forests.

Militia Support

 

China’s local militia forces play an important role in deception and camouflage support for regular PLA units.

 

The militia fields camouflage protection teams, which deploy decoys, provide camouflage support, and help execute displays, demonstrations, and ruses.

 

Peace time Measures

 

These teams can also hide targets and frustrate enemy reconnaissance and targeting efforts by creating large smoke screens, which inhibit laser-guided weapons, and using balloons, which confuse enemy radar by deploying chaff.

 

The PLA also uses deception measures such as decoys and disguises during military exercises to hinder intelligence collection by reconnaissance satellites. During exercises, a warning is given if an enemy reconnaissance satellite is about to pass over the area. At that point, dispersal and concealment efforts are immediately executed by personnel and equipment to minimise detection.

Implications

 

The PLA’s widespread use of deception presents serious wartime and peacetime challenge.

 

During a conflict, locating and targeting PLA high-value targets, such as the PLARF’s ballistic missiles, would be difficult.

 

Recommendations

 

Chinese Deception measures and techniques should be taught to all the defence imagery and intelligence analysts.

 

Use of decoys and deception measures by own forces should be increased.

 

For Reading all about Decoys:  https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla/2021/09/18/to-believe-or-not-to-believe-decoys-to-deceive-and-survive/

 

Bottom Line

It is better to deceive the enemy than getting deceived yourself.

 

Question

Are we using adequate deception measures?

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

For regular updates, please register here

Subscribe

References

https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/deception-is-key-to-chinese-military-strategies/#:~:text=According%20to%20estimates%20by%20one,effective%20at%20deceiving%20enemy%20troops.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/deception-chinese-way-war

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ApprovedFINALSAICStrategicDeceptionPaperRevisedDraft06Nov2009.pdf