May 2026 – Page 3 – Air Marshal's Perspective

May 4, 2026

808: REASSESSING COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL POWER IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

Article published on the “Chakra Dialogues Foundation” website on 02 May 26.

In the lexicon of contemporary statecraft, few concepts have generated as much analytical attention and strategic utility as Comprehensive National Power (CNP). As the twenty-first century has complicated the relationship between coercion and cooperation, between hard and soft instruments of statecraft, CNP has become the preferred analytical lens of strategic planners. CNP offers a multidimensional framework for assessing a state’s capacity to pursue its interests, shape its environment, and sustain its influence over time.

India today is navigating an increasingly uncertain global environment. The real challenge lies in building a broad and balanced base of national power that matches its ambitions and security needs. Doing so calls for a fresh, all-encompassing look at how the country approaches Comprehensive National Power (CNP).

Comprehensive National Power: Concept

Evolution. The intellectual genealogy of CNP stretches back through the classical traditions of strategic thought. Kautilya’s Arthashastra enumerated the elements of state power as territory, treasury, army, and allies. Over the years, several theorists have tried to codify the components of CNP. Some of these components included geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, and diplomacy. Chinese scholars and strategic planners in the 1980s developed systematic models for calculating CNP. They assigned numerical weightage to economic output, military capability, technological advancement, educational level, and international influence. The concept also gained currency in Western strategic studies in the late 1980s. Joseph Nye introduced the distinction between hard power and soft power.

Methodologies of Measuring CNP. Multiple methodologies have been developed to numerically measure the CNP. Each has its own assumptions and limitations. Chinese academic models (a formula developed by Huang Shuofeng) assign weightage to components such as economic strength, military capability, scientific and technological capacity, education, and resource endowments. The RAND Corporation, the IISS, and various academic institutions have developed variant frameworks that emphasise different components or measurement approaches. There are several challenges associated with measuring CNP. Many dimensions are difficult to quantify numerically. Soft power and cultural influence are difficult to measure quantitatively. Even harder components, such as military power, are not straightforwardly comparable.

Components of Comprehensive National Power

Economic Power. The economic dimension has a direct bearing on the national power. Economic power is not defined by the state’s GDP alone. It also includes factors such as economic structure, fiscal depth, trade relationships, and financial system resilience. These factors collectively determine a nation’s ability to invest in modernising its military, maintain diplomatic relations, support technological advancements, and withstand external shocks.

Military Power. Military capability remains the ultimate instrument of statecraft. It includes the capacity for power projection beyond borders and a deterrent capacity to prevent conflicts. Nuclear deterrence is also part of military power and the CNP.

Technological Power. In the modern era, technology has become the most dynamic component of national power. The contest for technological primacy is part of the great-power competition of the present century. Those who lead in modern technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, space, and advanced manufacturing will shape the strategic landscape of the coming decades.

Diplomatic Power. Diplomatic power is the capacity to shape the international environment through persuasion, coalition-building, and norm-setting. It encompasses factors such as the reach and depth of its relationships, standing in multilateral institutions, and say in global governance. States with high diplomatic power can often achieve their strategic objectives without using their instruments of hard power. Diplomatic power is closely related to, but distinct from, soft power. While soft power operates through attraction, diplomatic power operates through strategic engagements. The two are mutually reinforcing. A state with high soft power finds diplomatic engagement easier.

Cultural Power. Of all the components of national power, cultural power is the most underestimated. Military strength can be matched. Economic advantages can be eroded. But the influence of the country’s values, arts, language, and way of life cannot be neutralised. Cultural power works quietly, across generations, shaping how a country is perceived.

Hard-Soft-Smart Power Triad. The synthesis of these components into an effective strategy requires smart power. Smart power is the ability to choose the right mix of hard and soft instruments for a given strategic context. It also involves their coherent integration and precise deployment. Smart power recognises that hard and soft instruments are not substitutes but complements. Military credibility enhances diplomatic leverage. Cultural attractiveness amplifies economic ties. Technological leadership feeds back into all other domains. States that achieve this integration multiply their effective power well beyond the sum of its components.

Cross-Cutting Themes and Dimensions

Energy Security and Resource Control. Control over energy resources and critical minerals is a basic element of national power. Energy-secure states enjoy freedom of strategic action. The weaponisation of energy supply in the Iran war and China’s consolidation of rare earth mineral supply chains demonstrate how control of these resources translates directly into geopolitical leverage. India’s dependence on hydrocarbons from the Gulf is a significant CNP vulnerability. Addressing it is a strategic priority.

Demographics and Human Capital. Population size and structure are fundamental parameters of national power, but their relationship is not linear. A large, young, educated, and healthy population is a CNP asset of the first order, providing the labour force for economic growth, the military manpower for national defence, and the talent base for technological innovation. A large but poorly educated, unhealthy, or rapidly ageing population can instead be a drag on national resources. India’s demographic dividend (the largest working-age population on the planet through the 2040s) is simultaneously its greatest potential national power asset and, if insufficiently invested in, its most consequential risk. The quality of education, healthcare, and employment opportunities available to this population will determine whether the dividend is realised or squandered.

Media, Information Warfare, and Narrative Control. The information domain has emerged as a new battleground. In this domain, the capability is measured by the capacity to shape narratives, manage perceptions, and counter adversarial propaganda. Information warfare involves both offensive and defensive operations. The offensive operations comprise disinformation campaigns, cyber-enabled influence operations, and strategic communication. The defensive operations include media literacy, information resilience and credible public communication. States with sophisticated information management systems can shape how their actions are perceived internationally.

Non-State Actors and Their Impact. The assumption that national power is exclusively a property of states has been progressively eroded. Non-state actors include transnational corporations, international NGOs, terrorist and insurgent organisations, diaspora communities, and global media platforms. They can amplify, constrain, or subvert national power in many ways. A state’s ability to harness the power of its non-state actors while managing or countering hostile non-state forces is itself a dimension of CNP. Pakistan’s use of non-state militant proxies as instruments of state policy, and the Indian diaspora’s contribution to India’s soft power and economic connectivity, are both illustrations of this dynamic.

India’s Trajectory in Building Comprehensive National Power

India’s CNP trajectory is one of the most consequential stories in contemporary international relations. Its democratic political system, however imperfect, confers legitimacy in a global environment. Its constitutional pluralism (the capacity of a state with dozens of languages, hundreds of communities, and multiple religions to function as a coherent democracy) is itself a form of soft power. India has demonstrated that development and diversity are compatible.

Strengths and Structural Assets. India’s strategic geography is a substantial asset. Its peninsular position at the centre of the Indian Ocean, flanked by the Arabian Sea to the west and the Bay of Bengal to the east, gives it a natural role as the dominant maritime power of the world’s most commercially important ocean. The Indo-Pacific strategic construct is one in which India occupies a structural position of centrality that no amount of diplomatic effort could manufacture. Geography has delivered a strategic endowment that India must now develop the naval and air power, the port infrastructure, and the diplomatic networks to exploit fully.

Weaknesses and Structural Constraints. India’s CNP has structural weaknesses that are as significant as its assets. The quality of public institutions (in education, healthcare, and justice delivery) has improved but remains below the desired level. Poverty and malnutrition, although declining, continue to limit human capital development. Urban infrastructure is lagging behind the pace of urbanisation. It is causing congestion, pollution, and productivity losses.

Strategic Autonomy. India’s traditional policy preference for freedom from binding alliances has been a source of diplomatic flexibility but also of strategic ambiguity. In a world where great-power competition is sharpening the demand for alignment, India’s insistence on engaging multiple power centers simultaneously is increasingly difficult to sustain without incurring costs.

Make in India and the Industrial Power Imperative. The Make in India initiative is India’s most ambitious attempt to address the structural dependency that has historically constrained its national power. A nation that cannot manufacture its own aircraft engines, semiconductors, precision munitions, or advanced electronics is perpetually dependent on the strategic choices of foreign suppliers. The encouragement of Make in India in the defence sector is as much a CNP investment as an industrial one. Self-reliance in defence production does not merely save foreign exchange. It removes a class of strategic vulnerabilities and creates an indigenous capability. Beyond defence, Make in India’s ambition to develop world-class manufacturing in electronics, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy, and semiconductors directly addresses the economic dimension of CNP. India’s Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes have begun to shift economic structures in a favourable direction.

India’s Soft Power: Diaspora, Culture, and Democracy. India’s soft power resources are among the richest in the world, though their strategic mobilisation has been uneven. The Indian diaspora is over thirty million strong and distributed across every major economy, with particular concentrations of extraordinary influence in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Gulf. It is a soft power asset without parallel. This diaspora creates interpersonal networks, economic investment flows, and cultural bridges. It, in turn, multiplies India’s global presence far beyond what its diplomatic budget could achieve. Culturally, India’s reach is extraordinary. Indian cinema has an enormous audience across Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

The Way Ahead

Developing India’s CNP requires deliberate action across every domain. Economically, India needs to expand its manufacturing base, reduce critical import dependencies, and become a vital player in global supply chains. Militarily, the focus must be on modernisation backed by indigenisation. Technologically, investments in AI, quantum computing, and space should be seen as essential national security priorities. Diplomatically, India can draw on its credibility as a democracy that resonates with both the Global South and developed nations. India’s demographic advantage will only deliver results if it is backed by serious social reforms. None of these priorities can be tackled in isolation; they need to be addressed holistically.

Concluding Thoughts

Comprehensive National Power is not a possession but a process. It has to be continuously built, maintained, and adapted to a changing strategic environment. The states that have wielded the greatest influence in international affairs have not been those with the largest armies or the most abundant resources. Greatest Influencers are those who successfully integrated their economic, military, technological, diplomatic, and cultural assets into coherent strategies sustained over time.

India stands at a strategic inflexion point. It has all the ingredients (geography, demography, democratic legitimacy, and civilisational depth) for great-power status. Converting these endowments into an effective national power is the central challenge for India. It requires industrial transformation, military modernisation, institutional reform, and above all, strategic imagination. The measure of success is not a country’s rank on any index. It is measured by its ability to influence the international environment in a favourable way to its security, prosperity, and values. That, ultimately, is what Comprehensive National Power is really about.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:

Huang Shuofeng, “Comprehensive National Power Theory”, China Social Sciences Press, 1992.

Cline, Ray S, “World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift”, Washington DC: Georgetown University/CSIS, 1975.

Singh, P.K., Gera, Y.K., and Dewan, Sandeep, “Comprehensive National Power: A Model for India”, New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 2013.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009.

Klare, Michael T. “Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict”, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001.

Singer, P.W. and Brooking, Emerson T. “LikeWar: The Weaponisation of Social Media”, New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin, 2018.

Bloom, David E. and Williamson, Jeffrey G. “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1998.

Government of India, “Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme Reports”, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, various years.

May 3, 2026

807: PRE-EMPTION AND NUCLEAR SIGNALLING IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Article published in the May 26 edition of

The News Analytics Magazine

The Iran war began with Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 and culminated in the far larger Operation Epic Fury of 28 February 2026. During this war, the joint US-Israel strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure will be studied in war colleges for decades because of what they represent conceptually. It represents the operational normalisation of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear programmes. Preventive operations against a proliferating adversary, once theoretical, have now become an operational reality.

The February 2026 campaign crossed every threshold that its predecessors had approached but not breached. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in the opening wave. IRGC leadership was decapitated. The key Iranian nuclear installations at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan were struck again, along with command architecture, missile production, and air defence systems. Yet catastrophic escalation has not followed, and the international system has absorbed it so far. This absorption is the strategic fact that changes everything.

Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo (From Osirak to Epic Fury)

The Cold War theory of deterrence rested on the foundational proposition that nuclear weapons created a protective envelope. They deter direct use of military force. This proposition has gradually eroded. Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor established what became known as the Begin Doctrine, i.e. no hostile neighbour would be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons, regardless of international law or diplomatic cost. The 2007 strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar facility extended the precedent. The Stuxnet cyber operation against Natanz in 2010 took it into the covert domain. Yet these attacks remained exceptional and limited, with denial. These attacks were not against a near-nuclear power with a ballistic missile arsenal and a functioning deterrence architecture. The 2025–2026 campaign is different in kind and degree. Iran possesses missiles capable of reaching Israel and American bases across the region. Striking it was pre-empting a perceived near-nuclear power while deliberately managing the risk of escalation to general war.

New Nuclear Signalling Paradigm

The new nuclear signalling paradigm consists of three distinct features. The first one is that deterrence is communicated through action rather than doctrine. Second, escalation is managed by targeting discrimination rather than abstention; third, the nuclear threshold is maintained through real-time reinforcement rather than assumed stability.

Legitimisation of Pre-emption. A doctrine that cannot be justified is a doctrine that cannot be sustained. It was publicised that Iran’s programme had reached an irreversible breakout proximity. The strikes were legitimised as a necessary preventive measure. This is the first lesson of the new paradigm. Pre-emption in the nuclear age requires strategic communication as much as operational capability.

Management of Escalation. The February 2026 strikes targeted enrichment infrastructure, command architecture, and IRGC leadership of Iran. Civilian infrastructure was not attacked, signalling limited objectives. Iran’s retaliation consisted of missile barrages against Israeli cities and US Gulf bases, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides imposed costs on the other without crossing the threshold that would have made retreat impossible. This “controlled chaos” demonstrates that even in direct war between a nuclear power, a presumed nuclear power, and a threshold state, escalation can be managed if both sides retain the discipline and interest to do so.

Holding the Nuclear Threshold. Iran did not cross into nuclear use partly because weaponisation was incomplete, but also because the American strategic umbrella was made explicit in the weeks before the strikes — through repositioned assets, presidential statements, and back-channel communications that made the consequences of nuclear first use unambiguous. Extended deterrence did not merely exist; it was actively performed. The threshold was not held not because deterrence was passive but because it was continuously and visibly reinforced at the moment it was most needed.

Global Implications. The normalisation of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear infrastructure has far-reaching implications. The lesson for the near-nuclear-status states is that the period between “developing” and “possessing” can become an operational trigger point. A not-yet-complete enough-to-deter-nuclear programme is in great danger of adversary attack. For the non-proliferation regime, the damage is structural. The NPT relies on IAEA verification as the mechanism for distinguishing between civilian and military nuclear development. Military strikes that bypass this mechanism hollow out the regime’s legitimacy.

The Indian Calculus

India occupies a position of distinctive complexity in this new landscape. It is a nuclear-armed state with a declared No First Use doctrine, bordered by two nuclear-armed adversaries whose own postures diverge sharply from each other and from India’s own.

China’s nuclear doctrine, while historically minimalist, is in visible transition. It is rapidly expanding its ICBM silos, developing a more survivable sea-based deterrent, and progressively blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear delivery systems in its missile forces. These developments point toward a more assertive posture. China has not adopted preemption as declared policy. But its conventional military assertiveness means that the relevant Indian concern is not Chinese nuclear pre-emption but Chinese conventional operations that generate military pressure in the space below the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan presents a fundamentally more direct and disturbing challenge in this context. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is ambiguous, creating uncertainty about escalation thresholds. The Pakistani military’s institutional identification with its nuclear programme, the domestic political dynamics that any Pakistani government would face after absorbing a pre-emptive strike, and the genuine ambiguity about tactical thresholds all point toward escalation risk substantially higher than what obtained in the Iran case. India cannot assume that the Iran paradigm (i.e., strike, absorb limited retaliation, and manage to a ceasefire) would replicate in South Asia with the same level of containment.

Doctrinal Imperative for India

India’s No First Use doctrine has moral clarity, a stabilising function in crisis management, and diplomatic value in the international community. It remains strategically sound and needs to be retained. But the NFU must be backed by a more explicit, operationally developed conventional deterrence capability and posture. The conventional deterrence posture should credibly signal that India can impose unacceptable costs on an adversary without resorting to nuclear first use. The Iran war demonstrates that pre-emption works when the pre-emptor has overwhelming conventional capability, credible backing, and a carefully constructed legitimising narrative. India must develop all three elements to deter the conditions that would make preemption appear necessary.

Simultaneously, India must develop protective infrastructure for its strategic assets (Critical military infrastructure, command-and-control nodes, and Weapon delivery systems). The investment in survivability, dispersal, hardening, and redundancy for India’s strategic assets is a strategic necessity and priority.

Concluding Thoughts

The operating rules of the Nuclear age are being rewritten. The new paradigm will shape the deterrence calculations globally for decades. The line between war and peace is no longer fixed; it is actively managed, contested, and increasingly blurred. For a country with India’s strategic geography, adversary configuration, and developmental ambitions, adapting to these developments is essential.

The Iran war has normalised pre-emption. Escalation control below the nuclear threshold is now a practised art form. Deterrence is to be earned, not just declared in the doctrine. The question India must now answer is whether its doctrine, force structure, survivability investments, and strategic communication are credible enough to meet the new paradigm.

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References: –

Brodie, B. (Ed.). (1946). The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. Harcourt, Brace.
Clary, C., & Narang, V. (2019). India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities. MIT Press.
Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press.
Chari, P. R. (2003). Nuclear restraint, nuclear risk reduction, and the security-insecurity paradox in South Asia. Nonproliferation Review, 10(1), 73–85.
Clary, C. (2010). Thinking about Pakistan’s nuclear security in peacetime, crisis and war. IDSA Occasional Paper, 12, 1–47.

Fitzpatrick, M. (2016). Iran and nuclear ambitions. Adelphi Papers, 45(374), 1–176.
Sagan, S. D. (1994). The perils of proliferation: Organisation theory, deterrence theory, and the spread of nuclear weapons. International Security, 18(4), 66–107.

Arms Control Association. (2025). Iran’s nuclear program: A history of key agreements and violations. Arms Control Association.

Chaudhuri, R. (2023). India’s nuclear doctrine: Continuity and change. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

International Atomic Energy Agency. (2025). Iran: Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions (Report GOV/2025/14). IAEA Board of Governors.

Panda, A. (2025). Pakistan’s nuclear posture after Nasr: Tactical weapons and strategic instability (Working Paper). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Tellis, A. J. (2025). Striking Iran: What the US-Israeli operations mean for the Asian nuclear order. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Cooper, H., Schmitt, E., & Sanger, D. E. (2026, March 2). American bombers joined Israeli strikes on Iran in the February operation—The New York Times.
Warrick, J. (2025, July 4). Iran’s nuclear infrastructure: What was hit and what remains. The Washington Post.

May 2, 2026May 2, 2026

806: SPACE – THE NEW ARENA OF WARFARE

(Inputs to Questions)

Q1. Compressing the Sensor-to-Shooter Timeline

In today’s evolving warfare landscape, the true strength and deterrence now come from long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, space-based ISR networks, and the collaboration between manned and unmanned systems. This shift in military strategy calls for a broader structural change. Delays in taking action are no longer just tactical setbacks; they become a significant strategic vulnerability.

The sensor-to-shooter timeline compression is not only a technological problem but also a fundamental issue in decision architecture. Compressing that timeline requires work in several areas.

First, satellites must carry onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets. They should be able to transmit actionable intelligence over tactical data links. This eliminates the round-trip to a ground station for analysis.

Second, pre-authorised engagement envelopes, i.e. defined target criteria against which strike authority is delegated to the satellite before conflict begins. A satellite can trigger an execution sequence rather than a consultation.

Third, a direct machine-to-machine network between ISR assets and strike platforms, with AI cross-referencing satellite data with other sensors (UAVs, SIGINT, and ground radars) to automatically produce a confidence-rated target package.

The legal and ethical concerns surrounding a misattributed strike are understandable, highlighting the importance of having a careful approach in the kill chain. It’s essential to keep the human in the loop, ensuring the human authorises each kinetic attack. While smart machines can identify and designate targets, human oversight remains a crucial safeguard.

Q2. Fighting Through the Electronic Fog

Fighting through the Fog of war has existed since wars began. Electronic fog is a part of it. In the future, assessments of the threat environment should treat GPS jamming and ISR spoofing as baseline assumptions in conflict scenarios. The opening moves of any conflict involve cyber and electronic attacks before any kinetic exchange. Electronic attack is now a feature of even ostensibly non-combat environments (IAF aircraft flying into earthquake-hit Myanmar faced GPS spoofing).

The response must be across three levels. At the platform level, the need is for integrated systems with multiple guidance modes (inertial navigation, terrain-referenced navigation, NavIC integration, and optical terminal guidance). so that loss of GPS does not render the platform/weapon ineffective. Multi-constellation receivers (combining NavIC, GLONASS, and Galileo) would force an adversary to jam multiple frequencies simultaneously. In the future, quantum computing will enable precise navigation without reliance on GPS. At the same time, the implementation of quantum cryptography will secure communications.

At the space segment level, satellites should be capable of operating in a degraded communications environment. Resilience must be built into the architecture from the outset. They need anomaly-detection capability, frequency agility and hardened electronics. Optical communication between satellites is one way of reducing RF vulnerability.

At the operational level, the goal is not to eliminate the electronic fog but to remain functional inside it. Combat personnel must train regularly in GPS-denied and communications-degraded environments. Spectrum-agile systems, low-probability-of-intercept communications, and redundant networks are required to counter EW threats. Redundancy in sensors, communications, and commanders’ cognitive habits produces all-around resilience.

Q3. Distributed Constellations vs. Exquisite Satellites

The doctrine of “space deterrence” has become a key part of modern defence strategies. Protecting satellites through resilience and backups is now more important than ever. While a single valuable satellite can be a tempting target, having a group of smaller satellites spreads out the risk, making the overall system much sturdier. Each small satellite is less critical on its own, but together, they create a network that’s much harder to disrupt.

However, there are some trade-offs. Smaller satellites can carry smaller payloads. They have lower sensor resolution and have narrower per-node bandwidth. They may be suitable for tactical ISR functions, but insufficient for certain high-end ISR requirements. The practical answer is a tiered architecture. A mix of a small number of high-capability strategic satellites complemented by a larger constellation of capable, expendable ones.

Stratospheric airships present an exciting alternative! Operating comfortably at altitudes of 20–30 km, they blend the long-lasting qualities of satellites with the flexibility of terrestrial systems. Unlike geostationary satellites, airships can be moved, repaired, or upgraded with ease, allowing them to adapt to changing mission needs. The successful flight trial of DRDO’s stratospheric platform in May 2025 is a significant milestone. While these platforms won’t replace satellites, they offer a cost-effective addition to the overall surveillance setup.

India’s SBS-III programme, targeting 52 dedicated military satellites (equipped with SAR, electro-optical, and infrared payloads), is a step in the right direction. The involvement of private industry in a significant portion of those satellites signals an important shift toward faster production and greater cost efficiency.

Q4. Fusing Space Assets into a Common Operational Picture

The data fusion problem is a real challenge. Without integration, more sensors produce more confusion, rather than clarity. The challenge is to get the processed sensor data to the right person, in usable form, at the right time. It is more of an organisational and doctrinal issue than a technical one.

The information from space sensors must be fused into a single picture. The Common Operational Picture that a field commander can rely on must be continuously updated and remain current. It needs AI-driven correlation engines that perform real-time multi-sensor fusion, with confidence scoring for each data element, so a commander knows not just what the picture shows but how much to trust it. Building this requires common data standards across the IAF, the Army, the Navy, and the Defence Space Agency. This is a foundational necessity.

The most critical single step is to establish a jointly manned Space and Intelligence Fusion Center. The center should have real-time data access, direct connectivity and the authority to produce an integrated assessment. In the current model, information from different agencies passes through separate chains before being reconciled at a higher level. It introduces a delay that defeats the purpose of persistent surveillance. AI-enabled networked solutions for data collection, analysis, planning, dissemination, and monitoring must sit at the heart of this center.

Q5. Responsive Space and Tactical Satellite Launch

Space is becoming more militarised, with countries developing anti-satellite weapons, directed-energy systems, and cyber tools to disrupt vital assets such as GPS, reconnaissance, and communications satellites. Countries that can quickly rebuild their space infrastructure during challenges enjoy a lasting edge over those that can’t.

Tactical gaps can arise during hostilities due to satellite attrition or new threat activity not accounted for in pre-conflict planning. The ability to task a launch in response to these situations is necessary. The concept needs a shift in mindset of viewing the space as a static strategic asset to a fluid manoeuvre domain. In the longer term, the vision of a field commander requesting coverage over a sector and receiving a dedicated satellite within 24 to 72 hours is both feasible and strategically significant.

Current launch timelines are measured in weeks or months, not hours. Closing that gap requires investment in small launch vehicles with rapid turnaround capability. India’s SSLV technology transfer to industry is a step in the right direction. A stock of ready-to-launch, pre-integrated satellites with modular payloads needs to be built up. Launch infrastructure capable of supporting surge operations, including mobile or dispersed pad options, would also be required.

The more immediately achievable priority is responsive tasking of satellites already in orbit. The existing assets should be dynamically reprogrammable to cover a priority area at short notice. That is primarily a software and ground architecture problem and should be the near-term focus while launch responsiveness matures.

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