Land Back ASAP

 

It was a clear and sunny morning. I was flying at  a low level over the sea, deep inside on the eastern seaboard. Suddenly, the R/T silence was broken (a rare phenomenon) by the Navy ships in the area. The message was, “Dragon Leader, land back ASAP (as soon as possible).”

 

This was my third tenure in the squadron, and I had just taken over the command of the squadron. I had barely completed my revalidation and had taken the squadron to participate in a maritime exercise.

 

The exercise was aborted, and I led my formation back to the operating Navy base, wondering about possible reasons. On contacting the base on R/T, I was told that the Station Commander would like to see you in his office immediately. Thousand of thoughts crossed the mind as to what could be the reason of such an unusual and urgent recall.

 

Station Commander was straight to the point and very cryptic “Orders have been received to for you to take the squadron back to the parent base”.  I could not get any more information out of him. The exercise was called off and the fighters ferried back to base that evening. Technical manpower and the ground equipment was left behind awaiting airlift back.

 

On reaching the base, we came to know that something was cooking on the northern front. The Air Officer Commanding (AOC) told us to ferry out the very next day to our Op Location (location earmarked for operations during hostilities. Next day we moved to the op location and were deployed there for the next  60 days.

 

This was for the Kargil war – Operation Safed Sagar.

 

Memories of those 60 days is still vividly clear even after 25 years. They came flooding back on being asked to provide inputs about the events.

 

Queries and brief Inputs

 

1. What was the thought process in deploying Airpower in the Kargil War?

 

• • Initially, the Army wanted attack/armed helicopters from IAF to be used against the infiltrators. However, the IAF, recognising the gravity of the situation, insisted on a more strategic approach.

 

• • The IAF, fully committed to the cause, went on operational alert and initiated reconnaissance missions and support to the army for mobility and sustenance.

 

• • The then Air Chief (Air Chief Marshal AY Tipnis) insisted on political authorisation for combat airpower employment. Some wrongly perceived this as the IAF’s reluctance to support the Army.

 

• • Reasons/Thought Process:- Attack helicopters (Mi-35) could not operate at those heights, and armed helicopters (Mi-17) with unguided rockets would be highly vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft weapons (a Lesson again reiterated by the Russia-Ukraine war). The IAF would need to be much more holistically involved. A political authorisation is necessary to apply combat airpower due to potential consequences arising from employment on our territory, chances of collateral damage, and escalation potential.

 

• • The Cabinet Committee on Security substantiated the IAF’s rightness of thought process. It initially (18 May 99) denied the use of offensive airpower.

 

• • The final clearance came later, on 24-25 May 99, as the magnitude of intrusion became clearer. The clearance for combat airpower application was granted with the restriction of not crossing the LoC.

 

2. Was the Air Force able to achieve its laid-down objectives?

 

• • The IAF, showcasing its adaptability and readiness, rapidly adapted to the air campaign’s unique operational challenges and flew day and night during Operation “Safed Sagar.”

 

• • The use of air power made an enormous difference in ground operations. The effective application of air power saved our casualties and compressed the time frame needed to achieve our objective of regaining control of our territory.

 

• • The Indian Air Force achieved its primary objective of degrading the enemy’s offensive capabilities, softening its defence and denying essential supplies.

 

• • In the words of Gen VP Malik, the then Army Chief:-

“The success in the war could not have been achieved but for the IAF having jointly performed with valour and commitment in complete coordination. Use of the IAF altered the dynamics of the war in our favour.”

 

3. Which all aircraft took part in the deployment?

 

• • The entire Indian Air Force was activated and placed on operational alert within a few hours, and offensive air operations were offered to commence within six hours of authorisation.

 

• • Canberra and Mig-25 aircraft were used for aerial reconnaissance. Mig-23, Mig-27, Jaguars, and Mirage-2000 aircraft undertook offensive strike operations. Mig-21 and Mig-29 aircraft undertook air defence and dominance missions.

 

• • Fixed-wing transport and helicopters were used for large-scale troop movement, sustenance, supply missions, casualty evacuations, etc.

 

4. The Mig series aircraft, especially Mig-29s, have received praise for keeping PAF’s F-16s at bay. Could you talk about it?

 

• • Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft played an important role in local area air dominance by preventing enemy aircraft from interfering with our air and ground operations.

 

• • The effort these aircraft put into air defence escorts and Combat Air Patrolling by day and night proved an effective deterrent, ensuring local air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s, orbiting on their side of the LOC, were kept at bay by our air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike.

 

5. What were the important lessons for the IAF from the Kargil War?

 

• • Using air power quickens the process of achieving objectives while reducing costs due to a reduction in men and material casualties.

 

• • Restrictions (Not to cross LoC) on airpower application reduce its effectiveness.

 

• • Airpower needs to be applied innovatively with ingenuity. The challenges included high-altitude terrain (10,000 to 18,000 ft), low air density, strong winds, small camouflaged targets, self-imposed restrictions, etc.

 

• • IAF needs to improve its high-altitude area fighting capability (It has come a long way since then).

 

• • Stand-off and precision capabilities are essential.

 

• • Interdiction proved effective (Attack on NLI’s (Northern Light Infantry of Pakistan) command headquarters at Tiger Hill and supply dumps at Muntho Dhalo).

 

• • Helicopters and fixed-wing combat support aircraft are vulnerable in contested air space.

 

Lessons learnt from the operation Safed Sagar were valuable and helped in charting the future trajectory of the IAF capability building. IAF has come a long way, but still has a long way to go, considering the prevailing threat situation

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome.

 

 

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