AEROSPACE POWER STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH MULTIPLE THREATS WITH LIMITED RESOURCES

 

 

Article published in the inaugural issue of “Blue Yonder”, a Journal published by the Centre for Air Power Studies.

 

Peculiarity: There are no references (except from the quote below), and it has been written drawing from own experiences and impressions.

 

“Strategy is a broad concept, embracing an objective, resources, and a plan for using those resources to achieve the objective”.

 William P. Snyder

 

Introduction

 

Aerospace power is a decisive factor and a game-changer in any war. The application of aerospace power, although looks simple but is a complex process. Major roles of Aerospace power during war include shaping the environment, offensive force application, and synergising the operations with surface forces.

 

Resources influence strategy, especially at the strategic and operational levels. Air Resources are costly and generally limited. The availability of resources depends upon factors like cost, affordability, and national objectives and priorities. A superpower like the USA has adequate air resources to distribute them among all the services (Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines) and all the theatres (covering the entire Globe). Others have to manage with whatever they have and can afford.

 

The problem becomes accentuated when a nation faces more than one enemy, individually or collusively, and on multiple fronts. In such a scenario one does not have the luxury of keeping the air assets idle, and they have to be utilised optimally to achieve the desired objectives. Innovative strategies need to be devised for the effective utilisation of assets in such situations.

 

Aerospace Power Strategies.

 

Air strategy is the art of planning and directing the overall air operations.  Orchestrating an air war, especially with multiple threats and limited resources, needs some innovative strategies, both new and reworked existing ones. These strategies are somewhat applicable even when adequate resources are available but are more important with limited resources.

 

Resource Allocation.  Providing resources (platforms, sensors, and weapons) to the command headquarters for fighting the air war is the responsibility of the service headquarters. These resources are allotted ab initio, and reallocation is done during the war depending on the situation. The initial allocation is carried out depending on the nature of the threat envisaged in the command Area of responsibility. No problem is faced if the resources are adequate, with the possibility of keeping some as a reserve. However, with limited resources, the principle of “Sharing of poverty rather than the distribution of riches” needs to be followed. The Allotment plan needs to be prepared after a detailed analysis of various factors like enemy capabilities, the enemy concept of operation, terrain, likely employment philosophy, end state, war endurance, etc.

 

Active Monitoring. In the orchestration of air war, the roles of the service headquarter includes conveying higher directions, monitoring the progress of operations in all zones/fronts, and providing the required wherewithal. Active monitoring means not only listening out or observing, but collecting data continuously, analysing, anticipating, and proactively providing resources by transferring from one zone to the other. The principle followed would be “Providing milk before the baby cries”. An elaborate operations room with multiple cells for monitoring, analysing, and planning various aspects of air war would be required.

 

Seamless Operations.  The air command area of responsibilities is delineated with earmarked boundaries. The targets and resources for air operations are planned accordingly. More resources if needed are sought from the service headquarters. In the concept of seamless operations, a higher degree of synergy, cooperation, and teamwork between the command headquarters would have to be exercised making the inter-command boundaries a bit hazy. The commands would have to consult and document sharing of targets, resources, infrastructure, and operating bases, and formulate common plans and their execution (launch of forces, transit through the airspace, recovery, etc).

 

Effect-Based Force Application.  Air war entails effect-based operations. However, with limited resources, the available resources would have to be employed judiciously to obtain maximum effect. Some of the relevant aspects would be as follows:-

 

    • The principle of selective dominance would have to be applied rather than attempting to achieve air superiority.

 

    • The targeting would have to be selective to hit where it hurts the most.

 

    • Parallel operations on a tactical, operational, and strategic level would have to be conducted from the commencement of the war.

 

    • The risk-taking profile would have to be more conservative.

 

Enhancement of Sortie Generation Rate.  During an air war with limited resources, aircraft mustn’t be kept idle on the ground. Generation of a maximum number of sorties would be most desirable in such a scenario. Various enablers for enhancing the sortie generation rate would have to be addressed. Some of these are as follows:-

 

    • High pilot-to-cockpit ratio.

 

    • HOT turnaround capability.

 

    • Availability of trained maintenance crew in adequate numbers.

 

    • Availability of consumables, spares, and rechargeables (fuel, weapons, etc.). Supply lines up to dispersed locations like the hydrant refueling systems.

 

    • Automated equipment handling.

 

    • Availability of requisite power supply at the dispersed locations.

 

Protection of Assets.  Protection of assets becomes a priority in a limited assets scenario. The air assets would be the first ones to be targeted by the standoff, precision weapons, and missiles. Various measures need to be employed to ensure the protection of assets. Dispersal of assets is the most important following the principle of “not keeping all the eggs in one basket”. Even the induction of external, out-of-area forces should be in a phased manner on a requirement basis.  Protective infrastructure would be next on the priority list followed by passive measures of deception, camouflage, and concealment. To increase survivability in the air, the self-protection suite and systems of the platforms would be essential besides the use of tactical routing. Besides platforms, the protection of networks would be equally vital.

 

Strategy Enablers

 

The success of the suggested strategies depends upon several factors. Some of these are as follows:-

Integrated Planning. Integration of operational plans is the most important aspect in a limited resource scenario. The meagre assets cannot be kept idle or frittered away against trivial targets. The operational plans between the air and the surface forces have to be fully integrated. Both the pre-decided war plans and the dynamic in war planning need to be firmed up jointly. Air war is essentially targeting.  The joint target list should be made together with a lot of thought and deliberation. The list should contain essential targets, prioritised according to the likely areas of engagement. Duplication of effort should be avoided with clearly defined responsibility for engagement.

 

High Situational Awareness. High situational awareness is essential for the effective utilisation of limited air assets. Multi-domain, multi-sensor (including space-based) systems would be crucial for round-the-clock reconnaissance. Artificial Intelligence based systems would help provide a composite picture. Intelligence sharing (both raw and processed data, and both live and archived data) would improve the SA.  Information overload needs to be avoided.

 

Network environment.   A networked environment is a very important enabler. It would help in a speedier build-up of situational awareness, joint planning, dissemination, and execution of plans. The networks need to be adequately secured from external interference.

 

Mobility. Rapid mobility would allow the exploitation of the flexibility of aerospace power. Adequate heavy and medium lift capability needs to be maintained both by the fixed-wing and rotary-wing platforms. Civil aviation assets need to be included and utilised in this endeavour. Automation of the supply chain and air mobility is highly desirable.

 

Supporting Infrastructure. The ability to shift from one area to another area of operation would need supporting infrastructure. Dual-use infrastructure with civil and military use capability would be the most cost-effective. More operating surfaces including even highways as runways would add to the dispersion capability and flexibility.

 

Extra Support Equipment. Additional support equipment would be required for exercising the suggested flexibility.

 

Conclusion

 

The determinants of a successful air campaign are complex and interwoven. There is no “one best solution” for all cases. Doctrine shows how things should be done, and the strategy dictates how things will be done in the existing circumstances. Adequate resources allow plenty of flexibility, whereas, resource constraints limit the alternatives available for execution. Resources are one of the constraints that shape the strategy.

 

The strategies suggested above may not be the ideal way to conduct air operations but are ways to best utilise the available limited resources. They can be classified as plan B and not Plan A. word of caution here is that these strategies should not be construed as means and methods to reduce and cut down force levels. Another very important aspect to be kept in mind is that these strategies work when the entire land mass (including the area of interest over the sea) and the airspace above are considered as one theatre

 

Suggestions and value additions are most welcome

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from sources deemed reliable and accurate. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for purposes of wider dissemination.

 

26 Replies to “AEROSPACE POWER STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH MULTIPLE THREATS WITH LIMITED RESOURCES”

  1. A very well researched article for our commanders to envision, plan, operate, build capabilities with limited resources.

      1. Written with crystal clear clarity of thought on how to optimise limited resources. Given that the desired force level of 45 Squadrons (which had been identified more then a decade ago, may need re-evaluation), the IAF will need utilisation of all levers of technology to cover the deficits for the foreseeable future. And you have very cogently addressed this with deep analysis and thought, the considerable experience that you have across various command and staff appointments clearly emerging on, the way forward. Thanks for sharing

  2. Thank you for sharing the article with detailed views on two front scenario amid paucity of resources

    Two aspects I believe could have been added -adverse impact of theaterisation
    -Implement long term AtmaNirbharta plan to match technologically galloping China
    Gp Capt RK Narang

  3. Thanks for forwarding sir.
    Interesting read.
    If I may add, with AAR capabilities built into almost our entire fleet and the availability of long range weapon systems, rigid command-wise allocation of Air assets and targets may be a thing of the past. OCA/other offensive msns could certainly be utilised across these hitherto strictly defined dividing lines.
    Harish

    Reply
    If we do away the commands and their AORs, Air HQ would have to do entire op planning. Air Hq tasks and purpose is different and is accordingly manned and equipped.

  4. Good one Sir. You should write in other think tanks to proliferate contemporary air power thought and it place in India’s national interests.
    Air Mshl D Chowdhary (Retd)

  5. Nice article sir . I like the possibilities of implementation of strategies with the use of AI . Saw some very interesting concepts at aero india regarding management of war scenarios which would be so useful in “ situational awareness “ and decision support with AI doing a lot .
    I also think that forces must have a more comprehensive understanding and planning of composite AI applications rather than piecemeal .
    Another aspect which seems relevant is work on development of AI /ML doctrine …
    Jasmin

  6. Enjoyed reading this timely, concise & to the point article in an era of general resource constraints, availability of platforms, and the high decibel clamour for theatre commands. Airpower cannot hold land, but has the ability to effect outcomes at all levels of conflict, and near simultaneously, be it tactical, operational or strategic. Sub optimal allocation of airpower assets in such a scenario would take away the inherent flexibility, mobility, & best utilisation of these limited resources, but most importantly would go against the basic philosophy of “centralised control and decentralised execution” to achieve the aim. Theatre commands are for resource rich countries, with regional/global needs. India is still looking at defence of own territory, with offensive action limited to maintaining own territorial integrity and national interests.

    A great article, based on experiences and learning as a hard core airpower enthusiast and practitioner. Congratulations.

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