Being prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.
– George Washington
Russia – Ukraine war has entered the fourth month, with no end in sight. This war has affected every aspect of warfare and international engagement. The war has brought into focus the issues related to the new emerging world order, multilateralism, collective security, nuclear deterrence, economic sanctions, information warfare, and food & energy security.
Russia has not used the full potential of its military power against Ukraine. Question intriguing the military analysts is why the airpower has not been utilised fully and freely. While Russia is being criticised by the West for its lack of capabilities, another school of thought is that Russia is following a delicate approach towards the use of force and ensuing destruction. While the world is eagerly waiting for the end of this conflict, a lot of lessons are emerging from the prevailing situation.
General Aspects of war
Objectives. Officially, Russia stated her objectives of the “special military operation” as “demilitarisation, denazification and assurance about the neutral status of Ukraine (i.e. not joining NATO)”. The operations were justified by Russia, citing help call from the Donbas region for its liberation from Ukraine. In retrospect, it appears the undeclared objective was also to consolidate the Russian hold on Crimea.
Orchestration of Operations. The operations were initiated by Russia with hybrid warfare using disruption (cyber-attacks) and destruction (using surface to surface and air-delivered long-range vectors). Surface operations were three-pronged, with attacks from North, East and South. In the North, the advance was towards Kyiv and Kharkiv. History will tell whether going for the Ukrainian capital was a part of the plan that went wrong or was it just a diversionary tactic to divide and tie down the Ukrainian forces. In the east advances towards Donbas, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol were obviously to liberate the Donbas area and create a Russia friendly corridor. In the south addressing Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa and snake island was to consolidate hold on Crimea and deny sea access to Ukraine (making Ukraine a landlocked country). A few weeks into the war the Russian forces were reorganised and concentration shifted from the northern area to the eastern and southern areas. What stands out in the entire operation is that the full potential of the airpower is not being utilised by the Russians. The operations have reached a phase of medium tempo, urban guerrilla warfare, with Russian forces surrounding the cities and Ukrainian forces employing defensive, hit and run tactics.
Achievement of Objectives. Russia seems to be achieving most of its military objectives.
- Ukraine had already accepted that it would not join NATO.
- Ukrainian combat potential has been considerably reduced. Russia has attacked and destroyed most of its military targets and selective defence industry.
- Russia is now focused on the eastern region and gaining success in creating a Russia friendly corridor.
- Russia now has a land corridor to Crimea. It has also ended Crimea’s water and power blockade (The freshwater canal connecting the Dnieper River to the arid Crimean Peninsula is now in Russia’s hands, and so is a nuclear power station to the north of the peninsula, along with the power grid in south-eastern Ukraine).
- Russia has claimed control of the southern region of Kherson and trying to move westward, along the Black Sea coast towards Odesa and beyond. This would cut off Ukraine’s access to the Black sea making it a landlocked country.
Information Warfare, Narrative and Legitimacy. Information warfare has become an intrinsic part of any war and is being considered a separate domain of operation. A convincing and acceptable narrative is essential to shape public opinion, provide legitimacy to the actions taken, and enhance the morale of its forces. In this case, the western narrative was that “Russia is the aggressor, trying to rebuild its lost empire, with Ukraine being the victim, and the west (the USA, NATO and EU) supporting the democratic rights of the victim country”. The Russian narrative is that “The US-led west is the aggressor, using Ukraine against it as a pawn, not honouring its commitment and expanding the NATO westwards, bringing it to the Russian doorstep, and compelling Russia into taking this drastic action”.
“We will not fight a war against Russia in Ukraine. Direct conflict between NATO and Russia is World War III, something we must strive to prevent.”
– S. President Joe Biden
Sanctions. Economic and trade sanctions have become an effective tool of statecraft, being used extensively against unfriendly nations. India has also faced sanctions earlier at the time of nuclear tests and during the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war. History has shown that the sanctions by themselves have not deterred military actions but have added to the difficulty levels. The effect of these sanctions needs to be factored in the long run. In this case, Russia has faced severe sanctions, from the west to threaten the Russian economy.
- Russia’s central bank has had its assets frozen and major banks are shut out of the international SWIFT payment transfer network.
- The US has banned imports of Russian oil and gas; the EU aims to cut gas imports by two-thirds within a year and is working on a phased oil embargo; the UK aims to phase out Russian oil by the end of 2022.
- Russian airlines have been barred from airspace over the EU, UK, US and Canada.
- Personal sanctions have been imposed on President Putin and his entourage.
Effect on India.
Tight Rope Walk. India has good relations with both Russia and the US and siding with one of these countries could cost India its relationship with the other. India has to maintain its neutrality. India has abstained from the resolution opposing the military Russian operation against Ukraine at the UN Security Council (UNSC) with valid justification.
Defence Contracts. India has defence contracts with both Russia and Ukraine. Russia has been a traditional military supplier sharing platforms and technologies that others wouldn’t. Russian hardware still accounts for approximately 60 – 70 per cent of India’s defence equipment, especially with respect to fighter jets, tanks, helicopters and submarines among others, while several major deals are in the pipeline. Ukraine also plays a vital role as a supplier to India’s military, providing crucial subsystems for Russian systems. The war would hurt the delivery of ongoing contracts. A major ongoing contract is of supply of the S-400 AD missile system. The supply of the system has commenced but the further induction timelines may slip up due to the war. Also, doubt has arisen about the waiver of sanctions under CAATSA from the USA.
Defence Equipment Sustenance. India requires a functioning supply chain relationship with Russia and Ukraine for spares and support, which is critical for its military. The war has disrupted the supply chain and this would adversely affect the serviceability and availability of defence equipment. A similar situation was faced at the time of the breakup of the USSR. In the short term, the situation can be dealt with by reviewing the spare storage policy, finding alternative sources and Indigenisation. However, in the long run, self-reliance is the only answer.
Reliability of Russian equipment. The Indian air force has more than half of its military equipment of Russian origin. During this war, the operational employment philosophy of Russian equipment has come under doubt. The Indian air force has its testing and tactics development agencies. It inducts equipment and their operational employment philosophy from various countries, it picks up good practices from the joint exercises with different countries. These are not adopted blindly but are tailored to the domestic operating environment.
Aspects of Air War
Comparative analysis. There is a large disparity between the strength of the defence forces of Russia and Ukraine. Russia is the number two military power globally. The Russian air force is ranked second, whereas, the Ukraine air force is ranked 27th in the world. Numerically Russian air force is about 8 – 10 times the size of the Ukraine air force. Comparing the Army manpower and equipment, the Russian army is 3 to 6 times that of the Ukraine army.
Use of Airpower by Russia. The Russians have followed a delicate approach and have not used the full potential of their airpower. They are being criticised by the western media for their poor planning, tactics, and training, the poor performance of weapons and equipment and lack of synergy between defence forces. One of the reasons for the self-imposed restraint could be to avoid too much destruction and collateral damage, keeping in mind the public opinion (domestic and worldwide) and long term problems of insurgency, revolution, and resistance. Maybe for the same reason, Russia has not jumped into the fray of information warfare.
- Opening Salvo. Russia started the kinetic warfare with surface and air-launched air vectors. In the opening salvo, it attacked all the military targets including airfields, command and control centres, ammo dumps, early warning radars and air defence systems. Russia put down the Ukraine air force to a large extent.
- Selective Targeting. Russia has continued to use its log range precision weapons. It has targeted all the military targets and degraded the military power of Ukraine considerably. Even the defence industry has been selectively attacked and damaged. Besides, attacks on military targets Russia attacked some targets to send a message e.g. the attack on Lutsk airfield, 70 miles from the Polish border, was in all probability a message that military aid from the west would also be targeted in western Ukraine.
- Control of Air. Western media has been asserting that Russia failed to control the air space over Ukraine and it remains contested. The degree of control of air space cannot be ascertained but, no military commander would send its ground forces in kilometres of a long open convoy without assurance of non-interference from the enemy.
- Airborne / Heli-borne operations. Airborne forces are trained and equipped to fight with speed, surprise, and aggression. They are ideal for taking over an airfield and forming an airhead. One of the main Russian targets in the initial hours of the invasion was the Antonov airport near the Ukrainian town of Hostomel, about 20 miles from Kyiv. The airfield was captured but the airhead could not be established due to the threat from shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons.
Use of Airpower by Ukraine. The use of airpower by Ukraine is being overstated in the propaganda. Some of the salient aspects of the utilisation of airpower by Ukraine are as follows:
- Ukraine’s approach has generally been air defence centric.
- The shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons are being used extensively.
- The war has become like an Urban Jungle guerrilla warfare.
- Unmanned platforms are being used extensively.
- Ukraine kept asking the west to declare a no-fly zone over Ukraine. This request was denied, as the west does not want to get involved in a direct confrontation with Russia.
- The west keeps providing intelligence to Ukraine.
- The world’s largest plane AN-225 was destroyed.
Claims and Counterclaims. Truth is the first casualty during the war, due to the fog of war and propaganda. Both sides have been making exaggerated claims and counterclaims. The truth will take time to come out.
Security Lessons
The whole of Government Approach. Wars are no longer restricted to only the military domain. A whole of government approach is required to deal with the situations arising before the war, during the war and post-war. Synergy is required between various government agencies and departments.
Collective Security. Collective security is relevant if one joins a military alliance. So far India has not ever joined any military alliance, and it is also evident that one has to fight its own battles. Therefore, it is important to increase the deterrence value of our defence forces. Collective security still has relevance in dealing with grey zone situations using diplomatic support, intelligence sharing, cyber, and information warfare. Support can also come in the form of a supply of weapons, ammunition and spares. In the present circumstances, it is worthwhile to increase interoperability with a few friendly nations by carrying out exercises and developing commonality of equipment, procedures and tactics.
Multilateralism. In modern times the effectiveness and relevance of multilateral institutions have come under question. Moreover, the shift is taking place toward unilateralism, with the formation of regional alliances with a limited number of members, dealing with common issues. Engagement with these bodies needs to be issue-based.
Self-Reliance. This lesson has got reinforced once again. Besides self-reliance in military equipment and defence production, it needs to be attained in much a larger sense, including all facets that can be used in a hostile way. The government has provided a fresh impetus to the “Atma-nribharta”, and these initiatives need to be encouraged and supported.
Energy Security. The energy supply chain is the first casualty in any war. Both long and short term energy security plan is essential. The issue needs to be addressed holistically by optimum utilisation of domestic resources, maintaining multiple and alternative sources for procurement, enhancing storage capability and enhancing alternative renewable energy sources.
Nuclear Deterrence. Nuclear strategists and analysts believe that nuclear deterrence works against nuclear war. However, in this case, nuclear muscle-flexing (Putting the nuclear forces on alert and issuing of strongly-worded warning) by Russia seems to have worked in keeping US, EU or NATO from jumping into the fray directly. Another aspect is that at the time of the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine had nuclear assets that it surrendered. Russian course of action would have been different if Ukraine had retained nuclear capability. This aspect may encourage a nuclear arms race in future.
Out of Area Contingencies. India has its citizens spread the world over. In times of disaster, this diaspora needs evacuation or assistance. Some contingency plans do exist, however, these plans need to be made comprehensive and reviewed periodically. At times, the evacuation of Indian citizens is coordinated with the supply of relief material to the disaster area. The media generally goes overboard about the evacuation, underplaying the effort of providing relief material and aid.
Warfare Lessons
Clearly Defined Objectives. A clear and practical definition of objectives is very important. A clarity in political objectives helps in the formulation of achievable military objectives and orchestration of the war. An effective military strategy would flow out of these aims and objectives. Lack of clarity may result in high costs of operation or complete military failure in the worst-case scenario.
Importance of Human Factors. The intangible factors like morale, training, and tactics are very important for military success. Numerical strength and high technology equipment, platforms, and weapons alone cannot win wars. Military personnel need to be well-motivated and trained in the ways of modern warfare. The strategy and tactics employed for the application of force need to be robust, aggressive, and tailored to the prevailing situation.
Information Warfare. Information warfare has become a separate domain of warfare. An appropriate narrative is essential for public opinion both worldwide and at home. An acceptable narrative also provides much-needed legitimacy for own actions. It has a direct bearing on the morale of own and enemy forces.
Importance of Joint Warfare. Coordinated application of surface and air force is very important. The operations need to be planned and executed jointly. Joint training and joint exercises during peacetime are required, to increase interoperability between land and air forces. Joint organisational structures are required to increase the synergy. Joint theatre commands are one way of achieving it, but not the only way. The structural reorganisation should be done keeping in mind the factors like existing threats, availability of resources, economic strength, and the prevailing geopolitical situation. The restructuring should be able to deal with changing ways and new domains of warfare in future.
Importance of ISR and Information Sharing. In modern warfare, a high degree of situational awareness is of utmost importance. Multi-domain surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are required. Ai enabled hybrid systems are essential for processing the plethora of gathered data. A network environment is also required for speedy dissemination of raw and processed data on a need to know basis.
Airpower Specific Lessons
Importance of Unrestricted use of Airpower. Effect based, offensive application of airpower yields faster results due to the shock and awe effect that it creates. Applying airpower with restrictions is like fighting with one hand tied behind the back. Unrestricted use of airpower accelerates the achievement of military objectives.
Integrated Offensive and Defensive Air Campaigns. Airpower is inherently offensive in nature. Even the concept of air defence has become offensive with the philosophy of active defence. The offensive counter-air and defensive counter-air campaigns are enmeshed with each other. These cannot be planned and executed independently in isolation. The idea of a separate AD command is not viable.
No Fly Zone Efficacy. The declaration of a no-fly zone is one of the tools for strategic coercion and signalling in air warfare. However, it is viable and effective only if it is backed up by the wherewithal to implement it, in terms of air defence radars, weapons, platforms, and networks. Willingness to use them and readiness for escalation are other two important factors for the effectiveness of the no-fly zone.
Importance of Precision and Stand-off capability. These two capabilities are important in grey zone operations, punitive strikes, and operations in urban areas, to avoid threats to the launch platform and to avoid collateral damage. Both quality and quantity need to be ensured in the arsenal of surface to surface and air to surface weapons.
Efficacy of Airborne operations. Airborne operations (using fixed-wing and/or helicopters) yield quick results, speeding up the achievement of military objectives. However, the issue of their vulnerability is important. With the proliferation of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, the vulnerability of these platforms has increased manifold. These weapons can cause a prohibitively high cost to airborne operations, especially in urban and hilly areas.
Protection of Own Assets. Protection of own high-value assets from the enemy’s aerial attack with long-range vectors and standoff weapons is essential, especially during the opening phases of the war. Hardened aircraft shelters are essential and they should be able to withstand the destructive power of the enemy weapons. Future hypersonic weapons will have enhanced destructive power due to high kinetic energy. Dispersal of the assets, using the principle of not keeping all the eggs in one basket, would increase the enemy’s effort and cost.
Unanswered Questions
The tempo of war has slowed down with the area of operation restricted to the east and south of Ukraine. Russia seems to be prepared for the long haul and is pursuing its military objectives. With the balance of military power in its favour, it can afford to continue the war of attrition. The west is encouraging Ukraine to continue resisting. It is the Ukrainians that are suffering the most.
A few questions that remain unanswered are, Is Russia preserving its modern next-gen equipment for a stronger enemy? Are two sides looking for an honourable exit? The world is waiting and watching as to how this conflict will end.
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References
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