INTRODUCTION
A nation’s military aspirations have to be in consort with its socio economic condition and likely threats. Due to unique geographical location and geo-political environment India faces a collusive threat with significant chances of military conflict. Therefore her national interest dictate that the country be able to deter both her inimical neighbors from any military misadventure either singly or collusively.
Air power possesses significant offensive potential besides being the most responsive arm of military action. Indian Air Force must remain an adaptive and agile force to fight and win wars in a network centric battlefield with conflicts varying across the complete threat spectrum. Air Force is a technology intensive service and requires continuous infusion of modern cutting edge equipment and technology.
A straightjacket approach to military accretions with a purely force on force numeric calculus would not provide comprehensive answers to any military force buildup plan. It is imperative that focus areas be identified and assets, platforms, facilitators and infrastructure developed accordingly.
Future Security Challenges
External. India would remain a major regional player and IAF would be required to offer options to meet India’s domestic and regional security requirements. Although land borders would continue to be the main reason for dispute, security of IOR region would be a major security necessity for India given its geographic location.
Internal. The nation has to deal with insurgency in the north and the east. Moreover, the threat from Left Wing Extremism (LWE) has grown slowly but steadily across a wide swath of Indian Territory in South, Central and South Eastern India. The dimension of these problems at times goes beyond the realm of pure ‘law and order’ and hence state subject ambit, necessitating involvement of central forces as well. So far IAF has been involved in a supporting role.
TRANSFORMATION TRENDS, PHILOSOPHY & FOCUS AREAS
Trends
World over some of the trends in air power development and utilisation are as follows:-
- Development of very high-speed glide vehicles and cruise missiles to counter missile defences.
- Development of weapons capable of hyper-sonic (Mach 5+)
- Revamping of air-to- air missile (AAM) inventories.
- Development and employment of Next-generation bombers.
- Increase in use of standoff, precision weapons from unmanned platforms.
- Increased use of automation, networking, artificial intelligence, Nano-technology and data handling.
Transformation Philosophy
IAF must be able to orientate itself accurately to the existing and evolving environment so as to work towards focused capability building. The ability to clearly understand the ever changing environment is paramount for articulating the road map for capability building. Therefore, where we stand and where we need to reach needs to be understood at the organization level and energies need to be focused accordingly. While there are several issues that can be listed as key requirements, the main pillars are trained manpower, combat leadership, combat sustenance resources and sound strategy. Some of the salient aspects for transformational philosophy are as follows:
(a) Mix of Old and New. New state of the art equipment is costly and affordability is an important factor for consideration. Prioritization of capabilities is a major challenge as it needs to be done as per available resources. IAF must look to boost the capacity of existing assets along with induction of new assets. Ratio of approximately 30:40:30 in terms of new state of the art, refurbished / upgraded and old legacy equipment is a reasonable mix.
(b) Platform Centricity vs Capability Centricity. IAF’s procurement policy revolves around the Long Term Perspective Plan. Capability based approach rather than platform centric approach is desirable. Platform centric approach in a standalone manner without clearly defining desired capabilities based on threat assessment may lead to inaccurate prediction and sub optimal procurement of air assets. Employment of air power assets needs to be viewed in a holistic sense. An overarching and comprehensive basis for procurement is essential to achieving synergy in war fighting and meeting strategic ends. This will also help in achieving asymmetry over adversaries.
(c) Multi Domain Strategy. Apart from the air, land and sea, the domains of space and cyber play a crucial role in effective war fighting. Cyber capabilities need to be developed for both offensive and defensive ops. A joint services cyber warfare command needs to be operationalized. Defensive and offensive space capabilities are crucial. Defensive capabilities is the immediate priority whereas, offensive space capability may be developed over a period of time. Blending the kinetic and non-kinetic means of strategy are crucial to gaining the upper hand and keeping the enemy on the defensive.
(d) Multi-disciplinary Approach. India’s adversaries have traditionally used asymmetric approach. This is seen in the policy of ‘bleed through thousand cuts’ by Pakistan, and threat to use long range vectors to counter the deficiencies of fighter operations in TAR’ by china. IAF needs to focus on capability building adopting a multi-disciplinary and integrated war fighting approach.
Focus Areas
Ashey J Tellis in his article about troubles of IAF recommends that “India needs to safeguard its regional air superiority over both Pakistan and China by mustering the requisite end strength and enhancing its extant operational advantages. India should expand its investments in advanced munitions, combat support aircraft, electronic warfare, physical infrastructure, and pilot proficiency while being realistic about its domestic capacity to produce sophisticated combat air craft”. Some of the focus areas are as follows:
(a) Combat Strength. Indian armed forces have to plan for a two front contingency. Despite being a world-class combat arm, the IAF’s falling strength and force structure threaten its air superiority over its rapidly modernizing rivals. Resolving airpower shortfalls therefore, should be a top priority. The IAF’s fighter force, is short of its sanctioned strength.
(b) Self-sufficiency. IAF continues to be dependent on the international aviation market with bulk of its equipment being of foreign origin. High dependence on foreign vendors results in higher cost, and longer procurement cycles.
(c) Diversified Inventory. IAF is faced with a challenge because of the heterogeneity of its force. It is also referred to as “unusually diversified” with multiple types of fighters, helicopters, Transport ac, trainer ac and combat support ac namely tankers and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) platforms. The extremely diverse inventory of the IAF presents techno-logistical challenges of a large magnitude. Problems of inventory diversity includes logistics burden besides maintenance problems caused by the multiplicity of aircraft. However, diversity of inventory has its advantages as well. Major one being avoidance of relying on one or few sources.
(d) War Sustenance. Any fighting force needs to have ability to sustain desired tempo of operation. Hurdles impeding this capability need to be addressed.
(e) Infrastructure. Infrastructure like blast pens, sun shelters, parallel taxi tracks, runway rehabilitation scheme and hydrant refueling systems (HRS) etc. enables high tempo operations besides reducing the vulnerability of assets to air/SSM strikes.
(h) Networking. Networking of sensors, platforms, systems and other types of equipment has seen a surge in last decade or so. IAF has applied it to air defence, air ops planning and even maintenance and logistics functions. The IAF networking capability has evolved well however, it still has scope for further progress and improvement.
CAPABILITY BUILDING
Modernisation is a continuous process involving phasing out of old equipment and induction of new one. Induction takes a long gestation time. In this process permanent dilution of requisite force level should not take place.
Fighter Aircraft. Various calculations have been done and suggestions have been made regarding number of fighter aircraft squadrons required by the IAF. [‘Global Air Power’ book mentions a figure of 64 sqns (probably includes tpt sqns). A study by IDSA in 2012 had arrived at a figure of 53 – 63 Fighter squadrons against a collusive threat]. Most of the analysts conclude that while the authorised strength is 42 squadrons, minimum required is 45 squadrons. These figures may go up to even 60 in future as both adversaries keep growing in their operational potential. Fact is that at present the strength is even well below the authorised value. Mitigation plan does exist and is reviewed periodically however, inductions are slow as compared to draw down and the strength is reducing, if the draw down is not addressed the strength is likely to go down further. Immediate planned inductions include left over SU-30 ac, LCA (Mk 1, Mk 1A, Mk II) and contracted Rafael ac. Future induction of 110 Multi role fighter ac and AMCA need to be expedited. Balance between quantity and quality needs to be maintained.
Support Platforms. Support platforms include AWACS, Mid-air Refuellers, ISR platforms and medium / heavy lift aircraft.
(a) AWACS & AEW&C. To enhance the battlefield transparency and seamless coverage at Low levels, availability of airborne sensors becomes a prerequisite. Considering the assumption of proliferation of HL & ML radars providing seamless coverage all across the frontier AWACS & AEW&C would essentially provide LL trans-frontier cover. Considering factors like area to be covered, Duration of surveillance and turnaround time etc., existing numbers are inadequate. Being costly assets, these could be procured in a phased manner.
(b) Multi Role Tanker Transport. Mid-air refuelling aircraft are essential to increase the range and endurance of the aircraft. This combat enabler increases the flexibility of use of airpower. Considering factors like tanker capacity, fuel off take, area of operation etc. total requirement is more than the present strength. At least 06 ac more would be required on priority in near future.
(c) ISR Platforms. While tactical ISR needs are being addressed there is an urgent need for induction of ISTAR (Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) platform for ground situation monitoring and targeting. Considering the security scenario these ac are essential.
(d) Transport ac. While induction of C-17 and C-130 have enhanced the heavy lift and special ops capability, medium lift capability need to be addressed. Avro and AN-32 ac replacement is urgently required.
Air Defence. The concept of AD has undergone a change from point defence to offensive defence. This has been possible because of induction of Surveillance platforms (Ground and Aerial), long range AD weapons (SAGW and AA missiles), Air Superiority fighters and networked operations (IACCS). However few areas need capability enhancement.
(a) AD Systems. BMD and SAGW capable of countering multiple LR cruise missiles and SSMs, with variable trajectories, are imperative. CIWS at important installations are critical to counter the enemy’s LR PGMs and cruise missiles.
(b) SAGW. Due to the very nature of air attack, a single layer of weapon system cannot economically and efficiently provide all-encompassing, seamless and round-the-clock air defence coverage. With the stand-off ranges of air launched weapons increasing over the years, a layered AD concept has been implemented by IAF to provide defence in depth. Adequate numbers need to be procured to cover all the VA / VPs. Different types of SAGW systems envisaged for a layered AD include the following.
- Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) system for Area
- Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM) system for Area and Point Defence
- Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SRSAM) for Point defence (incl Akaash and Spyder)
- Very Short Range Air Defence System (VSHORADS) for Point Defence of deployed
- Close in Weapon System (CIWS) which includes Air Defence Guns for providing terminal Air
Weapons. The weapon list should provide a Mix of options. ON top of the list is the Long Range vectors for DEAD campaign. Effective DEAD campaign would be the lynchpin for all air operations. LR autonomous fire and forget ALCMs, SSMs, ARMs and persistent air vehicles with multiple homing heads are imperative for a successful DEAD campaign. While high tech weapon systems have increased accuracy and assurance, they are not a panacea for downsizing force levels. The enemy too would have matching high technology weapon systems, Numbers would matter to win decisively.
Armed RPA / UCAVs. These are likely to take over many offensive roles considering their potential and dispensability. The push for UCAV development and employment is increasing steadily. This situation may entail our fighters and AD weapons fighting against enemy RPA force in the future. Therefore, the endeavour should be to leapfrog the developmental cycle and design and develop a family of stealth / conventional UCAVs which specialize in different roles.
Space. An increase in defensive space based capabilities is a must. The three services with the IAF in lead must push for leveraging ISRO’s success and expertise for military use. Highest priority is for the Space based surveillance capability. Early warning of SSM launches, and space or land based ASAT capabilities are two other priority areas.
ISR. ISR capability should include following:-
(a) Responsive ISR on a tactical and strategic level in a defined area.
(b) Capability to execute real time surveillance / recce of dynamic targets based on HUMINT/ ELINT.
(c) COMINT capabilities to help in tracking dynamic targets as well as assessing intentions of the adversary.
(d) Capability to conduct ELINT ops against hostile communication and radar networks.
EW Warfare Capability. Capability is required to operate in a dense and hostile EW environment with a secure and jam resistant network as well as employ offensive EW assets with the aim of dominating the EW spectrum. Dominating the EW spectrum, will not only keep own attrition to the minimum but will also permit the IAF to impose high attrition on the adversary.
Other Capabilities. These include following:-
(a) Information Warfare Capability. Capability to execute offensive IW operations against adversaries.
(b) Precision and standoff Capability. Capability to inflict strategic paralysis through a systems approach and precision strike capability.
(c) Air Lift Capability. Airlift and Heli-lift capability including special ops capability to support operations.
(d) Reach. Air power projection capability in the area of interest stretching from Gulf of Aden to Straits of Malacca. Capability to employ the deterrence value of air power by basing offensive assets at the further reaches of India’s territories.
(e) Networked Environment. Network enabled real time command and control and air battle management including real time mission planning and tasking.
CONCLUSION
The gap between the war fighting capacity and capability of IAF and the perceived threats calls for immediate and substantial measures to ensure national security.
Building these capabilities may appear to be a tall order. Capability building entails a long gestation period. IAF is in urgent need of capability enhancement considering the prevailing security environment. There is an immediate need to invest in its capability building.
Value additions and comments are most welcome
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References
- Troubles They Come In Battalion, Ashley J Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Global Air Power by John Andreas Olsen, Chapter-Indian Air Power by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, Page 243.
- IAF Equipment & Force Structure Requirements to Meet External Threats, 2032, Vivek Kapur IDSA.
- Interview with CAS and articles in IAF anniversary issue of Chanakya aerospace, defence and maritime review, oct 18.
- Rebuilding the IAF fighter fleet, Gp Capt AK Sachdeva(Retd), SP’s Aviation issue 2, 2019.
- IAF modernisation challenges ahead, Air Mshl Anil Chopra (Retd), South Asia defence and strategic review.
- Indian Air Force at 86: options and challenges, Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, Vayu V/2018.
- Slow but Steady, Prasun K Sengupta, Force Oct 18.
- Strength lies in numbers: Rebuilding the combat fleet of IAF, Gp Capt J Noronha (Retd), Indian Defence Review Oct-Dec 18.
- 2020 and beyond, Air Mshl Dhiraj Kukreja, Indian Defence Review Jan – Mar 17
Very nicely elucidated Sir.
Employment of AI/ ML concepts into various capabilities including Decision Support System is also worth considering in modern warfare……. a suggestion sir.
definitely.