845: BANGLADESH’S STRATEGIC TRAJECTORY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

 

Taken together, Bangladesh’s move toward acquiring Chinese J-10CE fighters and its stated willingness to consider joining the Mecca Pact are strategically significant for India. However, neither development alone means Bangladesh has become a Chinese or Pakistani military ally. The more important issue is the direction of Bangladesh’s strategic relationships and whether these moves eventually develop into a broader China-Pakistan-Bangladesh security architecture.

 

China’s Push for the J-10CE to Bangladesh

China is not simply “giving” Bangladesh fighter jets. Dhaka is moving toward purchasing Chinese J-10CE multirole fighters, with reports of a draft arrangement for roughly 20 aircraft, though earlier reports mentioned up to 24. The overall package has been reported at around $2.2–2.3 billion, including aircraft, weapons, training, infrastructure, spares and support. The agreement is not yet a completed, delivered contract, so final numbers, price and delivery schedules remain subject to approval. The deal serves both Bangladeshi and Chinese interests.

Bangladesh’s Motivations.

Fleet Modernisation: Bangladesh needs to replace or augment an ageing fighter fleet, particularly its F-7s and other legacy aircraft.

Capability at a Manageable Cost: The J-10CE offers a substantial jump in capability, including AESA radar, modern beyond-visual-range (BVR) weapons, networked avionics and electronic-warfare capabilities, at a lower acquisition and operating cost than many Western alternatives.

Existing Chinese Ecosystem: China is already Bangladesh’s dominant defence supplier, with Chinese-origin aircraft, ships, tanks, missiles and other systems in service. A new Chinese fighter therefore fits relatively easily into an existing logistics, training and maintenance ecosystem.

Strategic Diversification: The acquisition also fits Dhaka’s broader “Bangladesh First” approach, in which it seeks to maximise strategic autonomy by maintaining relationships with China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, the Gulf and Western markets rather than relying exclusively on one partner.

China’s Motivations

For Beijing, the deal is about more than selling airframes.

Long-term Strategic Dependence: A fighter fleet creates a relationship that can last decades. Aircraft, missiles, spare parts, simulators, training, maintenance, upgrades and technical support can progressively tie Bangladesh’s air force to Chinese systems and standards.

Expansion of China’s Defence Footprint: Bangladesh would become another important Chinese defence customer in South Asia, strengthening Beijing’s military-industrial presence around the Bay of Bengal and along India’s eastern periphery.

Export-Market Validation: Pakistan is currently the principal established foreign operator of the J-10 family. A Bangladeshi purchase would provide China with another reference customer and strengthen its pitch to other prospective buyers.

Strategic Gains: A friendly state operating Chinese equipment near India can complicate Indian planning and give Beijing greater influence.

The key point is therefore that the strategic value of the J-10CE deal lies not only in the aircraft’s combat capability but in the long-term Chinese military ecosystem that could develop around it.

 

Bangladesh and the Mecca Pact

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed on 7 August 2026 by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, establishes a collective-defence framework under which an armed attack on one member is treated as an attack on all. It has consequently been compared with NATO-style collective defence, although publicly available information on its precise command structure, accession procedures and operational obligations remains limited.

Bangladeshi officials have said Dhaka would consider joining if formally invited. Politically and diplomatically, it appears possible, but it is not yet an imminent or settled decision. Bangladesh has expressed openness to the idea, but it has not committed to accession.

The Mecca Pact has greater potential political significance because it would move Bangladesh beyond defence procurement into a formal security relationship involving Pakistan. For Dhaka, potential benefits of joining the pact could include: 

    • Stronger defence and security relationships with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey.
    • Possible access to Turkish defence technology and training.
    • Deeper Gulf economic and energy relationships.
    • Additional diplomatic leverage through strategic diversification.

However, membership would also create complications. Bangladesh has traditionally pursued a non-aligned or balancing foreign policy and depends simultaneously on India for geography, connectivity and trade; China for defence and investment; Gulf countries for employment and remittances; and Western markets for exports.

Joining a mutual-defence framework that includes Pakistan would therefore represent a much more consequential foreign-policy decision than purchasing Chinese aircraft.

Most importantly, the Mecca Pact should not automatically be interpreted as a Bangladesh-Pakistan military alliance directed against India. Dhaka would retain its own interests, and actual obligations would depend on the final terms of membership and the circumstances of any future conflict.

 

India’s Concerns

The J-10CE would give the Bangladesh Air Force a modern BVR air-combat capability, including AESA radar and advanced air-to-air missiles. This would narrow the qualitative gap between Bangladesh and India in specific areas, particularly along India’s eastern approaches.

The J-10CE purchase alone does not fundamentally change the India-Bangladesh military balance. A fleet of roughly 20–24 aircraft would still leave Bangladesh’s overall air power considerably smaller than India’s, and combat effectiveness depends on much more than the aircraft themselves: pilot training, sortie generation, airborne early-warning and control, air defence, tankers, C4ISR and supporting infrastructure all matter.

The concern grows when the fighter purchase is considered alongside Bangladesh’s potential political alignment with a Pakistan-inclusive defence framework, and China’s growing hold on Bangladesh through the supply of defence equipment. The combination, not any single development, matters.

However, the more important issue is Bangladesh’s dependence on China.  A future combination of J-10CE, Chinese missiles, Chinese radars, UAVs, air-defence systems, naval systems, training, and maintenance would increase China’s institutional and technological influence over the Bangladesh Armed Forces.

Operating the same aircraft family as Pakistan could also make future technical cooperation, training or interoperability easier. However, this should not be assumed to mean that Bangladesh and Pakistan will automatically operate as a unified military force.

Bangladesh occupies a strategically important position between much of India’s mainland and the Northeast. Joining the Mecca Pact could be more consequential for India. This could represent an evolution from the traditional China-Pakistan strategic axis toward a looser, more complicated regional network, with Bangladesh as an additional node.

The consequence to the Bay of Bengal and India’s Northeast would be particularly relevant. Such an arrangement could complicate India’s eastern security environment. Deep defence relationships, technical dependence, intelligence cooperation, infrastructure access and military interoperability can themselves create strategic leverage for China.

 

India: Watch and Act

Several indicators will reveal whether these developments remain limited to procurement and diplomatic diversification or become strategically more serious. India should keep a close watch on: –

    • Final J-10CE contract, number of aircraft, delivery schedule, weapons package, sensors, data links, training arrangements and financing.
    • Expansion of the Chinese ecosystem with particular attention to Chinese AWACS, SAMs, ISR systems, UAVs, radar networks and other supporting capabilities. These could matter more strategically than the fighters themselves.
    • Chinese access to Bangladeshi infrastructure. Any future arrangements involving airbases, ports, logistics facilities, intelligence installations or sustained Chinese military access would represent a substantially more serious development.
    • Pakistan-Bangladesh military cooperation. Joint exercises, intelligence sharing, training arrangements or institutional defence agreements would indicate whether the political relationship is translating into operational cooperation.
    • Mecca Pact negotiations, accession process or a formal memorandum.

India’s response matters because excessive pressure on Dhaka could become counterproductive. A better approach would be to compete without confrontation. India should focus on: –

    • Stronger mutually acceptable defence-industrial cooperation.
    • Maritime cooperation.
    • Border-management mechanisms.
    • Economic and transport connectivity.
    • Energy cooperation.
    • Disaster-relief mechanisms.
    • Continued military-to-military engagement;
    • Sustained political dialogue.

At the same time, India should strengthen its own eastern capabilities rather than assume Bangladesh will remain strategically neutral indefinitely. This means continued attention to the Eastern sector.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The strategic concern is not whether Bangladesh acquires Chinese fighter aircraft. It is whether the agreement sets the stage for greater Chinese involvement. The situation grows more complicated if Bangladesh joins a security agreement that also includes Pakistan. If both happen, the consequences for India would be much more serious.

These developments should be seen as part of a strategic trend, not as an urgent military crisis. The right course of action is neither complacency nor panic. New Delhi should strengthen its military position in the east, watch how China and Pakistan cooperate on defence matters, and remain politically and economically engaged with Bangladesh.

 

Shared these thoughts with Kartikeya Sharma on News 9.

 

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. Ahmed, I. (2026, July 23). Recalibrating foreign policy: Implications of Tarique Rahman’s China visit. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

 

  1. (2026, August 7). Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan pledge mutual defence. Reuters.

 

  1. com, Draft deal takes shape for Bangladesh’s potential purchase of Chinese J-10CE jets. bdnews24.com. (2026).

 

  1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. Message to the nation by the Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister on the signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. (2026b, August 10).

 

  1. Rehman, I. (2021). China’s influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and resilience in four countries. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

 

  1. (2026a, August 7). Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan pledge mutual defence. Reuters.

 

  1. (2026b, August 25). Bangladesh could consider joining Mecca pact, testing foreign ties. Reuters.

 

 

  1. (2026c, August 25). Bangladesh in talks to buy Chinese J-10CE fighter jets. Reuters.

 

 

  1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). SIPRI arms transfers database.

 

10.          The Business Standard. (2026). Bangladesh set to buy 20 Chinese J-10CE fighter jets for $2.3b—The Business Standard.

 

 

 

 

707: TURKEY’S TANGO WITH INDIA’S NEIGHBORS A STRATEGIC DANCE WITH REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

 

My Article published on the “Indus International Research Foundation” website on 18 Jul 25.

 

In the grand theater of global geopolitics, alliances and rivalries shape the dynamics of diplomacy. Over the past decade, Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy that extends well beyond its traditional spheres of influence. One of the most intriguing and consequential elements of this strategy is Turkey’s deepening engagement with India’s neighbours. Turkey’s relations with India’s immediate neighbours form a complex web of strategic, military, economic, and ideological engagements. Turkey has pursued a neo-Ottoman foreign policy, leveraging historical ties, Islamic solidarity, and defence exports to expand its influence in South Asia. This “strategic tango” has significant implications for South Asia’s balance of power, particularly from New Delhi’s perspective.

 

Turkey and Pakistan: Ideological Brotherhood beyond Diplomacy

The relationship between Turkey and Pakistan is characterised by its closeness and growing complexity, grounded in a shared Islamic identity, historical connections, and reciprocal geopolitical backing. Under the leadership of Erdoğan, these ties have developed into a strong strategic partnership.

The two nations have engaged in collaboration concerning military training, defence manufacturing, and joint naval exercises. Turkey ranks as Pakistan’s second-largest arms supplier, following China, providing sophisticated military equipment, including Bayraktar TB2 and Asisguard Songar drones, corvettes, missile systems, and enhancements for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet. These exports have strengthened Pakistan’s military capabilities, notably in drone warfare, which constitutes an increasing concern for India along the Line of Control (LoC) and other unstable border regions. During the recent India-Pakistan conflict (Operation Sindoor), reports suggest Turkey supplied Pakistan with between 300 and 400 drones, along with other military assistance, thereby intensifying tensions.

Turkey has also supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, frequently raising the issue at the United Nations and other international forums. Ankara has consistently condemned India’s 2019 abrogation of Article 370, which nullified the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, and has articulated this position at various international platforms, including the United Nations. Conversely, Pakistan endorses Turkey on issues such as the Cyprus dispute and Azerbaijan’s stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, thereby reinforcing their strategic alliance.

By clearly aligning with Pakistan on a sensitive bilateral matter, Turkey has indicated its readiness to confront India on the international stage. This has led to a strong Indian reaction, with tourism bookings to Turkey decreasing by 60% and cancellations increasing by 250% in 2025, along with calls for trade boycotts.

 

Bangladesh: Growing Engagement and Deepening Ties.

Turkey’s diplomatic relations with Bangladesh have markedly strengthened, primarily due to defence collaboration and economic prospects. Ankara has employed a strategic approach incorporating humanitarian assistance, cultural diplomacy, and religious outreach to foster rapport with Dhaka. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has been actively engaged in Bangladesh, financing educational institutions, healthcare facilities, and infrastructure developments. Furthermore, the administration of President Erdoğan has adopted a firm stance regarding the Rohingya crisis, providing refuge to displaced persons and vocally criticising Myanmar’s policies. This stance aligns closely with the perspectives held by Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has reportedly acquired Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones, whilst augmenting Bangladesh’s military capabilities, evoke concerns in India regarding their possible deployment along the shared 4,096-kilometre border. Economically, Turkey has actively engaged with Bangladesh through trade and infrastructure initiatives, capitalising on Dhaka’s expanding economy and strategic positioning. Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions align with certain political factions within Bangladesh, notably those sympathetic to Islamist rhetoric, thereby further fortifying bilateral relations.

This ideological alignment, coupled with defence cooperation, has raised concerns in New Delhi, which fears that Turkey’s influence could destabilise its eastern neighbourhood.

 

Emerging Engagements With Other Neighbours

Turkey has also expanded its focus to smaller South Asian nations, including Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Myanmar, and the Maldives. These countries, often overlooked in global strategic considerations, possess significant geopolitical importance due to their strategic locations and vulnerability to external influences.

In Nepal, Turkey’s influence is predominantly diplomatic and cultural. Ankara has increased its embassy presence, provided scholarships, and facilitated interfaith dialogue through its Diyanet Foundation. Although not explicitly political, these initiatives form part of Turkey’s broader strategy to extend its influence via cultural engagement and religious diplomacy.

Turkey’s engagements with Sri Lanka are less pronounced but strategically significant. Turkey has pursued economic ties and limited defence cooperation, including potential drone exports. In Bhutan, Turkey’s presence is primarily economic, with investments in infrastructure and trade.

Myanmar, notwithstanding its political instability, has experienced Turkey’s outreach through humanitarian aid and limited defence negotiations, capitalising on shared Islamic affiliations with specific communities. Although these efforts are less advanced than those with Pakistan and Bangladesh, they demonstrate Turkey’s broader strategy to augment its presence in India’s vicinity.

The Maldives, a small island nation located in the Indian Ocean, has attracted interest from numerous international actors, including China, India, and currently Turkey. The government led by Erdoğan has enhanced bilateral engagements and extended development aid. As the archipelago increasingly assumes a pivotal position in the contest for influence within the Indian Ocean, Turkey’s engagement signifies its aspiration to participate actively in regional maritime geopolitics.

 

The China Factor: Converging Interests, Diverging Identities

While not a neighbour in the strict sense, China has a significant influence on India’s strategic outlook and is becoming increasingly important for Turkey as well. Ankara and Beijing share common viewpoints in criticising Western dominance and promoting multipolarity. Turkey participates in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though with varying enthusiasm. Economic needs have motivated Erdoğan to pursue Chinese investment, especially during Turkey’s ongoing financial instability.

Nevertheless, the relationship encounters some friction. Turkey has historically been a vocal critic of China’s treatment of the Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority in Xinjiang. Erdoğan previously characterised Chinese policies as “genocide,” although such rhetoric has become less prominent in recent years as economic pragmatism has gained precedence.

From India’s perspective, Turkey’s ties with China heighten concerns. Both nations have shown a readiness to oppose India on Kashmir and support Pakistan. Although their ideological bases differ—Turkey with its neo-Ottoman and Islamist inclinations, and China with its authoritarian state capitalism—their strategic interests sometimes align, especially in efforts to counter Indian influence.

 

Strategic Implications for India

Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, propelled by President Erdoğan’s vision of global Islamic leadership, frequently conflict with India’s secular, multipolar foreign policy. Turkey’s increasing engagement with India’s neighbouring countries carries strategic implications that New Delhi must carefully consider. Although Turkey does not possess the economic strength or geographical proximity to directly challenge India, its ideological assertiveness and alignment with adversarial interests render it a disruptive presence in South Asia.

Ankara’s vocal endorsement of Pakistan regarding Kashmir elevates the issue to an international level, countering India’s stance that it is a bilateral matter. This not only strengthens Pakistan’s position but also offers diplomatic protection for narratives that contest India’s territorial sovereignty.

The Turkey-Pakistan alliance, fortified through defence cooperation and shared stances on issues such as Kashmir, remains highly contentious. Turkey’s provision of advanced weapons, including drones and naval equipment, boosts Pakistan’s military strength, directly challenging India’s security along its western border. Additionally, Turkey’s defence collaborations with Bangladesh and the Maldives pose a threat to India’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.

Turkey’s soft power efforts, particularly in Muslim-majority areas, aim to establish Ankara as a leader within the Islamic world. This contrasts with India’s approach, which focuses on building ties with Muslim-majority nations through economic and developmental partnerships, rather than religious solidarity.

Turkey’s growing collaboration with China and Pakistan may constitute a loose yet influential axis characterised by common objectives to curtail Indian influence. While the establishment of a formal alliance appears improbable, convergences on particular issues, such as opposing India’s ascent or supporting anti-Indian narratives, could pose a persistent strategic challenge.

 

India’s Options

In response to Turkey’s assertiveness, India needs to adopt a multifaceted strategy. India’s displeasure needs to be signalled by reducing high-level diplomatic exchanges, and through economic levers such as trade and tourism advisories. Another option is to strengthen ties with countries that view Turkish policies with suspicion. Enhancement of defence and economic cooperation with Greece, Armenia, Cyprus, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would convey the right message. Closer at home, India needs to leverage its cultural diplomacy, economic strength, and infrastructure investments to counter Turkish influence in neighbouring countries. Initiatives like the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and the Indo-Pacific outreach provide platforms that could be used to build alternative narratives to Ankara’s Islamic solidarity approach.

Conclusion

Turkey’s strategic engagement with its neighbours in South Asia, often described metaphorically as a Tango, appears to be more than mere diplomatic manoeuvring. It seems to constitute a deliberate effort to reshape regional alliances and enhance Ankara’s influence within the Muslim world and beyond. For India, this diplomatic dance presents both a challenge and an opportunity: a challenge to its strategic environment and regional influence, and an opportunity to refine its diplomatic strategies and foster resilient partnerships. India must navigate these intricate geopolitical developments with vigilance to safeguard its regional interests. By fortifying its alliances and leveraging its economic and military capacities, India should endeavour to ensure that Turkey’s actions do not destabilise the delicate balance of power in South Asia.

 

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Turkey’s Tango with India’s Neighbours: A Strategic Dance with Regional Implications

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

 

  1. Hindu, T. (2025, March 10). India Sees 60% Drop in Tourism to Turkey Amid Kashmir Tensions.
  2. Dawn. (2025, February 15). Turkey Supplies 300–400 Drones to Pakistan During Operation Sindoor, Sources Say.
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  4. Ministry of External Affairs, India. (2024). India’s Response to Turkey’s Stance on Kashmir at the UN. New Delhi: Government of India.
  5. Reuters. (2025, January 5). Bangladesh Acquires Turkish TB2 Drones, Raising Concerns in India.
  6. Sharma, A. (2023). Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman Ambitions in South Asia. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation.
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  8. Times of India. (2025, April 2). 250% Surge in Cancellations of Turkey Travel Bookings After Operation Sindoor.
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  1. Asia Foundation. (2022). Turkey’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Bangladesh and the Rohingya Crisis.

 

  1. Pantucci, R. (2022). China-Turkey Relations: A New Axis of Authoritarian Influence? Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
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  1. Kugelman, M. (2020). Turkey and Pakistan: A Budding Strategic Alliance? Wilson Center.

 

  1. Anadolu Agency. (2020). Erdoğan Says Kashmir Is as Important to Turkey as It Is to Pakistan.

 

  1. Raja Mohan, C. (2020). The Rise of Turkey in Asia: A Challenge to India’s Regional Position? Carnegie India.
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