space – Air Marshal's Perspective

September 11, 2026September 10, 2026

852:INDIA’S AIR POWER AMID RISING GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of the “Blue Print” Magazine

Air power has become a crucial instrument of national security. Possessing credible, technologically advanced air power is no longer a luxury but a strategic imperative. India occupies a unique geopolitical position. It shares borders with two nuclear-armed neighbours. Both of whom present distinct and collusive security challenges. The increasing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region is further altering India’s security calculus. Newer technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), hypersonic missiles, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and space-based military capabilities have expanded the dimensions of aerial warfare.

Air power is essential to India’s security. As geopolitical tensions grow and military technology advances, India’s aerial capabilities will become a vital means of deterrence, power projection, and safeguarding national security. The extent to which the country modernises and integrates its aerial forces will significantly affect its ability to cope with the complicated geopolitical situation of the coming decades.

The Strategic Importance of Air Power. Air power constitutes a highly adaptable and lethal instrument of statecraft. It is characterised by its extensive reach, swift responsiveness, and ability to impose shock and influence through precise, non-contact means of applying force. Its effects can be activated or deactivated more easily than other instruments of national power. Although it provides a broad array of offensive capabilities, its utility extends beyond mere offensive operations. It also plays a vital role in deterrence, strategic positioning, and coercion, whether in wartime or peacetime. Unlike ground forces, air power can be deployed over great distances in just a short time and is therefore essential in times of crisis. In natural disasters, air power can provide rapid humanitarian assistance. It supports both military security and national resilience.

Geopolitical Challenges and Emerging Threats

India’s air power today sits at the centre of a far more complex security environment than at any point in the past two decades. The challenge is not only the classic two-front problem with China and Pakistan, but also the need to modernise fast enough to preserve deterrence. At the same time, air warfare is being transformed by drones, missiles, cyber, space, and networked targeting.

The China Challenge. China is India’s most significant long-term strategic challenge. The military standoff in eastern Ladakh since 2020 demonstrated that border tensions can escalate rapidly and require sustained military preparedness. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone extensive modernisation over the past two decades. China has also developed extensive military infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang. These include upgraded airbases, hardened aircraft shelters, extended runways, and logistics facilities that can support sustained air operations near the Indian border.

Pakistan and the Persistent Security Challenge. Pakistan relies on non-state actors funded and trained on its own soil to keep India in a state of unrest through disinformation, incitement and terrorism. It remains a security threat across the nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional dimensions simultaneously. The 2019 Balakot air strike and the recent Op Sindoor highlighted the growing role of air power in India’s strategy of punitive deterrence. India’s ability to conduct precision strikes deep inside hostile territory demonstrated a willingness to employ air power. However, the subsequent aerial engagement also emphasised the importance of superior situational awareness, electronic warfare, and beyond-visual-range combat capabilities.

The Rise of Drones and Autonomous Warfare. The rise of autonomous drones is one of the most significant developments in contemporary air warfare. Drones have moved from mere surveillance vehicles to versatile weapons. They can deliver precise strikes, conduct electronic warfare, and carry out reconnaissance and intelligence collection. In recent conflicts, it has been shown that relatively cheap drones can cause disproportionate damage to advanced military equipment. Swarm drone technology in particular poses considerable challenges for traditional air defence systems because it is hard to track and destroy multiple low-cost aerial targets at the same time. India is now encountering increasing drone-related threats on both its western and northern borders, and reports of drone-enabled smuggling, surveillance, and cross-border infiltration highlight the importance of having strong counter-drone capabilities.

Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare. Air operations now rely heavily on secure communication networks, satellite navigation, and data links. As aerial warfare platforms become more interconnected, they also become more susceptible to cyberattacks and electronic interference. Enemies could disrupt air operations by attacking communication systems, navigation networks, or mission-critical software. Electronic warfare can greatly reduce the effectiveness of the most advanced aircraft. Protection of digital infrastructure has become as important as protecting airbases. India must invest in secure communications, encrypted data links, and cyber defence capabilities.

Space as a Strategic Domain. Space has emerged as a critical component of air power. The term airpower has evolved into aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding into the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. They are providing capabilities including navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches, and space-based surveillance. The integration of space-based systems with air assets is expected to increase further. This will create opportunities for both offensive and defensive operations. However, increasing dependence on satellite-based systems also creates vulnerabilities. Anti-satellite warfare spans kinetic weapons such as missiles as well as non-kinetic systems including jammers, laser dazzlers and spoofing equipment. Denial of space-based systems directly affects air warfare.

The Indo-Pacific and Maritime Air Power. India’s strategic interests extend beyond its borders. The Indo-Pacific area is now the centre of global economic activity and strategic competition. It is seeing rising naval deployments, disputes over maritime routes, and a growing number of military cooperation agreements. Air power plays a vital role in protecting maritime interests by enabling long-range surveillance, conducting anti-submarine warfare, conducting maritime reconnaissance, and allowing rapid force deployment. The ability to monitor key sea lanes, respond effectively to humanitarian crises, and support naval operations confirms India’s status as a major security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.

Strengthening India’s Air Power

India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action. As the nature of warfare evolves, India’s approach to air power must keep pace. The future lies in building an integrated, technology-driven, and self-reliant aerospace ecosystem that can address conventional, asymmetric, and multidomain threats. Sustained investment in modernisation, indigenous innovation, joint military operations, and human capital will be essential for maintaining India’s strategic advantage.

Capability and Capacity Balance for Credible Deterrence. Warfighting capability and the capacity to sustain operations are both essential, combining quality and quantity. While India’s air power capabilities (in terms of reach, high-altitude operations, precision, standoff, and all-weather performance) have advanced significantly, it must also increase the numerical strength of fighter aircraft, combat enablers, long-range vectors, and drones. One of the Indian Air Force’s foremost priorities is to restore its fighter squadron strength. Bridging this gap requires the timely induction of new-generation aircraft (fighters and combat support aircraft), while ensuring modernisation plans are financially sustainable.

Enhancing Indigenous Defence Manufacturing. Self-reliance has become a strategic necessity. Relying on imported defence equipment creates vulnerabilities. India should develop its own technological abilities and increase its defence manufacturing capacity. It will reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. Indigenous development of radars, electronic warfare systems, missiles, drones, and aircraft components will strengthen India’s technological base, create jobs, and boost exports. As part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat effort in defence manufacturing, the aim is to enhance self-reliance by encouraging the domestic production of these systems. The initiative has sped up domestic defence production by involving more public sector enterprises, private industries, start-ups, and research institutions. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), academic institutions, and the private sector must work together to shorten development timelines and promote innovation.

Embracing Emerging Technologies. The adoption of emerging technologies. Technological advances are further reshaping the nature of air warfare. Precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, network-centric operations, satellite-enabled communications, artificial intelligence, and autonomous drones are all altering the battlefield. Autonomous drones and the idea of loyal wingmen are expected to transform aerial combat. India should also make investments in directed-energy weapons, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber-resilient command-and-control networks. These technologies can greatly increase operational effectiveness while reducing personnel risk. Air power assets depend heavily on technology. Turning technology into capability takes a long time. To stay ahead of the challenges, we need to invest in emerging technologies and think through their use in warfare. Impetus is also required for existing aviation-related programs such as fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers, stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and long-range vectors.

Airpower Utilisation in Grey Zone Scenario. Grey zone operations occur in a contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare. These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both of India’s adversaries resort to these operations regularly. Airpower can reinforce the nation’s course of action against grey zone warfare, with involvement in several direct and supporting roles. Besides offensive use, it can also be effectively utilised in many ways in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Applying airpower in these grey zone situations requires some reorientation, supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

Conclusion

India’s air Power is at a crucial stage. Competing regional interests, technological progress, and changes in warfare have increased the strategic value of air power. As India faces challenges from both China and Pakistan and the Indo-Pacific region grows more important, it needs constant modernisation and strategic adjustment. India can ensure its air power remains capable of protecting its national interests in this increasingly uncertain and contested geopolitical environment by promoting innovation, supporting domestic research, and adopting multidomain warfare.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References: –

Fontanellaz A, “Operation Sindoor: The India-Pakistan air war”, Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaires (2026).

Jane’s, “Feature: China accelerates air combat modernisation”, Janes.com (2025, November 19).

Jha M K, “IAF – Target “42 squadron”, SP’s Aviation, (9), (2025).

Khosla A, “Future conflict scenarios: Implications for IAF (Part 1)”, Air Marshal’s Perspective, (2021, March 15).

Khosla, A. (2021, July 26). Airpower in the grey zone. USI Journal; reproduced on Air Marshal’s Perspective.

Khosla, A. “Aero India 2025 and key solutions for IAF’s challenges”, SP’s Aviation; reproduced on Air Marshal’s Perspective (2025, February 11).

Khosla, A. (2025, February). Future trends of fighter aircraft—SP Aviation Yearbook; reproduced on Air Marshal’s Perspective.

Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2025, February). Make in India powers defence growth [Press release]. Press Information Bureau.

August 5, 2026

834: INTEGRATING AIR OPERATIONS FOR CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Article published in the inaugural issue of

ADITI NATIONAL STRATEGY MAGAZINE

Credible conventional deterrence is not a function of numerical superiority alone. It is the demonstrated capacity to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary. The cost is imposed at short notice, with sufficient speed, precision, and integration across all domains, with a message that aggression will not be rewarded but punished. In this sense, deterrence is as much a matter of perception as of capability. The adversary must believe that the costs of military action will outweigh any conceivable gain. That belief must rest on something more substantial than a declaratory posture. It must rest on observable, tested, and credible military power.

For India, the architecture of conventional deterrence has been evolving gradually. At its heart is the transformation in how the three services fight, plan, and operate together. Jointness, once an aspirational buzzword, is now the necessary operative principle behind India’s warfighting doctrine. The nation’s security establishment has recognised that the conventional deterrent value of its armed forces is only as strong as the degree to which those forces can act in concert, with speed, precision, and lethality, across all domains simultaneously.

A Collusive Threat Environment. Understanding why joint operations matter to conventional deterrence requires first understanding the threat environment in which India operates. India faces a collusive threat and the possibility of concurrent or coordinated military pressure from both China and Pakistan. This is not merely a theoretical construct. The deepening military-to-military ties between Beijing and Islamabad, evidenced by technology transfer, co-developed weapons systems, and coordinated diplomatic positions, mean that India cannot plan its conventional responses in a sequential or siloed manner. It must be prepared to fight on multiple fronts and in multiple domains simultaneously.

Doctrine of Punitive Deterrence. Pakistan’s long-standing strategy has been of sponsoring cross-border terrorism while sheltering behind its nuclear umbrella (bleed India through a thousand cuts). It has compelled India to rethink and change its conventional response. For decades, India’s posture was one of strategic restraint (absorbing provocations diplomatically and avoiding military action). That calculus has fundamentally changed as India has shifted toward a doctrine of punitive deterrence. Air strikes on terror camps have been carried out (Balakot in 2019 and Op Sindoor in 2025) as an instrument of punitive action.

Airpower Contribution to Conventional Deterrence. Deterrence refers to the ability to prevent an adversary from undertaking hostile action. It is achieved by convincing the enemy that the costs of aggression will outweigh any potential gains. Air power is an important part of military deterrence. It provides rapid military response options and creates strategic uncertainty for adversaries. The ability to strike with speed, precision, and unpredictability produces disproportionate strategic effects relative to the scale of force employed.

Misunderstood Roles. The Indian Air Force has repeatedly demonstrated that it can conduct joint operations while independently shaping strategic outcomes. Yet scepticism persists among some observers. Some view air power as an auxiliary arm supporting surface operations. This perspective is flawed as it ignores the inherent flexibility and reach of air power. Viewing air power through the narrow lens of close air support ignores its role in shaping the entire battlefield before the surface engagement begins. To relegate the IAF to a support arm is to ignore the vertical dimension that prevents conflict from degenerating into attritional, terrain-bound warfare.

Air Superiority as an Enabler of Joint Operations. No element of joint warfighting is more foundational to conventional deterrence than air superiority. Control of the air domain enables all other joint force activities: it shields ground and maritime forces from enemy air attack, provides real-time intelligence that improves situational awareness across the force, and enables deep strike against adversary command nodes, logistics centres, and critical infrastructure. Conversely, the absence of air superiority exposes every other component of the joint force to attrition and denial. The objective is not to achieve a permanent air superiority across an entire area of operations. A window to enable uninterrupted operations would suffice.

SEAD/DEAD as the Gateway. The Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences mission is neither a secondary nor a preliminary task. It is the gateway through which the joint force enters the contested battlespace. An adversary’s integrated air defence network is its primary tool for denying the air superiority required for joint operations. The systematic suppression and destruction of that network (radars, fire-control systems, surface-to-air missile batteries, and command nodes) is therefore among the most operationally significant tasks the IAF performs and among the most strategically visible. An adversary that knows its air defence architecture can be comprehensively degraded in the opening hours of a conflict must factor that vulnerability into its pre-conflict calculations. That factoring is deterrence.

Demonstrated Capability and the IAF’s Evolution. The IAF has transformed from a tactical air force to a broad-spectrum aerospace power. The induction of airborne early warning and control systems gave the IAF the ability to manage the air battle across a vast area in real time. Aerial refuelling tankers extended strike ranges to operational depths. These capabilities fundamentally altered the adversary’s assessment of which assets were at risk. Stand-off precision capability enabled the IAF to engage hardened targets deep inside adversary territory without entering the engagement envelopes of the most capable surface-to-air missile systems.

Jointness as a Force Multiplier. While air power possesses independent strategic utility, its effectiveness increases when integrated into a joint operational framework. For India, the importance of this integration is amplified by the need for two-front planning. No single service has sufficient capacity to address the full scope of requirements on both fronts simultaneously. Joint planning that optimises the employment of air power across combat zones, that allocates strike, surveillance, airlift, and air defence assets according to operational priority rather than service entitlement, and that fuses the intelligence from all domains into a single coherent picture for commanders at every level, is the only organisational response adequate to the problem India faces.

The Maritime Dimension. Conventional deterrence is not a purely continental affair for India. The Indian Ocean Region is India’s strategic backyard and the artery of its economic prosperity. More than 80 per cent of India’s energy imports transit these waters. Any adversarial interdiction of these sea lanes, or a hostile maritime presence in the IOR, represents a direct threat to national interest. The Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept being employed by the maritime forces aligns with India’s broader strategy to control key chokepoints and sustain an uninterrupted supply chain in the IOR. Airpower (integral with IN and AF), operating within a networked joint framework, makes the maritime deterrent credible against both state and grey-zone threats.

The Emerging Domain Space and Intelligence. The exploitation of space has become indispensable to joint conventional operations. Space assets provide the persistent surveillance, early warning, precision navigation, and communications infrastructure upon which joint warfighting depends. The key challenge that India’s joint space and intelligence architecture must address is fusing multi-source intelligence into a single, coherent operational picture that field commanders can act upon with confidence. Space-based surveillance, airborne radar, electronic intelligence, and human intelligence currently flow through separate chains before being reconciled at higher levels of command. An intelligence fusion center, is required to create a Common Operational Picture.

Building a Credible Joint Deterrence Architecture. An adversary assessing India’s military balance would also evaluate mobilisation speed, reinforcement capacity, and sustainment resilience as carefully as it evaluates weapon and platform inventories. Several priorities emerge for India in translating these principles into a credible conventional deterrent.

- Strengthening joint planning at the operational and strategic levels must be institutionalised. The Joint Operations Control Centre, bringing all three services together into a single, real-time command-and-control node, is a critical step in this direction.

- Military reorganisation should prioritise meeting future challenges. A command-level joint structure for the space and cyber domains is a high priority. The existing joint Command (Andaman and Nicobar Command) on the eastern seaboard needs to be strengthened, and a similar structure needs to be established on the western seaboard.

- The theatre command concept is one means of achieving jointness, not an ultimate panacea. Its relevance is greater for expeditionary operations conducted with adequate resources, far from the homeland. The challenge is to formulate a model suitable for domestic needs.

- Expanding indigenous capability in critical systems enhances strategic resilience. It reduces dependence on foreign supply chains.

- Developing a multi-domain doctrine that genuinely integrates air, land, maritime, cyber, and space operations would enhance the deterrence value.

- Aerospace Doctrine’s assertion (that “space exploitation is integral to achieving national security objectives”) needs to be translated into institutional practice.

Concluding Thoughts

The character of warfare is changing rapidly. In contemporary warfare, the actions in space affect outcomes on the ground, electronic warfare shapes the effectiveness of kinetic strikes, and information operations condition the political environment. In such a scenario, no single service can act alone. The interconnectedness of the modern battlespace demands a high level of integration and coordination. The necessity of integrated multi-domain operations will increase as the security environment grows more complex.

India faces a two-front threat environment, has vast maritime responsibilities, and growing strategic obligations across the Indo-Pacific.

Joint air operations are the cornerstone for achieving credible conventional deterrence. The integration of aerospace power with land, maritime, cyber, and space capabilities is the work on which India’s deterrent credibility ultimately rests. All-around integration is required across planning, doctrine, and command architecture. An institutional culture needs to be shaped so that officers from all three services understand one another’s roles. India’s journey toward a credible conventional deterrent is inseparable from the journey toward jointness. The future of deterrence will depend on how effectively India integrates all domains into a coherent, credible, and lethal strategic instrument.

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References: –

Cohen SP and Dasgupta S. “Arming without aiming: India’s military modernisation”, Brookings Institution Press (BIP). 2010.

Crowell L. “Multi-domain operations and the future of joint warfare”. Naval Institute Press (NIP). 2023.

Deptula, D. A. “Effects-based operations: Change like warfare”. Aerospace Education Foundation, 2001.

Government of India, Ministry of Defence. “Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces”. Headquarters, Integrated Defence Staff. 2023.

Gupta, A., “Building an arsenal: The evolution of regional power force structures”. Praeger. 2019.

Kapila, S., India’s defence modernisation: Structural constraints and strategic imperatives”. Journal of Defence Studies. 2021.

Air Mshl Anil Khosla. “Punitive deterrence: India’s evolving conventional response”. Blog “Air Marshal’s Perspective”, 2023. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla

Air Mshl Anil Khosla. “Air superiority and joint operations: The SEAD/DEAD imperative”. Blog “Air Marshal’s Perspective”, 2024. https://55nda.com/blogs/anil-khosla

Ladwig, W. C. Indian military modernisation and conventional deterrence in South Asia. “Journal of Strategic Studies”, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.942937, 2020.

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June 9, 2026

820: ARTEMIS II AND THE SECOND SPACE RACE FOR THE LUNAR RESOURCES

Article published in the jun 26 edition of the News Analytics Magazine

On April 1, 2026, the Space Launch System ignited at Launch Pad 39B at Kennedy Space Centre and punched the Orion spacecraft into a clear Florida sky. Onboard were Commander Reid Wiseman, Pilot Victor Glover, Mission Specialist Christina Koch, and Canadian Space Agency astronaut Jeremy Hansen. Ten days and 1.4 million kilometres later, having looped around the far side of the Moon on a free-return trajectory and broken the distance record set by Apollo 13, they splashed down in the Pacific off San Diego. Artemis II was complete.

It is humanity’s first crewed journey to the vicinity of the Moon in more than fifty years. It was also the first test of Orion’s life-support systems with humans aboard in deep space. The Orion capsule’s computers ran 20,000 times faster than those used during Apollo, while the European Service Module, built by ESA, provided propulsion, power, water, and oxygen throughout. The Space Launch System, generating roughly 15 per cent more thrust than the Saturn V, performed without issue. Technicians were already beginning work on the hardware for Artemis III before the recovery ships reached the crew.

But the mission’s significance goes far beyond the engineering feat. Artemis II is a move in a geopolitical contest. The stakes are much higher than Apollo’s. The second space race has started, and this time the prize is not prestige alone.

From Apollo to Artemis. The first space race was about ideology. The United States claimed a symbolic victory over the Soviet Union when Neil Armstrong stepped onto the Moon in July 1969. Then the urgency collapsed for several reasons. These included budget constraints, a shift toward the Space Shuttle and low-Earth orbit, and the thawing of the Cold War. The pace became a domain of cautious cooperation, culminating in the International Space Station. Even that era is over now. The Artemis programme, announced in 2017, has revived lunar ambition on entirely different terms. The Artemis Program is built around a sustained presence and a plan to use the Moon as a proving ground for Mars.

Racing Blocs. The geopolitical architecture of the second space race is hardening into two distinct coalitions.

- The American-led bloc is around the Artemis Accords. It has now been signed by 61 nations, establishing principles for transparency, interoperability, and the legality of resource extraction under existing international law. The partners include Canada, ESA member states, Japan, the UK, Australia, and the UAE.

- China’s answer is the International Lunar Research Station, co-founded with Russia in 2021. Russia has become a junior partner in a China-led programme. China has recruited 13 countries to the ILRS framework, including Pakistan, Belarus, South Africa, and Venezuela, and is aggressively expanding that list through a “5-5-5” initiative. The initiative aims to enrol 50 nations, 500 institutions, and 5,000 researchers in lunar science by the early 2030s. Beijing is offering low-interest loans for ground stations, technology transfer guarantees and payload slots on Chinese missions.

- India occupies the middle ground. India has signed the Artemis Accords while simultaneously building indigenous capability. While joining the Accord, India is not a direct participant in the NASA-led Artemis Programme’s mission-driven hardware development, but rather a partner in its guiding principles. By joining, India aligns with international principles for space exploration. These include transparency, interoperability, and the peaceful use of space resources. The agreement fosters strengthening space cooperation between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and NASA.

South Pole: Ground Zero for the Next Space Race. Every major programme (Artemis, the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, and Chandrayaan) targets the same narrow strip of terrain. The reason is water ice, preserved for billions of years in permanently shadowed craters at temperatures around -173°C. Through electrolysis, that ice can be split into hydrogen and oxygen (which are useful for rocket propulsion). A reliable South Pole water supply could turn the Moon into what planners call a gas station in the sky. There is also helium-3 stock, deposited by solar wind over billions of years. It is estimated at around one million tonnes across the lunar surface. Helium-3 holds promise as a fuel for aneutronic fusion reactions that produce far less radioactive waste than conventional fission. The South Pole’s value is as much strategic as it is geological. Both Artemis and the ILRS are fixated on the same area.

US Increasing the Pace. The Artemis programme, announced in 2017, is built around a sustained presence around the moon. Artemis II was the crewed proof of concept for that ecosystem. Artemis III will test lunar landing equipment in Earth orbit in 2027. Artemis IV, carrying the first crew actually to land at the South Pole, is targeted for 2028. Each member of the accord is contributing hardware or expertise (Canada’s Canadarm3 for the Gateway, ESA’s service modules, and Japan’s logistics). The programme also integrates the private industry. SpaceX holds the Artemis IV lander contract, and Blue Origin holds the Artemis V contract. Intuitive Machines and Firefly Aerospace are conducting robotic precursor missions under NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services programme.

China Maintaining the Momentum. In roughly two decades, the China National Space Administration has gone from launching its first taikonaut in 2003 to landing a rover on the lunar far side, returning samples from the surface, operating its own space station, and sending a rover to Mars. The Chang’e programme has been methodical: Chang’e-4 became the first mission to soft-land on the far side in 2019; Chang’e-5 returned near-side samples in 2020; Chang’e-6 brought back far-side samples in 2024, the first time that had been done. Chang’e-7, scheduled for late 2026, will survey the south pole for water ice. Chang’e-8, in 2028, will test in situ source utilisation. China is targeting a crewed landing by 2030. The crewed mission will adopt a dual-launch architecture. The Long March 10 rocket will carry the Mengzhou spacecraft, which will carry three taikonauts. Another one will deliver the Lanyue lander. The two vehicles will rendezvous in lunar orbit. Two crew members will descend to the surface while a third remains above. The ILRS envisions a permanent facility near the Lunar South Pole being built and operationalised in three phases—reconnaissance through 2025, construction from 2026 to 2035, and full utilisation from 2036.

Indian Effort. India’s space programme has, in a short span, moved from ambition to achievement. In August 2023, Chandrayaan-3’s soft landing near the lunar south pole was a landmark moment. No nation had touched down on that terrain before. The feat placed the Indian Space Research Organisation in a category, until then occupied only by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, in terms of demonstrated lunar landing capability. The follow-up mission, Chandrayaan-4, targets the MM-4 site on Mons Mouton at nearly 84 degrees south latitude. The return mission planned for 2028 will push India’s indigenous capability further still.

The Stakes. The Apollo contest was primarily a demonstration of ideological and technological superiority. The Artemis contest is about infrastructure and norms. Leadership in space is not symbolic. It shapes standards, partnerships and long-term strategic influence. Whoever builds the first permanent presence at the South Pole gains the standing to set the terms for everyone who follows. These include docking interfaces, communication protocols, and resource-extraction norms. The United States set them for the internet. China is making a methodical bid for the lunar space. The stakes are much higher than in the 1960s race. The logic is simple. Resources are needed to sustain presence, but presence is needed to access resources. What matters is who reaches first.

What Next. The Artemis programme is moving, but so is China’s IRLS. The ILRS coalition continues to add members. Artemis II proved the hardware works with people inside. The Orion heat shield held, the SLS performed, and the European Service Module delivered. Work on Artemis III and IV is already underway. On the other hand, China’s Chang’e-7 is planned for launch later in 2026 to map resources at the South Pole. The Long March 10 crewed vehicle is approaching its maiden flight. The window to set multilateral governance frameworks before the first permanent infrastructure goes into the ground is closing.

The Moon that humanity walked away from after Apollo 17 in December 1972 is returning to the centre of global attention. This time, not as a destination for brief visits but as a domain to be occupied, developed, and contested. The second space race is not a metaphor or a rhetorical convenience. It is a structural feature of twenty-first-century great-power competition. The race, playing out at a quarter-million miles, is just warming up.

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References: –

NASA, “Artemis II: First crewed Orion & SLS flight test”, 2026. https://www.nasa.gov/mission/artemis-ii

NASA, “NASA’s plan for sustained lunar exploration and development”, 2017. https://www.nasa.gov/artemis

NASA, “The Artemis Accords”, 2020. https://www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords

China National Space Administration, “China and Russia sign a MoU to construct the International Lunar Research Station”, CNSA, 2021. http://www.cnsa.gov.cn

China Manned Space Agency, “Long March 10 and crewed lunar mission architecture”, 2026. http://www.cmse.gov.cn

Jones A, “Chang’e-6 returns first samples from the Moon’s far side”, Space News, 25 Jun 2024. https://spacenews.com

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Indian Space Research Organisation, “Chandrayaan-4: Site selection for sample return at Mons Mouton”, Apr 2026. https://www.isro.gov.in

Ministry of External Affairs, GOI, “Joint statement from the United States and India: A partnership for the 21st century”, 2023. https://www.mea.gov.in

Lowy Institute, “Artemis II and the geopolitics of the second space race”, Apr 2026. https://www.lowyinstitute.org