767: JAISH-E-MOHAMMED LAUNCHES “TUFAT AL-MUMINAT”: DIGITAL JIHAD FOR WOMEN’S RADICALISATION

 

Pakistan-based, UN-designated terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) has launched an online jihadist training programme titled Tufat al-Muminat. The initiative targeting women serves as the foundation course for JeM’s newly announced female militant wing (Jamat ul-Muminat). The course is reportedly led by Sadiya and Samaira Azhar, sisters of JeM founder Masood Azhar, and Afreera Farooq, wife of Umar Farooq, one of the terrorists behind the April 2025 Pahalgam attack in Jammu and Kashmir.

 

According to news reports, the online sessions are scheduled to begin on 08 Nov 2025. It will be conducted for 40 minutes daily through live video platforms.​ A nominal fee of PKR 500 is being charged to each participant.  The sessions will likely focus on preaching extremist interpretations of Islam, emphasising women’s roles in jihad.

 

In the past, women played a minimal role in JeM’s activities. However, the development of a dedicated female wing and online training programs shows an increasing effort to involve women more actively. This is a significant change in JeM’s approach.  It seems JeM is taking cues from other groups like ISIS, Boko Haram, and Hamas, which have a history of recruiting women for combat and even suicide missions.

 

Digital Jihad

 

In the digital age, warfare has moved beyond physical battlefields, infiltrating the virtual realm where ideas spread faster than bullets. Digital jihad is also called “electronic jihad” or “e-jihad.” It is an online version of jihadist ideology and activities in the cyber domain. The internet, with its enormous, anonymous, and interlinked nature, is being used to disseminate extremist ideologies, attract believers, and form worldwide connections. Digital jihad is practised in the darkness of social media, encrypted applications, and AI-generated content. The process of converting extremism into a digital form is now one of the key factors influencing global terrorism.

 

Evolution of Jihad in the Digital Era. The shift from traditional insurgencies to digital jihad began in the late 1990s when extremist groups recognised the internet’s potential as both an ideological and operational tool. Al-Qaeda led this change, using basic websites for fatwas and recruitment videos after 9/11. As social media grew, this evolved into complex digital systems in which recruitment, propaganda, indoctrination, and training became borderless, efficient, and viral. By the 2010s, ISIS took it further by creating a “virtual caliphate.” Social media gave jihadist organisations—including ISIS and al-Qaeda—the opportunity to connect with a worldwide audience with minimal expenses. ISIS revolutionised digital jihad through its propaganda films, magazines (Dabiq and Rumiyah), published in multiple languages. These publications served as tools for ideological indoctrination. Recent advances include “AI jihad,” where Hamas, al-Qaeda, and ISIS use generative AI for deepfakes and memes.

 

Mechanisms of Digital Jihad. Digital jihad works on several overlapping functions: propaganda, recruitment, training, funding, and coordinating activities. The most obvious one is propaganda, which is conveyed through multimedia messages, videos, GIFs, and memes that praise martyrdom and foster a sense of belonging to the world object. Emotional and ideological vulnerabilities of isolated, susceptible youth are being targeted online for recruitment. Encrypted networks have become the preferred option for jihadists to communicate and plan. They can coordinate across continents anonymously.

 

Ideological Narratives and Online Radicalisation. The ideological axis of digital jihad blends traditional Islamic discourse with modern grievance narratives—claiming to defend the ummah (global Muslim community) against alleged Western aggression. Online preachers and influencers exploit religious symbolism to justify violence morally. Digital content idealises jihad as an empowerment or a commandment of god that builds on the feelings of alienation of most migrants and diasporic young people. This narrative warfare was institutionalised in the media jihad by ISIS, which re-packaged jihad as not only a moral imperative but as an identity of lifestyle.

 

The Role of Technology and AI in Digital Jihad. Emerging artificial intelligence-based technologies have expanded the reach of digital jihad. Extremist content is now more visible than ever before. The extremist echo chambers are self-perpetuating, bombarding people with extremist content. The jihadist groups are utilising video editing software, bot networks, and data encryption to disguise operations within legitimate cyber traffic. The deep web and dark web serve as the extremist underworld—used for secure communications, recruitment screening, and financial transfers via cryptocurrencies. Virtual environments now replace physical training camps, providing tactical and ideological grooming.

 

Countermeasures and Digital Counter-Jihad. So far, the global response to digital jihad has been two-pronged—technological solutions and Counter-ideology campaigns. Technology is being used to develop automated tools to remove extremist content from various platforms. Artificial intelligence is progressively able to identify terrorist “clusters,” connecting pages, posts, and users to map networks and eliminate them. Yet, these roadblocks put up by the authorities and tech companies are not foolproof solutions in themselves. Initiatives for the counter-jihad movements also include online deradicalisation campaigns and educational outreach programs.

 

Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Challenges. Balancing security and freedom of expression remains one of the most controversial issues in countering digital jihad. Since online monitoring prevents threats, it also threatens privacy and civil liberties. In addition to that, the definition of terrorist propaganda is somewhat subjective and can be used as a means to stifle legitimate dissent. Discrepancies in jurisdictional law also threaten international cooperation, as the definition of online extremism varies from country to country. This conflict between private rights and collective security makes it more challenging to regulate the internet.

 

Future Trajectory. Digital jihad is transitioning to decentralised networks of self-governing cells that use encrypted communications rather than a hierarchical command-and-control structure. Cyberspace has taken on the characteristics of the new caliphate—unconfined, unformed, and resilient ideologically. The rapid development of artificial intelligence, deepfakes, and virtual reality will encourage the use of these technologies by digital jihad for recruitment and psychological operations. Consequently, governments need to consider the internet as an ever-changing battlefield that requires constant, flexible, and cooperative strategies among all state and non-state actors.

 

Conclusion

“Digital jihad” refers to the use of digital technologies and cyberspace by extremist groups to further their agenda. Dealing with digital jihad requires finding a delicate balance between using technology and applying legal measures, without infringing on human rights. The victory over digital jihad will be achieved through the application of more technologies and also through combating the causes of radicalisation worldwide that globalisation has brought about.

 

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References: –

  1. India Today, “Pakistan terror hypocrisy exposed again: Jaish-e-Mohammed launches online jihad course for women in Islamabad”, 22 Sep 25. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/jaish-e-mohammed-online-course-launch-for-women-recruitment-pakistan-terror-masood-azhar-2806662-2025-10-22
  1. Tom O’Connor, “Generating jihad: How ISIS could use AI to plan its next attack”, Newsweek, 19m Sep 2025. https://www.newsweek.com/isis-ai-terrorism-al-qaeda-attack-2132143
  1. Soumya Awasthi, “Jihadi use of artificial intelligence: A growing threat in the digital age”, Observer Research Foundation, 18 Aug 2025. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/jihadi-use-of-artificial-intelligence-a-growing-threat-in-the-digital-age
  1. Ben Makuch, “AI-Generated Extremism: How Terror Groups Exploit New Tech” The Guardian, 08 July 2024.
  1. Lakomy M, “In Mapping Digital Jihad: Understanding the Structure and Evolution of al-Qaeda’s Information Ecosystem on the Surface Web”, Perspectives on Terrorism, 18(2), 82–99, 2024.
  1. Siegel D, “AI jihad: Deciphering Hamas, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State’s generative AI digital arsenal”, Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024.
  1. Foreign Affairs, “The Cyber Caliphate Lives On”, Foreign Affairs, March 2024.
  1. Montasari R, “Analysing ethical, legal, technical and operational challenges of the application of machine learning in countering cyber terrorism”, (pp. 123–145), Springer, 2024.
  1. Siegel D & Chandra B, “The digital weaponry of radicalisation: AI and the recruitment nexus”, Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2024.

762: AZM-E-ISTHEKAM: PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN AT WAR

 

In October 2025, the volatile border between Pakistan and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan once again erupted into violence, marking the sharpest escalation seen since the fall of Kabul in 2021. Years of mutual suspicion, militant activity, and punitive cross-border actions have culminated in a conflict that threatens to redraw the region’s security landscape and deepen humanitarian tragedy. At the heart of the crisis lies Pakistan’s longstanding grievance over militant sanctuaries in Afghanistan, alongside the Afghan Taliban’s fury at perceived violations of sovereignty. What started with airstrikes and border raids has grown into a war of retaliation.

 

Genesis. Beyond the militant issue lies a deeper, century-old source of tension, the Durand Line, the 2,600-kilometer boundary drawn by British colonial authorities in 1893. Afghanistan has never formally recognised it as an international border, arguing that it unjustly divides ethnic Pashtun communities between the two countries. Pakistan, on the other hand, insists that the border is internationally recognised and non-negotiable. This disagreement frequently sparks clashes, especially when Pakistan attempts to fence or fortify sections of the frontier. In recent years, Islamabad has built extensive fencing and new security posts, moves that the Afghan Taliban view as unilateral and illegitimate. For local tribes who straddle the border, these disputes have disrupted trade, travel, and traditional social networks, fuelling resentment on both sides.

 

A Legacy of Mistrust. The irony of the current conflict is striking: for years, Pakistan was seen as one of the Taliban’s key supporters. Islamabad maintained close ties with the group during the U.S. war in Afghanistan, providing political and logistical backing while officially denying direct involvement. Many in Pakistan’s security establishment believed a Taliban-run Afghanistan would ensure a friendly, stable neighbour, one that would curb Indian influence and maintain strategic depth. Yet since 2021, the opposite has occurred. The Taliban’s rise to power has not translated into reliable cooperation. Instead, the Afghan government’s reluctance to act against the TTP has deepened Islamabad’s insecurity. Meanwhile, Taliban leaders have accused Pakistan of bowing to Western pressure and violating Afghan sovereignty with repeated cross-border strikes.

 

The Refugee and Humanitarian Dimension. Another flashpoint is the treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. For over four decades, Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghans who fled war and instability. However, as domestic economic challenges mount and security incidents rise, Islamabad has hardened its stance. In 2023 and again in 2025, Pakistan announced mass deportations of undocumented Afghans, citing concerns that militants were using refugee camps for cover. Kabul condemned the policy as collective punishment, arguing that most refugees are innocent civilians. The crackdown has strained relations further, with human rights groups warning of humanitarian crises as thousands of Afghans are forced to return to an unstable homeland.

 

Aggressive Pakistan Strategy. Pakistan’s “Azm-e-Isthekam” campaign, launched in mid-2025, signalled a shift: no longer would Pakistan rely solely on defensive border policing. Instead, Islamabad adopted a new deterrence framework, crossing into Afghanistan with targeted military operations aimed at chronic safe havens. This bold approach antagonised the Taliban, who see themselves as sovereign rulers rather than proxies for Pakistani interests.

 

Escalation: From Airstrikes to Border War. The immediate trigger for this round of fighting was a series of Pakistani airstrikes on October 9, 2025, targeting Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) leaders, including Noor Wali Mehsud, in Kabul and several Afghan provinces. Islamabad cited security concerns, claiming TTP was using Afghan territory as a staging ground for attacks inside Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban called these actions unprovoked aggression, denouncing civilian deaths and promising retribution. Days later, Taliban fighters shelled Pakistani outposts along the Durand Line, with both sides exchanging heavy fire, drone strikes, and artillery barrages, resulting in dozens of military and civilian casualties on both sides.​

 

The Battles. Clashes have centered on traditional flashpoints: Spin Boldak and Chaman, major crossings on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and Kurram and Khyber districts further north. Taliban fighters shelled Pakistani posts, killing soldiers and reportedly seizing weaponry. Islamabad responded with precision airstrikes, claiming to destroy Taliban military compounds and inflict significant casualties. Afghan sources, however, report large-scale civilian deaths and widespread displacement, including in Kandahar and Paktika, triggering renewed calls for restraint by international agencies.​ The scale and intensity of the fighting surpassed previous border skirmishes. Both sides deployed drones, tanks, and heavy artillery in what some analysts described as “border war” conditions, closing major trade crossings and halting cross-border movement. Satellite images confirmed destroyed military infrastructure and burning market stalls; hospital reports cited dozens of injured women and children.​

 

Ceasefire Attempts. Amid mounting casualties and economic paralysis along the border, international actors intervened. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, both regional stakeholders, urged restraint and pushed for a diplomatic ceasefire. On October 15–16, a temporary 48-hour truce was announced, brokered with back-channel Pakistani and Afghan talks. Yet, even as fighting subsided briefly, mutual distrust simmered. Both parties continued to exchange accusations over border violations and destabilisation, threatening to reignite hostilities.​ Diplomatic channels remain open, with China, Qatar, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) playing potential mediating roles.

 

Humanitarian and Economic Impacts. The militarisation of the border is causing a profound humanitarian crisis. Trade has collapsed at major crossings, disrupting food and fuel supplies throughout southern Afghanistan and Balochistan, Pakistan. Tens of thousands have been displaced; hospitals report surging casualties amidst shortages of medical supplies. Businesses suffer as markets fall under shellfire, and civilians fear raids and bombings. The economic cost, layered on political instability and poverty, further erodes any prospect for peace.​

Geopolitical Ripples. The escalation has regional consequences. India, long marginalised by the Taliban, is signalling renewed diplomatic interest in Afghanistan, such as the reopening of its Kabul embassy. The Taliban government’s recent diplomatic outreach to New Delhi, including trade talks and security meetings, has made Islamabad uneasy. China, a major investor in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is worried that instability could threaten its infrastructure projects and trade routes. Beijing has quietly urged both sides to restore calm. The evolving security equation, characterised by shrinking American influence and rising intra-regional rivalries, makes the crisis especially combustible.​

 

Future Outlook. For the Taliban, maintaining sovereignty and legitimacy means resisting external control, whether from Pakistan, the U.S., or others. For Pakistan, ensuring border security and suppressing militant threats are non-negotiable national interests. The clash between these priorities makes compromise difficult. If the violence continues, the consequences could be severe: destabilisation of border regions, humanitarian crises from refugee flows, and the potential for militant groups to exploit chaos on both sides. While the recent truce offers a temporary pause, most analysts believe it is unlikely to hold unless both sides address the root causes. Pakistan wants concrete action against the TTP and assurances that Afghan soil will not be used for attacks. Afghanistan demands an end to cross-border strikes and respect for its sovereignty.

 

Conclusion. As the fragile ceasefire holds, there is little optimism for a durable peace. The deep mistrust over terrorism, sovereignty, and historic grievances remains unresolved. Pakistan faces an emboldened TTP, increasingly sheltered by Kabul, while Afghanistan bristles at cross-border airstrikes and civilian deaths. Diplomats warn that only sustained dialogue, regional mediation, and genuine efforts to address militant sanctuaries can halt the drift toward wider war. Ultimately, the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict is not just a border dispute or a fight against militancy; it is a test of whether two neighbouring Islamic republics, each grappling with its own legitimacy and governance crises, can find a path toward coexistence in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Developments indicate that old alliances and new doctrines are insufficient in the face of deep-rooted mistrust and shifting power. The need for comprehensive security solutions and humanitarian support grows ever more urgent, as the fate of the region hangs in the balance.

 

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References:-

  1. Durani, Mohammad Usman, and Asad Khan. “Pakistan-Afghan Relations: Historic Mirror.” Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, vol. 63, no. 4, 2023, pp. 1–35.
  2. Johnson, Thomas H., and M. Christine Fair. “The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border.” Asian Affairs, vol. 40, no. 2, 2009, pp. 177–195. (A historical survey of border negotiations and ongoing disputes.)
  3. Usman, Muhammad, and Muhammad Khan. “Dynamics of Trust and Mistrust in the Afghanistan–Pakistan Relationship.” Asian Perspective, vol. 45, no. 2, 2021, pp. 295–317.
  4. Gul, Imtiaz. “Heavy Clashes Erupt Along Pakistan-Afghanistan Border.” The Guardian, 11 October 2025.
  5. “Border Clash Between Afghanistan and Pakistan Threatens a Wider Conflict.” The New York Times, 12 October 2025.
  6. Shah, Syed Akhtar Ali, et al. “Pakistan, Afghanistan Agree to Temporary Truce After Fresh Fighting, Airstrikes.” Reuters, 15 October 2025.
  7. “‘New Normal’: Is Pakistan Trying to Set New Red Lines with Afghan Taliban?” Al Jazeera, 15 October 2025.
  8. “Uncertainty Torments Afghan Refugees Facing Deportation From Pakistan.” The New York Times, 31 March 2025.
  9. “Pakistan Accelerates Deportation of Afghans: UN.” Al Jazeera, 15 April 2025.
  10. Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. 2nd ed., Yale University Press, 2010.
  11. Yousaf, Mohammad, and Mark Adkin. The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story. Leo Cooper, 1992.
  12. Khan, Shahnaz. Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity. Rowman & Littlefield, 2011.

760: THE MUNIR DOCTRINE:  PAKISTAN’S PATH TO MILITANCY

 

 

In the volatile aftermath of the May 2025 border conflict with India, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Syed Asim Munir, elevated himself to Field Marshal. Amid economic malaise, political fragmentation, and heightened Indo-Pak tensions, Munir seized the crisis to present himself as the defender of Pakistan’s Islamic identity, echoing the authoritarian legacies of Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. Munir has become the central figure in Pakistan’s governance, overshadowing the Prime Minister and the judiciary in decision-making.

 

Munir’s worldview blends military strategy with Islamic theology, reminiscent of General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation policies in the 1970s and 1980s. He overtly infuses religious ideology into military affairs. In a speech to a grand jirga in Peshawar, Munir explicitly stated that the Pakistan Army operates under the principles of “imaan, taqwa, and jihad fi sabeelillah”, the Arabic phrase translates to “Faith, Piety, and Struggle in the path of God”.  Although these are core concepts in Islam, the phrase has been adopted as the official motto of the Pakistani Army. These statements are more in line with militant organisations than modern militaries. Munir’s rhetoric has emboldened radical groups and blurred the line between conventional military operations and religious militancy.

 

This “Munir Doctrine,” a hardline military and ideological framework, has redefined Pakistan’s strategic posture.  The doctrine signifies a regressive shift away from the geo-economic pragmatism of Munir’s predecessor, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, toward a fusion of religious fervour, proxy warfare, and unyielding military dominance. This regressive and incendiary worldview intensifies longstanding themes in the Pakistan Army’s ethos, positioning it as the guardian of both territorial borders and ideological frontiers.

 

Core Tenets of Munir Doctrine

 

Emphasis on Religious Ideology. At its heart, the doctrine invokes a narrow interpretation of the Two-Nation Theory, portraying India as an existential threat to Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Munir elevates religious scholars and clerics to influential roles, fusing military command with faith-based justification, a “militarisation of faith” that narrows pluralism. Speeches brim with symbolism, recasting soldiers as “martyrs of the faith” in state media and school curricula infused with jihadist vignettes. This exclusivist stance, critics argue, echoes Zia’s Islamisation but with 21st-century tools like fatwas endorsing preemption.

 

Shift from Geo-Economics to Jihadism. Reversing Bajwa’s focus on trade corridors, pragmatic diplomacy, and Gulf investments, Munir decries “economic surrender” as a “Zionist-Indian ploy.” A leaked June 2025 memo to corps commanders revives proxy warfare. At a Lahore rally, he quipped, “Jihad feeds the soul; dollars feed the enemy.” He has been redirecting external aid to madrasa expansions, border fortifications, and drone upgrades.

 

Military Dominance. Exploiting external threats, the doctrine justifies deeper military intervention in governance. Some of the enhancements to the military power include the reinstatement of military trials for civilians (the Pakistan Army Act permits the prosecution of civilians in military courts) and the expansion of preventive detention powers (military and civil armed forces can detain terror suspects for up to 3 months without charge).

 

Political Consolidation. Recent developments have increased the military’s influence over governance in Pakistan. This has been achieved through political manoeuvring and the erosion of democratic institutions. Military leaders have historically exerted control over key policies (including foreign policy) by manipulating civilian governments with the notion of “ideological threats” to justify their interventions in political and judicial affairs.

Aggressive Posture toward India. Asim Munir has adopted an aggressive posture toward India through provocative rhetoric and support to terrorist organisations. His fiery, inciting speeches are a testament to explicit brinkmanship against India.

 

Harsh Measures against Opposition. Munir’s repression mirrors Zia’s tactics. Opposition leaders like Imran Khan face sedition from Adiala jail. Women’s groups report a surge in honour killings, excused as “faith preservation.” Media is muzzled with shuttered outlets for “defeatist” coverage, weaponising “ideological purity” to delegitimise critics as “enemies of Islam” or Indian agents.

 

Analytical Perspective

 

Comparisons with Past Doctrines. The Munir Doctrine evokes General Zia-ul-Haq’s 1980s Islamisation, which used religion to legitimise authoritarianism and arm the Afghan mujahideen. Like Zia, Munir blends barracks and belief, but his explicit nuclear threats and economic abandonment heightens the peril. Unlike Ayub Khan or Pervez Musharraf, who balanced ideology with modernisation, Munir prioritises perpetual conflict to entrench military authority, risking the collapse of a fragile state under the weight of its own dogma.

 

Implications for Pakistan. The Munir Doctrine, with its emphasis on ideological militancy over pragmatic reform, is steering Pakistan into treacherous waters, exacerbating its already dire economic, social, and political crises. By prioritising religious fervour and military dominance, Field Marshal Asim Munir risks threatening its stability. IMF negotiations, critical for averting default, have stalled due to what analysts call “militarised budgeting”. Foreign reserves cannot sustain imports, while remittances are plummeting.

 

Radicalisation. The situation in Pakistan is compounded by social polarisation. The doctrine’s appeal prioritising Islamic identity delivers short-term unity by rallying the pious middle class and rural heartlands around a narrative of “faith under siege.” However, it masks a dangerous long-term trend, the radicalisation of public discourse and the marginalisation of moderate voices. By weaponising “ideological purity,” the military alienates secular intellectuals, urban professionals, and minority communities, pushing them to the fringes.

 

Regional Consequences. Regionally, the Munir Doctrine’s revival of proxy warfare inflames tensions in Kashmir and Afghanistan, destabilising South Asia. Renewed support for militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, evidenced by a spike in arms flows, would escalate cross-border violence with India. In Afghanistan, Pakistan’s interference strains ties with the Taliban, once proxies but now rivals in jihadist branding, risking spillover into China’s Xinjiang region, where Uighur militancy could threaten Beijing’s interests. This jeopardises fears of a broader regional conflagration.

 

Conclusion

The Munir Doctrine marks a profoundly regressive turn, elevating jihadist statecraft, authoritarian control, and aggression toward India. While consolidating short-term power, it risks economic despair, isolation, and regional catastrophe. The Munir Doctrine, whether it forges a fortress or a funeral for Pakistan, remains South Asia’s most perilous risk.

 

Bottom Line

Stay Alert, Keep a lookout, Be ready and Keep the powder dry.

 

 

 

 

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Disclaimer:

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References:-

 Pande, Aparna. “Munir’s Dangerous Doctrine.” Observer Research Foundation, May 16, 2025.

 

  1. Shah, Aqil. “Pakistan’s Military and Foreign Policy under Gen. Asim Munir.” Middle East Institute, 2023.

 

  1. Bisaria, Ajay. “Asim Munir, Pakistan’s ‘Hafiz-e-Quran’ Army Chief Who Aimed for the Jugular Days Before Pahalgam.” The Print, May 20, 2025.

 

  1. Haqqani, Husain. “Munir’s Mad, Bad Doctrine.” The Times of India, May 8, 2025.

 

  1. Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. “The Asim Munir Doctrine: Redefining Civil-Military Dynamics in Pakistan.” Foreign Affairs Forum, June 1, 2025.

 

  1. Jalal, Ayesha. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

 

  1. Shaikh, Farzana. Making Sense of Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

 

  1. Tankel, Stephen. “The Supporting Structures for Pakistan’s Proxy War in Jammu & Kashmir.” Strategic Analysis 25, no. 6 (2001): 769–788.

 

  1. Ganguly, Sumit. “Proxy War in Jammu & Kashmir: Jehad or State-Sponsored Terrorism?” Strategic Analysis 23, no. 10 (2000): 1693–1713.

 

  1. Paul, T. V. “Why Pakistan’s Proxy War Will Now Intensify.” The Tribune, May 8, 2020 (updated 2025 context).

 

  1. Husain, Ishrat. “Rescuing Pakistan’s Economy.” Atlantic Council, April 8, 2025.
  2. Cloughley, Brian. A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

 

  1. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

 

  1. Cohen, Stephen P. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

 

 

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