loyal wing man – Air Marshal's Perspective

October 6, 2026October 6, 2026

861: INPUTS TO MEDIA QUESTIONNAIRE ON IAF

The IAF will celebrate its 94th anniversary on 08 Oct 2026.

Shared my views on some of the aspects the media highlighted.

You have discussed India’s air power and the challenges beyond the border on both sides, as well as China’s extensive modernisation. What challenges has the IAF faced in your time in pushing for modernisation? Has it been enough? What would you have liked to see done in your time?

Perspective: China is rapidly modernising its defence forces. It is in competition with the USA and pulling way ahead of us. In the process, they are also pulling along their ally Pakistan, narrowing the gap with India. Of late, both have been belligerent.

India’s Past Approach to Military Modernisation. Until about a decade back, India’s approach was incremental. It was phased and reactive, with war-triggered acquisitions and reforms. It aimed to replace the legacy systems rather than prepare for the future.

Fresh Impetus. In the last decade or so, the approach has shifted to a more proactive stance, driving defence modernisation, self-reliance, and the development of the defence production ecosystem.

Past Challenges:

- Budgetary Constraints. In the past, India did not spend enough on enhancing the capabilities of its defence forces.
- Prolonged Procurement Cycles. Procurement processes were tedious and time-consuming, involving approvals, evaluations, trials, negotiations, clearances, and scrutiny.
- Self-Reliance. The approach towards self-reliance was a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, the leapfrog method didn’t work due to several reasons. A classic example is the Tejas story.
- Defence Production Ecosystem. The components of the defence production ecosystem worked in individual silos. Further, DPSUs faced no competition because the protectionist approach prevented private-sector participation.

Adequacy of Modernisation. Over the years, the IAF has grown in capability (high-altitude ops, Day, night, and all-weather ops, Precision, standoff, reach, strategic airlift, Combat support ops, etc.). However, its capacity to endure (e.g., the number of fighter squadrons and combat support aircraft) has not kept pace with the perceived threats.

Since your tenure as VCAS, there have been considerable changes in how AI, and specifically LLMs, are used in warfare, with the most recent example being Iran-US and Anthropic. What challenges might the IAF face in adopting such autonomous systems? Is it outdated training, or is it domestic capacity and data security?

AI has made a significant impact on the aviation sector, including defence aviation. All three factors mentioned are important.

- Data Security. AI-enabled fusion of sensors, platforms, and weapons has become central to airpower. The effectiveness of the fusion depends upon software, algorithms, and data. They need comprehensive protection.
- Training and Doctrine. Air crew, ground crew, and commanders need training to operate in an AI-enabled environment. Synthetic training environments and advanced simulation have become essential. Training exercises need to include operations in degraded environments. Further, Air Forces need to incorporate institutional mechanisms for experimentation, contingency handling, and converting lessons into doctrine.
- Indigenous Capability. This is the most important aspect to retain strategic autonomy. It also offers scalability when needed.

Broader Challenges. Beyond the challenges above, broader challenges remain.

- Change of Mindset. The mindset needs to shift from platform-centric (bean-counting) to developing a comprehensive combat ecosystem.
- Technology Absorption Cycle. Technological development outpaces procurement cycles. A two-speed mechanism is required. Long-term procurement cycles for platforms, systems, and weapons, and a faster (Experimental and adaptive) cycle for technology absorption.
- MUM-T Challenge. Manned-unmanned teaming is the future of combat. The loyal wingman concept is already being developed. Beyond the advantages, it also brings associated challenges. The vulnerabilities related to communications, electronic warfare, cyber aspects, and decision support systems need to be addressed.
- Interconnected Domains. Operations in space, cyber, electronic, and information domains are interconnected. These operations require organisational adaptation. China combined all four domains into a single service. However, after a decade-plus, it realised the drawbacks and reverted to the US model of independent commands for each domain. India has agencies for space, cyber and special forces ops.
- Extent of Autonomy. The world is still grappling with this question. Technology allows humans to be removed from the kill chain. The bigger question is about responsibility, legality, and ethics.

It has been 94 years since the formation of the IAF, and nearly 8 decades since Indian sovereign skies have been protected. You have talked about different “eras” in the force’s life (pilot, platform, weapon); what comes next? AI and LLMs?

Air warfare has continuously changed in how air operations are conducted. It has changed from a pilot-centric era to a platform-centric one, and now to a weapon-centric one.

In my opinion, the next will be the era of three Cs. That is the era of Coherent, Collaborative Combat. Air combat will take place in an environment where all components (sensors, platforms, systems, and weapons) of airpower (ground-, air-, and space-based; manned and unmanned) work as a coherent combat ecosystem.

The acronym RADIANT summarises the characteristics of such a system.

- Resilience. Can sustain ops even under degraded conditions.
- Autonomous. With human oversight, accruing the advantage of mass and persistence.
- Distributed. Ability to generate airpower from multiple, maybe mobile locations.
- Indigenous. Allowing strategic freedom with the advantage of scalability.
- Adaptive. Ability to adapt to changes rapidly.
- Networked. Coherent and resilient architecture.
- Technology Absorptive. Ability to develop and integrate new technology rapidly.

From Operation Safed Sagar (part of Op Vijay) to Operation Sindoor, the IAF has carried out multiple direct strikes to protect its sovereignty. How have you seen the IAF’s operational capacity and strategy change to address direct and ubiquitous threats? Or has it been a mentality of “if not broken, don’t fix it”?

Proactive Approach. IAF’s approach to modernisation and capability enhancement has been proactive and continuous. Its air strategy has evolved over time.

Historical Evolution. The IAF was formed during the British era. It was tactical, supporting ground forces. It remained reactionary post-partition. Post-partition, it grew, with its role expanded to include border and airspace protection. 1971 war saw air campaigns being conducted in parallel. The IAF modernised in the last two decades of the previous century, inducting advanced platforms, systems, and weapons. During the Kargil War, the IAF demonstrated the capability to apply air power innovatively at high altitudes. Over the last two-plus decades, the IAF has transformed into a capable strategic air force.

Doctrinal Adaptation. The IAF has also been evolving doctrinally. It has published three Doctrines. The first, published in 1995, was a basic doctrine on airpower, the importance of combat support ops, and modernisation. The second doctrine, published in 2012, linked airpower to the national objectives. It included airpower’s role in combating terrorism, as well as space ops, HADR, and the IAF’s role in nation-building. The last one was published in 2022, signalling a shift from airpower to aerospace power, with an emphasis on Multidomain ops and technology absorption.

With gender parity in forces a major focus these days, and AVM Shakti Sharma becoming ACAS Education, do you think women fighter pilots will also see themselves elevated to senior ranks soon? Will the IAF see its first woman Chief of Air Staff before completing 100 years of operations?

The induction of women in the IAF has been gradual. From the medical branch to supporting services, then to combat and command roles. 1992, women officers were inducted into the admin branch for the first time. Thereafter, they were inducted into the flying branch (helicopters and transport aircraft) and eventually began flying fighters from 2015 onwards. From initial induction into the short service commission, they were granted a permanent commission. They are now even being utilised for combat and command roles. Now, women are joining the training institutions (NDA and Sainik schools) and being inducted into the non-officer ranks.

The IAF has led the integration of Women in the service. It has the highest percentage of women officers. The IAF has a good track record of balancing their individual aspirations with organisational goals. The IAF’s policies are gender-neutral, providing equal opportunities with no differentiation in performance or standards.

They have already started reaching the senior officer ranks. Someday, one of them may become Chief of the Air Staff. However, becoming CAS by the IAF’s 100th anniversary may not be possible, as they would not reach that seniority within the next six years.

Views are personal.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

July 20, 2026

830: AI-ENABLED COLLABORATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT RESHAPING THE AIR POWER

On July 10 this year, over restricted airspace at Edwards Air Force Base in California, an uncrewed aircraft crossed an important threshold in military aviation. An Anduril Industries YFQ-44A fired a live AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile at a simulated target after receiving only the command to strike from a human operator. The aircraft itself handled the engagement geometry, target tracking and weapon release, becoming the first American autonomous combat wingman to complete a live air-to-air weapons engagement. The test, supported by the Air Dominance Combined Test Force from Edwards’ 412th Test Wing, marked far more than a successful missile launch.

The event’s demonstration was significant. The autonomy software managed the entire sensor-to-shooter chain. The aircraft managed the mechanics of the engagement while the human retained the firing authority. It was a clear demonstration of how future air combat is likely to be fought. Allowing pilots to command formations of autonomous teammates rather than fly every engagement themselves.

Collaborative Combat Aircraft

An AI-enabled collaborative combat aircraft, also known as an ‘Uncrewed collaborative combat aircraft’ (UCCA) or ‘loyal wingman’, is an autonomous, armed aerial platform designed to operate alongside fighter jets. It can fly in formation, engage threats, and respond to changing battlefield conditions without requiring a ground operator to manage its every move. The main idea behind the CCA is to increase ‘combat mass’ during operations and extend the reach of crewed aircraft.

This is where the concept of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) comes in. In essence, crewed combat aircraft act as the command centre, while the CCA is the operator’s ‘extended arm’. The pilot provides high-level mission objectives, which the CCA then executes at the desired level of autonomy. They can take on specialised roles: for instance, one CCA might engage an enemy target while others jam enemy radar or scan the battlefield and relay real-time data back to the pilot.

The CCAs can even coordinate among themselves, dynamically dividing responsibilities for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, decoy operations, and strike operations. Authority over the use of lethal force remains with the human operator, who is assisted by AI-based decision-support software.

The concept also changes how missions are executed. AI fuses all the sensor inputs (radar returns, infrared imagery, electronic support measures and off-board sensor feeds) into a single tactical picture. Machine-learning algorithms continuously improve target recognition.

All of this is made possible by a sophisticated mission system. These systems allow humans and machines to work together seamlessly as a team. The CCA takes on the cognitive burden of processing data and carrying out routine manoeuvres, allowing the human pilot to focus on high-level tactical decisions.

CCA Necessity

In modern warfare, the side that can process information and act fastest has the advantage. In addition, it’s not just about the first 24 hours of a conflict; it’s also about endurance. The attraction of Collaborative Combat Aircraft is as much economic as technological.

Modern fifth-generation fighters are extraordinarily capable but also extraordinarily expensive to procure, sustain and replace. Every aircraft lost represents not only a financial cost but also years of pilot training. CCAs are designed to generate what air forces increasingly describe as affordable combat mass: multiplying combat power by pairing each crewed fighter with several autonomous aircraft that can undertake high-risk tasks without putting pilots in harm’s way.

This development changes the way air superiority is achieved, especially against a peer competitor. Commanders can distribute tasks, sensors, payloads, and weapons across a larger network of autonomous platforms.

They do not have to rely solely on a relatively small number of exquisite aircraft.

Global Programs

The United States Move from Experiment to Capability Development. The United States has progressed further than any other country in translating this concept into operational capability. The Air Force’s Increment 1 programme selected two aircraft for production: Anduril’s YFQ-44A and General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Dark Merlin. Together, they will form the service’s first operational fleet of Collaborative Combat Aircraft. The pace of their development has been remarkable. Within less than a year, the YFQ-44A progressed from its maiden flight (in October 2025) to a successful live air-to-air missile engagement. The industrial ecosystem is also expanding rapidly. Northrop Grumman, Kratos and General Atomics’ modular Gambit family are all developing related concepts. At the same time, the Air Force has indicated that future increments could follow a collaborative approach with allied participation. The objective would no longer be to build a better aircraft but to field interoperable autonomous combat fleets capable of operating alongside allied air forces.

British Program. Britain’s Royal Air Force has launched the £300 million Storm Fighter programme to develop autonomous aircraft capable of operating alongside the Typhoon, F-35, and, eventually, the Tempest sixth-generation fighter.

Australian Program. Australia’s Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat, developed under the Airpower Teaming System, predates the American CCA designation and has accumulated significantly more flight experience than either of the US Increment 1 designs.

Although these programmes differ in design philosophy and industrial approach, they reflect a striking convergence. Independent air forces have reached the same operational conclusion: future air superiority will depend less on ever more expensive crewed fighters operating alone and more on tightly integrated formations of humans and autonomous systems.

Chinese Program. China has pursued a more opaque but equally ambitious path towards AI-enabled collaborative combat aircraft. Rather than treating loyal wingmen as standalone projects, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) appears to be developing them as integral components of a networked combat ecosystem centred on the J-20 stealth fighter and future sixth-generation aircraft. State-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) has unveiled several candidate platforms, including the FH-97A, widely regarded as China’s analogue to the US Collaborative Combat Aircraft, as well as concepts such as the Dark Sword and other high-speed unmanned combat air vehicles. Chinese military publications suggest these systems are intended to undertake high-risk missions including forward reconnaissance, electronic attack, suppression of enemy air defences, decoy operations and air-to-air combat, while remaining under human command for the employment of lethal force.

The Indian Approach

On the indigenous side, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) envisions a Tejas or future AMCA acting as a “mothership”, controlling multiple Warrior and Hunter drones capable of conducting reconnaissance, suppressing enemy air defences, defending the crewed fighter and striking high-value targets. HAL’s Unmanned Kiran programme offers a complementary, lower-cost route by converting existing Kiran Mk-II trainers into optionally manned aircraft capable of both piloted and autonomous operation.

The longer-term vision extends into the AMCA programme itself. Rather than retrofitting autonomy onto an existing platform, the AMCA is expected to incorporate manned-unmanned teaming from the outset, potentially supported by a future Combat Cloud architecture that links fighters, satellites, AWACS, and autonomous aircraft into a single combat network.

The Bottom Line

Collaborative Combat Aircraft represent the most significant conceptual shift in the application of airpower since the advent of stealth. CCAs would not replace the pilots but redefine their role. Future aviators will increasingly command formations of autonomous formations.

The air force that masters networked integration will enjoy advantages in decision speed, survivability, and operational endurance. The future of air power will belong not to the aircraft with the best individual performance, but to the force that can most effectively combine humans, machines and networks into a single fighting system.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

References: –

U.S. Air Force News, “Air Dominance Combined Test Force conducts first autonomous CCA live missile firing at Edwards AFB”, 2025. https://www.af.mil/, https://www.edwards.af.mil/

Anduril Industries. “YFQ-44A Autonomous Collaborative Combat Aircraft”, 2025. https://www.anduril.com/

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. YFQ-42A Collaborative Combat Aircraft. (2025). https://www.ga-asi.com/

Future Combat Air System (FCAS), Tempest Programme, https://www.raf.mod.uk/

Boeing Defence Australia. MQ-28 Ghost Bat (Airpower Teaming System). https://www.boeing.com/defense/

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Combat Air Teaming System (CATS) https://hal-india.co.in/

Scharre, P. Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. W. W. Norton. (2018).

RAND Corporation. Studies on Autonomous Air Combat, Human-Machine Teaming, https://www.rand.org/

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Airpower and AI Future Combat Aircraft, https://www.csis.org/

Endsley, M. R. (2017). From Here to Autonomy: Lessons Learned From Human–Automation Research. Human Factors.

June 26, 2026

823: Wings of Dominance: The Future of Air Warfare

Q1. What is the new balance of air power in the world today? Are fighter jets still the focus of warfare, or are drones beginning to take their place?

Fighter jets remain the backbone of air power, and that is not about to change. What has changed fundamentally is the ecosystem around them. A modern fighter operates in a networked environment comprising long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, and space-based ISR.

Drones are taking over the missions that are too risky, too repetitive, or too economically unjustifiable to warrant a manned sortie. They are not replacing the manned aircraft.

The prevailing trend favours a combination of manned and unmanned systems. Manned aircraft are focusing on contested, high-end missions that require judgment, adaptability, and versatile payloads. Concurrently, unmanned systems are being employed in persistent, attritable, and mass-effect roles.

The adaptation to this hybrid model is no longer merely a tactical requirement; it has become a strategic necessity.

Q2. Russia’s Su-57 and the US F-35 embody different philosophies — one emphasises air combat, the other network-centric warfare. Whose future will it be?

The Su-57 seems to reflect the traditional Russian emphasis on kinematic performance and super-manoeuvrability.

The F-35 is claimed to be built around sensor fusion and battlespace awareness. It is advertised as capable of detecting, classifying, and engaging the threat at beyond-visual-range distances through a data architecture spanning an entire networked force.

Future aerial combat is progressing towards a network-centric model. Contemporary air engagements are increasingly determined by the priority of achieving information and decision dominance, rather than by performance alone.

Compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline is now as critical as speed or manoeuvrability. This is fundamentally a problem of decision architecture, not merely of technology.

The sixth-generation programmes are pushing emerging platforms toward multi-domain integration. Fusion of air, space, cyber, and electronic warfare into a single operational architecture will make the network-centric model more definitive.

Q3. China already has the J-20. Has India delayed the AMCA too long, or is it still possible to turn the situation around?

It is a fact that India’s timeline has slipped. The J-20 has been operational for nearly a decade. China is already iterating toward a sixth-generation capability, as evidenced by the prototypes that emerged publicly in late 2024.

AMCA is still working through prototype development. The gap is significant and widening. Reversal of the trend is a realistic necessity.

India can recover lost ground in fighter development if the programme is properly resourced, executed and politically backed.

A significant structural shift is also underway with the Ministry of Defence opening AMCA prototype development to private consortia rather than relying exclusively on the public-sector model.

The window to close the capability gap exists. It will not remain open indefinitely, and the margin for complacency on programme management is close to zero.

Q4. In the wars to come, will Artificial Intelligence and Loyal Wingman drones be more important than pilots?

The pilot does not become less important. His job changes, and in some respects becomes more demanding, not less.

Manned-unmanned combat air teams would have one crewed aircraft effectively commanding a tactical formation of attritable unmanned assets, absorbing risk that would otherwise fall on the manned platform, carrying missiles, jammers, decoys, or forward reconnaissance payloads.

What AI is changing is the speed and volume of decision-making below the human threshold.

AI-enabled satellites and sensors, capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets, can push that picture directly to the shooter over tactical data links, rather than routing it back through a ground station first. That is what compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. However, human intervention cannot be removed from the kill chain.

As of now, the human crew retains authority over decisions that carry lethal and political consequences, while AI absorbs the burden of processing, prioritising, and routing information faster than any human can.

So, AI and unmanned teaming will unquestionably become more important than they are today. But the human crew would remain relevant and in control.

The pilot of 2040 will be managing a far more complex battle picture, commanding a digital wolfpack rather than flying a single aircraft.

Q5. If India has the opportunity to purchase the F-35 or the Su-57, should we go ahead and purchase them, or stick to developing our own aircraft?

These are not competing choices, and treating them as such leads to a false dilemma.

The IAF’s squadron strength shortfall is real, immediate, and strategically significant. The Rafale has helped close that numerical gap, but has not closed it.

Further, there is a case for qualitative enhancement by the induction of fifth-generation aircraft.

The F-35 carries substantial geopolitical weight, end-use restrictions, and software dependency. Cost, delivery timelines, extended supply chains, Transfer of technology and trust deficit are other factors to be taken into account.

Russia has been a trusted partner, willing to share its technology to a certain extent and accepting Make in India. The Su-57 also raises several concerns besides the factors listed above. India had earlier walked out of the co-development program mainly due to concerns related to cost and technology sharing.

Neither platform offers a clean, dependency-free solution. The importance of self-reliance in defence production is a common lesson emerging from recent wars. The Indigenous program (AMCA) is some time away and urgently needs a technology infusion.

The logical answer is to plug the gap pragmatically by expanding the Rafale order and carefully reassessing the induction of fifth-generation aircraft, while protecting AMCA’s funding and schedule as a non-negotiable national priority.

The near-term interim acquisition and the long-term indigenous programme must be advanced concurrently. The contract should be negotiated in a manner that boosts the indigenous programme rather than undermining it.

Q6. Is engine technology still India’s biggest weakness today?

The answer is YES. The Tejas Mark 1A flies on the American GE F404. AMCA’s initial squadrons will likely depend on an imported engine in the ninety-kilonewton class. The latest news is that negotiations for the GE 414 engine for AMCA have hit rough weather due to a 300 per cent cost increase.

India still does not have a proven indigenous engine anywhere near the ninety to one hundred ten kilonewton range required for a credible fifth or sixth-generation fighter. The Kaveri programme, running since the mid-1980s, is the most visible illustration of how difficult this problem is. High-performance turbofan technology demands a combination of high-temperature metallurgy, single-crystal turbine blade manufacturing, precision tolerances, and decades of iterative test data that very few nations have accumulated.

Urgent need of the hour is a deal that includes a degree of co-production and technology transfer for engine manufacturing in India. Co-production extends the supply chain into India, but it does not give India the ability to independently design, test, and certify a clean-sheet high-thrust engine. Engine independence remains the single weakest link in the self-reliance story.

Q7. Will the export of fighter jets become an increasingly important geopolitical tool?

Fighter exports are already an important geopolitical tool, and their leverage is intensifying rather than diminishing.

Fighter exports create decades of dependency for the buyer. The seller retains influence over the buyer’s operational readiness (by supplying spares, software updates, weapons integration, training pipelines, and maintenance protocols). This dependency lasts for the life of the platform (often 30 to 40 years after the sale).

India’s own indigenous push is a deliberate effort to reduce exposure to precisely this kind of dependency. India’s active promotion of the Tejas and its indigenous missile systems in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Gulf reflects a clear understanding that defence exports are as much an instrument of foreign policy as of industrial economics. Future fighter sales will be negotiated as much on reliability of supply and strategic alignment as on cost or raw capability.

Q8. What are India’s greatest achievements and biggest challenges in defence self-reliance?

Tejas moving from a deeply troubled programme to a credible inducted fighter is, to a certain extent, an achievement. The development of indigenous rotary-wing platforms (Dhruv, Rudra, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand) demonstrates that the industrial capacity extends beyond fast jets. The Astra beyond-visual-range missile and the continued maturation of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile represent genuine capability in the weapons domain. The missile and space programs are doing comparatively well.

Perhaps most significantly, India’s defence production turnover has grown substantially over the past decade. The country has moved from being almost exclusively an arms importer to a growing exporter, which is a structural shift that would have seemed improbable fifteen years ago.

The challenges are equally tangible. Squadron strength remains well below the sanctioned forty-two. Force multipliers, tankers, airborne early warning and control platforms are inadequate in numbers for a force that needs to project across two frontiers simultaneously. Engine technology remains unresolved.

The achievements prove India can build technically demanding systems. What remains unproven is whether it can build them at the pace and scale that the threat environment now demands.

Q9. How will the Indian Air Force look in 2040, compared to today?

By 2040, assuming the squadron strength target is met or even meaningfully mitigated, the IAF should be a genuinely different force, operating on a different conceptual basis.

AMCA should be in serial production, forming the high-end backbone alongside an upgraded Rafale fleet and a substantially modernised Su-30MKI. The Tejas Mark 2 and the twin-engine deck-based fighter should round out the order of battle, bringing the indigenous content of the combat fleet to a level inconceivable at the beginning of this decade.

Loyal Wingman and unmanned systems would be standard formation elements rather than experimental adjuncts.

AI-assisted Space-based ISR would be integrated into the network.

The UCAV and other Unmanned platforms will significantly enhance airpower capabilities.

If the present trajectory and pace are sustained, by 2040 the IAF should be more networked, more integrated with the space and cyber domains, and far less dependent on foreign supply chains than anything currently in service.

Q10. If you had to identify one defining trend in air warfare over the next twenty years, what would it be?

The shift from platform-centric to weapon-centric airpower operating in a networked environment. The idea that the decisive factor in air combat is increasingly not which aircraft you fly, but how fast you can sense, decide, and act across a distributed force. Ada result:

The sensor-to-shooter timeline will get shortened further.

Space-based satellites with onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing the targets will push that picture directly to the shooter.

Manned and unmanned systems will operate as a single collaborative entity rather than parallel fleets.

Mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum, with digital and cognitive dimensions layered on top, would become essential.

Stealth, hypersonics, manoeuvrability, drone swarms, and directed energy technologies/capabilities would follow this shift.

The air forces that adapt to it early will hold the operational advantage in 2040 and beyond. The ones that keep procuring better individual platforms while neglecting the architecture around them (i.e. modern equipment running on an outdated decision framework) will find themselves technologically current but operationally lagging.

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer: