Indian Air Force – Page 2 – Air Marshal's Perspective

October 7, 2026October 6, 2026

862: IAF @94: SHAPING IT FOR FUTURE CHALLENGES

Article published in the Oct 2026 edition of “Life of Soldier” Journal.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has spent much of the past several decades dealing with familiar questions: the size and composition of its combat fleet, modernisation of ageing platforms, induction of new aircraft, availability of weapons, and the persistent challenge of maintaining an adequate force structure in the face of competing demands. These remain important questions. But they no longer define the future of Indian air power.

The more consequential question is how the IAF will transform itself for a battlespace in which technology changes faster than traditional military acquisition cycles, the distinction between air and other domains is increasingly blurred, and relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can impose disproportionate costs on sophisticated platforms.

The answer cannot be reduced to the number or generation of combat aircraft in the inventory. The wars of the future will be fought in an increasingly transparent, contested and networked battlespace in which air power will have to contend simultaneously with long-range precision weapons, autonomous systems, massed drones, electronic and cyber warfare, space-based surveillance, increasingly sophisticated air defences and attacks on the very infrastructure that sustains combat operations.

The implication is consequential. The IAF’s future challenge is not simply to modernise its existing force structure, but to transform how it generates combat power.

Changing Character of Air Warfare

Two characteristics are defining future warfare. First, the compression of the sensor-to-shooter cycle; second, the proliferation of capabilities that can challenge the advantages of advanced air forces.

The emergence of inexpensive unmanned systems is particularly significant. The operational use of drones and loitering munitions in recent conflicts has demonstrated that relatively low-cost systems can perform surveillance, targeting, electronic warfare and strike missions while imposing disproportionate demands on conventional air defence.

At the other end of the spectrum are increasingly sophisticated integrated air-defence systems, long-range missiles, passive sensors and electronic warfare capabilities designed to deny or degrade the employment of high-value aircraft.

Air forces will have to find targets in an environment in which adversaries actively conceal, deceive and disrupt. They will have to generate combat sorties while their bases and communications infrastructure are under attack. They will have to operate when the electromagnetic spectrum is contested and when access to individual sensors or networks cannot be assumed. The concept of Air superiority will increasingly be less about controlling the air through fighter performance alone and more about controlling the adversary’s ability to sense, decide, and engage while preserving one’s own ability to do the same.

From Platforms to Combat Ecosystems

Platforms have heavily influenced traditional measures of air power: how many fighters, what type of aircraft, how many missiles, how much airlift, or how many airborne early-warning aircraft. The traditional platform remains an important unit of military capability because aircraft determine range, payload, persistence and survivability. Yet the platform is increasingly becoming one component of a larger combat system.

Future air warfare is unlikely to be determined by the performance of an individual fighter aircraft alone. It will depend on the ability to connect sensors, weapons, platforms, data, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, space-based capabilities and command-and-control systems into a coherent combat architecture. This suggests a fundamental change in how the IAF should conceptualise force development. The IAF will therefore need to move progressively from a platform-centric conception of air power towards an adaptive and networked conception of aerospace power.

This isn’t a completely new approach since the IAF has already shown an interest in unmanned systems, swarm technologies, artificial intelligence, and manned-unmanned teaming. The challenge now is to turn these initiatives into a broader force transformation.

Technology Absorption Cycles

In the future, the ability to absorb technology will matter more than the ability to acquire it. A country can purchase a sophisticated aircraft and operate it effectively. But genuine technological advantage comes from the ability to understand, integrate, modify, upgrade and eventually replace the technologies on which that capability depends.

Traditional acquisition cycles are designed around major weapons platforms whose development and service lives span decades. Artificial intelligence algorithms, sensors, communications architectures and autonomous systems evolve much faster. The IAF therefore needs an institutional mechanism that can operate at two speeds. Long-cycle programmes will remain necessary for fighters, transport aircraft, tankers, and other major systems. Alongside them, however, there must be a much faster pathway to experiment with and adopt emerging technologies.

The objective should be continuous technological insertion. A promising technology should be able to move from laboratory demonstration to operational experimentation and, if successful, limited induction without becoming trapped in a decade-long acquisition process. This requires greater tolerance for experimentation and, crucially, for failure. The IAF therefore needs to institutionalise experimentation as a core military function.

Manned-Unmanned Teaming

Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) is therefore more than another technology programme. It could change the architecture of air combat. The crewed aircraft could become a command-and-control node for a larger group of autonomous systems. The pilot would no longer simply fly an aircraft and employ its weapons, but manage a distributed combat formation.

This creates new possibilities but also new vulnerabilities. The communications links required to control or coordinate autonomous systems will themselves be contested. Electronic warfare could disrupt them. Cyber operations could attempt to compromise them. An adversary could seek to deceive the autonomous system’s sensors.

Consequently, MUM-T must be developed alongside resilient communications, electronic warfare, cyber protection and autonomous decision-making. The objective should not be to create autonomous systems that require continuous human intervention. Nor should it be to remove humans from the decision-making loop indiscriminately. This balance will become a doctrinal question, not merely a technological one.

The Drone Question

High-end fighters will remain necessary for air superiority and other missions requiring range, speed, sensors, weapons, and survivability. But some missions may no longer be most efficiently carried out by deploying an expensive crewed aircraft. Surveillance, decoy operations, electronic attack, communications relay, battle-damage assessment and selected strike missions could increasingly involve unmanned or autonomous systems.

The IAF has recognised this emerging requirement. Its technology initiatives have included unmanned systems, swarm technologies, counter-UAS capabilities and manned-unmanned teaming. The Mehar Baba competitions have sought to connect operational requirements with Indian industry and the innovation ecosystem. At the same time, Dronathon-2026 has focused on unmanned and counter-unmanned technologies, autonomous operations, swarms and electronic warfare.

The proliferation of unmanned systems also raises a question considerably larger than how many drones the IAF should acquire. It raises the question of the balance between future exquisite, survivable, and expensive drones and affordable, numerous, and potentially attritable ones.

All-Prevailing Information Superiority

The next major contest will also be over information. The force that can sense first, understand first, decide first and engage first will enjoy a significant operational advantage. This makes sensor fusion central to future air warfare. The IAF already operates a diverse network of airborne and ground-based sensors. The challenge is to fuse information from these systems, and increasingly from unmanned and space-based assets, into a coherent operational picture.

Artificial intelligence could help process the resulting volume of information. But AI should be approached as an enabler rather than a substitute for military judgement. Algorithms can identify patterns, prioritise information and accelerate decision-making, but they remain dependent on data quality, communications, computing infrastructure and the ability to withstand adversarial manipulation. The IAF should therefore pursue AI-assisted command rather than AI-dependent command.

Interconnected Domains

Future conflicts will require simultaneous actions across air, land, maritime, space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. The IAF must therefore be capable of operating both independently as well as an integral part of a broader multi-domain warfighting system.

The IAF’s future will also be inseparable from developments in space and cyberspace. Modern air operations already depend on space-based communications, navigation, surveillance and meteorological information. The degradation of these capabilities could significantly affect combat effectiveness. Air operations need to be integrated with the cyber and space domains. The transition from air power to multi-domain aerospace power is therefore not merely semantic.

Indigenous Capability for Strategic Agility

Indigenisation is another area where the objective needs broadening. The strategic value of self-reliance is not simply that India can manufacture a greater proportion of an aircraft or missile domestically. Its real value lies in freedom of action during a prolonged conflict. Strategic autonomy will be measured by the following abilities: –

Repair a system when external supply chains are disrupted.
Modify software rapidly.
Integrate a new weapon.
Scale production quickly.
Identify and replace a vulnerable component.

This requires a deeper defence-industrial ecosystem involving the IAF, DRDO, public-sector enterprises, private industry, start-ups, universities and specialised technology companies.

Tuning the Acquisition Process

Technology-driven capability enhancement and the acquisition process are limited by technological cycles. An aerial platform may justify a long acquisition cycle; however, software capabilities, autonomous systems, or electronic-warfare applications do not. In a rapidly changing scenario, being late can be more dangerous than being imperfect.

A more useful model would combine long-term capability programmes with rapid technology insertion and experimentation. This could include limited initial procurement, operational trials, iterative upgrades and modular architectures.

Personnel and Doctrine are Decisive

New technology alone cannot transform the IAF. The most sophisticated system is useless till the personnel are trained to employ it, operators understand its limitations, and doctrine provides an appropriate framework for its use.

Future airmen will need greater familiarity with data, AI, autonomy, electronic warfare and cyber operations. Pilots will increasingly interact with autonomous systems. Ground personnel will manage increasingly software-intensive platforms. Commanders will have to make decisions based on information generated by multiple machines and humans.

Training consequently needs to evolve. Synthetic environments and advanced simulation should become integral to preparing crews for complex, contested scenarios. Exercises should increasingly test degraded communications, electronic attack, cyber disruption, loss of satellites and attacks on air bases.

Most importantly, doctrine should be developed through experimentation. The IAF cannot afford to wait for a future conflict to reveal whether a new concept works. It needs a permanent institutional mechanism for operational experimentation to test emerging technologies, challenge existing assumptions and translate lessons into doctrine. The organisation that learns faster will possess an advantage over the organisation that merely buys faster.

Transformation not Modernisation

IAF of the future should have the attributes required to prevail in a contested war. It should be: –

- Networked, with sensors, shooters and command nodes operating as an integrated system.
- Distributed, capable of generating combat power from multiple locations.
- Resilient, able to sustain operations despite attacks on bases, communications and logistics.
- Autonomous, employing unmanned systems to generate mass, persistence and risk tolerance.
- Technology-absorptive, with institutions capable of rapidly identifying, testing and integrating emerging technologies.
- Indigenous in critical capabilities, providing strategic freedom of action during crisis and war.
- Adaptive, faster than the changes in the character of warfare.

The decisive advantage may ultimately belong not to the air force with the largest inventory or even the most advanced individual platform, but to the one that can sense faster, decide faster, adapt faster and regenerate combat power faster.

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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References: –

Indian Air Force, “Joint doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “New process for procurement of defence equipment”, Press Information Bureau. (2022).

Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “IAF Dronathon 2026”, Press Information Bureau, 08 Sep 26.

Khosla, A., “Q&A series: IAF—AI-powered unmanned platforms, space ops, and future challenges”, Air Marshal’s Perspective, 02 Oct 23.

Khosla, A., “Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) via-a-vis loyal wingman concept”, Air Marshal’s Perspective, 26 Oct 24.

Khosla, A. “IAF challenges and necessities”, Air Marshal’s Perspective, 09 Mar 25.

Khosla, A. “Aerial war: The shift from pilots to platforms to weapons”, Air Marshal’s Perspective, 24 Aug 25.

Khosla, A. (2026, June 26). Wings of dominance: The future of air warfare. Air Marshal’s Perspective.

Khosla, A. “IAF capability and capacity balance”, Air Marshal’s Perspective, 11 Sep 26.

Horowitz, M. C, “Artificial intelligence, international competition, and the balance of power”, Texas National Security Review, 1(3), 36–57 (2018).

Johnson, J. “Artificial intelligence and future warfare”, The RUSI Journal, 165(3), 1–12, 2020.

Scharre, P, “Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War”, W. Norton, 2018.

October 6, 2026October 6, 2026

861: INPUTS TO MEDIA QUESTIONNAIRE ON IAF

The IAF will celebrate its 94th anniversary on 08 Oct 2026.

Shared my views on some of the aspects the media highlighted.

You have discussed India’s air power and the challenges beyond the border on both sides, as well as China’s extensive modernisation. What challenges has the IAF faced in your time in pushing for modernisation? Has it been enough? What would you have liked to see done in your time?

Perspective: China is rapidly modernising its defence forces. It is in competition with the USA and pulling way ahead of us. In the process, they are also pulling along their ally Pakistan, narrowing the gap with India. Of late, both have been belligerent.

India’s Past Approach to Military Modernisation. Until about a decade back, India’s approach was incremental. It was phased and reactive, with war-triggered acquisitions and reforms. It aimed to replace the legacy systems rather than prepare for the future.

Fresh Impetus. In the last decade or so, the approach has shifted to a more proactive stance, driving defence modernisation, self-reliance, and the development of the defence production ecosystem.

Past Challenges:

- Budgetary Constraints. In the past, India did not spend enough on enhancing the capabilities of its defence forces.
- Prolonged Procurement Cycles. Procurement processes were tedious and time-consuming, involving approvals, evaluations, trials, negotiations, clearances, and scrutiny.
- Self-Reliance. The approach towards self-reliance was a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, the leapfrog method didn’t work due to several reasons. A classic example is the Tejas story.
- Defence Production Ecosystem. The components of the defence production ecosystem worked in individual silos. Further, DPSUs faced no competition because the protectionist approach prevented private-sector participation.

Adequacy of Modernisation. Over the years, the IAF has grown in capability (high-altitude ops, Day, night, and all-weather ops, Precision, standoff, reach, strategic airlift, Combat support ops, etc.). However, its capacity to endure (e.g., the number of fighter squadrons and combat support aircraft) has not kept pace with the perceived threats.

Since your tenure as VCAS, there have been considerable changes in how AI, and specifically LLMs, are used in warfare, with the most recent example being Iran-US and Anthropic. What challenges might the IAF face in adopting such autonomous systems? Is it outdated training, or is it domestic capacity and data security?

AI has made a significant impact on the aviation sector, including defence aviation. All three factors mentioned are important.

- Data Security. AI-enabled fusion of sensors, platforms, and weapons has become central to airpower. The effectiveness of the fusion depends upon software, algorithms, and data. They need comprehensive protection.
- Training and Doctrine. Air crew, ground crew, and commanders need training to operate in an AI-enabled environment. Synthetic training environments and advanced simulation have become essential. Training exercises need to include operations in degraded environments. Further, Air Forces need to incorporate institutional mechanisms for experimentation, contingency handling, and converting lessons into doctrine.
- Indigenous Capability. This is the most important aspect to retain strategic autonomy. It also offers scalability when needed.

Broader Challenges. Beyond the challenges above, broader challenges remain.

- Change of Mindset. The mindset needs to shift from platform-centric (bean-counting) to developing a comprehensive combat ecosystem.
- Technology Absorption Cycle. Technological development outpaces procurement cycles. A two-speed mechanism is required. Long-term procurement cycles for platforms, systems, and weapons, and a faster (Experimental and adaptive) cycle for technology absorption.
- MUM-T Challenge. Manned-unmanned teaming is the future of combat. The loyal wingman concept is already being developed. Beyond the advantages, it also brings associated challenges. The vulnerabilities related to communications, electronic warfare, cyber aspects, and decision support systems need to be addressed.
- Interconnected Domains. Operations in space, cyber, electronic, and information domains are interconnected. These operations require organisational adaptation. China combined all four domains into a single service. However, after a decade-plus, it realised the drawbacks and reverted to the US model of independent commands for each domain. India has agencies for space, cyber and special forces ops.
- Extent of Autonomy. The world is still grappling with this question. Technology allows humans to be removed from the kill chain. The bigger question is about responsibility, legality, and ethics.

It has been 94 years since the formation of the IAF, and nearly 8 decades since Indian sovereign skies have been protected. You have talked about different “eras” in the force’s life (pilot, platform, weapon); what comes next? AI and LLMs?

Air warfare has continuously changed in how air operations are conducted. It has changed from a pilot-centric era to a platform-centric one, and now to a weapon-centric one.

In my opinion, the next will be the era of three Cs. That is the era of Coherent, Collaborative Combat. Air combat will take place in an environment where all components (sensors, platforms, systems, and weapons) of airpower (ground-, air-, and space-based; manned and unmanned) work as a coherent combat ecosystem.

The acronym RADIANT summarises the characteristics of such a system.

- Resilience. Can sustain ops even under degraded conditions.
- Autonomous. With human oversight, accruing the advantage of mass and persistence.
- Distributed. Ability to generate airpower from multiple, maybe mobile locations.
- Indigenous. Allowing strategic freedom with the advantage of scalability.
- Adaptive. Ability to adapt to changes rapidly.
- Networked. Coherent and resilient architecture.
- Technology Absorptive. Ability to develop and integrate new technology rapidly.

From Operation Safed Sagar (part of Op Vijay) to Operation Sindoor, the IAF has carried out multiple direct strikes to protect its sovereignty. How have you seen the IAF’s operational capacity and strategy change to address direct and ubiquitous threats? Or has it been a mentality of “if not broken, don’t fix it”?

Proactive Approach. IAF’s approach to modernisation and capability enhancement has been proactive and continuous. Its air strategy has evolved over time.

Historical Evolution. The IAF was formed during the British era. It was tactical, supporting ground forces. It remained reactionary post-partition. Post-partition, it grew, with its role expanded to include border and airspace protection. 1971 war saw air campaigns being conducted in parallel. The IAF modernised in the last two decades of the previous century, inducting advanced platforms, systems, and weapons. During the Kargil War, the IAF demonstrated the capability to apply air power innovatively at high altitudes. Over the last two-plus decades, the IAF has transformed into a capable strategic air force.

Doctrinal Adaptation. The IAF has also been evolving doctrinally. It has published three Doctrines. The first, published in 1995, was a basic doctrine on airpower, the importance of combat support ops, and modernisation. The second doctrine, published in 2012, linked airpower to the national objectives. It included airpower’s role in combating terrorism, as well as space ops, HADR, and the IAF’s role in nation-building. The last one was published in 2022, signalling a shift from airpower to aerospace power, with an emphasis on Multidomain ops and technology absorption.

With gender parity in forces a major focus these days, and AVM Shakti Sharma becoming ACAS Education, do you think women fighter pilots will also see themselves elevated to senior ranks soon? Will the IAF see its first woman Chief of Air Staff before completing 100 years of operations?

The induction of women in the IAF has been gradual. From the medical branch to supporting services, then to combat and command roles. 1992, women officers were inducted into the admin branch for the first time. Thereafter, they were inducted into the flying branch (helicopters and transport aircraft) and eventually began flying fighters from 2015 onwards. From initial induction into the short service commission, they were granted a permanent commission. They are now even being utilised for combat and command roles. Now, women are joining the training institutions (NDA and Sainik schools) and being inducted into the non-officer ranks.

The IAF has led the integration of Women in the service. It has the highest percentage of women officers. The IAF has a good track record of balancing their individual aspirations with organisational goals. The IAF’s policies are gender-neutral, providing equal opportunities with no differentiation in performance or standards.

They have already started reaching the senior officer ranks. Someday, one of them may become Chief of the Air Staff. However, becoming CAS by the IAF’s 100th anniversary may not be possible, as they would not reach that seniority within the next six years.

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September 11, 2026September 10, 2026

852:INDIA’S AIR POWER AMID RISING GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES

Article published in the Sep 26 edition of the “Blue Print” Magazine

Air power has become a crucial instrument of national security. Possessing credible, technologically advanced air power is no longer a luxury but a strategic imperative. India occupies a unique geopolitical position. It shares borders with two nuclear-armed neighbours. Both of whom present distinct and collusive security challenges. The increasing militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region is further altering India’s security calculus. Newer technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), hypersonic missiles, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and space-based military capabilities have expanded the dimensions of aerial warfare.

Air power is essential to India’s security. As geopolitical tensions grow and military technology advances, India’s aerial capabilities will become a vital means of deterrence, power projection, and safeguarding national security. The extent to which the country modernises and integrates its aerial forces will significantly affect its ability to cope with the complicated geopolitical situation of the coming decades.

The Strategic Importance of Air Power. Air power constitutes a highly adaptable and lethal instrument of statecraft. It is characterised by its extensive reach, swift responsiveness, and ability to impose shock and influence through precise, non-contact means of applying force. Its effects can be activated or deactivated more easily than other instruments of national power. Although it provides a broad array of offensive capabilities, its utility extends beyond mere offensive operations. It also plays a vital role in deterrence, strategic positioning, and coercion, whether in wartime or peacetime. Unlike ground forces, air power can be deployed over great distances in just a short time and is therefore essential in times of crisis. In natural disasters, air power can provide rapid humanitarian assistance. It supports both military security and national resilience.

Geopolitical Challenges and Emerging Threats

India’s air power today sits at the centre of a far more complex security environment than at any point in the past two decades. The challenge is not only the classic two-front problem with China and Pakistan, but also the need to modernise fast enough to preserve deterrence. At the same time, air warfare is being transformed by drones, missiles, cyber, space, and networked targeting.

The China Challenge. China is India’s most significant long-term strategic challenge. The military standoff in eastern Ladakh since 2020 demonstrated that border tensions can escalate rapidly and require sustained military preparedness. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone extensive modernisation over the past two decades. China has also developed extensive military infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang. These include upgraded airbases, hardened aircraft shelters, extended runways, and logistics facilities that can support sustained air operations near the Indian border.

Pakistan and the Persistent Security Challenge. Pakistan relies on non-state actors funded and trained on its own soil to keep India in a state of unrest through disinformation, incitement and terrorism. It remains a security threat across the nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional dimensions simultaneously. The 2019 Balakot air strike and the recent Op Sindoor highlighted the growing role of air power in India’s strategy of punitive deterrence. India’s ability to conduct precision strikes deep inside hostile territory demonstrated a willingness to employ air power. However, the subsequent aerial engagement also emphasised the importance of superior situational awareness, electronic warfare, and beyond-visual-range combat capabilities.

The Rise of Drones and Autonomous Warfare. The rise of autonomous drones is one of the most significant developments in contemporary air warfare. Drones have moved from mere surveillance vehicles to versatile weapons. They can deliver precise strikes, conduct electronic warfare, and carry out reconnaissance and intelligence collection. In recent conflicts, it has been shown that relatively cheap drones can cause disproportionate damage to advanced military equipment. Swarm drone technology in particular poses considerable challenges for traditional air defence systems because it is hard to track and destroy multiple low-cost aerial targets at the same time. India is now encountering increasing drone-related threats on both its western and northern borders, and reports of drone-enabled smuggling, surveillance, and cross-border infiltration highlight the importance of having strong counter-drone capabilities.

Cyber Warfare and Electronic Warfare. Air operations now rely heavily on secure communication networks, satellite navigation, and data links. As aerial warfare platforms become more interconnected, they also become more susceptible to cyberattacks and electronic interference. Enemies could disrupt air operations by attacking communication systems, navigation networks, or mission-critical software. Electronic warfare can greatly reduce the effectiveness of the most advanced aircraft. Protection of digital infrastructure has become as important as protecting airbases. India must invest in secure communications, encrypted data links, and cyber defence capabilities.

Space as a Strategic Domain. Space has emerged as a critical component of air power. The term airpower has evolved into aerospace power, with the aerial warfare envelope expanding into the space domain. Space-based systems and applications are embedded in every aspect of aerial warfare. They are providing capabilities including navigation, targeting, communication, early warning of missile launches, and space-based surveillance. The integration of space-based systems with air assets is expected to increase further. This will create opportunities for both offensive and defensive operations. However, increasing dependence on satellite-based systems also creates vulnerabilities. Anti-satellite warfare spans kinetic weapons such as missiles as well as non-kinetic systems including jammers, laser dazzlers and spoofing equipment. Denial of space-based systems directly affects air warfare.

The Indo-Pacific and Maritime Air Power. India’s strategic interests extend beyond its borders. The Indo-Pacific area is now the centre of global economic activity and strategic competition. It is seeing rising naval deployments, disputes over maritime routes, and a growing number of military cooperation agreements. Air power plays a vital role in protecting maritime interests by enabling long-range surveillance, conducting anti-submarine warfare, conducting maritime reconnaissance, and allowing rapid force deployment. The ability to monitor key sea lanes, respond effectively to humanitarian crises, and support naval operations confirms India’s status as a major security provider in the Indian Ocean Region.

Strengthening India’s Air Power

India’s military aspirations must align with its socioeconomic condition and likely threats. The path forward for India is clear: it must enhance its deterrence capability while investing in future war-fighting technologies. With its significant offensive potential and responsiveness, air power is the most crucial arm of military action. As the nature of warfare evolves, India’s approach to air power must keep pace. The future lies in building an integrated, technology-driven, and self-reliant aerospace ecosystem that can address conventional, asymmetric, and multidomain threats. Sustained investment in modernisation, indigenous innovation, joint military operations, and human capital will be essential for maintaining India’s strategic advantage.

Capability and Capacity Balance for Credible Deterrence. Warfighting capability and the capacity to sustain operations are both essential, combining quality and quantity. While India’s air power capabilities (in terms of reach, high-altitude operations, precision, standoff, and all-weather performance) have advanced significantly, it must also increase the numerical strength of fighter aircraft, combat enablers, long-range vectors, and drones. One of the Indian Air Force’s foremost priorities is to restore its fighter squadron strength. Bridging this gap requires the timely induction of new-generation aircraft (fighters and combat support aircraft), while ensuring modernisation plans are financially sustainable.

Enhancing Indigenous Defence Manufacturing. Self-reliance has become a strategic necessity. Relying on imported defence equipment creates vulnerabilities. India should develop its own technological abilities and increase its defence manufacturing capacity. It will reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. Indigenous development of radars, electronic warfare systems, missiles, drones, and aircraft components will strengthen India’s technological base, create jobs, and boost exports. As part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat effort in defence manufacturing, the aim is to enhance self-reliance by encouraging the domestic production of these systems. The initiative has sped up domestic defence production by involving more public sector enterprises, private industries, start-ups, and research institutions. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), academic institutions, and the private sector must work together to shorten development timelines and promote innovation.

Embracing Emerging Technologies. The adoption of emerging technologies. Technological advances are further reshaping the nature of air warfare. Precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, network-centric operations, satellite-enabled communications, artificial intelligence, and autonomous drones are all altering the battlefield. Autonomous drones and the idea of loyal wingmen are expected to transform aerial combat. India should also make investments in directed-energy weapons, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber-resilient command-and-control networks. These technologies can greatly increase operational effectiveness while reducing personnel risk. Air power assets depend heavily on technology. Turning technology into capability takes a long time. To stay ahead of the challenges, we need to invest in emerging technologies and think through their use in warfare. Impetus is also required for existing aviation-related programs such as fifth-generation fighters, Transport aircraft (for civil and military requirements), Development of gas turbines and engines, sensors and seekers, stealth, metallurgy and composites, unmanned platforms and swarms, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and long-range vectors.

Airpower Utilisation in Grey Zone Scenario. Grey zone operations occur in a contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare. These are becoming a norm in modern-day warfare. Both of India’s adversaries resort to these operations regularly. Airpower can reinforce the nation’s course of action against grey zone warfare, with involvement in several direct and supporting roles. Besides offensive use, it can also be effectively utilised in many ways in non-conventional hostile situations categorised above. Applying airpower in these grey zone situations requires some reorientation, supported by capability enhancement in certain fields.

Conclusion

India’s air Power is at a crucial stage. Competing regional interests, technological progress, and changes in warfare have increased the strategic value of air power. As India faces challenges from both China and Pakistan and the Indo-Pacific region grows more important, it needs constant modernisation and strategic adjustment. India can ensure its air power remains capable of protecting its national interests in this increasingly uncertain and contested geopolitical environment by promoting innovation, supporting domestic research, and adopting multidomain warfare.

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References: –

Fontanellaz A, “Operation Sindoor: The India-Pakistan air war”, Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaires (2026).

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