In recent years, the evolving geopolitical landscape of South Asia has been redefined by an emerging alignment among China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The growing convergence between these three countries, particularly under China’s Initiative, is reshaping regional dynamics and presenting new challenges to India and broader Indo-Pacific security arrangements.
China-Pakistan Relations. The China-Pakistan relationship, often described as an “all-weather friendship,” has been a cornerstone of regional geopolitics for decades. Rooted in shared strategic interests, particularly countering India, it has been institutionalised through defence cooperation, economic assistance, and infrastructural integration. It has been further deepened through initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013, connecting China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. This strategic partnership has been further solidified by China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear program and military modernisation, with Pakistan acquiring 70–80% of its weapons from China over the past five years. China has also become Pakistan’s largest arms supplier and a crucial diplomatic ally at forums like the United Nations Security Council, where it has repeatedly shielded Pakistan from international scrutiny over terrorism-related issues.
Bangladesh’s Gradual Pivot. Bangladesh’s inclusion in this dynamic marks a shift, particularly following the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2024. Hasina’s government maintained a balanced foreign policy, fostering close ties with India while engaging China economically. However, the interim government under Muhammad Yunus has pivoted toward closer relations with Beijing and Islamabad, driven by deteriorating India-Bangladesh ties and China’s proactive engagement. This shift was evident during Yunus’s March 2025 visit to China, where he positioned Bangladesh as a gateway for Chinese economic cooperation in the region, a move that strained relations with India. The motivations behind this convergence are multifaceted. For China, expanding influence in South Asia counters U.S.-India strategic alignment and secures access to the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. Pakistan seeks to bolster its regional relevance. Bangladesh, navigating domestic political transitions, sees alignment with China and Pakistan as a means to secure economic and diplomatic support, particularly through BRI projects.
The Triangle Takes Shape. A pivotal development was the trilateral meeting in Kunming, China, on June 19, 2025, involving representatives from China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This “informal” consultation, hosted by China, focused on regional cooperation and connectivity, sparking speculation about a new regional bloc to replace SAARC. While Bangladesh’s interim government dismissed claims of a formal alliance, the meeting signaled a strategic intent to enhance collaboration among the three nations.
Implications for India. The proposed bloc poses a direct challenge to India. India’s concerns were heightened by comments from Bangladesh’s leadership, such as Yunus’s claim that Bangladesh is the “only guardian” of the Indian Ocean. India, finds itself encircled by Chinese-influenced states on nearly all fronts, Nepal to the north, Pakistan to the west, and Bangladesh and Myanmar to the east. From a maritime perspective, China’s presence in Gwadar (Pakistan) and Chittagong (Bangladesh) gives it a foothold in the Indian Ocean, threatening India’s naval supremacy and potentially undermining the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy. The strategic alignment also threatens India’s northeastern states, especially the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, which connects mainland India to its northeast.
Broader Geopolitical Ramifications. The China-Pakistan-Bangladesh convergence complicates the U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S., viewing China’s growing influence as a challenge to its regional strategy. This dynamic could intensify Sino-U.S. competition, with Bangladesh’s strategic choices shaping the regional balance of power. Smaller South Asian states, such as Nepal and Sri Lanka, may face pressure to align with either the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh bloc or India, complicating regional integration. The dormancy of SAARC, exacerbated by India’s boycott following the 2016 Uri attack, has created a vacuum that China seeks to fill, potentially reshaping South Asia’s geopolitical architecture.
Conclusion. The emerging China-Pakistan-Bangladesh alignment reflects a strategic realignment in South Asia, driven by shared economic and geopolitical interests. While not yet a formal alliance, this convergence challenges India’s regional dominance and complicates the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape. As China expands its influence through BRI and diplomatic engagements, India must navigate a complex dilemma, balancing regional influence with global partnerships. The future of South Asian stability hinges on how these dynamics evolve and whether a new regional bloc can foster cooperation without exacerbating tensions.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
Hindustan Times. “CDS Chauhan Says Convergence between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh Has Implications for Regional Stability.” July 9, 2025.2.
India Today. “To Counter India, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh Creating a Saarc-Replacement.” June 30, 2025.
The Hindu. “Bangladesh, Pakistan, China Hold Inaugural Trilateral Foreign Office Discussion.” June 20, 2025.
The Hindu. “Pakistan, China Working to Establish New Regional Bloc with Potential to Replace SAARC: Report.” June 30, 2025.
Modern Diplomacy. “Bangladesh-Pakistan Thaw and a Regional Realignment.” February 23, 2025.
South Asian Voices. “The Bangladesh-Pakistan-China Triangle and India’s Strategic Dilemma.” April 26, 2025.
The Express Tribune. “Ex-Bangladeshi General Urges China Alliance to Seize India’s Northeast If Pakistan Is Attacked.” May 3, 2025.
United States Institute of Peace. “China’s Influence on Conflict Dynamics in South Asia.” December 16, 2020
My Article published on the “Indus International Research Foundation” website on 18 Jul 25.
In the grand theater of global geopolitics, alliances and rivalries shape the dynamics of diplomacy. Over the past decade, Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy that extends well beyond its traditional spheres of influence. One of the most intriguing and consequential elements of this strategy is Turkey’s deepening engagement with India’s neighbours. Turkey’s relations with India’s immediate neighbours form a complex web of strategic, military, economic, and ideological engagements. Turkey has pursued a neo-Ottoman foreign policy, leveraging historical ties, Islamic solidarity, and defence exports to expand its influence in South Asia. This “strategic tango” has significant implications for South Asia’s balance of power, particularly from New Delhi’s perspective.
Turkey and Pakistan: Ideological Brotherhood beyond Diplomacy
The relationship between Turkey and Pakistan is characterised by its closeness and growing complexity, grounded in a shared Islamic identity, historical connections, and reciprocal geopolitical backing. Under the leadership of Erdoğan, these ties have developed into a strong strategic partnership.
The two nations have engaged in collaboration concerning military training, defence manufacturing, and joint naval exercises. Turkey ranks as Pakistan’s second-largest arms supplier, following China, providing sophisticated military equipment, including Bayraktar TB2 and Asisguard Songar drones, corvettes, missile systems, and enhancements for Pakistan’s F-16 fleet. These exports have strengthened Pakistan’s military capabilities, notably in drone warfare, which constitutes an increasing concern for India along the Line of Control (LoC) and other unstable border regions. During the recent India-Pakistan conflict (Operation Sindoor), reports suggest Turkey supplied Pakistan with between 300 and 400 drones, along with other military assistance, thereby intensifying tensions.
Turkey has also supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, frequently raising the issue at the United Nations and other international forums. Ankara has consistently condemned India’s 2019 abrogation of Article 370, which nullified the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, and has articulated this position at various international platforms, including the United Nations. Conversely, Pakistan endorses Turkey on issues such as the Cyprus dispute and Azerbaijan’s stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, thereby reinforcing their strategic alliance.
By clearly aligning with Pakistan on a sensitive bilateral matter, Turkey has indicated its readiness to confront India on the international stage. This has led to a strong Indian reaction, with tourism bookings to Turkey decreasing by 60% and cancellations increasing by 250% in 2025, along with calls for trade boycotts.
Bangladesh: Growing Engagement and Deepening Ties.
Turkey’s diplomatic relations with Bangladesh have markedly strengthened, primarily due to defence collaboration and economic prospects. Ankara has employed a strategic approach incorporating humanitarian assistance, cultural diplomacy, and religious outreach to foster rapport with Dhaka. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has been actively engaged in Bangladesh, financing educational institutions, healthcare facilities, and infrastructure developments. Furthermore, the administration of President Erdoğan has adopted a firm stance regarding the Rohingya crisis, providing refuge to displaced persons and vocally criticising Myanmar’s policies. This stance aligns closely with the perspectives held by Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has reportedly acquired Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. These drones, whilst augmenting Bangladesh’s military capabilities, evoke concerns in India regarding their possible deployment along the shared 4,096-kilometre border. Economically, Turkey has actively engaged with Bangladesh through trade and infrastructure initiatives, capitalising on Dhaka’s expanding economy and strategic positioning. Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions align with certain political factions within Bangladesh, notably those sympathetic to Islamist rhetoric, thereby further fortifying bilateral relations.
This ideological alignment, coupled with defence cooperation, has raised concerns in New Delhi, which fears that Turkey’s influence could destabilise its eastern neighbourhood.
Emerging Engagements With Other Neighbours
Turkey has also expanded its focus to smaller South Asian nations, including Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Myanmar, and the Maldives. These countries, often overlooked in global strategic considerations, possess significant geopolitical importance due to their strategic locations and vulnerability to external influences.
In Nepal, Turkey’s influence is predominantly diplomatic and cultural. Ankara has increased its embassy presence, provided scholarships, and facilitated interfaith dialogue through its Diyanet Foundation. Although not explicitly political, these initiatives form part of Turkey’s broader strategy to extend its influence via cultural engagement and religious diplomacy.
Turkey’s engagements with Sri Lanka are less pronounced but strategically significant. Turkey has pursued economic ties and limited defence cooperation, including potential drone exports. In Bhutan, Turkey’s presence is primarily economic, with investments in infrastructure and trade.
Myanmar, notwithstanding its political instability, has experienced Turkey’s outreach through humanitarian aid and limited defence negotiations, capitalising on shared Islamic affiliations with specific communities. Although these efforts are less advanced than those with Pakistan and Bangladesh, they demonstrate Turkey’s broader strategy to augment its presence in India’s vicinity.
The Maldives, a small island nation located in the Indian Ocean, has attracted interest from numerous international actors, including China, India, and currently Turkey. The government led by Erdoğan has enhanced bilateral engagements and extended development aid. As the archipelago increasingly assumes a pivotal position in the contest for influence within the Indian Ocean, Turkey’s engagement signifies its aspiration to participate actively in regional maritime geopolitics.
The China Factor: Converging Interests, Diverging Identities
While not a neighbour in the strict sense, China has a significant influence on India’s strategic outlook and is becoming increasingly important for Turkey as well. Ankara and Beijing share common viewpoints in criticising Western dominance and promoting multipolarity. Turkey participates in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though with varying enthusiasm. Economic needs have motivated Erdoğan to pursue Chinese investment, especially during Turkey’s ongoing financial instability.
Nevertheless, the relationship encounters some friction. Turkey has historically been a vocal critic of China’s treatment of the Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority in Xinjiang. Erdoğan previously characterised Chinese policies as “genocide,” although such rhetoric has become less prominent in recent years as economic pragmatism has gained precedence.
From India’s perspective, Turkey’s ties with China heighten concerns. Both nations have shown a readiness to oppose India on Kashmir and support Pakistan. Although their ideological bases differ—Turkey with its neo-Ottoman and Islamist inclinations, and China with its authoritarian state capitalism—their strategic interests sometimes align, especially in efforts to counter Indian influence.
Strategic Implications for India
Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, propelled by President Erdoğan’s vision of global Islamic leadership, frequently conflict with India’s secular, multipolar foreign policy. Turkey’s increasing engagement with India’s neighbouring countries carries strategic implications that New Delhi must carefully consider. Although Turkey does not possess the economic strength or geographical proximity to directly challenge India, its ideological assertiveness and alignment with adversarial interests render it a disruptive presence in South Asia.
Ankara’s vocal endorsement of Pakistan regarding Kashmir elevates the issue to an international level, countering India’s stance that it is a bilateral matter. This not only strengthens Pakistan’s position but also offers diplomatic protection for narratives that contest India’s territorial sovereignty.
The Turkey-Pakistan alliance, fortified through defence cooperation and shared stances on issues such as Kashmir, remains highly contentious. Turkey’s provision of advanced weapons, including drones and naval equipment, boosts Pakistan’s military strength, directly challenging India’s security along its western border. Additionally, Turkey’s defence collaborations with Bangladesh and the Maldives pose a threat to India’s influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
Turkey’s soft power efforts, particularly in Muslim-majority areas, aim to establish Ankara as a leader within the Islamic world. This contrasts with India’s approach, which focuses on building ties with Muslim-majority nations through economic and developmental partnerships, rather than religious solidarity.
Turkey’s growing collaboration with China and Pakistan may constitute a loose yet influential axis characterised by common objectives to curtail Indian influence. While the establishment of a formal alliance appears improbable, convergences on particular issues, such as opposing India’s ascent or supporting anti-Indian narratives, could pose a persistent strategic challenge.
India’s Options
In response to Turkey’s assertiveness, India needs to adopt a multifaceted strategy. India’s displeasure needs to be signalled by reducing high-level diplomatic exchanges, and through economic levers such as trade and tourism advisories. Another option is to strengthen ties with countries that view Turkish policies with suspicion. Enhancement of defence and economic cooperation with Greece, Armenia, Cyprus, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would convey the right message. Closer at home, India needs to leverage its cultural diplomacy, economic strength, and infrastructure investments to counter Turkish influence in neighbouring countries. Initiatives like the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and the Indo-Pacific outreach provide platforms that could be used to build alternative narratives to Ankara’s Islamic solidarity approach.
Conclusion
Turkey’s strategic engagement with its neighbours in South Asia, often described metaphorically as a Tango, appears to be more than mere diplomatic manoeuvring. It seems to constitute a deliberate effort to reshape regional alliances and enhance Ankara’s influence within the Muslim world and beyond. For India, this diplomatic dance presents both a challenge and an opportunity: a challenge to its strategic environment and regional influence, and an opportunity to refine its diplomatic strategies and foster resilient partnerships. India must navigate these intricate geopolitical developments with vigilance to safeguard its regional interests. By fortifying its alliances and leveraging its economic and military capacities, India should endeavour to ensure that Turkey’s actions do not destabilise the delicate balance of power in South Asia.
Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
Hindu, T. (2025, March 10). India Sees 60% Drop in Tourism to Turkey Amid Kashmir Tensions.
Dawn. (2025, February 15). Turkey Supplies 300–400 Drones to Pakistan During Operation Sindoor, Sources Say.
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Sharma, A. (2023). Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman Ambitions in South Asia. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation.
Siddiqui, N. (2024). Pakistan-Turkey Strategic Partnership: Defence and Diplomacy. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies.
Times of India. (2025, April 2). 250% Surge in Cancellations of Turkey Travel Bookings After Operation Sindoor.
Yilmaz, I., & Shakil, K. (2023). Turkey’s Foreign Policy Under Erdoğan: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism. Journal of South Asian Studies, 46(3), 231–245.
The Diplomat. (2023).Turkey’s Growing Footprint in South Asia: Soft Power or Strategic Intent?
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Pantucci, R. (2022).China-Turkey Relations: A New Axis of Authoritarian Influence? Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
Sharma, R. (2021).India’s Strategic Realignment in the Eastern Mediterranean: Balancing Turkey’s Outreach. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS).
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Article for the “Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies” website of Reva University on 08 Jul 25.
The West Asia has long been a crucible of geopolitical strife, with its conflicts reverberating far beyond its borders. In 2025, escalating tensions in the region, driven by a volatile mix of sectarian rivalries, resource competition, and great power interventions, continue to reshape the political, economic, and security landscape of Eurasia. From energy markets to migration flows, and trade routes to diplomatic alignments, the ripple effects of West Asian instability are profoundly felt across the vast Eurasian supercontinent, influencing both regional powers and global dynamics.
Energy Market Disruptions. The West Asia remains a linchpin of the global energy supply, with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq holding significant portions of the world’s oil and gas reserves. Tensions, particularly between Iran and its Gulf neighbours, have repeatedly threatened key chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil passes. Recent escalations have driven oil prices higher, with Brent crude currently hovering around $95-100 per barrel as of mid-2025. This volatility directly impacts the economies of Eurasia, particularly energy-hungry nations like China and India, which rely heavily on West Asian oil.
Trade Routes and Supply Chain Vulnerabilities. The West Asia’s strategic geography makes it a crucial node in Eurasian trade networks, particularly in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conflicts in the region, such as the ongoing Israel-Palestinian/Iran crisis and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, threaten maritime routes like the Suez Canal, through which 12% of global trade flows. Houthi drone and missile strikes on shipping in 2024-2025 have forced rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing costs and delays for goods moving between Asia and Europe. This has prompted China to bolster overland BRI routes through Central Asia.
Migration and Humanitarian Crises. West Asian conflicts have driven waves of migration, with profound implications for the Eurasian region. The Syrian civil war continues to push refugees into Turkey. In 2025, renewed violence in Iraq and Yemen has triggered fresh displacement, with refugees and asylum seekers moving not only westward but also eastward into Central Asia and South Asia. Pakistan and Iran, already hosting millions of Afghan refugees, face additional pressures, exacerbating resource scarcity and ethnic tensions. The humanitarian toll also diverts resources from development projects.
Security and Geopolitical Realignments. West Asian tensions are reshaping Eurasian security dynamics, prompting major powers to recalibrate their strategies in response. Russia, a key player in both regions, leverages its military presence in Syria to project power while deepening ties with Iran. This alignment, however, alienates Turkey and complicates Moscow’s relations with Sunni-majority states like Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, China’s non-interventionist stance is tested as it seeks to protect its investments in the Middle East and Central Asia, leading to cautious military cooperation with regional powers. The U.S., while reducing its West Asian footprint, remains a pivotal actor through alliances with Israel and the GCC.
The Broader Eurasian Impact. The interplay of these factors creates a feedback loop that destabilises Eurasia. Regional powers, such as Turkey, Iran, and India, are often forced to adapt, often at the expense of their domestic priorities. Smaller Eurasian states, particularly in Central Asia, face heightened risks of being drawn into great power rivalries or extremist networks. Meanwhile, global initiatives like the BRI and climate transition efforts are slowed by the need to address immediate crises emanating from the West Asia.
Conclusion. In 2025, the West Asia’s tensions are not merely a regional issue but a Eurasian one, with consequences that ripple across continents. Addressing these challenges requires coordinated diplomacy, robust economic diversification, and a commitment to humanitarian principles. Without such efforts, the fault lines of the West Asia will continue to fracture the Eurasian landscape, undermining stability and prosperity for years to come.
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Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
CSIS: Experts React: Energy Implications of Escalating Middle East Conflict, Published: October 8, 2024
TRENDS Research & Advisory: Energy Geopolitics in a Fragmented World, Published: November 12, 2024
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies: The Geopolitics of Global Trade: Why the Middle East Matters Now More Than Ever, Published: June 3, 2025
Carnegie Endowment: The Geopolitics of Economic Development in the Middle East, Published: February 15, 2024
Foreign Policy Research Institute: Turkey’s Evolving Geopolitical Strategy in the Black Sea, Published: December 4, 2024
World Economic Forum: Global Risks Report 2025, Published: January 15, 2025
IMF: Press Briefing Transcript: Middle East and Central Asia Department, Spring Meetings 2025, Published: April 24, 2025
International Institute for Iranian Studies: The Middle East Conflict and Indications of Change in the Strategic Environment, Published: February 10, 2025
Carnegie Endowment: Ending the New Wars of Attrition: Opportunities for Collective Regional Security in the Middle East, Published: March 5, 2025
Brookings: Forecasting China’s Strategy in the Middle East over the Next Four Years, Published: December 19, 2024
Asian Review of Political Economy: China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeast Asia and its Implications for ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership, Published: December 3, 2024
Science Direct: The Belt and Road Initiative and Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment: Comparison and Current Status, Published: June 1, 2025
