823: Wings of Dominance: The Future of Air Warfare

 

Q1.  What is the new balance of air power in the world today? Are fighter jets still the focus of warfare, or are drones beginning to take their place?

Fighter jets remain the backbone of air power, and that is not about to change. What has changed fundamentally is the ecosystem around them. A modern fighter operates in a networked environment comprising long-range strike weapons, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, airborne tankers, and space-based ISR.

Drones are taking over the missions that are too risky, too repetitive, or too economically unjustifiable to warrant a manned sortie. They are not replacing the manned aircraft.

The prevailing trend favours a combination of manned and unmanned systems. Manned aircraft are focusing on contested, high-end missions that require judgment, adaptability, and versatile payloads. Concurrently, unmanned systems are being employed in persistent, attritable, and mass-effect roles.

The adaptation to this hybrid model is no longer merely a tactical requirement; it has become a strategic necessity.

 

Q2.  Russia’s Su-57 and the US F-35 embody different philosophies — one emphasises air combat, the other network-centric warfare. Whose future will it be?

The Su-57 seems to reflect the traditional Russian emphasis on kinematic performance and super-manoeuvrability.

The F-35 is claimed to be built around sensor fusion and battlespace awareness. It is advertised as capable of detecting, classifying, and engaging the threat at beyond-visual-range distances through a data architecture spanning an entire networked force.

Future aerial combat is progressing towards a network-centric model. Contemporary air engagements are increasingly determined by the priority of achieving information and decision dominance, rather than by performance alone.

Compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline is now as critical as speed or manoeuvrability. This is fundamentally a problem of decision architecture, not merely of technology.

The sixth-generation programmes are pushing emerging platforms toward multi-domain integration.  Fusion of air, space, cyber, and electronic warfare into a single operational architecture will make the network-centric model more definitive.

 

Q3.  China already has the J-20. Has India delayed the AMCA too long, or is it still possible to turn the situation around?

It is a fact that India’s timeline has slipped. The J-20 has been operational for nearly a decade. China is already iterating toward a sixth-generation capability, as evidenced by the prototypes that emerged publicly in late 2024.

AMCA is still working through prototype development. The gap is significant and widening. Reversal of the trend is a realistic necessity.

India can recover lost ground in fighter development if the programme is properly resourced, executed and politically backed.

A significant structural shift is also underway with the Ministry of Defence opening AMCA prototype development to private consortia rather than relying exclusively on the public-sector model.

The window to close the capability gap exists. It will not remain open indefinitely, and the margin for complacency on programme management is close to zero.

 

Q4.  In the wars to come, will Artificial Intelligence and Loyal Wingman drones be more important than pilots?

The pilot does not become less important. His job changes, and in some respects becomes more demanding, not less.

Manned-unmanned combat air teams would have one crewed aircraft effectively commanding a tactical formation of attritable unmanned assets, absorbing risk that would otherwise fall on the manned platform, carrying missiles, jammers, decoys, or forward reconnaissance payloads.

What AI is changing is the speed and volume of decision-making below the human threshold.

AI-enabled satellites and sensors, capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing targets, can push that picture directly to the shooter over tactical data links, rather than routing it back through a ground station first. That is what compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline. However, human intervention cannot be removed from the kill chain.

As of now, the human crew retains authority over decisions that carry lethal and political consequences, while AI absorbs the burden of processing, prioritising, and routing information faster than any human can.

So, AI and unmanned teaming will unquestionably become more important than they are today. But the human crew would remain relevant and in control.

The pilot of 2040 will be managing a far more complex battle picture, commanding a digital wolfpack rather than flying a single aircraft.

 

Q5.  If India has the opportunity to purchase the F-35 or the Su-57, should we go ahead and purchase them, or stick to developing our own aircraft?

These are not competing choices, and treating them as such leads to a false dilemma.

The IAF’s squadron strength shortfall is real, immediate, and strategically significant. The Rafale has helped close that numerical gap, but has not closed it.

Further, there is a case for qualitative enhancement by the induction of fifth-generation aircraft.

The F-35 carries substantial geopolitical weight, end-use restrictions, and software dependency. Cost, delivery timelines, extended supply chains, Transfer of technology and trust deficit are other factors to be taken into account.

Russia has been a trusted partner, willing to share its technology to a certain extent and accepting Make in India. The Su-57 also raises several concerns besides the factors listed above. India had earlier walked out of the co-development program mainly due to concerns related to cost and technology sharing.

Neither platform offers a clean, dependency-free solution. The importance of self-reliance in defence production is a common lesson emerging from recent wars. The Indigenous program (AMCA) is some time away and urgently needs a technology infusion.

The logical answer is to plug the gap pragmatically by expanding the Rafale order and carefully reassessing the induction of fifth-generation aircraft, while protecting AMCA’s funding and schedule as a non-negotiable national priority.

The near-term interim acquisition and the long-term indigenous programme must be advanced concurrently. The contract should be negotiated in a manner that boosts the indigenous programme rather than undermining it.

 

Q6.  Is engine technology still India’s biggest weakness today?

The answer is YES. The Tejas Mark 1A flies on the American GE F404. AMCA’s initial squadrons will likely depend on an imported engine in the ninety-kilonewton class. The latest news is that negotiations for the GE 414 engine for AMCA have hit rough weather due to a 300 per cent cost increase.

India still does not have a proven indigenous engine anywhere near the ninety to one hundred ten kilonewton range required for a credible fifth or sixth-generation fighter. The Kaveri programme, running since the mid-1980s, is the most visible illustration of how difficult this problem is. High-performance turbofan technology demands a combination of high-temperature metallurgy, single-crystal turbine blade manufacturing, precision tolerances, and decades of iterative test data that very few nations have accumulated.

Urgent need of the hour is a deal that includes a degree of co-production and technology transfer for engine manufacturing in India. Co-production extends the supply chain into India, but it does not give India the ability to independently design, test, and certify a clean-sheet high-thrust engine. Engine independence remains the single weakest link in the self-reliance story.

 

Q7.  Will the export of fighter jets become an increasingly important geopolitical tool?

Fighter exports are already an important geopolitical tool, and their leverage is intensifying rather than diminishing.

Fighter exports create decades of dependency for the buyer. The seller retains influence over the buyer’s operational readiness (by supplying spares, software updates, weapons integration, training pipelines, and maintenance protocols). This dependency lasts for the life of the platform (often 30 to 40 years after the sale).

India’s own indigenous push is a deliberate effort to reduce exposure to precisely this kind of dependency.  India’s active promotion of the Tejas and its indigenous missile systems in Southeast Asia, West Africa, and the Gulf reflects a clear understanding that defence exports are as much an instrument of foreign policy as of industrial economics. Future fighter sales will be negotiated as much on reliability of supply and strategic alignment as on cost or raw capability.

 

Q8.  What are India’s greatest achievements and biggest challenges in defence self-reliance?

Tejas moving from a deeply troubled programme to a credible inducted fighter is, to a certain extent, an achievement.  The development of indigenous rotary-wing platforms (Dhruv, Rudra, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand) demonstrates that the industrial capacity extends beyond fast jets. The Astra beyond-visual-range missile and the continued maturation of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile represent genuine capability in the weapons domain. The missile and space programs are doing comparatively well.

Perhaps most significantly, India’s defence production turnover has grown substantially over the past decade. The country has moved from being almost exclusively an arms importer to a growing exporter, which is a structural shift that would have seemed improbable fifteen years ago.

The challenges are equally tangible. Squadron strength remains well below the sanctioned forty-two. Force multipliers, tankers, airborne early warning and control platforms are inadequate in numbers for a force that needs to project across two frontiers simultaneously. Engine technology remains unresolved.

The achievements prove India can build technically demanding systems. What remains unproven is whether it can build them at the pace and scale that the threat environment now demands.

 

Q9.  How will the Indian Air Force look in 2040, compared to today?

By 2040, assuming the squadron strength target is met or even meaningfully mitigated, the IAF should be a genuinely different force, operating on a different conceptual basis.

AMCA should be in serial production, forming the high-end backbone alongside an upgraded Rafale fleet and a substantially modernised Su-30MKI. The Tejas Mark 2 and the twin-engine deck-based fighter should round out the order of battle, bringing the indigenous content of the combat fleet to a level inconceivable at the beginning of this decade.

Loyal Wingman and unmanned systems would be standard formation elements rather than experimental adjuncts.

AI-assisted Space-based ISR would be integrated into the network.

The UCAV and other Unmanned platforms will significantly enhance airpower capabilities.

If the present trajectory and pace are sustained, by 2040 the IAF should be more networked, more integrated with the space and cyber domains, and far less dependent on foreign supply chains than anything currently in service.

 

Q10.  If you had to identify one defining trend in air warfare over the next twenty years, what would it be?

The shift from platform-centric to weapon-centric airpower operating in a networked environment. The idea that the decisive factor in air combat is increasingly not which aircraft you fly, but how fast you can sense, decide, and act across a distributed force. Ada result:

The sensor-to-shooter timeline will get shortened further.

Space-based satellites with onboard AI capable of detecting, classifying, and cueing the targets will push that picture directly to the shooter.

Manned and unmanned systems will operate as a single collaborative entity rather than parallel fleets.

Mastery of the electromagnetic spectrum, with digital and cognitive dimensions layered on top, would become essential.

Stealth, hypersonics, manoeuvrability, drone swarms, and directed energy technologies/capabilities would follow this shift.

The air forces that adapt to it early will hold the operational advantage in 2040 and beyond. The ones that keep procuring better individual platforms while neglecting the architecture around them (i.e. modern equipment running on an outdated decision framework) will find themselves technologically current but operationally lagging.

 

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625: F-35 DILEMMA REVISITED: BALANCING AFFORDABILITY, CAPABILITY AND TRADE-OFFS.

 

My Article published on the EurasianTimes Website on 19 Mar 25.

 

In an interesting development, Portugal, Canada, and Germany are hesitating over the F-35. These developments can be both a challenge and an opportunity for India, whether India should jump into the fray and take the risk or stay away.

 

Indian Worries. India’s worries include operational and maintenance challenges, US policy uncertainty and technology transfer issues. Countries reconsidering their F-35 purchases usually cite concerns about high operational costs, maintenance complexities, and reliability issues. If a country like Canada, with a strong NATO supply chain, has problems, India, without an established F-35 ecosystem, could face serious logistics nightmares. India has historically struggled with restrictive American defence deals (e.g., CAATSA concerns with Russia). If Canada and Portugal are reconsidering under U.S. influence, India’s potential F-35 deal might come with diplomatic strings attached. Moreover, the U.S. is unlikely to share deep tech integration rights.

 

Opportunity. On the bright side, the cancellations by these countries could open up production slots, potentially leading to expedited deliveries if India proceeds with an F-35 deal. Furthermore, under these circumstances, Lockheed Martin may be more accommodating in pricing or support agreements with India. A limited number of F-35s could act as a stepping stone to India’s indigenous AMCA program, providing valuable 5th-gen combat experience until India develops its own.

 

Balancing Affordability and Capability.  Balancing affordability and capability in fighter acquisition programs is a complex and intellectually stimulating challenge in defence procurement. Modern fighter jets, with their advanced avionics, stealth technology, and weapons systems, are not just engineering marvels but also strategic assets that can dominate air, land, and sea. However, these capabilities come at a steep cost, and governments must grapple with budgetary constraints while ensuring their air forces remain capable of addressing current and future threats.

 

Trade-offs. Understanding and navigating the myriad trade-offs in fighter aircraft acquisition programs are a cornerstone of defence procurement. Balancing performance, cost, operational requirements, and strategic objectives is a complex task that governments and military planners must master to ensure optimal capability within the constraints of their resources. This knowledge empowers decision-makers and enhances the effectiveness of defence strategies.

 

Trade-Offs for Consideration in Fighter Acquisition Programs

Cost vs. Capability. A fundamental trade-off in fighter acquisition is between cost and capability. High-end fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 and the F-22 offer unparalleled performance but come at an exorbitant price. More cost-effective alternatives, such as the F-16 or the Gripen, may lack some advanced features but remain viable options for many air forces. Nations must decide whether to prioritise cutting-edge technology or opt for a more extensive fleet with slightly reduced capabilities.

 

Multirole Flexibility vs. Specialisation. Many modern fighters, such as the F-35 and Rafale, are designed as multirole platforms capable of performing air-to-air, air-to-ground, and electronic warfare missions. This flexibility reduces fleet diversity but may lead to compromises in specific roles. In contrast, specialised aircraft like the A-10 Thunderbolt II excel in close air support but lack air superiority capabilities. Decision-makers must weigh whether a single multirole platform meets their needs or if specialised aircraft are necessary.

 

Short-Term vs. Long-Term Investment. Some nations prioritise acquiring proven, off-the-shelf platforms that provide immediate operational capability, while others invest in the long-term development of next-generation aircraft. The former minimises short-term risks but may become outdated sooner. The latter approach, seen in programs like the Tempest and NGAD, is high-risk but ensures future technological superiority.

 

Fleet Size vs. High-End Technology. Budget constraints often force militaries to choose between a more extensive fleet of less advanced fighters or a smaller number of top-tier aircraft. A more comprehensive fleet provides more coverage and sortie rates, while a smaller fleet of high-end fighters offers superior combat capability. For instance, many nations supplement their fleets of expensive stealth aircraft with cheaper fourth-generation fighters to maintain numbers.

 

Capability vs. Quantity. Nations must decide between procuring fewer advanced jets or a more extensive fleet of less capable aircraft. For instance, the U.S. chose to supplement its high-end F-22 fleet with the more affordable F-35, while countries like China and Russia have emphasised quantity to ensure strategic depth.

 

Indigenous Development vs. Foreign Procurement. Countries face a strategic choice between developing domestic fighter programs and purchasing from foreign suppliers. Indigenous programs, such as India’s Tejas/AMCA or South Korea’s KF-21, promote self-sufficiency but require significant research and industrial infrastructure investment. Buying foreign jets ensures immediate capability but can lead to dependency on external suppliers.

 

Indigenous Fighter Development for Cost-Effectiveness. India’s HAL Tejas was developed to reduce reliance on foreign fighters while maintaining affordability. Designed with modular upgrades in mind, the Tejas has gradually improved with better radar, weapons integration, and avionics. Despite delays in development, its affordability compared to Western counterparts has made it an attractive option for India’s long-term air power strategy.

 

Balancing Affordability and Capability

Balancing affordability and capability in fighter acquisition programs is a complex but essential task for modern air forces. Governments must ensure that their aircraft provide operational effectiveness without exceeding budgetary constraints. The following best practices help achieve this balance.

 

Comprehensive Lifecycle Planning. A fighter jet’s cost extends far beyond its initial acquisition price. Governments must consider long-term expenses, including operation, maintenance, upgrades, and eventual disposal. Comprehensive lifecycle cost analysis, which involves estimating all costs associated with a system over its entire life, helps mitigate budgetary surprises and ensures financial sustainability over decades of service.

 

Incremental Upgrades. Modern fighter jets should have modular systems and open architectures to accommodate incremental upgrades. This approach extends an aircraft’s service life while spreading costs over time. The F-16 Fighting Falcon, introduced in the 1970s, remains operational due to continuous upgrades in avionics, radar, and weapons. This strategy prevents obsolescence while reducing the need for costly new aircraft acquisitions.

 

Focus on Multi-Role Capability. Multi-role fighters provide greater operational flexibility by performing various missions with a single platform. The Dassault Rafale exemplifies this concept, capable of air-to-air combat, ground attack, and reconnaissance missions. This versatility allows air forces to reduce the number of specialised aircraft types, simplifying logistics and maintenance while lowering overall costs.

 

Prioritising Export Potential. Designing fighter jets with exportability in mind helps amortise development costs and reduce per-unit expenses. Countries that successfully market their fighters to foreign buyers can reinvest revenues into further technological advancements.

 

Emerging Trends and Technologies. Technological advancements are reshaping how air forces balance affordability and capability. The following emerging trends offer cost-effective solutions while enhancing combat effectiveness.

 

Unmanned Systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ‘loyal wingman’ drones, which are autonomous aircraft that operate alongside manned aircraft, complement traditional fighter jets by taking on high-risk missions at a lower cost. These platforms can conduct reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and combat operations without endangering pilots. Programs like the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat highlight the growing role of UAVs and ‘loyal wingman’ drones in modern air combat.

 

Artificial Intelligence. AI-powered systems improve decision-making, enhance situational awareness, and reduce pilot workload. Advanced AI integration enables autonomous operations, making fighters more effective while potentially reducing crew training costs. AI-driven mission planning and adaptive combat algorithms are key to next-generation fighter capabilities.

 

Conclusion

Balancing affordability and capability in fighter acquisition programs is a complex but essential endeavour. As nations face evolving threats and fiscal constraints, the ability to make strategic trade-offs will determine their air power’s effectiveness. By embracing innovative technologies and fostering international collaboration, governments can achieve an optimal balance that ensures operational readiness and financial sustainability.

 

India traditionally prefers non-restrictive platforms like the Rafale and Su-30MKI that allow customisation. The F-35, despite its advanced stealth and networking, is deeply tied to U.S. control mechanisms. If Germany, Canada, and Portugal, NATO allies with solid U.S. interoperability, are hesitating, India must be doubly cautious before signing anything. The Big Question, however, remains whether India should even consider the F-35. After analysing the factors mentioned earlier, the current answer is negative (even with faster delivery schedules).  

 

For considering the F-35 as a potential option for India, several critical concerns must be addressed to make it a viable choice. Foremost among these is the issue of technology transfer and support to Indigenous aircraft development. Operational sovereignty is essential, as any restrictions imposed by the U.S. could limit India’s ability to integrate indigenous systems and conduct independent upgrades. Cost considerations (including procurement, maintenance, and lifecycle expenses) must be carefully weighed against alternative platforms. Geopolitical reliability is another key factor, given past U.S. sanctions and export restrictions that could impact fleet sustainability. Finally, interoperability with India’s existing fleet and infrastructure must be thoroughly assessed to ensure seamless integration without excessive logistical burdens. Addressing these concerns through ironclad agreements and long-term strategic assurances would be essential for India even to consider the F-35 option (in limited numbers).

 

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Link to the article on the website:-

U.S.-China Tensions: F-16 Vipers To Get LRASM Capability That Could Puncture World’s Biggest Navy

 

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624: F-35 Stealth Vs Beast Mode

 

Israel’s recent revelation about deploying the F-35 in beast mode, carrying weapons externally during aerial strikes, prompts a deeper exploration. This strategic decision, while compromising the aircraft’s stealth, is a calculated move. The understanding of going beast mode over Gaza, with its negligible air defence, is clear. However, the prospect of employing this mode in Lebanon or Iran, with their formidable air defences, presents a complex operational challenge. This raises the question: what are the operational intricacies of using the beast mode in such scenarios?

 

The F-35, in its ‘stealth mode,’ carries weapons internally, effectively reducing its radar signature. However, when it transitions to ‘beast mode,’ carrying weapons externally, it sacrifices this stealth advantage for increased firepower. This Trade-off is a crucial consideration in military operations.

 

In “beast mode,” it carries additional munitions on external pylons. This configuration increases the aircraft’s radar cross-section (RCS), making it more detectable by enemy radar.

 

Beast mode increases the F-35’s firepower by allowing it to carry more ordnance, maximising strike efficiency against numerous ground targets.

 

However, Israel’s use of the F-35 in beast mode likely depends on the specific operational environment and objectives.

 

The Beast Mode can be used in the following operational scenarios:-

    • The enemy has no air defence capability or weapons.
    • SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) missions have degraded the enemy’s radar and SAM capabilities.
    • One way to mitigate the risks of flying in beast mode is by staying out of the enemy’s air defence weapons range. This can be achieved through intelligence-supported operational planning and/or stand-off attacks. The role of intelligence and meticulous planning in these operations cannot be overstated.
    • Using escort and suppression support from electronic warfare platforms to mitigate the risks of flying in beast mode.

 

Low Threat Environment (Gaza Strikes). Against Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza, stealth is unnecessary since they lack sophisticated radar-guided air defences. Beast mode can be used in a risk environment to maximise firepower.

 

Lebanon (Hezbollah) Strikes. Hezbollah has comparatively more advanced air defence capabilities than Hamas, including Iranian-made radars and some older Russian SAMs. Beast mode can be used in a medium-risk environment by avoiding enemy air defences.

 

Iran Strikes—A Different Challenge. Iran operates a more sophisticated air defence network. Using beast mode over Iran would be risky because the F-35 would be much more visible on Iranian radar, and Iran’s long-range SAMs could engage the aircraft before it reaches the target. Beast mode can be used in a high-risk environment after neutralising enemy air defences.

 

Link to the article by Sakshi Tiwari :-

After 1st Combat Use Of F-35, Israel Achieves Another First By Flying Adir Stealth Fighters In “Beast Mode”

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