Geo-politics – Page 20 – Air Marshal's Perspective

April 30, 2025June 9, 2025

662:OP SINDOOR – INDIA’S WATER CANNON AGAINST PAKISTAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM: INDUS WATER TREATY

My article was published on the “Life of Soldier” website

on 29 Apr 25.

“Blood and water cannot flow together”

– Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi

The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan, signed on September 19, 1960, in Karachi by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The World Bank brokered it and governs the use of the Indus River system, which includes six rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The Indus River system is critical for both countries’ irrigation, hydropower, and drinking water.

India held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on April 23, 2025, following the Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed 26 civilians. India’s decision, citing national security concerns, grants it greater control over the western rivers, potentially impacting Pakistan’s agriculture and water supply. Pakistan condemned the move as an “act of war,” suspending the Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but lacks enforcement power. This development heightens regional instability and raises concerns about future conflicts and diplomatic relations.

Key Provisions

Division of Rivers. Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) are allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, except for limited Indian uses (e.g., domestic, non-consumptive, and specified agricultural purposes). Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) are allocated to India for unrestricted use.

Water Sharing. Pakistan receives about 80% of the Indus system’s water (around 135 million acre-feet annually), while India gets 20%.

Infrastructure. India can build run-of-the-river dams on Western Rivers for hydropower, but cannot store water beyond specified limits. Pakistan can object to designs that violate the treaty.

Permanent Indus Commission. A bilateral body with representatives from both countries meets regularly to monitor implementation, share data, and resolve disputes.

Context and Significance.

The treaty was necessitated by the 1947 partition, which split the Indus basin, leaving canal headworks in India and irrigated lands in Pakistan. A 1948 standoff, when India briefly cut off water to Pakistan, underscored the need for a formal agreement. It is considered one of the most successful water-sharing treaties globally, surviving three wars.

The Indus system originates in the Himalayas, with major tributaries flowing through Indian-administered Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistani-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, making it geopolitically sensitive. In 2016, after a terrorist attack in Uri, India reviewed the treaty. In 2022 and 2023, India issued notices to Pakistan for treaty modification, citing “fundamental changes” like cross-border terrorism and environmental challenges, but no formal revocation has occurred. In 2023, Pakistan sought arbitration over Kishanganga and Ratle, while India challenged the arbitration process, preferring Neutral Expert resolution.

Pakistan, heavily dependent on the Indus for 90% of its water needs, fears reduced flows due to Indian projects or climate change. Delays in its storage infrastructure (e.g., Diamer-Bhasha Dam) exacerbate vulnerabilities. Glacial melt, erratic monsoons, and floods (e.g., 2010, 2022) strain the treaty’s framework, which lacks provisions for climate adaptation.

Recent Development

India has officially held the IWT with Pakistan in abeyance, marking a significant shift in bilateral relations. This decision was announced on April 23, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. India invoked Article XII(3) of the IWT and sent a formal notice to Pakistan. The Ministry of Jal Shakti cited Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism, shifting demographics, and energy demands as reasons the agreement could no longer continue “in good faith.”

With the treaty placed in abeyance, India is no longer obligated to share information regarding water storage levels or flow in the rivers of the Indus River System with Pakistan. India has ceased sharing hydrological data (e.g., water flow, snowmelt, flood updates) with Pakistan, halted technical meetings, and stopped allowing Pakistani inspections of Indian projects. India is no longer bound by treaty restrictions on building storage or hydropower projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab).

Adverse Impact on Pakistan

India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) poses significant adverse impacts on Pakistan, particularly in agriculture, water supply, energy, and economic stability.

Agriculture. Pakistan relies on the Indus River system for 80% of its irrigated agriculture, supporting 16 million hectares of farmland. The western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) allocated to Pakistan under the IWT provide 93% of its irrigation water. A 10-20% reduction in water availability could lead to significant declines in agricultural output, threatening food security and rural livelihoods. Pakistan’s agriculture sector, which employs 40% of the workforce and contributes 24% to GDP, faces severe risks. While India’s current infrastructure limits immediate large-scale water diversion, future dams or storage projects could reduce water availability, especially during critical sowing seasons (e.g., Rabi and Kharif), reduced flows could lower crop yields for wheat, rice, and cotton—key staples and export crops.

Water Scarcity in Urban Centres. Major cities like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, and Faisalabad depend on the Indus and its tributaries for drinking water and industrial use. Any reduction in river flows, even temporary, could exacerbate existing water scarcity. Pakistan already faces a per capita water availability of ~1,000 cubic meters, close to the “water scarce” threshold. Water rationing, public health crises, and industrial slowdowns could occur, particularly in Punjab and Sindh provinces, which rely heavily on the Indus.

Energy Sector. Pakistan generates significant electricity from hydropower plants like Tarbela (3,478 MW) and Mangla (1,000 MW), which rely on consistent river flows from the Indus and Jhelum. Reduced or irregular water flows could lower power generation, worsening Pakistan’s energy crisis. For example, a 10% reduction in Tarbela’s water inflow could cut its output by hundreds of megawatts, affecting millions of households.

Economic. Energy shortages could disrupt industrial production and increase reliance on costly imported fuels, straining Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves. A decline in crop production would reduce export revenues (e.g., rice and cotton) and increase food import costs, exacerbating Pakistan’s trade deficit. Reduced agricultural output could lead to job losses in rural areas, driving migration to urban centers and rising social unrest. Higher food and energy prices and potential infrastructure damage from flooding (if India releases water abruptly) could fuel inflation. Pakistan’s external debt (~$130 billion in 2025) limits its ability to fund mitigation measures. A 2023 World Bank study estimated that a 20% reduction in Indus water flows could shave 5-7% off Pakistan’s GDP over a decade.

Social and Political Fallout. Water shortages could spark protests, particularly in Sindh and Punjab, where water allocation disputes between provinces are already contentious. Provinces like Sindh, which rely on downstream flows, may accuse Punjab of hoarding water, exacerbating internal political divides.

India’s Justification and Legitimacy.

India’s justification and Legitimacy for holding in abeyance the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) hinges on the principle of a “fundamental change of circumstances,” as outlined in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. New Delhi argues that Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism, especially following incidents like the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, violates the underlying premise of peaceful bilateral relations that formed the basis of the IWT in 1960. India contends that a country facilitating terrorist activity cannot expect continued cooperation on vital issues like water sharing. While the IWT lacks a unilateral withdrawal clause, India maintains that suspension, not withdrawal, can be a legitimate, proportionate response to persistent security threats.

Diplomatic and Legal Aspects

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called the suspension an “act of war” and announced retaliatory measures, including suspending the 1972 Simla Agreement and closing the Wagah border.

Pakistan may seek World Bank mediation or international arbitration. The IWT lacks a unilateral exit clause, and India’s suspension may not be easily challenged under international law if framed as a response to terrorism (per Article 62, Vienna Convention). Experts argue India’s suspension is permissible under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, citing a “fundamental change of circumstances” due to Pakistan’s alleged terrorism support for terrorism. The World Bank, a treaty signatory, has urged dialogue but cannot enforce compliance.

Pakistan may seek neutral expert mediation or arbitration, but India’s refusal to cooperate could render these mechanisms ineffective. Escalating the issue to the UN or other forums may gain Pakistan sympathy but will unlikely force India to reverse the suspension.

The Only Way out for Pakistan.

The only viable way for Pakistan to restore the Indus Waters Treaty is through diplomatic engagement coupled with tangible actions to address India’s core security concerns, particularly those related to cross-border terrorism. India’s decision, justified under the “fundamental change of circumstances” clause in international law, is rooted in accusations of Pakistan’s support for militant activities. Therefore, Pakistan would need to:-

Stop escalatory rhetoric (including regular and brash nuclear sabre rattling) and retaliatory actions, as these would only harden India’s stance.

Demonstrate a verifiable crackdown on terror infrastructure operating from its territory, especially groups targeting India.

Offer security guarantees and confidence-building measures that acknowledge India’s national security concerns to rebuild trust and initiate fresh dialogue.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s path to treaty restoration lies not just in legal appeals but in restructuring the political and security context in which the treaty was suspended. Only by addressing the root causes—especially terrorism—can the IWT be revived in a stable, sustainable way.

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https://www.lifeofsoldiers.com/2025/04/29/indias-water-cannon-against-pakistan-sponsored-terrorism-indus-water-treaty/

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

References:-

Financial Times. “Undermining the Indus Waters Treaty imperils Indian security.” April 26, 2025.

Reuters. “India suspends Indus Waters Treaty after Pahalgam terror attack.” April 23, 2025.

Al Jazeera. “Pakistan calls Indus Treaty suspension ‘an act of war’.” April 24, 2025.

The Hindu. “India halts hydrological data sharing with Pakistan under Indus Treaty.” April 25, 2025.

BBC. “Water Wars? India wields Indus Treaty amid rising tensions with Pakistan.” April 27, 2025.

Dawn. “Pakistan to seek World Bank mediation on Indus Treaty row with India.” April 28, 2025.

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Indus Treaty as a Strategic Lever: Implications for India’s National Security. Issue Brief, 2023.

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. India’s Water Diplomacy: Reclaiming the Strategic Narrative. Observer Research Foundation, 2023.

Observer Research Foundation (ORF). India’s Options under the Indus Waters Treaty: A Strategic Overview. 2022.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Resolving India-Pakistan Water Disputes: A Legal and Strategic Perspective. 2020.

International Crisis Group. Water Pressure: Climate Risk and Security in Pakistan. ICG Asia Report No. 297, 2018.

World Bank. Indus Waters Treaty and Current Status of Disputes. [World Bank Briefing Note, 2023].

Wirsing, Robert G. The Indus Waters Treaty: Political Stability and Water Security in South Asia. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2013.

Salman, Salman M.A. The Indus Waters Treaty: A History of a Treaty that has Survived Wars and Disputes. Water International, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2011.

April 24, 2025April 21, 2025

658: RARE EARTH AS RARE WEAPON: INDIA’S OPPORTUNITY, AND CHALLENGE

My Article was published on the Eurasian Times website

on 21 Apr 25.

On 04 April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium) and rare earth magnets, requiring special export licenses. This move, a retaliation to U.S. tariffs as high as 145%, has halted shipments from Chinese ports, severely impacting U.S. industries like defence, electric vehicles, and medical technology.

The U.S. relies heavily on China for REEs, with over 50% of its critical minerals sourced there. China’s restrictions threaten U.S. defence (F-35 jets, missiles), tech (smartphones, AI chips), and healthcare (MRI machines, cancer treatments). Analysts warn of shortages, price hikes, and delays, with some companies facing permanent supply cuts.

Rare earth elements (REEs), a group of 17 chemically similar elements including scandium, yttrium, and the 15 lanthanides, are critical to modern technology. Often dubbed the “vitamins of modern industry,” REEs are indispensable, from smartphones and electric vehicle batteries to advanced military systems and renewable energy infrastructure. However, their supply chain is heavily concentrated, with China dominating global production and processing. This dominance has transformed rare earths into a potent geopolitical tool, particularly in trade wars, most notably between the United States and China.

For India, a country rich in rare earth potential but limited in production and processing capacity, this presents an urgent strategic opportunity and a daunting set of challenges. As the global balance of power shifts, New Delhi must rethink its resource security strategy, especially in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry and the growing importance of resilient supply chains.

Rare Earths: Strategic Importance

Rare earth elements comprise a group of 17 chemically similar metals: the 15 lanthanides, scandium, and yttrium. Despite their name, these elements are relatively abundant in the Earth’s crust but rarely found in concentrated forms economically viable to mine. Their unique magnetic, luminescent, and electrochemical properties make them indispensable to various high-tech applications.

- Neodymium is essential for high-performance magnets in electric motors, drones, and wind turbines.
- Europium and terbium are used in fluorescent and LED lighting.
- Lanthanum is used in camera lenses and hybrid vehicle batteries.
- Yttrium finds applications in radar and superconductors.
- Gadolinium and terbium are critical for military sensors, sonar systems, and advanced imaging technologies.
- Cerium and lanthanum are used in catalysts for refining petroleum.

The global demand for REEs has surged with the rise of green technologies and digital economies. The International Energy Agency projects that demand for specific REEs, like neodymium, could increase tenfold by 2040 to meet net-zero emissions goals. As of 2022, the global rare earth market was valued at approximately USD 3.9 billion, and is expected to reach USD 9.6 billion by 2030, growing at a CAGR of over 10% annually due to rising demand from clean energy and defence sectors (Fortune Business Insights, 2023).

China’s Dominance in the Global Rare Earth Chain

China’s strategic approach to rare earths began in the 1980s. Offering low prices and absorbing environmental costs drove many competitors out of the market, especially in the U.S., Australia, and India. 1992 Deng Xiaoping famously stated, “The Middle East has oil. China has rare earths.” This foresight has translated into geopolitical leverage.

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, in 2022, China accounted for approximately 70% of global rare earth mining, over 90% of refining and processing, and 90% of rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing (International Energy Agency, 2021). This concentration gives China significant leverage in international trade disputes.

Rare Earths in Trade War

The U.S.-China trade war, which escalated in 2018 under the Trump administration, saw tariffs, export controls, and technological decoupling dominate bilateral relations. Rare earths quickly emerged as a flashpoint. In 2010, China briefly restricted rare earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute, causing global prices to spike and exposing the risks of supply chain dependence. This incident foreshadowed China’s willingness to use REEs as a bargaining chip.

In 2019, amid escalating trade tensions, Chinese state media hinted at curbing rare earth exports to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s visit to a rare earth processing facility in Jiangxi province was widely interpreted to signal China’s readiness to leverage its dominance. The U.S., heavily reliant on Chinese REEs for commercial and military applications, faced a stark vulnerability. For example, the F-35 fighter jet program depends on rare earth magnets, and any disruption could halt production.

China’s control extends beyond raw materials to the processing and manufacturing of REE-based components. Even if other countries mine rare earths, they often send them to China for refining due to its advanced infrastructure and lower costs. This creates a choke point that China can exploit during trade disputes. In 2023, China introduced export controls on certain rare earth technologies, further tightening its grip and prompting concerns about supply chain security. On April 4, 2025, China imposed new export restrictions on seven critical medium and heavy rare earth elements.

Economic and Geopolitical Implications

The weaponisation of rare earths has far-reaching consequences. For importing nations, supply disruptions can cripple industries, inflate costs, and delay technological advancements. In 2010, Japan’s automotive and electronics sectors faced production delays due to China’s export restrictions. Similarly, a sustained cut off to the U.S. could disrupt everything from consumer electronics to defence manufacturing.

For China, rare earths are a double-edged sword. While they provide leverage, overusing this tool risks alienating trading partners and accelerating efforts to diversify supply chains. China’s domestic demand for REEs is also rising, particularly for its electric vehicle and renewable energy sectors, which could limit its ability to restrict exports without harming its economy.

Globally, the rare earth trade war underscores the fragility of critical mineral supply chains. Countries like Australia, Canada, and the European Union have recognised the need for resilience, but building alternative supply chains requires significant investment and time. Environmental regulations and high capital costs further complicate efforts to scale up mining and processing outside China.

India’s Untapped Potential

India is not immune to this dynamic. Although it holds the fifth-largest rare earth reserves in the world, estimated at 6.9 million tonnes (USGS, 2023), India contributes only around 1% of global rare earth production. This is due to regulatory, environmental, and infrastructure barriers.

Opportunities for India. The U.S. and its allies actively seek to reduce their reliance on China for REEs. This allows India to become an alternative supplier, particularly in downstream value chains like magnets, batteries, and high-end components. A robust rare earth industry could enhance India’s economic security and bargaining power in international diplomacy. It can also reduce import dependency for key sectors such as defence and renewable energy. Developing a domestic rare earth value chain can create high-skilled jobs and foster innovation in materials science, metallurgy, and green technologies, which are critical for India’s future economic growth. India’s monazite deposits are rich in thorium, a potential future fuel for nuclear reactors. While radiological concerns complicate extraction, if thorium-based reactors become viable, they could offer a strategic advantage.

India’s Approach. India’s rare earth sector is primarily led by Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL), a public sector entity under the Department of Atomic Energy. The National Critical Minerals Mission, launched in 2024, aims to bolster domestic production. IREL plans to quadruple its mining capacity to 50 million tonnes annually by 2032, increasing REE output from 5,000 to 15,000 tonnes. Investments in processing and separation facilities aim to address India’s lag in midstream capabilities, though technical expertise remains a bottleneck.

- Policy Reforms and Liberalisation. In 2023, India initiated policy changes to attract private players into critical mineral exploration. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act now allows private companies to bid to explore critical minerals, including REEs (Ministry of Mines, 2023). This is a significant shift from the earlier state-dominated regime.

- Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation. India has begun forging rare earth supply chain partnerships with like-minded democracies. Under the India-Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership, India has committed to co-invest in Australian REE projects. It also explores partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and the EU under the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP).

- Research and Development. India has stepped up R&D through institutions like the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to develop indigenous REE extraction and separation technologies. Still, the gap in advanced metallurgy and processing know-how remains wide.

- Strategic Stockpiling. India is considering creating strategic reserves for critical minerals similar to those for crude oil. This would buffer supply disruptions, although implementation remains in the early stages.

Challenges Ahead. REE extraction is environmentally damaging and involves toxic waste. India lacks the robust regulatory and technological frameworks to mitigate these hazards, especially given the proximity of mineral-rich areas to ecologically sensitive zones. While mining is a start, the real value lies in processing and manufacturing advanced REE products like permanent magnets. India currently lacks world-class facilities and expertise in this area. Despite recent reforms, bureaucratic red tape, conflicting regulations, and slow implementation continue to plague India’s mining sector. A coherent, industry-friendly policy framework is essential. India’s non-aligned posture and cautious diplomacy can sometimes limit its ability to align with Western-led initiatives fully. Balancing its strategic autonomy while engaging in rare earth diplomacy will be delicate.

Recommendations

Establish a National Critical Minerals Mission, modelled on the success of the Solar Mission, which can bring together ministries, PSUS, private firms, and academia to develop a holistic roadmap.

Encourage joint ventures and public-private partnerships with technologically advanced nations, which can help overcome India’s processing deficiencies.

Incentivise Green Mining and Processing, to ensure sustainability, the use of cleaner technologies and strict environmental guidelines must be incentivised.

Invest in specialised training for mineral extraction, metallurgy, and environmental management to create a workforce for the REE sector.

Prioritise Mining and Processing, focusing on developing mining and midstream capabilities before investing in magnet production and leveraging international partnerships for technology.

Incentivise Private Investment by offering tax breaks and subsidies to attract private capital, addressing IREL’s monopoly legacy.

Expand Strategic Reserves and increase REE stockpiles to buffer against supply disruptions, learning from China’s 2024 embargo.

Conclusion

Rare earths are no longer just a matter of economic competitiveness but a pillar of strategic autonomy. They have become a powerful weapon in the U.S.-China trade war, reflecting the broader struggle for technological and financial supremacy. China’s dominance in the REE supply chain gives it significant leverage but also exposes the vulnerabilities of importing nations. Diversifying, recycling, and innovating are critical to reducing this dependence; however, they require time, investment, and international cooperation. As the world transitions to a greener, tech-driven future, securing a stable supply of rare earths will remain a geopolitical priority. The outcome of this struggle will shape trade relations and the global race for technological leadership.

For China, rare earths are a weapon; for the United States, a vulnerability; and for India, an opportunity. By seizing this moment, India can transform its rare earth sector from a dormant asset into a force multiplier, positioning itself as a consumer and a producer of the materials that will define the 21st century. India’s rare earth diplomacy and trade warfare strategy hinge on leveraging its vast reserves, forging international partnerships, and navigating geopolitical complexities. Opportunities to reduce global reliance on China, boost economic growth, and advance technology are significant, but technical, environmental, and financial challenges persist. By prioritising mining and processing, incentivising private investment, and deepening global alliances, India can establish itself as a pivotal player in the REE supply chain, aligning with its ambition to become a developed nation by 2047.

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Rare Earth As Rare Weapon! Amid US-China ‘Nasty’ Trade War, How Can India Use It’s ‘Dormant Asset’ To Assert Dominance

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

References:-

Mancheri, N. A., Sundaresan, L., & Chandrashekar, S. (2019). India’s Rare Earths Industry: Challenges and Opportunities. Institute for South Asian Studies.

Ministry of Mines, Government of India. (2023). Critical Minerals Strategy and MMDR Amendments. https://mines.gov.in

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). (2022). Thorium and Rare Earth Research. https://barc.gov.in

Niti Aayog (2021). Strategy on Resource Efficiency in Rare Earths and Critical Minerals.

Mineral Security Partnership (MSP). (2024). Overview of Global Cooperation on Critical Minerals. https://www.state.gov/mineral-security-partnership

Press Information Bureau (2023). Government Notifies Critical Minerals List; Amends Mines and Minerals Act.

Fortune Business Insights (2023). Rare Earth Elements Market Size, Share & Industry Analysis.

International Energy Agency (2021). The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions.

US Geological Survey. (2023). Mineral Commodity Summaries: Rare Earths. https://pubs.usgs.gov

Global Times (2019). China is ready to weaponise rare earths in a trade war.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2020). Defence Industrial Base: DOD Efforts to Assess and Mitigate Rare Earth Risks.

April 23, 2025April 21, 2025

657: XI JINPING’S MAGICAL PURGES: MAKING PEOPLE DISAPPEAR

My Article was published on the IIRF website on 21 Apr 25.

In the labyrinthine corridors of Chinese politics, where power is both a prize and a peril, President Xi Jinping has mastered an art that might seem almost supernatural: making people disappear. Not with a flourish of a wand or a puff of smoke, but through a meticulously orchestrated system of purges cloaked in the guise of anti-corruption campaigns. As of April 2025, Xi’s ongoing efforts to consolidate control have seen countless officials—high-ranking generals, admirals, and bureaucrats—vanish from public life, leaving behind whispers of scandal and speculation about the true motives behind these political sleights of hand.

The Vanishing Act: A Series of Disappearances

Xi Jinping’s purges, a phenomenon that is not new but of a scale and relentlessness that has drawn comparisons to historical figures such as Stalin and Mao, represent a significant aspect of Chinese politics. Since assuming power in 2012, Xi has overseen the discipline of over 2.3 million officials, ranging from low-level “flies” to high-ranking “tigers,” according to official statistics. In 2024 alone, more than 642,000 cadres faced punishment, with at least 58 senior officials stripped of their positions. The latest wave, which continues into 2025, has targeted the upper echelons of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including figures like General He Weidong, a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), who has notably been absent from public view since early 2025, and Admiral Miao Hua, who was dismissed in November 2024 for “serious violations of discipline”—a euphemism often signalling corruption or disloyalty.

These disappearances follow a familiar script. An official stops appearing at public events or in state media. Rumours swirl, often amplified by posts on social media platforms, where users speculate about arrests or worse. Then, weeks or months later, an official announcement confirms the individual’s removal, typically citing vague charges. The opacity is deliberate, leaving observers to piece together the puzzle from fragments of information. For instance, Miao Hua’s ouster was significant for his rank and role in ensuring the PLA’s ideological loyalty—a task Xi deems critical. Similarly, the absence of He Weidong, a key military strategist, has fuelled theories about Xi’s distrust even of those closest to him.

The Mechanics of the Magic: How Xi Makes It Happen

Xi’s purges rely on the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the Communist Party’s anti-corruption watchdog, which operates with almost unchecked power. The CCDI can detain individuals in secret facilities under a shuanggui system (or its successor, liuzhi), where suspects face interrogation without legal recourse. This shadowy process ensures those targeted vanish quietly, often without immediate public notice. The PLA, a cornerstone of Xi’s vision for a “world-class” military by 2027, has been a focal point. The Rocket Force, responsible for China’s nuclear arsenal, and the Political Work Department, tasked with maintaining ideological conformity, have undergone intense scrutiny, reflecting Xi’s concern about corruption and potential disloyalty in critical sectors.

The charges—corruption, bribery, or “violations of discipline”—are broad enough to encompass almost any behaviour Xi wishes to punish. Yet, corruption alone doesn’t fully explain the purges. Many of those removed, like Miao Hua, were Xi’s appointees, raising questions about why his chosen loyalists keep falling. Some analysts argue that Xi uses corruption as a pretext to eliminate rivals or those whose loyalty he doubts, echoing Mao’s maxim that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Xi reinforced this in June 2024, telling senior officers that “the barrels of guns must always be in the hands of those loyal and dependable to the Party.” The purges are as much about control as they are about cleaning house.

The Motives: Power, Paranoia, or Both?

Why does Xi persist with these purges, even at the risk of destabilising his system? Several motives emerge. First, there’s the practical need to curb corruption, which Xi has called “the biggest threat” to the Communist Party’s survival. Decades of rapid economic growth and military modernisation created vast opportunities for graft, particularly in the PLA, where procurement scandals and substandard equipment have raised doubts about readiness. Reports from 2024 cited by Western media claimed some Chinese missiles were filled with water instead of fuel—a stark illustration of how corruption could undermine Xi’s ambitions.

Second, the purges served as a tool for consolidating power. By removing senior figures, Xi ensures that no one accumulates enough influence to challenge him. Even his protégés, like Miao Hua or former defence ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, aren’t spared, which suggests a Stalin-like logic: better to purge allies than risk betrayal. This approach, however, carries risks. Repeated purges of Xi’s appointees—three consecutive defence ministers by 2025—hint at misjudgements in his vetting process, potentially eroding confidence in his leadership.

Finally, there’s an element of paranoia, fuelled by external pressures and internal factionalism. China’s tense relations with the U.S. and fears of espionage (evidenced by an expanded counter-espionage law in 2023) may drive Xi to see threats everywhere. Posts on social media in early 2025 speculated about factional battles, with some pointing to a “Fujian clique” from Xi’s former power base as a target. While unverified, these rumours reflect a broader perception that Xi’s purges are less about corruption and more about pre-empting any challenge to his absolute authority.

The Consequences: A Double-Edged Sword

Xi’s purges have reshaped China’s political and military landscape, but their impact is complex. On one hand, they reinforce Xi’s dominance. Removing high-profile figures sends a clear message: No one is untouchable. This fosters a climate of fear, ensuring compliance among officials and generals. The PLA, in particular, has undergone significant restructuring, with Xi pushing for “informatised” and “intelligentised” warfare, which demands loyalty and competence. Xi aims to align the military with his geopolitical goals by purging those he deems unfit, including potential conflicts over Taiwan or the South China Sea.

Yet, the purges come at a cost. Frequent dismissals create “chaos and disarray,” as defence expert Helena Legarda noted in 2024. Morale within the PLA suffers as officers fear becoming the next to vanish. Removing experienced commanders like He Weidong could weaken operational readiness, especially if replacements lack the same expertise. Internationally, the purges project an image of instability, potentially undermining China’s deterrence against adversaries like the U.S. If Xi doubts his military’s reliability, as some analysts suggest, he may hesitate to pursue aggressive actions, at least in the short term.

Moreover, the purges risk alienating Xi’s allies. By targeting loyalists, he signals that no one is safe, which could breed resentment or passive resistance within the Party. The high turnover—9.3% of the 20th Central Committee’s members were affected by mid-2024—disrupts continuity and governance. Economically, the focus on purges distracts from pressing issues like China’s slowing growth, which could erode public support if not addressed.

The Illusion of Control: Can Xi Sustain the Magic?

Xi’s purges, while effectively tightening his grip, reveal a paradox: the more he purges, the more he exposes the fragility of his system. Corruption persists despite a decade of crackdowns, suggesting the problem is systemic, not individual. Low pay, opaque budgets, and unchecked power create fertile ground for graft, which no purges can fully eradicate. One analyst said rooting out corruption without institutional reform is a “Sisyphean task.”

Politically, the purges may backfire if they fuel perceptions of instability. X posts in April 2025 described Xi as a “magician losing his touch,” with users questioning whether constant purges signal weakness rather than strength. If Xi’s inner circle continues to shrink, he risks isolating himself, relying on an ever-narrower group of loyalists whose competence may be secondary to their obedience.

Looking Ahead: The Next Act

As Xi’s third term progresses, the purges show no sign of slowing. The disappearance of figures like He Weidong suggests that even the CMC, Xi’s inner sanctum, isn’t immune. Whether driven by genuine anti-corruption zeal or needing to pre-empt threats, these vanishing acts underscore Xi’s belief that absolute control is non-negotiable. Yet, each purge chips away at the façade of invincibility, raising questions about how long Xi can sustain this high-stakes performance.

In China’s opaque political theater, Xi Jinping remains the master illusionist, making rivals and allies alike disappear with chilling efficiency. But magic, even political magic, has its limits. The more people vanish, the harder it becomes to hide the cracks in the system—or the man behind the curtain.

Conclusion: The Sorcerer’s Shadow

Xi Jinping’s “magical purges” are not magic in the traditional sense but in the political sleight of hand they perform. People vanish, yet no one asks where they went. Their names are erased, yet no one mourns. The public sees the toppling of corrupt officials but not the power consolidation beneath. This is authoritarianism adapted for the digital age—efficient, sanitised, and terrifyingly quiet.

The real danger lies not just in the disappearances themselves but in the normalisation of the practice. In China today, disappearance is no longer extraordinary. It is a tool of governance, an extension of politics by other means. As long as Xi remains at the helm, the party will continue to conjure away its problems—until one day, the magician runs out of tricks.

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Xi Jinping’s Magical Purges: Making People Disappear (by Air Marshal Khosla)

References and credits

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