738 : THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF THE NOTION OF VICTORY IN WARS

 

Article published on the “Life of Soldier” website.

 

Victory in war was previously definitive, concrete things—such as taking land or defeating one’s foes. It is now an elusive, frequently disputed concept, influenced by personal perceptions and diverse objectives. It is no longer solely military victory; it is political pandering, economic interference, or psychological brinksmanship.

Such new-style wars as the current India-Pakistan war are proof of this transformation. Wherein both declare victory, enmeshed in competing narratives, regional stability, and international acknowledgement. Victory today no longer simply lies on the battlefield. It can control the narrative, ravage an enemy’s economy, or forge lasting peace. It is worth debating how perceptions, power imbalance, and worldwide pressures make defining and measuring what “winning” actually does in modern hybrid wars difficult.

 

Historical Background of the Evolution of Victory

Its meaning has evolved through time because it reflects developments in warfare, societal values, and global influences.

Ancient and Medieval (Before the 17th century). Success was typically final, marked by dominance on the battlefield, capture of land, or surrender of the enemy. The Roman conquest of Carthage (Punic Wars, 264–146 BCE) or medieval kingdoms ending up dominating by taking territory over land would be cases in point. Success implied actual acquisition (land, resources) and was quite frequently appended to notions of honour or divine blessing.

Nation-State Era (17th–19th Centuries). With the advent of modern states, the triumph was legalised by treaties and diplomatic recognition (e.g., Treaty of Westphalia, 1648; Treaty of Vienna, 1815). The conflicts had now become based on recognisable winners and losers, reshaping boundaries and establishing a lasting peace.

20th Century – Total Wars.  World War I and World War II remade victory as the total destruction of the enemy regimes, typically followed by unconditional surrender (Germany and Japan in 1945, for example).  Victory entailed eliminating the enemy’s war-fighting capacity, occupation, and regime change (democratisation of post-World War II Japan, for example).

Cold War Period (1947–1991). The victory was not so much a matter of outright military triumph but rather of control over ideology, economics, and geography. The West and the United States “won” the Cold War by means of economic pressure and the use of proxy wars (e.g., Korea, Vietnam) and not a climactic battle.

Post-Cold War New Wars. Asymmetric and hybrid wars (i.e., insurgencies, cyber war) have blurred the idea of victory. Military supremacy is not invariably translatable to political or social victory, as one has seen with the American interventions in Afghanistan (2001–2021) or Iraq (2003–2011). Weaker actors, like the Taliban or Hamas, may triumph by survival or erosion of superior powers.

 

Concept of Victory

Victory in contemporary warfare is increasingly a matter of relative vision rather than an absolute fact, defined at different levels. Tactical victory involves triumph in operations or battles, and operational victory is about the attainment of larger campaign goals. Strategic victories are directed towards ultimate political or social ends. The 1971 India-Pakistan War is a classic case of a clean-cut victory, as India achieved unequivocal military and political triumphs, such as the establishment of Bangladesh’s independence. On the other hand, long wars like those in Afghanistan or Ukraine are a case of limited or disputed victory, where one can speak of victory in terms of endurance, deterrence, or diplomatic success but certainly not in terms of outright control. They reflect how the concept of victory is context- and perspective-relative, and conforms to short-term gains, shorter-term, typically imprecise objectives in the complex nature of modern wars.

 

Types of Victory.

Victory can be categorised in terms of its focal point, although modern conflicts will have them combined.

Military Victory. Defeating the forces of an adversary, e.g., the Gulf War (1991), where coalition troops drove Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.

Political Victory. Successful achievement of strategic objectives, i.e., change of regime or policy changes (e.g., the NATO action in Kosovo, 1999, forcing Serbian retreat).

Economic Victory. Economically debilitating an enemy through sanctions, blockades, or denial of resources (i.e., Union blockade of the American Civil War, 1861–1865).

Psychological/Moral Victory. Shattering the will of an enemy to continue fighting or acquiring international legitimacy (i.e., Vietnam’s stand against the U.S., 1965–1973, despite defeat on the battlefield).

Informational/Cyber Victory. Dominance of narratives or infrastructure destruction in hybrid warfare (i.e., cyberattacks in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, 2022–ongoing).

 

Challenges in Defining Victory.

Victory is no longer easy to define due to a number of complicating factors.

Subjectivity. Victory is relative depending on who proclaims it. In the Iraq War (2003–2011), America proclaimed victory after Saddam Hussein’s fall, but long-lasting insurgency and instability caused people to question the outcome.

Short-Term vs. Long-Term. Tactical wins (e.g., battles) may not lead to a strategic win. The U.S. won most battles in Vietnam but lost the war politically due to opposition both at home and abroad.

Cultural Context. Different societies value outcomes differently. For others, preserving cultural identity or honour may be worth more than the loss of land (e.g., 19th-century Native American resistance).

Asymmetric Warfare. The weaker side can triumph by enduring or prolonging the fight, weakening stronger enemies (e.g., the Taliban in Afghanistan).

No Formal Endings. Modern wars end unclearly, in stalemate, in negotiations, or “managed conflict” rather than a clear-cut victory.

 

The India-Pakistan Wars – A Prism of Ambiguous Victories

The Indo-Pakistani wars also make for a fascinating framework for examining the idea of victory since they span from border battles in times of partition to nuclear-capable warfare. Right from their origins in the 1947 Partition of British India, when the two countries came into existence in the wake of communal riots, the wars recognise that both sides conceptualise victory differently depending on what transpires at home, global intervention, and disparate capabilities. Four extensive wars—1947–48, 1965, 1971, and 1999 (Kargil)—and the brief war of 2025 highlight such subjectivity. The First Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–48 erupted over the issue of Kashmir, a princely state whose accession to India or Pakistan was disputed.

1947 War. Pakistani regulars and tribal irregulars moved across the border, taking control of parts of the state, but Indian troops launched a counterattack. There was a UN-mandated ceasefire. The outcome was a standoff: India controlled approximately two-thirds of Kashmir, and the remaining portion was held by Pakistan. India regarded it as a defensive victory, sovereignty intact, while Pakistan could celebrate having taken territory even though they were weaker. Imagination varied; Pakistan’s were of unequal victory, India’s of preventing aggression. This conflict set the precedent: no clear victor, the Line of Control (LoC) as a de facto dividing line.

1965 War. The 1965 War, triggered by Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar—guerrilla penetration into Kashmir—exploded into full-scale war. War broke out in Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan. India boasted better tanks. The war concluded on a UN-negotiated ceasefire after 17 days, and pre-war borders came back under the Tashkent Agreement. Both declared victory: Pakistan focused on its defence against a superior force, commemorating September 6 as Defence Day, and India referred to having repelled the invasion and causing more damage. Historians consider it to be a draw, but this was employed in domestic propaganda to produce different impressions to illustrate how one could “win” a victory in the arena of information when there was a parity of arms.

1971 War. The 1971 War is the strongest example of a definite victory in this competition. Overwhelmed by Pakistan’s repression of Bengali separatists in East Pakistan (Bangladesh), India reacted with compassion following the refugee influx and frontier fighting. Indian troops, aided by Mukti Bahini guerrillas, encircled Dhaka in a rapid 13-day operation, resulting in the Dec. 16, 1971, surrender of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers—the biggest wartime surrender since World War II. Bangladesh became an independent country, separated from Pakistan’s eastern wing. India achieved military power, political projection, and a psychological boost, fundamentally reshaping South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. Pakistan, however, framed it as a question of geography and superpower intervention (as American and Chinese backing ebbed), highlighting their toughness in the face of defeat. This is an example of a Clausewitzian victory: gaining ascendancy over the adversary through sheer force.

Kargil War. The 1999 Kargil War was a tenuous, mountainous confrontation wherein Pakistani troops, masquerading as militants, held key summits in India’s Kargil district over the winter. India initiated Operation Vijay and Safed Sagar and drove the intruders out with a ground and air assault. Pakistan retreated but refused to acknowledge the regular army’s involvement. India observes July 26 as Kargil Vijay Diwas, declaring a strategic victory. Pakistan alone in the world perceived this as a triumph of morality for putting Kashmir on the international map. World opinion across the board condemned the Pakistani folly by comparing it with previous blunders in 1965 and 1971.

Op Sindoor. The latest Operation Sindoor was a four-day battle last month, which had begun with a terrorist strike at Pahalgam, Kashmir. India conducted punitive raids, destroying terrorist camps. Pakistan retaliated against Indian military and civilian targets. Pakistani provocation was reciprocated by further punitive attacks on several Pakistani airfields, and Pakistan called for a ceasefire. But both sides claimed victory: India claimed military dominance and deterrence restored, with strategists like Tom Cooper proclaiming it a “clear-cut victory.” Pakistan claimed staying power, and most at home who were asked and believed they had won and considered the ceasefire a diplomatic triumph. The war was an emblem of the ambiguity of contemporary victory: tactical advantages were lost in perception battles.

India-Pakistan confrontations have a pattern: India’s larger army wins militarily, but Pakistan claims victory morally through asymmetry and narratives.

 

Conclusion

Victory in war has changed from decisive battlefield victories and territorial gains to nuanced, multi-dimensional results that combine political stability, psychological impact, and international legitimacy. In networked times, pure success is not typical, as conflicts spill over into ideological, information, and cyberspace. Victory itself remains a relative concept, varying with point of view, timing, and cost-benefit. The India-Pakistan wars, from the 1947 stand-off to the current tensions in 2025, show how differing points of view generate pyrrhic or partial victories. War in the globalised, nuclear world is more about survival, deterrence, and media control than about wins per se. With heightened tensions all over the world, policymakers must understand the relativity of victory in order not to commit mistakes that will create endless loops of war.

 

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References:-

 

  1. Arend, Anthony Clark. “The Fog of Victory.” European Journal of International Law, vol. 24, no. 1, 2013, pp. 391–404.

 

  1. Bhandari, Prakash. “The Victory Paradox: Why Does Everyone Claim Victory in Modern Conflicts? Case of India-Pakistan.” Medium, May 2025,

 

  1. Biddle, Stephen. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton UP, 2004.

 

  1. CENJOWS. “Operation Sindoor: Redefining Notion of Victory in the Modern Limited Wars.” CENJOWS, 2025.

 

  1. Cooper, Tom. “Operation Sindoor: India’s Clear-Cut Victory?” The National Interest, 15 May 2025.

 

  1. Fatima, Manal. “The 2025 India-Pakistan Conflict: A Diplomatic Perspective.” Atlantic Council, 12 May 2025.

 

  1. Freedman, Lawrence. Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy. Cambridge UP, 2006.

 

  1. Indian Defence Review. “India-Pakistan War 1971: Analysis of India’s Military Strategy.” Indian Defence Review, 2025.

 

  1. Martel, William C. “Theory of Victory.” Parameters, U.S. Army War College, 2007, pp. 23–36.

 

  1. Raghavan, V. R. “1965: A War with No Winners.” The Hindu, 1 Sept. 2015.

 

  1. The Citizen. “The Notion of Victory—A Mirage in Modern Conflict.” The Citizen, 2025.

 

  1. Mattila, J., & Parkinson, S. (2017). Predicting the Architecture of Military ICT Infrastructure. The European Conference on Information Systems Management, (), 188-198.

 

  1. “What Constitutes Victory in Modern War?” Militaire Spectator, 2018.

737: Air Power Seminar by The Indian Netizens

 

Shared my views during the Air Power Webinar organised by The Indian Netizens

 

Spoke about:-

  1. Role of IAF in the Strategy of Punitive Deterrence.
  2. IAF Preparedness to Meet Current Challenges.
  3. Integration of Force Multipliers and Combat Enablers.
  4. IAF role in Military Diplomacy, HADR and Aid to Civil Authorities.

Q & A session was interesting.

 

 

Your Comments are welcome.

 

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Disclaimer:

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736 : DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS: APPLICABILITY IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

 

Article published on the IIRF website on 03 Sep 25.

 

As India has emerged as a rising maritime power in the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Navy needs to protect its vast sea interests from advanced threats, with China being a significant threat with highly advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Rising long-range precision missiles, advanced sensors, and cyber warfare erode the traditional naval formation. Therefore, it is necessary to learn new concepts. The U.S. Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) approach offers a model for India to enhance its maritime strike capability, operational flexibility, and survivability in contested areas, such as the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It is prudent to consider the principles of DMO, their applicability to India’s maritime environment, operational shift, technological enablers, challenges, and strategic implications, and how India can leverage DMO to advance its interests and increase its maritime influence.

 

The Strategic Environment for India

India’s oceanic space is vital to its economic and security requirements, with 90% of its volumetric trade and 70% of its value trade transiting the IOR. The region contains key chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait, critical for world trade but susceptible to A2/AD measures by competitors, who have increased their naval presence by way of bases in Djibouti and Gwadar. China’s reconnaissance-strike complex, including anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D, over-the-horizon radars, and space-based surveillance, challenges India’s power projection and freedom of navigation.

Initiated by the U.S. Navy in 2015, DMO offers a template for India to respond to these challenges. By distributing naval forces, linking them in strong networks, and creating flexible command arrangements, DMO conforms to India’s requirement for a flexible, resilient navy able to manoeuvre in contested seas. DMO is consistent with India’s maritime doctrine, which is centred on sea control, power projection, and regional cooperation through ventures such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region).

 

Core Principles of DMO & Relevance for India

Dispersion with Networked Integration. Dispersal of naval resources across the IOR lowers the chances of detection. India’s warships, including aircraft carriers such as INS Vikrant, destroyers, and frigates, can patrol vast geographies and stay networked with secure C4ISR systems. This facilitates synchronised attacks and situational awareness, imperative in contested regions such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Decentralised Command and Control (C2). DMO prioritises mission command, enabling naval commanders to take quick tactical judgments, crucial for swift responses in evolving situations, e.g., prospective conflicts in the South China Sea or Arabian Sea. This decentralisation helps India better exploit the rapidly changing opportunities with its larger opponents.

Lethality in Distribution. India’s increasing inventory of long-range weapons, including BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, can be plugged into DMO’s “kill webs,” enabling distributed forces to deliver coordinated attacks. This is debilitating without centralising troops, which is essential to counter enemy anti-ship missiles.

Operational Resilience. By spreading capability across manned and unmanned systems, India can take losses without paralysing operations. Continuity is ensured through backup systems, essential for sustained operations in prolonged conflicts.

Integration of Unmanned Systems. Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface ships (USVs), and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) can add to India’s sensor and strike capabilities. Initiatives such as the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) development of unmanned systems fall within the ambit of DMO’s focus on autonomous platforms.

All-Domain Synergy. DMO’s multi-domain approach bridges India’s naval operations with air, space, cyber, and land resources. Integrating with the Indian Air Force and Indian Army, and space assets, enhances collaborative operations and conforms to India’s transition towards tri-service integration.

 

Operational Framework for India

Historically, India’s maritime operations have been focused on carrier battle groups, such as those commanded by INS Vikramaditya. DMO alters the focus to a networked fleet system, with destroyers, frigates, submarines, and drones operating as nodes in the IOR. For instance, a DMO context could be a destroyer off the Arabian Sea coast, a P-8I Poseidon flying over the Bay of Bengal, and unmanned platforms off the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, all communicating in real-time to synchronise a missile attack on an enemy fleet.

India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command, which is a tri-service command, and similar structure on the western islands, can serve as a hub for DMO, like the U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). Islands with forward bases can accommodate sensors, anti-ship missiles, and logistics, advancing India’s presence in contested seas and depriving enemies of sea control. This multi-layered approach makes the enemy fight from all sides, increasing India’s strategic depth.

 

Technological Enablers

DMO implementation is based on leveraging and building the most important technologies:-

    • C4ISR Systems. India’s Naval Communication Satellite GSAT-7 and GSAT-7R will provide robust communications. Coupling with Tactical Data Links (as Link 16 of NATO) can improve data exchange between platforms, essential for network operations.
    • Unmanned Systems. DRDO’s work with UAVs and USVs for naval surveillance aligns well with DMO’s emphasis on autonomous platforms. Investments in UUVs in the future can enhance underwater reconnaissance and strike capabilities.
    • Long-Range Precision Weapons. The long-range BrahMos missile and future hypersonic variants enable distributed forces to strike from considerable ranges. Platform integration with the Scorpene-class submarines enhances DMO’s capability to strike.
    • Artificial Intelligence (AI). AI can process sensor data, assist in autonomous operations, and augment decision-making, minimising the burden on Indian naval operators in intricate scenarios.
    • Cyber and Electronic Warfare. India’s growing cyber capabilities, such as the Navy’s Information Warfare divisions, can jam adversary systems and networks, while electronic decoys defend Indian forces.

 

Implementation Strategies

To achieve DMO, the Indian Navy can focus on:-

    • Force Design. Maintain a balanced force structure. Invest in small, nimble platforms like the Next Generation Missile Vessels (NGMV) and unmanned vessels to augment larger vessels, increasing fleet adaptability.
    • Technological Development. Expedite DRDO’s unmanned systems efforts and invest in jam-resistant, secure communications for A2/AD environments.
    • Doctrinal Evolution. Revise India’s Maritime Doctrine to include DMO principles, with a focus on networked operations and decentralised C2. Exercises such as MALABAR and TROPEX can hone DMO tactics.
    • Training. Foster initiative-driven leadership through training initiatives, training officers for decentralised decision-making in contested environments.
    • Regional Cooperation. Enhance interoperability with friendly foreign countries and other IOR navies, incorporating DMO principles in joint exercises and operations.

 

Challenges

Implementing DMO poses a number of challenges for India:-

Communications Resilience. Enemy cyber and electronic warfare capabilities pose a threat to network stability. India needs to create backup, secure C2 systems for sustaining connectivity under hostile conditions.

Sustainment Logistics. Resupplying scattered forces over the long and wide IOR calls for creative logistics, e.g., resupply ships autonomously or pre-positioning stock at locations such as Lakshadweep.

Technological Deficits. India needs to induce critical technologies in its defence production ecosystem. Urgent acceleration of indigenous development and cooperation with international partners is needed.

Resource Limitations. Limited budgets and other priority defence requirements could stall investments in new platforms, weapons, and networks.

Institutional Adjustment. The move to decentralised command schemes would necessitate significant training and institutional transformation.

 

Strategic Implications

The Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) framework greatly enhances India’s Indo-Pacific strategic interests by strengthening deterrence against Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) approaches. DMO’s enduring and lethal operational reach demonstrates power in the face of A2/AD threats, thus complementing India’s deterrence posture and communicating its capability to counter aggression effectively. In addition, the DMO’s flexible architecture aligns with India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) policy, fostering maritime security cooperation with countries in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Through the dominance of key trade routes and chokepoints, DMO also protects India’s economic interests by facilitating an uninterrupted supply chain in the IOR and enhancing regional stability.

 

Future Outlook

As India develops its technological prowess, DMO can be enhanced to incorporate AI-powered battle management, autonomous swarming strategies, and space-based sensors. Friendly countries’ collaborative efforts in the mutual development of unmanned systems can speed DMO adoption. Activities such as MILAN exercise and bilateral patrols in the IOR can be used to experiment with DMO ideas, enhancing tactics and coordination. DMO could redefine India’s naval force structure in the long run, with a focus on networked, nimble platforms, aligned with global naval warfare trends.

 

Conclusion

Distributed Maritime Operations give India a new way to counter A2/AD threats and exercise maritime dominance in the Indo-Pacific. By dispersing forces, drawing on network integration, and building dynamic command structures, India can increase its naval survival and effectiveness against sophisticated opponents such as China. Though aspects related to communication resilience, logistics, and technology gaps would challenge the implementation of DMO, it nevertheless serves India’s strategic interests and overall vision for the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Navy can leverage DMO to protect its maritime interests and shape the direction of maritime warfare in a contested space by implementing doctrinal changes and promoting regional cooperation.

 

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

References:-

  1. Military Strategy Magazine. (2025, May). Distributed Maritime Operations, logistics, industry, and American strategy in Asia.

 

  1. Guevara, J. (2025). Sustaining the fight: Challenges of Distributed Maritime Operations. Center for Maritime Strategy.

 

  1. Filipoff, D. (2024, June). Distributed Maritime Operations: Solving what problems and seizing which opportunities? Atlantic Council.

 

  1. U.S. Naval Institute News. (2024). Report to Congress on Navy Distributed Maritime Operations.

 

  1. USNI News. (2024). Report to Congress on the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept.

 

  1. Congressional Research Service. (2024). Defence primer: Navy Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept. U.S. Congress.

 

  1. CIMSEC. (2023, March). Operationalising Distributed Maritime Operations. Center for International Maritime Security.

 

  1. Winegar, S. (2022). The eyes of the fleet: Corbett and Distributed Maritime Operations in the First Island Chain. Yale Journal of International Affairs.

 

  1. Military Medicine. (2022, January/October 2023). Navy en-route care in future Distributed Maritime Operations.

 

  1. Holmes, J. R. (2021, July). Distributed Maritime Operations: What is it and why it matters. The Diplomat.

 

  1. Clark, B., & Sloman, T. (2020). Advantage at sea: Prevailing with integrated all-domain naval power. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

 

  1. Galdorisi, G., & Hszieh, S. (2017). Distributed Maritime Operations: The Navy’s new warfighting concept. Naval War College Review, 70(3), 1–18.

 

  1. Clark, B., & Patt, D. (2017). Distributed Maritime Operations: An emerging paradigm for naval warfare. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
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