Tag: Warfare

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175: China’s Active Defence Strategy

 

Genesis. China’s Active defence Strategy appeared first time in  MAO’s writings in the year 1936. However, its meaning has been changing from time to time along with the war fighting philosophy of China.

 

Changes in War Fighting Philosophy. War fighting Philosophy of China has changed with the era of person in power. Over the years the changes are as follows:-

 

  • Mao Zedong – Final War (with reference to world wars)
  • Ding Xiaoping – Local War (Shift from world war to limited wars)
  • Jing Zemin – Local war with Hi Technology.
  • Hu Jintao – Informatised Local War (Network centric war)
  • Xi Jinping – Informatised and intelligentised war (Unrestricted War – including elements of hybrid and unconventional warfare even in the Grey Zone).

 

Initial Connotation. When the idea was conceived initially it meant allowing the enemy to come into own territory, in area of own choice and up to pre decide depth. Allow the enemy’s logistics supply lines get stretched out and dry down and at an opportune moment attack and defeat him. It was sort of offensive defence.

 

Present Framework. China articulates its Active Defence response as:

“China would never invade or expand, at the same time would never permit any piece of Chinese territory to separate from China & PLA will strike after enemy has attacked”.

 

Analysis & Implications

  • There is always a gap between what china preaches and practices. China although states that she will not expand, but is driven by the baser instinct of expansionism, considering herself as an empire state rather than nation state.

 

  • China decides as to what is part of China, by staking claims and producing conveniently select and doctored historical and legal documents.

 

  • China has left definition of enemy attack intentionally vague. It is not limited to military attack by kinetic means. It may include any action by the adversary which is against the interest of China.

 

  • In other words China decides what enemy attack is, and reserves the right to respond in a way it feels is appropriate.

 

  • It means China will always have the initiative and will have the legitimacy (in her opinion) for her actions.

 

  • China justifies her approach to this active defence strategy as strategically defensive but operationally offensive.

 

  • In tune with her war fighting philosophy of unrestricted warfare, the attack on enemy would be any domain (land, air, sea, cyber, space, electronic, information, psychological or even nuclear). It could use everything and anything as a weapon from the instruments of national power (DIME).

 

  • This strategy coupled with China’s practiced strategic approach of “achieving objectives without firing a shot”, would mean that China would continue to perpetuate grey zone warfare (inclusive of hybrid and unconventional warfare).

 

  • China’s formation of Strategic Support Force as a separate service, is in tune with the above mentioned strategy and actions.

 

Bottom Line

 There is an urgent need for reorientation and gearing up (not only by military) to deal with these challenges.

 

Question

Are we doing it?

 

YOUR SUGGESTIONS & VIEWS ARE MOST WELCOME

 

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169: Pillars of China’s Military Modernisation

 

China’s military modernisation has been top driven, well guided process.

Through observing other countries’ wars, including the Gulf War, the China realised that the information dominance was key to winning modern warfare.

 

Active Defence Strategy and Unrestricted Warfare

China has consistently followed the military strategy of “active defence”. However, the meaning and interpretation of the strategy has undergone changes from time to time.

In Mao Zedong’s era the strategy was premised on “striking only after the enemy has struck” in the overall back drop of total war (World war scenario).

In Deng Xiaoping’s era, local war using conventional weapons was elevated to strategic level, and the active defence strategy came to encapsulate the concept of pre-emptive attack conceived in local wars.

In Jiang Zemin’s era, the goal was to win “local wars under high-tech conditions.”

In Hu Jintao’s era, China recognized the importance of information in warfare, and the goal became winning “local wars under the conditions of informationisation.” Network-centric war is the closest equivalent of this terminology.

After Xi Jinping came to power, China’s aim shifted to winning informatised and intelligentised warfare making use of all the domains, including space, cyber, electromagnetic and psychological. Unrestricted warfare is the terminology introduced in the Chinese military lexicon.

The targets of attack in this type of warfare will include not only physical objects but also nontangible targets in cyber and cognitive spaces. The warfare is not restricted to military and military hardware.  This type of warfare uses anything as a weapon in the DIME paradigm.

 

Information Warfare and Cyber Domain

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has recognised that “information dominance” is crucial for seizing core initiative in modern warfare.

In this process, the Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in late 2015. It appears that the SSF is responsible for achieving information dominance as well as providing information support for joint operations, including the space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, and converting advanced technologies into military capabilities.

To achieve information dominance, the PLA also attaches importance to information warfare and cyber operations. This includes monitoring (surveillance), offensive operations (cyber-attacks) and defensive operations.

To cope with these challenges, China has sought to indigenise core technologies and train specialists in the cyber field.

 

Military Use of Space

China considers space as an essential domain for the prospective intelligentised warfare.

China’s space activities from their inception have been closely linked to military activities. However, it was only from the 1990s through the 2000s that the military value of space began to be recognized more widely in the PLA.

The PLA uses space to provide information support for operations on land, sea, and air and is also developing capabilities to disrupt other countries’ use of space.

In China, emerging space enterprises have rapidly boosted their technological capabilities with government and military support. The future is expected to herald an era in which the military adopts the technologies developed by the private sector and uses their services.

 

China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy

In China, military capabilities are being enhanced through military-civil fusion (MCF).

The MCF strategy advanced by the Xi administration aims to strengthen military capabilities and promote national development by tying together the military and socio-economy.

Since its establishment, the PLA has maintained close relations with the private sector, including participating in production activities. However, this relationship has changed with the times.

As science and technology takes on an increasing role in the security sector, and against the backdrop of the rising technological level of China’s private companies in the shift to a market economy, emphasis has been placed on MCF to enhance the military capabilities of the PLA.

The Xi administration created the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development, a powerful organization. It has launched measures in succession to ensure the smooth implementation of MCF.

In conjunction, the commission promotes the prioritisation of science, technology, and industry for national defence in new security domains, the active use of cutting-edge technologies for military purposes, and indigenisation of core technologies.

 

Thought

At times it is prudent to learn few things from one’s adversary.

Are we doing that?

 

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References

NIDS China Security Report 2021.

https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-military-has-a-hidden-weakness/

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/is-china-speeding-up-military-modernisation-it-may-but-its-not-yet

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modernization_of_the_People%27s_Liberation_Army

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

 

 

 

 

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164: Dozen Interesting Military Quotes

 

1
Know and use all the capabilities in your airplane. If you don’t, sooner or later, some guy who does use them all will kick your ass.

Dave “Preacher” Pace
Quoted in Robert L . Shaw, Fighter Combat

 

2
As one veteran Israeli pilot said after the June 1982 air campaign over Lebanon in response to American questions about how much doctrine the Israeli Air Force had written down, “Yes, we have books. But they are very thin.”

Barry D. Watts and James 0. Hale
Air University Review, 1984

 

3
It is a good thing for an uneducated man to read books of quotations.

Sir Winston Churchill

 

4
A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly trained Air Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but without it there can be no national security.

Gen H. H. “Hap” Arnold

 

5
War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well.

Frederick the Great

 

6
A wise man learns from his experience; a wiser man learns from the experience of others.

Confucius

 

7
Every soldier generally thinks only as far as the radius of action of his branch of the service and only as quickly as he can move with his weapons.

Luftwaffe general Karl Koller

 

8
Strategic air assault is wasted if it is dissipated piecemeal in sporadic attacks between which the enemy has an opportunity to readjust defenses or recuperate.

Hap Arnold

 

9
The science of war (knowledge).
The art of war (application of knowledge).

Wallace P. Franz and Harry G. Summers

Art of War Colloquium, textbook Army War College

 

10
Space in which to maneuver in the air, unlike fighting on land or sea, is practically unlimited.

Group Captain J. E “Johnnie” Johnson

 

11
Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.

Napoléon

12
Tactics are concerned with doing the job “right,” higher levels of strategy are concerned with doing the “right” job.

Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow

 

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