857: Veer Guardian 2026 Brings Air Exercises in the Limelight

 

Discussion with Shivan Chanana on the “DefencePulse” program of WION TV  

Talked about  “Beyond Exercise Veer Guardian”:  Japanese fighter operates from Indian soil for the first time. Fighters fly together: India & Japan build greater air force interoperability. India and Japan are moving from air exercises to deeper synergy.

 

Link to the WION post:-

 

 

Inputs to the questionnaire from a journalist on exercise.

 

  1. What’s driving the jump in India’s exercise tempo in the last 12–18 months?

I don’t think there’s really a “jump” in the strict sense. India has been steadily engaging in bilateral and multilateral exercises with a wide range of countries as part of its defence cooperation and military diplomacy for years now. What has changed is media attention. These exercises are, in fact, a continuation of an established trajectory. India’s participation has also evolved and expanded in scope over time, a logical progression as its defence relationships and operational engagements grow.

 

  1. Given today’s volatile geopolitics, China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and persistent border/maritime tensions—is India’s surge in joint exercises about deterrence, asserting power, or both?

In my view, it would be difficult to characterise these exercises primarily as being about either deterrence or power projection. At its core, India’s participation is an evolving, natural progression, increasing in scope and complexity as our forces mature and our partnerships deepen.

That said, these exercises do carry strategic and political signalling value. Globally, partners and adversaries alike read into who exercises with whom, and how often.  Highly complex, multi-domain drills (such as Malabar, Tarang Shakti, or Yudh Abhyas) signal that India has both high-end capability and coalition interoperability. Expanding exercise zones into the Western Pacific, the South China Sea, and deep into the Southern IOR asserts India’s status as a power capable of out-of-area contingency responses.

The exercises should therefore be seen in the broader context of India’s growing engagement with different countries and armed forces, rather than being attributed to a single strategic objective.

 

  1. Apart from geopolitical benefits, what are the military benefits for a country conducting these many exercises?

Beyond diplomacy and geopolitics, these exercises yield critical military-technical advantages. Exercises provide several direct military benefits:

    • They increase interoperability between participating forces, including communications, procedures, command relationships and tactical coordination.
    • They allow each force to learn from the other’s operational practices, training methods, logistics systems and tactical experience.
    • They build military-to-military familiarity and trust, which are particularly valuable during a crisis.
    • They expose personnel to unfamiliar operating environments, doctrines and equipment.
    • They improve the ability to conduct coordinated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime-security and evacuation operations.
    • They strengthen military solidarity and professional relationships among participating forces.

 

  1. How do these exercises fit into India’s broader alliance calculus balancing Quad engagements, SCO ties with Russia/China, and deeper drills with France/UK without slipping into a NATO-style bloc?

India engages in joint bilateral and multilateral exercises across a wide spectrum of partners, but that participation does not signal a drift toward any military alliance. Strategic autonomy remains a cornerstone of Indian policy, and historically India has never been part of a formal military alliance. Exercising with multiple, even competing, blocs simultaneously is entirely consistent with that autonomy; it is not a contradiction.  India’s model is closer to strategic autonomy with selective interoperability rather than a collective security model.

 

  1. What’s one clear sign this high tempo of exercises will last, not just a short spike? For example, more back-to-back drills, new first-time exercises with partners, or procurement/MRO deals linked to the platforms used in these drills.

These exercises are not ad hoc events. The proposals are drawn up for three-to five-year horizons and put up for in-principle approval, followed by detailed annual planning. Naturally, execution of the planned calendar depends on several factors. The mix of exercise partners (old and new) changes with the geopolitical landscape. These exercises are not intended to secure defence procurement deals. Dedicated platforms like DefExpo or Aero India serve that function. However, they do advertise and showcase exportable equipment.

 

  1. Where do you see the clearest line from exercise outcomes to procurement/co-production in the next 12–24 months?

Exercises primarily have an operational and training purpose. They can improve understanding of each other’s capabilities and operating procedures, but that does not mean that participation will automatically lead to a procurement or co-production agreement. Those decisions are driven by separate strategic, operational, technological and commercial considerations. The two tracks, operational exercises and acquisition, are largely separate and run through different processes and forums.

 

  1. Is it smarter for India to keep connections and allies across groups—Quad, SCO, France/UK rather than locking into one bloc like NATO, and does this exercise-heavy approach fit India’s non-aligned strategy better?

India engages with countries across different blocs based on mutual interest and benefit, not bloc allegiance. This approach is consistent with India’s long-standing emphasis on strategic autonomy. Maintaining defence relationships across different groupings gives India greater flexibility to cooperate with individual countries on areas of common interest without necessarily joining a formal military bloc.

 

  1. With drills stretching from the Bay of Bengal to the Western Pacific and new activities with Japan, Mongolia, the Philippines and others, is India subtly pushing back on China’s “String of Pearls,” and how does this change the South Asian geopolitical game?

I would not characterise India’s exercise engagements as being directed at any particular adversary. They are part of India’s broader defence cooperation with partner countries.

That said, the interoperability and logistical familiarity built through these exercises do enable operations across diverse geographies.

Clearly, a common strategic concern or adversary can incentivise closer defence cooperation, including joint exercises, between two or more countries. But that does not mean that every exercise should be viewed through that lens.

 

  1. India is deepening economic and diplomatic ties with both the US and China, while simultaneously building military power through these exercises, does this “engage all, prepare for all” approach work, or does it risk overstretch and mixed signals?

The sound policy is to engage everyone, including potential adversaries. International relations have no permanent friends or enemies; national interests and the geopolitical environment are dynamic and can change over time. India therefore has an interest in maintaining relationships across different groupings while building the capabilities necessary to protect its own interests. The challenge is to maintain that flexibility while ensuring that defence engagements remain aligned with India’s broader strategic priorities.

 

  1. With India-Japan air drills and other IAF exercises, which air-domain capabilities and platforms are being stress-tested, and what does that mean for spares, engines, and MRO in India?

These exercises have significant training and learning value, particularly in terms of operational procedures, interoperability and exposure to different methods of conducting air operations.

However, I would not describe them as placing extraordinary additional stress on the aircraft or leading to exceptional spare consumption. The flying and maintenance requirements associated with exercises are generally factored into the annual spare and maintenance support planning.

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

The information and data in this blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

846: VEER GUARDIAN 2026: SMALL EXERCISE WITH LARGER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

 

Inputs shared with journalists on the joint Indo-Japan air exercise “Veer Guardian 2026”

 

India and Japan’s air forces will conduct a joint training exercise, Veer Guardian 26, from September 9 to 21 in the Jodhpur area of Rajasthan, western India. As part of the joint training, Tokyo will deploy three F-2 fighter jets to India, as well as about 110 personnel from the Eighth Air Wing stationed at Tsuiki Airbase in southwestern Japan’s Fukuoka prefecture.

The first-time deployment of Japan’s fighter aircraft for Exercise Veer Guardian 26 is an important milestone in India–Japan air cooperation. High-end air combat training on each other’s soil signals a major increment in the partnership and defence cooperation.

 

Air Exercise

Veer Guardian introduces cooperation at the sharp end of air power: fighter operations, mission planning, air-combat training, communications, deconfliction and the practical problems of deploying and sustaining aircraft on a foreign airbase. The larger objective is therefore not platform-versus-platform competition, but gradually building a more interoperable air ecosystem.

The exercise provides both sides with an opportunity to understand different operating philosophies and equipment ecosystems. The JASDF operates predominantly US-origin or US-derived platforms, while the IAF fields a much more diverse inventory combining Russian, French, Israeli, indigenous and other technologies. Training across these differences matters because interoperability cannot be created through political agreements alone. It has to be built through repeated operational contact.

Strategic and Geopolitical Importance

For years, Indo-Japan bilateral security cooperation has been centred on diplomatic consultations, senior-level exchanges, logistics arrangements and broader Indo-Pacific initiatives. That relationship is now acquiring a more operational character.

The agreements reached during the India-Japan defence ministerial meeting (in August 2026) confirm this trend. The two countries agreed to conduct more complex exercises at short notice. They also agreed to expand cooperation in operational activities, intelligence, equipment, technology, and the defence industry.

That makes Veer Guardian 2026 less an isolated fighter exercise than one component of an increasingly institutionalised defence relationship under the India-Japan “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”

The exercise aligns with other tracks of a more resilient partnership, namely defence industry cooperation, maritime domain awareness, and economic security.

For Japan, this is part of a broader shift from “defence only” postures to expeditionary, coalition-capable air operations, including long-range deployments and integration with non-US partners.

 

Indo-Pacific context

Exercise Veer Guardian 26 also fits well within the larger Indo-Pacific framework. It follows the India–Japan agreement on Maritime Security Cooperation, signed at the defence ministers’ meeting on 20 Aug 26. The agreement stresses interoperability, security of the sea lanes of communication, and a ‘stable Indo-Pacific order’.

It dovetails with other bilateral/multilateral drills: Malabar (navies), Dharma Guardian (armies), JAIMEX (special forces), and the expanding US–Japan–India–Australia web of exercises.

Strategically, this is a sort of minilateralism. Defence ties and cooperation without a formal alliance. It should be viewed as one component of a much larger India-Japan military relationship that is becoming increasingly operational.

 

Upset China

India maintains defence and strategic relationships with a wide range of countries (including the United States, Japan, France, Russia and Southeast Asian partners. Its objective is to expand strategic options rather than subordinate its security policy to any single bloc.

India conducts joint exercises with numerous nations to learn best practices and improve interoperability. These engagements do not mean that India is joining a military bloc. This is best understood as alignment without alliance. India’s participation should therefore not be interpreted as a decision to join an anti-China coalition. Veer Guardian fits that model, and not every event should be viewed through a China lens.

Japan and India confront different manifestations of the same broad strategic challenge. Japan is increasingly concerned about China’s military power and its activities in the East China Sea, around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and across the western Pacific. India faces China along the Line of Actual Control and is increasingly attentive to China’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

India and Japan are Special Strategic and Global Partners with converging interests in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries have disagreements and clash of interest with China. They view China’s military modernisation, grey-zone activities and territorial assertiveness as challenges. Such joint military events naturally make China wary and uncomfortable.

 

Future Trajectory

Veer Guardian 26 can be seen as an early building block of a much deeper India-Japan security relationship. Such frequent, routine deployments reduce political and logistical barriers. Future exercises could involve larger participation and scope. Deployments could include more fighter aircraft, support aircraft, unmanned systems, and electronic-warfare elements. They could expand to include more complex fighter training, stronger logistics cooperation, and increasingly rapid or short-notice deployments.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The scale of Japanese participation (with three fighters and about 110 personnel) is modest.  Veer Guardian 26 is therefore best understood as a milestone rather than a military game-changer. Its immediate combat value may be limited, but its interoperability dividend is significant. Its political signalling value is even greater.

The exercise demonstrates that:

    • Japan can deploy combat aircraft to India and sustain them there;
    • the two air forces are willing to deepen tactical interoperability;
    • Japan is gaining experience operating militarily farther from its immediate home environment;
    • the bilateral relationship is becoming increasingly connected to the wider Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The future iterations are likely to grow in complexity if the political relationship and defence cooperation continue on their current trajectory.

 

Bottom Line

India and Japan are not creating an alliance. They are creating the interoperable capacity to act together.

 

Link to the quoted article on the subject:-

https://www.visiontimes.com/2026/09/04/japan-sends-fighter-jets-to-india-as-tokyo-and-new-delhi-eye-china.html

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. Japan Ministry of Defence, “Japan-India joint press statement”, Japan Ministry of Defence, 20 Aug 26.
  1. Japan Ministry of Defence, “Extraordinary press conference by Defence Minister Koizumi on Thursday, August 20, 2026, at 3:02 PM”, Japan Ministry of Defence, 20 Aug 26.
  1. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “IAF & Japan Air Self Defence Force set to exercise jointly in Japan”, Press Information Bureau. 07 Jan 26.
  1. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, “IAF’s joint air defence exercise with Japan, ‘Veer Guardian 2023’ concludes”, Press Information Bureau. 27 Jan 26.
  1. Embassy of India, Tokyo, “Veer Guardian 2023”, Embassy of India, Tokyo, 2026.
  1. Embassy of India, Tokyo, “India-Japan defence cooperation”, Embassy of India, Tokyo, 2026.
  1. The Diplomat, “JASDF fighter jets to visit India for first time”, The Diplomat, Aug 26.
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