Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
General Asim Munir has developed a notably close public relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump, marked by multiple high-profile meetings and mutual praise. Trump has repeatedly described Munir as his “favourite field marshal,” a “great fighter,” and an “exceptional human,” crediting him with de-escalating tensions and highlighting Pakistan’s resources, such as rare earth minerals. This rapport has helped repair strained U.S.-Pakistan ties, including discussions on security cooperation and potential deals involving minerals or military support. However, this alignment carries risks for Pakistan.
This engagement positions Pakistan as overly dependent on U.S. favour, potentially drawing it into American geopolitical agendas, such as in the Middle East (e.g., Gaza or Israel-Iran tensions), where U.S. policies may conflict with Pakistan’s interests or public sentiment. This could exacerbate internal divisions, fuel anti-U.S. narratives from opposition groups, or strain relations with other allies. Munir’s engagement with the US symbolises a broader sell-out of Pakistani sovereignty for personal or short-term gains, potentially harming national pride or long-term stability. The danger level is moderate: it boosts short-term U.S. aid and influence but risks isolating Pakistan if perceived as subservient.
Question 1: To what extent does Field Marshal Asim Munir’s close personal and strategic alignment with President Donald Trump increase Pakistan’s external vulnerabilities and internal distortions in civil–military decision-making?
Potential risks if Pakistan appears overly aligned with Trump-style politics:
Unpredictability. Trump’s foreign policy is transactional, not strategic. Pakistan could be treated as a short-term bargaining chip rather than a long-term partner.
Domestic instability. Any perception that the army favours the US political camp can lead to internal polarisation. It strengthens the narrative that Pakistan’s sovereignty is influenced externally.
Damage to institutional credibility. The army historically benefits from appearing neutral internationally. Open alignment with controversial figures can weaken that image.
Pakistan’s military cannot afford ideological loyalty to any US leader. Any engagement with Trump would likely be pragmatic, not emotional. It is not inherently dangerous, but overdependence or symbolic alignment could prove to be risky.
Question 2: How, and through which strategic and economic channels, could Munir’s renewed tilt towards the United States under Trump dilute Pakistan’s partnership with China, and what specific costs might this impose on Pakistan’s security, CPEC-related geoeconomics, and regional balancing posture?
China’s Interests
China’s interest in Pakistan is structural, not emotional.
CPEC
Indian containment
Arabian Sea access
Beijing understands Pakistan’s need to balance relations.
China’s Concerns
Security trust. China would be extremely sensitive to Pakistan’s intelligence-sharing with the US (especially about the Chinese military equipment).
CPEC momentum. China would prefer stability and predictability in Pakistan. Political chaos or Western pressure could delay Chinese investment.
Strategic ambiguity. Pakistan’s strength has always been its ability to balance great powers. Losing that balance could be disastrous. Harm if balance is lost:
Slower infrastructure development
Reduced military technology transfer
Weaker bargaining position globally
China will not leave Pakistan—but China can disengage quietly, which is often more damaging than open conflict. A tilt toward the US does not automatically alienate China, but mismanagement can.
Question 3: In what ways does Munir’s current diplomacy—simultaneously projecting Pakistan as a leading military voice in the Muslim world while deepening dependency on the U.S. and Gulf monarchies—undermine Pakistan’s long-term project to emerge as an autonomous “commander” or agenda-setter in the Muslim world?
Pakistan has positioned itself as a prominent leader in the Muslim world and a defender of Islamic values. It aims to strengthen relationships with Gulf states and others, presenting itself as a stable nuclear power that supports Muslim stability. While Pakistan often claims to be the “leader of the Muslim world,” this role is mainly symbolic rather than literal. Its pro-U.S. stance undermines this claim, and its Islamist rhetoric is often regarded as superficial. Pakistan faces the risk of alienating anti-Western Muslim groups or revealing hypocrisy in international forums like the OIC. The success of this strategy is debated—though it may boost domestic morale, it could also weaken regional alliances.
Reasons for the rhetoric.
It works domestically.
It reinforces Pakistan’s self-image as strategically important.
It helps justify military influence in foreign policy.
The notion is weakening:
Economic weakness. Leadership requires economic power. Pakistan currently relies on the IMF and bilateral bailouts.
Internal instability. No country follows a state that appears politically fragmented.
Military-first diplomacy. Muslim countries prioritise trade and investment over ideology.
The Muslim world is deeply divided – Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Turkey’s independent ambitions and Gulf states’ alignment with the West
The claim is promoted rhetorically while being weakened in practice, not necessarily by intent, but by Pakistan’s current limitations.
Analytical Assessment (Bottom Lines)
There is no evident ideological “love” for Trump/USA.
Pakistan’s strength historically has lain in multi-alignment, not in loyalty.
Pakistan’s real danger is losing balance, not choosing sides.
The Muslim leadership narrative is symbolic, not operational.
Munir vs Bajwa vs Musharraf – Strategic Comparison
Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008): Strategic Alignment Era
Approach. Open, explicit alliance with the US after 9/11. Clear “camp selection”
Strengths. Massive military and financial inflows. High international visibility. Clear command-and-control internally
Costs. Severe internal radicalisation. Long-term sovereignty damage. Blowback terrorism. China ties slowed (not broken)
Summary. Musharraf traded long-term stability for short-term power and money.
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
Bagram airbase is situated about 50 kilometers north of Kabul in Afghanistan’s Parwan Province. The fortified base has two runways and a vast support infrastructure. It has been a nerve center for every significant foreign military power to occupy the country since the Cold War. It was constructed in the 1950s and expanded significantly during the Soviet era. It became the main hub for Soviet military operations in Afghanistan during their 1979–1989 occupation.
Following the events of 9/11, the airfield was transformed into the centerpiece of the U.S.-led coalition’s operations in Afghanistan. At its peak, the facility featured runways capable of handling large transport and bomber aircraft, more than one hundred revetments, massive logistical and support infrastructures, and housed thousands of troops and aircraft. It was the launchpad for drone strikes, intelligence missions, and air support operations.
On 2 July 2021, after almost twenty years of continuous U.S. control of Bagram Airfield, the control was handed over to the Afghan authorities, marking a key moment in the coalition’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Bagram became a symbol of the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Four years later, the airbase has again attracted global attention. But this time, the debate isn’t about counterterrorism. It’s about geopolitical competition, regional sovereignty, and a changing balance of power in Asia.
A Strategic Asset. Bagram’s strategic appeal is noticeable. Located less than an hour’s flight from China’s western Xinjiang province and within reach of Iran, Pakistan, and Central Asia, it offers unparalleled access to some of the most contested airspace in the world. The base has two runways capable of hosting heavy bombers and long-range reconnaissance aircraft, along with hardened hangars, and infrastructure enough to house thousands of personnel. For the United States, regaining access to such a facility could restore a foothold in Central Asia. The region is now dominated by Chinese and Russian influence. For the Taliban, retaining control over it is both a matter of pride and sovereignty. For neighbouring countries, Bagram represents a potential spark that could reignite competition and instability.
Bagram’s Symbolic Power. Besides military significance, Bagram airbase has become a symbolic battlefield in the narrative wars. For the Taliban, it is a monument to victory. It symbolises foreign retreat and the restoration of national control. Military parades featuring captured U.S. hardware have been staged there annually since 2022, turning the base into both a propaganda tool and a training hub. For Western observers, Bagram remains a haunting reminder of how two decades of war ended with little enduring infrastructure or political legacy.
Renewed US Interest. In September 2025, former U.S. President Donald Trump reignited the debate over Bagram by declaring that the U.S. is “trying to get it back.” Trump, while speaking at a joint press conference (with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer), contended that the vital airbase was “given up for nothing”. His subsequent post on his social media escalated the rhetoric. He claimed that the base needs to be reclaimed. Otherwise, the “enemies of freedom” would consolidate power across the region. The Taliban called these comments delusional. Afghanistan spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that Bagram belongs to Afghanistan and not a meter of our land will return to foreign occupation.” However, the US president’s statement rekindled speculation about Washington’s interest in regaining influence in Afghanistan. Analysts feel that any U.S. attempt to retake the base would be an undertaking politically and strategically implausible in the current climate.
The Regional Chessboard. Bagram’s fate is not just a bilateral issue between Washington and Kabul. It sits at the intersection of larger geopolitical currents.
China views any U.S. return as a potential surveillance threat to its Belt and Road investments and its sensitive Xinjiang region.
Russia, seeking to expand its influence across Central Asia, has made clear that it will not tolerate new Western military outposts in the region.
Iran shares similar concerns and has strengthened its ties with the Taliban, providing limited economic and diplomatic backing.
Pakistan is caught between its complex relationship with the Taliban and with Washington.
For India, interest in the airbase is governed by factors such as location & connectivity, regional competition, and Afghanistan’s sovereignty & stability.
Regional Powers Push Back. The strongest rebuke came from Afghanistan’s neighbours. On October 7–8, 2025 (at the 7thMoscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan), Russia, China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics issued a joint declaration. They collectively rejected the idea of any foreign military presence on Afghan soil. The statement was obviously directed at Trump’s remarks and potential U.S. ambitions. The declaration reflected a fear about upsetting the stability in Afghanistan. Moscow and Beijing view any American return as a strategic encroachment. Islamabad is concerned about the growing influence of domestic insurgents. India publicly supported Afghanistan’s sovereignty and rejected the idea of foreign bases. Indian officials emphasised the need for “regional solutions” over external interventions.
Disinformation Drive. Rumours of U.S. (even Indian) control of Bagram airbase are circulating online. A social media post purported that the Taliban had transferred limited control of Bagram to US Special Forces. The report was debunked by both Taliban and U.S. officials. Similar speculation suggested that India might be using the base. The Afghan Foreign Ministry dismissed the rumours as a disinformation campaign and reaffirmed that there is no foreign presence.
Firm Taliban Control. All official reports indicate that Bagram Airbase is firmly under Taliban control. No confirmed signs of U.S., Indian, or any other foreign presence have emerged. In official statements, Taliban leaders have pledged to maintain the base for Afghanistan’s defence forces and reject “any form of shared control.” This stance enjoys regional support, even among nations that remain wary of Taliban governance.
Spotlight Remains. The Bagram issue captures the Afghan post-war era dilemma. It is a clash between its sovereignty and strategic interest. The airbase has become a measuring stick for regional order. As of now, no U.S. re-involvement appears imminent. But the rhetoric surrounding Bagram indicates how Afghanistan continues to serve as both a symbol and a stage in the contest for influence between the world powers (Washington, Beijing, and Moscow). For Afghans, it also serves as a reminder that even during a supposed state of peace, the fight for control in Afghanistan is not yet over.
Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.
For regular updates, please register your email here:-
Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.
References:-
Grau, Lester W, and Michael A, “The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost”, University Press of Kansas, 2002.
Jones, Seth G, “In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan”, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.
Department of Defence. “Bagram Airfield Infrastructure Overview”, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010.
Gul, Imran, “The Fall of Bagram: Symbol of a Chaotic Exit”, Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2021.
Wilder, Andrew, and Stuart Gordon, “Money Can’t Buy America Love: US Aid to Afghanistan and Its Unintended Consequences”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2021.
Trump, Donald J, “Remarks on Afghanistan and Regional Security”, Joint Press Conference (with UK Prime Minister), Sep 2025.
Cordesman, and Anthony H, “Reassessing US Options in Afghanistan: The Bagram Enigma”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Brief, Oct 2025.
Pant, Harsh V, “India’s Stake in Afghan Stability: Bagram as a Regional Litmus Test”, The Diplomat, Nov 2025.
Moscow Format Consultations, “Joint Declaration on Afghanistan: Rejecting Foreign Military Presence”, Official Communiqué, Oct 2025.
Fair, C Christine, “Pakistan’s Taliban Dilemma: Balancing Washington and Kabul Over Bagram”, Global Politics and Strategy 67, no. 5 (2025): 123–145.
Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Debunking Rumours of Foreign Control at Bagram Airfield”, Official Statement, Oct 2025.
