860: GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY AMID PROLONGED ARMED CONFLICTS

 

Shared my thoughts on the subject with the news channel.

 

The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war and the 2026 Iran–US/Israel conflict are creating a compounding shock across global food, fuel and fertiliser markets. The two conflicts affect different parts of the supply chain: the Russia–Ukraine war has primarily disrupted grain exports, energy supplies and Black Sea trade, while the Iran conflict has created a major energy, fertiliser and shipping shock centred on the Strait of Hormuz. Together, they raise production and transport costs while increasing the risk of lower agricultural yields and tighter food supplies.

 

Fuel and Energy

Russia–Ukraine War. The war has disrupted Russia’s exports of energy and caused damage to its refining facilities. Attacks by Ukraine on Russian refineries have lowered the amount of fuel that can be processed and have thus led to more strained global markets for diesel and gasoline, while Russia’s limitations on fuel exports have increased the pressure on the supply side. Earlier cuts in Russia’s pipeline gas exports to Europe also meant that global energy markets had to depend more on liquefied natural gas.

Iran–US and the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran conflict has added a much larger chokepoint risk. The Strait of Hormuz normally carries roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG trade and is also critical for Gulf fertiliser shipments. Conflict, attacks, insurance problems and shipping restrictions have sharply reduced traffic through the strait. Reportedly, Middle Eastern oil exports in September 2026 remained around 3.2 million barrels per day below their February pre-war level, while Brent crude was around $103 a barrel at the end of September.

Combined effect. The two conflicts therefore reinforce one another. Russian refining and export disruption and Hormuz disruption result in tighter fuel markets. Higher oil, diesel and gas prices manifest as higher costs for farming, irrigation, harvesting, processing and transportation. Fuel is a cross-cutting cost because virtually every stage of the food chain depends on it.

 

Fertiliser

Fertiliser is arguably the most important connection between the energy conflicts and future food supplies. Nitrogen fertiliser production depends heavily on natural gas. When gas and energy become more expensive or unavailable, fertiliser production becomes more expensive or is curtailed. Farmers then face a choice between paying much higher prices or reducing fertiliser application.

Russia–Ukraine. Russia remains a major exporter of nitrogen, phosphate and potash fertilisers. The war, sanctions, export restrictions and attacks on plants, ports and transport infrastructure have periodically tightened these supplies and forced importing countries to find alternative sources.

Iran–US and the Gulf. The Middle East is even more important for some fertiliser products. Gulf countries account for approximately 30–35% of global urea exports, 20–30% of ammonia and about 50% of sulphur exports. Sulphur is particularly important for phosphate fertilisers. The Hormuz disruption has therefore had an effect on both the production and transport of fertilisers. Plants in the Gulf have suffered production interruptions, and shipments of urea, ammonia and sulphur have been delayed or halted. Prices for fertilisers have gone up sharply, with urea prices rising by about 30–40% during periods of severe disruption. FAO has reported that 1.5–3 million tonnes of monthly fertiliser trade had been delayed by the disruption. The crucial effect is that the higher fertiliser prices today can translate into lower crop yields later. This makes fertiliser potentially more consequential for future harvests than the immediate effect of the energy shock itself.

 

Food and Grain Supplies

The two conflicts affect food supplies in different ways.

Russia–Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine are major suppliers of wheat, maize, barley, sunflower oil and other agricultural commodities. The war has disrupted farmland, ports, storage, processing facilities, vessels, and Black Sea shipping. Attacks on Black Sea infrastructure and shipping have intensified in 2026. Ukrainian agricultural exports have consequently fallen substantially in some periods, while attacks on Russian infrastructure have also affected grain and energy logistics.

Iran–US conflict. The Iran conflict initially affects food more indirectly. Its principal impact is through fuel, gas, fertiliser and shipping costs rather than a direct loss of major global grain production. Farmers facing unaffordable fertiliser may reduce application or switch to less fertiliser-intensive crops. The resulting reduction in yields could affect wheat, maize, rice and other crops in subsequent growing seasons.

The Compounding Effect. The two wars are affecting different links of the same agricultural chain at the same time. The key difference is that Russia–Ukraine has directly affected agricultural output and exports, while the Iran conflict has delivered a particularly severe energy and fertiliser shock. Together, however, they create a feedback loop in which higher energy costs make fertiliser more expensive, expensive fertiliser reduces agricultural input use, and reduced input use can eventually reduce food production.

 

Effect on India

India is on the receiving end of both aspects of this shock since its energy and fertiliser needs are largely met through imports, and at the same time it has a big agricultural sector that makes heavy use of these imports. It is reported that India obtains about 35% of its fertilisers from the Gulf. Fertiliser prices have increased significantly. In response, the government has increased its fertiliser subsidies and lowered fuel taxes, but this means that part of the external price shock is passed on to the public finances.

India does have an important buffer in the form of food stocks. Government warehouses held substantial quantities of wheat and rice, providing some protection against an immediate food shortage. However, this stockpile does not eliminate the longer-term problem of higher fertiliser, fuel and transport costs, particularly if weather conditions reduce domestic agricultural production.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The result of wars is a dual supply shock. The Russia–Ukraine war constrains important agricultural and energy flows through the Black Sea and Russian infrastructure, while the Iran conflict constrains energy and fertiliser flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The greatest longer-term concern is the fertiliser channel because today’s shortage or high prices can translate into lower harvests in subsequent growing seasons.

The principal risk is not necessarily that the world immediately runs out of food. The more significant risk is a sustained increase in the cost of producing, transporting and processing food.

The countries most exposed are those that are simultaneously dependent on imported fuel, fertiliser and food, particularly lower-income countries with limited fiscal capacity to subsidise these imports.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

Arita, S., Wang, M., & Glauber, J.  How fertilizer policies could exacerbate Hormuz price shocks. International Food Policy Research Institute.  (2026, May 22).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global agrifood implications of the 2026 conflict in the Middle East: Impacts on energy and fertilizer trade, and food security. 2026

Glauber, J., & Arita, S. How are fertilizer markets coping with the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz? International Food Policy Research Institute. IFPRI article, 18 Sep 2026.

International Energy Agency. Oil market report – June 2026. (2026, June 17).

International Energy Agency. How global oil supplies have readjusted to help fill the huge gap left by the Strait of Hormuz shock. (2026, June 22).

Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Government of India. 15 vessels safely cross Strait of Hormuz; India’s fertilizer stocks set to rise. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2026, July 5).

Pal, B. D., Kumar, A., Sirohi, S., Sainath, B., Sharma, K., & K. V., P. (Iran war supply chain disruptions: Impacts on India’s economy. International Food Policy Research Institute.  2026, June 25).

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. From gas to grain: Fertilizer disruptions raise risks for food security and trade. UNCTAD. 30 Mar 26.

Welsh, C., Curtis, E., & Glauber, J. How do the latest Black Sea attacks affect global food security? Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2026, September 11).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. FAO Chief Economist warns of severe global food security risks from disruption to Strait of Hormuz trade corridor.  (2026, March 26).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses. 28 Apr 26.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Export prices of wheat, maize and rice generally increased in August 2026, despite weaker Black Sea quotations. 14 Sep 26.

804: PAKISTAN’S MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA: A TIGHTROPE WALK OR A STRATEGIC MASTER STROKE

 

On 11 April 2026, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed the arrival of a massive Pakistani military contingent at its King Abdulaziz Air Base. Approximately 13,000 troops joined the 10,000 Pakistani personnel already stationed in the Kingdom.  This brings the total to over 23,000. Between 10 and 18 Pakistan Air Force fighter jets, support aircraft, and missile interceptors arrived alongside them. The last comparable Pakistani deployment to the Gulf was during the 1991 Gulf War. This military move is of consequential significance at a time when the Middle East is on fire.

 

Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the SMDA on 17 September 2025.  Previous cooperation between them was limited to military training, advisory roles, and limited support on security matters. The SMDA fundamentally changed the character of their relationship. It also has a collective security clause that suggests that “an attack on one country is considered an attack on both”. The recent deployment of Pakistani troops and fighter jets in Saudi Arabia marks the first major operational activation under the SDMA. It represents a significant escalation from earlier engagements between the two countries.

 

Pakistani Deployment. The deployment of PAF assets and ground forces suggests that the reality is considerably more serious than a symbolic gesture. The strategic logic of the deployment’s location is also noteworthy. King Abdulaziz Air Base is located in the heartland of Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure. Important oil infrastructure, i.e. the Abqaiq processing facility and the Ras Tanura terminal, is in this region. Reportedly, the missile interceptors were dispatched earlier following Iranian strikes on Gulf targets in March 2026. The phased deployment suggests that it is a deliberate, staged increase of Pakistan’s forces in the Kingdom. The air assets provide enhanced interception capability against the drone and missile threats that have characterised Iranian and Houthis’ offensive operations. The ground forces serve a dual purpose: deterring Houthi incursions from the south and freeing Saudi forces for higher-technology defensive and offensive operations.

 

Political Signalling. Some analysts still characterise the SMDA as primarily a political signal of solidarity. Pakistani officials have been careful with their framing. The forces are “not there to attack anyone.” The deployment is a form of defensive cooperation under an existing bilateral agreement. Saudi officials described it as aimed at “enhancing joint military coordination, raising operational readiness, and supporting security and stability at both the regional and international levels.” The language is measured. The military footprint is not.  This transforms Pakistan from a secondary security provider into a primary deterrent.

The Diplomatic Tightrope. What makes Pakistan’s position uniquely complex is what was happening in Islamabad at the same time. Even as Pakistani jets were landing in the Eastern Province, Pakistan was hosting direct US-Iran ceasefire negotiations in its capital. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, visited Riyadh and Tehran during this period. It indicates that Pakistan is trying to maintain both relationships simultaneously. Reuters reported that PAF jets provided a military escort for Iranian officials coming to Islamabad for the peace talks. Pakistan was, in the same week, escorting Iranian diplomats to safety and sending troops to Saudi Arabia against Iran. The diplomatic tightrope does not get more precarious than that.

 

Economic Dimension. Pakistan’s involvement cannot be understood without its economic context. Pakistan’s economy has been under severe stress. Gulf remittances are a structural pillar of its balance of payments. Saudi financial bailouts have repeatedly given Islamabad breathing room to prevent default. The troop deployment reflects a relationship that is simultaneously strategic, institutional, transactional, and above all, symbiotic. Pakistan is providing the military power and the associated nuclear umbrella. In return, Saudi Arabia would provide the financial support to keep Pakistan’s economy afloat. Concurrent with this military deployment, Saudi Arabia and Qatar pledged an additional $5 billion in financial support to Pakistan. The Jerusalem Post and Gulf analysts have described this bluntly as a “military repayment” system.

 

Regional Stakeholder. How the key actors read this deployment reveals the full complexity of what Pakistan has stepped into.

    • Saudi Arabia views the SMDA’s activation as long overdue. A formalisation of “Muslim brotherhood” solidarity and a critical component of strategic diversification at a moment when the widening conflict in West Asia has strained US reassurances. For Riyadh, Pakistani forces provide a tangible backstop that no amount of American diplomatic signalling can substitute.
    • Iran officially welcomed the SMDA when it was signed, labelling it as part of a “regional security system.” However, the circumstances for this deployment are different. A nuclear-armed state has deployed its doorstep, on the side of its principal regional adversary. The risk of Iranian miscalculation cannot be dismissed.
    • Israel faces more intricate repercussions. Pakistan’s presence constrains Iranian offensive options against Saudi targets. In some ways, it serves Israeli interests by restricting the opening of multiple fronts. But it also brings a nuclear-armed hostile state into the region. Israel would be watching the developments with sustained attention.
    • India is monitoring closely and quietly. The combat experience Pakistani forces will accumulate in a high-intensity multi-domain environment, the financial windfalls from Gulf support, and the deepening military-institutional ties with well-equipped Gulf partners. All of this has implications for India’s security calculus. The Line of Control is not the Eastern Province. But armies learn, adapt, and bring lessons home. India would be unwise to treat this deployment as a matter of purely West Asian concern.

 

Challenges. Pakistan’s military is already involved with the Afghan border, the Line of Control with India, and domestic counterterrorism operations.  Now, a major overseas deployment in an active conflict zone has been added to the commitments. Sustaining 23,000 personnel in the Gulf while maintaining domestic readiness is a significant challenge for resources and logistics. The escalation risk is also equally real. Pakistani forces are positioned in a high-readiness status region.  In this region, miscalculations have already produced multiple unintended engagements. If Iranian strikes resume against Saudi energy infrastructure, Pakistani personnel could be caught in the crossfire.  The SMDA’s collective defence clause obligates a legal and political response. Defensive cooperation can rapidly escalate into direct involvement.  Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. Its conventional forces in the Gulf operate under the implied umbrella of that deterrent. Every actor in the region is aware of this. It shapes calculations in ways that are difficult to model and impossible to predict.

 

Concluding Thoughts.

It is the first time since 1991 that Pakistan has committed forces at this scale to an active crisis zone outside its immediate neighbourhood. The SMDA has moved from paper to practice. A nuclear-armed state is now a frontline participant in the most volatile regional security environment on the planet.

Pakistan’s deployment to Saudi Arabia is either one of five things, or a combination of them.

    • Honouring of the treaty obligation.
    • Sustenance of financial relationship.
    • Diplomatic signalling.
    • Establishment of deterrence posture.
    • Acceptance of strategic risk.

The move could either strengthen deterrence and contribute to de-escalation or deepen polarisation and raise the risk of miscalculation. It will depend on decisions made in Tehran, Riyadh, Washington, and Islamabad in the weeks ahead.

What is already clear is that Pakistan has crossed a threshold (willingly or under duress). The coming months will determine whether that crossing was wise.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. “Pakistan sends military force, jets to Saudi Arabia under 2025 defence pact”, Al Arabiya English, 11 Apr 26. https://english.alarabiya.net (or relevant article URL)
  1. “The Saudi defence ministry says military force from Pakistan reached King Abdulaziz Air Base” Arab News, 11 Apr 26. https://www.arabnews.com
  1. “Pakistan sends a military force to Saudi Arabia as part of a pact”, Bloomberg, 11 Apr 26. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-11/pakistan-sends-military-force-to-saudi-arabia-as-part-of-pact
  1. “Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi defence agreement”, Global Security Review, 03 Nov 25.

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement

  1. “Why did Pakistan deploy soldiers and fighter jets to Saudi Arabia?”, The New Arab, Apr 26. https://www.newarab.com/news/why-did-pakistan-deploy-soldiers-fighter-jets-saudi-arabia
  1. “US-Iran war: Pakistan-Saudi defence pact, Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement details”, NDTV, Apr 26. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-iran-war-pakistan-saudi-secret-defence-pact-strategic-mutual-defence-agreement-details-11355801
  1. “Pakistan sends fighter jets to Saudi Arabia under a mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 11 Apr 26. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-says-pakistan-sends-fighter-jets-kingdom-under-defence-pact-2026-04-11/
  1. “Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan sign mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 17 Sep 25. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/
  1. “Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement: Implications for India”, Vivekananda International Foundation, 30 Sep 26. https://www.vifindia.org/2025/september/30/Saudi-Arabia-Pakistan-Strategic-Mutual-Defence-Agreement
  1. “Pakistan’s dual role is that of a mediator and military ally”, WION, Apr 26. https://www.wionews.com/world/pakistan-saudi-smda-pact-us-iran-war-1776144006783

790: THE U.S. STRIKE ON KHARG ISLAND AND ITS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

 

Inputs (video bytes) provided to the NDTV (Hindi) on 14 Mar 26.

 

The recent United States attack (on March 13-14, 2026) on Kharg Island marks a major escalation in the ongoing conflict between Washington and Tehran. The strike targeted military installations on the island, which serves as the primary hub for Iranian oil exports. Although the oil terminals themselves were reportedly spared, the operation has raised serious concerns about the future of the war, Iran’s potential response, and the stability of global energy markets.

This development highlights how modern conflicts increasingly involve not only military objectives but also economic pressure, particularly through attacks on critical infrastructure. The targeting of Kharg Island has therefore become a key geopolitical event with consequences that could extend far beyond the Middle East.

 

 

Strategic Importance of Kharg Island

Kharg Island is far more than a military target; it is the absolute epicentre of Iran’s economic survival. The 83-square-kilometre island is located in the Persian Gulf, 25 kilometres off the southwestern coast. The island is often referred to as the “crown jewel” of the Islamic Republic for several critical reasons.

It is located off the coast of Iran’s Bushehr province. Despite its modest size, it holds enormous economic and strategic significance for Iran. The island functions as the country’s main oil export terminal and handles the vast majority of its crude shipments to international markets.

Estimates suggest that around 90% of Iran’s oil exports (approximately 1.7 million barrels per day) pass through Kharg Island, making it the backbone of the country’s petroleum industry and a central pillar of its economy.

The island contains massive oil storage facilities capable of holding tens of millions of barrels of crude. Its deep-water terminals allow large supertankers to dock and load oil, something that many parts of Iran’s coastline cannot accommodate due to shallow waters.

Because Iran’s government relies heavily on oil revenues to finance its state budget, military operations, and social programs, Kharg Island effectively acts as the financial lifeline of the Iranian state. Any disruption to operations there can immediately reduce Iran’s export capacity and significantly weaken its economy.

The island has long been regarded as one of the most sensitive and heavily protected targets in the Persian Gulf.

 

The U.S. Strike and Its Objectives

According to reports, U.S. forces conducted airstrikes that destroyed military installations and defensive systems (including air defences, a naval base, missile/mine storage sites, and related facilities) on Kharg Island. However, the oil infrastructure itself was not directly attacked.

This selective targeting reflects a strategic calculation by Washington. By striking military defences rather than oil facilities, the United States may have intended to send a strong warning to Iran without immediately triggering a full-scale economic crisis in global energy markets.

At the same time, the attack demonstrates that the United States possesses the capability to strike at the heart of Iran’s energy system if tensions escalate further. U.S. officials have also indicated that oil infrastructure could become a target if Iran disrupts international shipping or escalates attacks on U.S. forces and allies in the region.

This approach effectively places Kharg Island at the center of strategic pressure in the conflict.

 

Possible Iranian Retaliation

Iran is unlikely to ignore an attack on such a critical national asset. Several possible retaliatory options are being discussed by military analysts.

Disrupting the Strait of Hormuz. One of Iran’s most powerful strategic tools is its ability to threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply passes through this route, making it one of the most important energy chokepoints on Earth. Iran could attempt to mine the strait, attack tankers, or use missiles and drones to disrupt shipping traffic. Even a partial disruption would significantly affect global energy supplies.

Attacking Regional Energy Infrastructure. Iran may also target oil facilities in neighbouring countries allied with the United States, such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. Such strikes could mirror previous attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure and would aim to increase economic pressure on Western allies.

Targeting U.S. Military Bases. Iran has several options for direct military retaliation against U.S. forces stationed in the Middle East. American bases in Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, and other Gulf states are within range of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones.

Expanding Proxy Warfare. Iran could also rely on allied militant groups across the region. Organisations in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have historically acted as Iran’s proxies and may launch attacks on U.S. interests or allied targets.

Any of these responses could escalate the conflict into a broader regional war.

 

Impact on Global Energy Markets

The attack on Kharg Island has already raised concerns in global energy markets. Because the island is responsible for the majority of Iranian oil exports, any disruption could remove significant volumes of crude from global supply.

Even before the strike, tensions in the region had caused oil prices to rise sharply. Analysts warn that further escalation could push prices dramatically higher, potentially reaching levels not seen in years.

The situation becomes even more serious if shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted. A prolonged closure or reduction in tanker traffic would create a major supply shock for the global oil market.

In recent weeks, tanker traffic through the strait has already declined dramatically amid fears of attacks, illustrating how quickly the conflict can affect global energy flows.

 

Economic Consequences for the World

The broader economic consequences of escalation could be severe. Oil price spikes typically lead to higher transportation costs, increased inflation, and pressure on national economies.

Countries heavily dependent on energy imports—especially in Asia and Europe—would be particularly vulnerable. China, India, Japan, and South Korea all rely heavily on oil shipments passing through the Persian Gulf.

Higher oil prices could also slow global economic growth. If energy costs remain elevated for an extended period, industries such as aviation, shipping, and manufacturing may face rising operational expenses.

A prolonged disruption to Middle Eastern energy supplies could even trigger a global recession, especially if combined with instability in financial markets and trade routes.

 

Conclusion

The U.S. attack on Kharg Island represents a pivotal moment in the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran. While the strike targeted military facilities rather than oil infrastructure, it has demonstrated that one of Iran’s most important economic assets is vulnerable.

For Iran, Kharg Island is not merely a piece of territory—it is the cornerstone of the nation’s oil export system and a vital source of government revenue. Any sustained disruption to operations there could have profound consequences for Iran’s economy and its ability to sustain military operations.

At the same time, Iran possesses several options for retaliation, ranging from attacks on regional energy infrastructure to disrupting global shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Such actions could dramatically intensify the conflict and push the region closer to a wider war.

Perhaps the most significant concern is the potential impact on the global economy. Because the Persian Gulf remains the world’s most important energy corridor, any escalation involving Kharg Island or the Strait of Hormuz could trigger sharp increases in oil prices and widespread economic instability.

In this sense, the attack on Kharg Island is not just a regional military development—it is a geopolitical event with global consequences that could shape the future of energy security and international economic stability.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:

Axios. (2026, March 13). U.S. conducts major bombing of strategic Iran island. https://www.axios.com/2026/03/13/iran-strike-trump-us

Hamilton, J. D. (2011). Historical oil shocks. In R. E. Parker & R. M. Whaples (Eds.), The handbook of major events in economic history (pp. 239–265). Routledge.

International Energy Agency. (2023). World energy outlook 2023. International Energy Agency.

International Monetary Fund. (2024). World economic outlook: Commodity price shocks and global growth. IMF.

Mansour, M. (2026, March 11). The orphan pearl: Inside Kharg, the beating heart of Iran’s oil empire. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/3/11/the-orphan-pearl-inside-kharg-the-beating-heart-of-irans-oil-empire

Reuters. (2026, March 14). Kharg Island struck by U.S. is key hub for Iran oil exports. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kharg-island-struck-by-us-is-key-hub-iran-oil-exports-2026-03-14

Reuters. (2026, March 14). Trump threatens strike on Iran’s Kharg Island oil network if shipping lanes remain blocked. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-threatens-strike-irans-kharg-island-oil-network-if-shipping-lanes-remain-2026-03-14

S&P Global Commodity Insights. (2025). Iran adds crude storage capacity at Kharg Island. https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/051825-iran-adds-2-million-barrels-of-crude-storage-capacity

Tehran Times. (2007). Iran exports over 90% of its crude oil via Kharg Island. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/130703/Iran-exports-over-90-of-its-crude-oil-via-Kharg-Island

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2024). World oil transit chokepoints. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints

World Bank. (2024). Commodity markets outlook. World Bank.

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