804: PAKISTAN’S MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA: A TIGHTROPE WALK OR A STRATEGIC MASTER STROKE

 

On 11 April 2026, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed the arrival of a massive Pakistani military contingent at its King Abdulaziz Air Base. Approximately 13,000 troops joined the 10,000 Pakistani personnel already stationed in the Kingdom.  This brings the total to over 23,000. Between 10 and 18 Pakistan Air Force fighter jets, support aircraft, and missile interceptors arrived alongside them. The last comparable Pakistani deployment to the Gulf was during the 1991 Gulf War. This military move is of consequential significance at a time when the Middle East is on fire.

 

Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the SMDA on 17 September 2025.  Previous cooperation between them was limited to military training, advisory roles, and limited support on security matters. The SMDA fundamentally changed the character of their relationship. It also has a collective security clause that suggests that “an attack on one country is considered an attack on both”. The recent deployment of Pakistani troops and fighter jets in Saudi Arabia marks the first major operational activation under the SDMA. It represents a significant escalation from earlier engagements between the two countries.

 

Pakistani Deployment. The deployment of PAF assets and ground forces suggests that the reality is considerably more serious than a symbolic gesture. The strategic logic of the deployment’s location is also noteworthy. King Abdulaziz Air Base is located in the heartland of Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure. Important oil infrastructure, i.e. the Abqaiq processing facility and the Ras Tanura terminal, is in this region. Reportedly, the missile interceptors were dispatched earlier following Iranian strikes on Gulf targets in March 2026. The phased deployment suggests that it is a deliberate, staged increase of Pakistan’s forces in the Kingdom. The air assets provide enhanced interception capability against the drone and missile threats that have characterised Iranian and Houthis’ offensive operations. The ground forces serve a dual purpose: deterring Houthi incursions from the south and freeing Saudi forces for higher-technology defensive and offensive operations.

 

Political Signalling. Some analysts still characterise the SMDA as primarily a political signal of solidarity. Pakistani officials have been careful with their framing. The forces are “not there to attack anyone.” The deployment is a form of defensive cooperation under an existing bilateral agreement. Saudi officials described it as aimed at “enhancing joint military coordination, raising operational readiness, and supporting security and stability at both the regional and international levels.” The language is measured. The military footprint is not.  This transforms Pakistan from a secondary security provider into a primary deterrent.

The Diplomatic Tightrope. What makes Pakistan’s position uniquely complex is what was happening in Islamabad at the same time. Even as Pakistani jets were landing in the Eastern Province, Pakistan was hosting direct US-Iran ceasefire negotiations in its capital. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, visited Riyadh and Tehran during this period. It indicates that Pakistan is trying to maintain both relationships simultaneously. Reuters reported that PAF jets provided a military escort for Iranian officials coming to Islamabad for the peace talks. Pakistan was, in the same week, escorting Iranian diplomats to safety and sending troops to Saudi Arabia against Iran. The diplomatic tightrope does not get more precarious than that.

 

Economic Dimension. Pakistan’s involvement cannot be understood without its economic context. Pakistan’s economy has been under severe stress. Gulf remittances are a structural pillar of its balance of payments. Saudi financial bailouts have repeatedly given Islamabad breathing room to prevent default. The troop deployment reflects a relationship that is simultaneously strategic, institutional, transactional, and above all, symbiotic. Pakistan is providing the military power and the associated nuclear umbrella. In return, Saudi Arabia would provide the financial support to keep Pakistan’s economy afloat. Concurrent with this military deployment, Saudi Arabia and Qatar pledged an additional $5 billion in financial support to Pakistan. The Jerusalem Post and Gulf analysts have described this bluntly as a “military repayment” system.

 

Regional Stakeholder. How the key actors read this deployment reveals the full complexity of what Pakistan has stepped into.

    • Saudi Arabia views the SMDA’s activation as long overdue. A formalisation of “Muslim brotherhood” solidarity and a critical component of strategic diversification at a moment when the widening conflict in West Asia has strained US reassurances. For Riyadh, Pakistani forces provide a tangible backstop that no amount of American diplomatic signalling can substitute.
    • Iran officially welcomed the SMDA when it was signed, labelling it as part of a “regional security system.” However, the circumstances for this deployment are different. A nuclear-armed state has deployed its doorstep, on the side of its principal regional adversary. The risk of Iranian miscalculation cannot be dismissed.
    • Israel faces more intricate repercussions. Pakistan’s presence constrains Iranian offensive options against Saudi targets. In some ways, it serves Israeli interests by restricting the opening of multiple fronts. But it also brings a nuclear-armed hostile state into the region. Israel would be watching the developments with sustained attention.
    • India is monitoring closely and quietly. The combat experience Pakistani forces will accumulate in a high-intensity multi-domain environment, the financial windfalls from Gulf support, and the deepening military-institutional ties with well-equipped Gulf partners. All of this has implications for India’s security calculus. The Line of Control is not the Eastern Province. But armies learn, adapt, and bring lessons home. India would be unwise to treat this deployment as a matter of purely West Asian concern.

 

Challenges. Pakistan’s military is already involved with the Afghan border, the Line of Control with India, and domestic counterterrorism operations.  Now, a major overseas deployment in an active conflict zone has been added to the commitments. Sustaining 23,000 personnel in the Gulf while maintaining domestic readiness is a significant challenge for resources and logistics. The escalation risk is also equally real. Pakistani forces are positioned in a high-readiness status region.  In this region, miscalculations have already produced multiple unintended engagements. If Iranian strikes resume against Saudi energy infrastructure, Pakistani personnel could be caught in the crossfire.  The SMDA’s collective defence clause obligates a legal and political response. Defensive cooperation can rapidly escalate into direct involvement.  Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. Its conventional forces in the Gulf operate under the implied umbrella of that deterrent. Every actor in the region is aware of this. It shapes calculations in ways that are difficult to model and impossible to predict.

 

Concluding Thoughts.

It is the first time since 1991 that Pakistan has committed forces at this scale to an active crisis zone outside its immediate neighbourhood. The SMDA has moved from paper to practice. A nuclear-armed state is now a frontline participant in the most volatile regional security environment on the planet.

Pakistan’s deployment to Saudi Arabia is either one of five things, or a combination of them.

    • Honouring of the treaty obligation.
    • Sustenance of financial relationship.
    • Diplomatic signalling.
    • Establishment of deterrence posture.
    • Acceptance of strategic risk.

The move could either strengthen deterrence and contribute to de-escalation or deepen polarisation and raise the risk of miscalculation. It will depend on decisions made in Tehran, Riyadh, Washington, and Islamabad in the weeks ahead.

What is already clear is that Pakistan has crossed a threshold (willingly or under duress). The coming months will determine whether that crossing was wise.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1878
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. “Pakistan sends military force, jets to Saudi Arabia under 2025 defence pact”, Al Arabiya English, 11 Apr 26. https://english.alarabiya.net (or relevant article URL)
  1. “The Saudi defence ministry says military force from Pakistan reached King Abdulaziz Air Base” Arab News, 11 Apr 26. https://www.arabnews.com
  1. “Pakistan sends a military force to Saudi Arabia as part of a pact”, Bloomberg, 11 Apr 26. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-11/pakistan-sends-military-force-to-saudi-arabia-as-part-of-pact
  1. “Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi defence agreement”, Global Security Review, 03 Nov 25.

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement

  1. “Why did Pakistan deploy soldiers and fighter jets to Saudi Arabia?”, The New Arab, Apr 26. https://www.newarab.com/news/why-did-pakistan-deploy-soldiers-fighter-jets-saudi-arabia
  1. “US-Iran war: Pakistan-Saudi defence pact, Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement details”, NDTV, Apr 26. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-iran-war-pakistan-saudi-secret-defence-pact-strategic-mutual-defence-agreement-details-11355801
  1. “Pakistan sends fighter jets to Saudi Arabia under a mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 11 Apr 26. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-says-pakistan-sends-fighter-jets-kingdom-under-defence-pact-2026-04-11/
  1. “Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan sign mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 17 Sep 25. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/
  1. “Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement: Implications for India”, Vivekananda International Foundation, 30 Sep 26. https://www.vifindia.org/2025/september/30/Saudi-Arabia-Pakistan-Strategic-Mutual-Defence-Agreement
  1. “Pakistan’s dual role is that of a mediator and military ally”, WION, Apr 26. https://www.wionews.com/world/pakistan-saudi-smda-pact-us-iran-war-1776144006783

798: IRAN’S MOSAIC DEFENCE AND DISTRIBUTED COMMAND ARCHITECTURE

 

Iran’s Mosaic Defence doctrine is one of the most deliberately constructed asymmetric military strategies of the 21st century, and the ongoing US-Israel military campaign against Iran — Operation Epic Fury, launched February 28, 2026 — has provided its first real-time stress test against a peer-level adversary. The doctrine’s performance in the opening weeks of that conflict has validated decades of Iranian military planning and confounded Western expectations of rapid regime collapse.

Iran’s defence doctrine was shaped by two formative historical experiences: the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War and Israel’s intervention in Lebanon. Both anchored ballistic missiles and proxy networks are core instruments of Iranian strategy. But the formal doctrine crystallised from a more recent lesson. Iranian military planners studied US operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, concluding above all from the 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein’s centralised regime that highly centralised militaries collapse quickly once their leadership is struck. As Foreign Minister Araghchi put it: “We’ve had two decades to study defeats of the US military to our immediate east and west. Bombings in our capital have no impact on our ability to conduct war. Decentralised Mosaic Defence enables us to decide when — and how — war will end.”

 

Formalisation and Architecture

The doctrine was formalised in 2005 when the IRGC, under General Mohammad Jafari, announced the Mosaic Defence model: a decentralised command-and-control system restructured into 31 separate provincial commands. Each of Iran’s 31 provinces has its own IRGC headquarters, command structure, weapons stockpile, and intelligence capability — effectively a complete military system in miniature. “Every province is a mosaic, and the commanders have the ability and power to make decisions,” analyst Farzin Nadimi has noted. “So when they are cut off from their command in Tehran, they can still function as a cohesive military force.”

 

Under this model, the IRGC, regular army, missile units, naval assets, and the Basij militia form a distributed defence network. If one unit is destroyed, others continue operating independently. The architecture was designed against one specific adversary capability: the decapitation strike.

 

The Four Operational Pillars

Asymmetric Warfare and Cost Imposition. Rather than conventional force-on-force engagement, the doctrine imposes prohibitive costs through endurance — survive the initial shock, keep retaliating through multiple channels, and raise the costs of a prolonged campaign until continuation becomes politically untenable for the attacker.

Distributed Command with Pre-Delegated Authority. Iranian sources described how the Revolutionary Guards delegated authority far down the ranks and built “successor ladders” so units continue operating if commanders are killed. Each provincial command operates with overlapping chains of command and dispersed stockpiles — not just decentralisation but redundancy at every level. Provincial IRGC units can call upon Basij forces during crises. This enables a multi-level defence that is largely unfazed by decapitation strikes.

Missile Arsenal as Strategic Anchor. Iran’s ballistic missile capability is the backbone of the mosaic architecture. Distributed missile batteries across 31 provincial commands mean that neutralising Iran’s missile threat requires destroying 31 separate, geographically dispersed launch systems rather than a single centralised arsenal — an operation orders of magnitude more complex than a leadership strike.

The Axis of Resistance as Strategic Depth. National security is not limited to the protection of national territory; it rests on preventing confrontation from spilling over national borders. Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias, and Syrian proxy forces each represent distributed nodes of retaliatory capacity operating semi-independently of Tehran — a regional application of the same mosaic logic applied domestically. Acting upon nodes across the Middle East’s interconnected system of military bases, maritime chokepoints, and energy corridors can transform a localised confrontation into a crisis with global repercussions.

 

The 2026 Operational Test

The initial US-Israeli campaign followed the standard Western pattern. It aimed to create a systemic collapse by destroying command centres, communications nodes, and senior figures. The US campaign did not yield the desired results. On the contrary, it highlighted the fundamental characteristic of the Iranian system, i.e. its capacity to absorb strategic shock.

Rather than triggering disintegration, the loss of the decision-making center appears to have accelerated the activation of a resilience mechanism already embedded in Iranian doctrine. What has emerged is that the Iranian strategic model can be described as “war without a centre”.  The military capability is organised not around a single decision-making nucleus, but across an array of interconnected tactical centers.

The system seems to be working. The independent Iranian military units (somewhat isolated) are acting based on general instructions given to them in advance. They have responded to heavy bombardment by firing unprecedented barrages of ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones at Israel, US military and diplomatic facilities across the Middle East, and critical energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.

 

Doctrinal Vulnerabilities

Mosaic Defence, however, does carry significant structural vulnerabilities.

  • Coordination Problem. Decentralisation enables resilience; however, it simultaneously creates coordination challenges. It becomes difficult to coordinate with the autonomous provincial units.
  • Strategic Coherence. Without a clear political direction, the doctrine designed for endurance risks prolonging the conflict, without achieving any meaningful strategic outcomes. Military persistence must eventually convert into political outcomes.
  • Dependency on Political Cohesion. The doctrine depends on public support and internal unity. Provincial commanders operating with pre-delegated authority must be politically reliable as well as militarily capable — a requirement that becomes more demanding as the human and economic costs of sustained conflict accumulate.
  • Escalation Unpredictability. Units acting on general instructions given in advance, without real-time central guidance, are inherently prone to escalation. The doctrine that gives Iran resilience also makes selective de-escalation difficult. These units may not be reachable for recall or restraint.

 

Strategic Implications

For US and Israeli Doctrine. The most significant implication is that the standard Western decapitation playbook, which worked against Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, did not work against Iran. Defeating mosaic defence requires not precision strikes on central nodes but sustained, comprehensive degradation of 31 independent provincial systems simultaneously.

For India’s Strategic Assessment of War Duration. The activation of Iran’s mosaic defence has direct implications for India. It implies that Hormuz closure is not a temporary measure, but a potentially sustained strategic instrument. India must plan for a prolonged, rather than brief, disruption scenario.

For India’s Structural Reorganisation. In terms of military doctrine, Iran’s architecture offers relevant insights for India’s distributed warfighting requirements. The concept of 31 self-contained provincial commands maps directly onto questions about India’s theatre command architecture. The lesson that decentralised command enables resilience is relevant to India’s two-front scenario planning.

For the Theory of Modern Warfare. The emergence of “war without a center” as an operational reality, rather than just a theoretical concept. It poses a fundamental challenge to the Western doctrine of rapid dominance. The assumption that power is concentrated in a single center, and that striking that center causes strategic paralysis has been disproven in real time. The broader implication is that the era of quick, decisive, decapitation-based military victories against a sophisticated adversary, who has studied and prepared specifically for such an approach, may be fundamentally over.

 

Analytical Perspective

Iran’s Mosaic Defence represents a genuinely innovative solution to a fundamental strategic problem—the problem of facing a technologically superior adversary by a militarily inferior state. The challenge is to survive the first strike and sustain the fight long enough to make the cost of continuation prohibitive for the attacker. The solution lies in distributing everything, pre-delegating authority, building redundancy at every level, and making the system function as a web rather than a hierarchy.

This doctrine’s greatest success is not operational but psychological. In the case of the war in Iran, it has converted Iran’s structural military inferiority into a manageable constraint. It has ensured that the adversary’s greatest advantages (i.e., precision, speed, and decapitation capability) did not translate into a rapid victory on which the entire campaign logic depended. Iran has prepared itself for a long war. Whether that long war serves Iran’s strategic interests better than a rapid defeat would have done is a question the doctrine itself cannot answer.

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1878
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:

  1. Connell, M. (2010). Iran’s military doctrine. CNA Analysis and Solutions.
  1. Eisenstadt, M. (2011). The strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion, expediency, and soft power in an era of disruptive change. Middle East Journal, 65(4), 551–570.
  1. Golkar, S. (2015). Captive society: The Basij militia and social control in Iran. Columbia University Press.
  1. Jafari, M. (2005). Mosaic defence doctrine: IRGC restructuring framework [Internal IRGC policy document, as cited in open-source analyses].
  1. Nadimi, F. (2020). Iran’s evolving approach to asymmetric naval warfare: Strategy and capabilities in the Gulf. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
  1. Ostovar, A. (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Oxford University Press.
  1. Takeyh, R. (2009). Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the world in the age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford University Press.
  1. Ward, S. (2009). Immortal: A military history of Iran and its armed forces. Georgetown University Press.
  1. Pape, R. A. (1996). Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war. Cornell University Press.
  1. Reuters. (2024). Iran’s Revolutionary Guards delegate authority down the chain of command amid preparations for conflict. Reuters.

791: IRAN WAR: MANY QUESTIONS, DIVERSE PERCEPTIONS (PART 1)

 

The answers are collated from open sources. Information warfare and propaganda are generally active, as in any other war. Bias in the answers cannot be ruled out.

 

ORIGINS & CAUSES

  1. What were the root causes of the Iran-Israel conflict, and how did the US get drawn in?

The conflict’s deepest roots go back to a single transformative moment: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. The new regime did not merely dislike Israel — it wrote hostility toward it into its founding ideology, framing Israel as the “Little Satan” and an instrument of American imperialism in the region. What followed over the next four decades was a methodical Iranian effort to turn that ideological enmity into strategic reality: a nuclear programme advancing toward weapons capability, a large and growing ballistic missile arsenal, and the “Axis of Resistance” — a network of proxy forces positioned to threaten Israel from multiple directions simultaneously. For Israel, this combination eventually crossed the threshold from threat to existential danger.

The United States did not enter this conflict in a single decisive moment. Still, it drew in gradually — first as Israel’s primary partner in air defence, then as the guarantor of global non-proliferation norms that Iran was visibly eroding, and finally as a direct combatant when the Trump administration judged that Iran’s military weakening after the 2025 campaign had opened a window for military action.

  1. How did the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack reshape the broader confrontation?

October 7 set off a chain of events whose full strategic consequences Tehran almost certainly did not anticipate. The immediate result was the Gaza war — but what mattered more in the longer run was what Israel did in the wars that followed. Through 2024, Israel systematically degraded Hamas. More consequentially, between September and November 2024, it decapitated Hezbollah’s entire senior leadership in Lebanon — a blow that reverberated far beyond Lebanon itself. With Hezbollah broken, the Assad regime in Syria lost a critical pillar of support and collapsed in December 2024. By early 2025, the proxy buffer Iran had spent three decades carefully constructing — the forward deterrence that was supposed to keep any direct conflict away from Iranian territory — had been stripped away, component by component. Iran found itself exposed, facing Israel and the United States without the defensive depth its strategy had always assumed. October 7 was, in retrospect, proved to be a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions for Tehran.

  1. How did Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” strategy contribute to the escalation?

The Axis of Resistance was Iran’s answer to a fundamental strategic problem: how does a state threaten a powerful adversary without inviting direct retaliation on its own territory? The answer was proxy warfare — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia militias scattered across Iraq, each providing Iran with deniable reach and the ability to keep Israel under constant pressure from multiple fronts. After October 7, these forces launched coordinated barrages designed to overwhelm Israeli responses and demonstrate the axis’s power. Instead, they invited precisely the attrition campaign Israel had been preparing for — and one by one, the pillars of the network were destroyed. By the time direct Iran-Israel exchanges began in 2025, the axis had been reduced to survival mode: capable of rhetorical solidarity and occasional harassment strikes, but unable to mount the kind of coordinated strategic response that might have deterred Israeli action. Iran’s forward deterrence had been hollowed out. It was left to face its most powerful adversaries essentially alone.

PRIMARY GOALS & REGIME CHANGE

  1. What are the primary goals of the US and Israeli operation?

Operation Epic Fury (USA) / Roaring Lion (Israel), launched on 28 February 2026, was built around four core US military objectives: dismantling Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and the industrial infrastructure that produces it; annihilating Iran’s navy and closing off its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz; permanently denying Iran a nuclear weapons capability; and degrading the IRGC command structure along with the proxy networks it funds and directs. Israel’s stated ambitions went further. Netanyahu framed the campaign not merely as the neutralisation of specific military capabilities but as the elimination of the “existential threat” posed by the Ayatollah regime — working down through Iran’s entire defence industrial chain, from the large IRGC-linked missile assembly plants to the smaller component suppliers that feed them. Trump, in his characteristic register, publicly framed the operation as delivering “freedom for the people of Iran” and ending the activities of the “number one state sponsor of terror.”

  1. Is “regime change” an official objective?

Not in so many words. Pentagon briefings have been careful to frame the campaign in terms of discrete military objectives — missiles, the navy, nuclear sites, proxy networks — rather than the fate of the Iranian government. But the gap between the stated military objectives and the unstated political ones is not hard to read. Trump and senior officials have spoken of toppling the clerical regime and called on Iranians to “seize their destiny.” The deliberate targeting and assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei on the opening night of operations is not the kind of act a government undertakes when its goals are purely military. Analysts have consistently treated it as a calculated step toward regime collapse. Israel, by most serious assessments, holds regime change as a strategic objective — an expansion of the goals it set in the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. The real endgame, as analysts have described it, is what they call “strategic disarmament”: the permanent elimination of Iran’s ability to project power through missiles, nuclear latency, and proxy networks. Whether the regime itself survives that process in some diminished form or collapses entirely appears to be a secondary concern.

IRANIAN LEADERSHIP POST-KHAMENEI

  1. Who is leading Iran following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei?

Ali Khamenei was killed on 28 February 2026 in the opening strikes of Operation Epic Fury — the first sitting Supreme Leader to be assassinated in the history of the Islamic Republic. The immediate aftermath saw an interim three-person leadership council assume power: President Masoud Pezeshkian, Guardian Council member Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, and Judiciary head Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i. The Assembly of Experts convened from 3 to 8 March and on 9 March unanimously elected Mojtaba Khamenei — the slain leader’s son — as his successor. He is 56 years old, deeply embedded in the IRGC, and regarded by those who know the Iranian system as a hardliner in his father’s mould, with no apparent inclination toward the kind of accommodation with the West that a less ideologically committed successor might have offered. The IRGC, meanwhile, holds de facto dominant power over security and decision-making in the vacuum the assassination created. Both Trump and Israel have already declared the appointment unacceptable. Israel has gone further — it has described Mojtaba Khamenei as a potential future target.

 

GLOBAL ENERGY MARKETS

  1. How will the war affect global energy markets?

The short answer is: badly, and possibly for a long time. Analysts have described the energy disruption as the worst shock to global markets since the 1970s oil crisis. The immediate trigger was Iran’s partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow waterway through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supplies and a significant share of LNG shipments pass every day. Within days of the closure, Brent crude surged from around $70 to over $110 per barrel, crossing $100 on 8 March 2026 for the first time in four years. European natural gas prices nearly doubled. Asian LNG costs spiked sharply. Tanker rates across the board soared as shipping companies rerouted or halted transits. Israeli strikes on Iran’s South Pars gas field and IRGC threats against Gulf oil infrastructure added a further layer of anxiety to already strained markets. The vulnerability is not evenly distributed. Around 80% of Asia’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Countries like Vietnam, Pakistan, and Indonesia hold emergency oil reserves estimated at less than 20 days — a dangerously thin buffer if the closure is prolonged. The International Energy Agency responded by releasing 400 million barrels from strategic reserves worldwide, a significant intervention that nonetheless covers only approximately four days of normal global demand.

 

RUSSIA AND CHINA

8. What are Russia’s and China’s positions?

Both countries have condemned the strikes in strong diplomatic language while doing very little that would concretely change the situation on the ground — a posture that has revealed, more clearly than any diplomatic formulation, how conditional their partnerships with Iran actually are.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov called the strikes “a deliberate, premeditated, and unprovoked act of armed aggression.” Putin expressed personal condolences over Khamenei’s death and called for an immediate ceasefire and return to diplomacy. Behind this public stance, however, Moscow has offered Tehran no direct military assistance. The reason is straightforward: Russia’s military is fully committed to Ukraine, and it has no interest in a confrontation with the United States over Iran. Russia’s bilateral strategic partnership treaty with Iran pointedly lacks a mutual-defence clause — a detail that matters enormously now. What Russia has reportedly done, behind the scenes, is share sensitive intelligence with Iran, including the precise locations of US warships and aircraft in the region — an allegation Putin publicly denied when Trump confronted him with it. Russia is also, it should be noted, a beneficiary of the conflict: elevated oil prices driven by Strait of Hormuz disruption directly ease the financial pressure of Western sanctions on Moscow.

China’s public position has been one of unambiguous condemnation. Beijing called the killing of Khamenei “a grave violation of Iran’s sovereignty” that “tramples on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter” and demanded an immediate halt to military operations. In practice, China’s support for Iran has been limited to diplomatic messaging, the supply of missile spare parts, and reported discussions on anti-ship missile systems — nothing that approaches direct military involvement. China abstained from a UN Security Council resolution condemning Iranian attacks on Gulf states, a studied ambiguity that reflects its desire to maintain working relationships with Gulf energy exporters even while criticising the US-Israeli campaign. Beijing’s longer game appears to be positioning itself as the indispensable post-conflict mediator and regional stabiliser. This power was not a party to the destruction and can therefore broker what comes after.

 

IMPACT ON REGIONAL ALLIES

9. What has been the impact on regional allies and the balance of power?

 Iran’s decision to widen its retaliation beyond Israel has produced a strategic result it almost certainly did not intend. By striking across nine countries — hitting US military installations and civilian infrastructure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE — Iran exposed Gulf states to direct attack at a scale they had not previously experienced. The effect has been paradoxical: governments that had carefully maintained public neutrality or quiet distance from the conflict have been pushed, covertly but unmistakably, toward the US-Israeli security umbrella. Intelligence-sharing with Israel is deepening. Security cooperation is expanding. Israeli defence exports to Gulf countries are growing. All of this is happening beneath the surface of public statements that continue to call for restraint and de-escalation. Iran’s proxy network, meanwhile, has been largely absent from the 2026 fighting — weakened by prior Israeli degradation, struggling to reconstitute, and capable of offering little more than solidarity gestures. The cumulative effect has been a significant and durable shift in the regional balance of power: Iran militarily diminished, its forward deterrence dismantled, and its neighbours moving — quietly but unmistakably — in the opposite direction.

 

(More to follow)

 

Please Add Value to the write-up with your views on the subject.

 

1878
Default rating

Please give a thumbs up if you  like The Post?

 

For regular updates, please register your email here:-

Subscribe

 

 

References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

Pics Courtesy: Internet

Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

English हिंदी