860: GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY AMID PROLONGED ARMED CONFLICTS

 

Shared my thoughts on the subject with the news channel.

 

The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war and the 2026 Iran–US/Israel conflict are creating a compounding shock across global food, fuel and fertiliser markets. The two conflicts affect different parts of the supply chain: the Russia–Ukraine war has primarily disrupted grain exports, energy supplies and Black Sea trade, while the Iran conflict has created a major energy, fertiliser and shipping shock centred on the Strait of Hormuz. Together, they raise production and transport costs while increasing the risk of lower agricultural yields and tighter food supplies.

 

Fuel and Energy

Russia–Ukraine War. The war has disrupted Russia’s exports of energy and caused damage to its refining facilities. Attacks by Ukraine on Russian refineries have lowered the amount of fuel that can be processed and have thus led to more strained global markets for diesel and gasoline, while Russia’s limitations on fuel exports have increased the pressure on the supply side. Earlier cuts in Russia’s pipeline gas exports to Europe also meant that global energy markets had to depend more on liquefied natural gas.

Iran–US and the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran conflict has added a much larger chokepoint risk. The Strait of Hormuz normally carries roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG trade and is also critical for Gulf fertiliser shipments. Conflict, attacks, insurance problems and shipping restrictions have sharply reduced traffic through the strait. Reportedly, Middle Eastern oil exports in September 2026 remained around 3.2 million barrels per day below their February pre-war level, while Brent crude was around $103 a barrel at the end of September.

Combined effect. The two conflicts therefore reinforce one another. Russian refining and export disruption and Hormuz disruption result in tighter fuel markets. Higher oil, diesel and gas prices manifest as higher costs for farming, irrigation, harvesting, processing and transportation. Fuel is a cross-cutting cost because virtually every stage of the food chain depends on it.

 

Fertiliser

Fertiliser is arguably the most important connection between the energy conflicts and future food supplies. Nitrogen fertiliser production depends heavily on natural gas. When gas and energy become more expensive or unavailable, fertiliser production becomes more expensive or is curtailed. Farmers then face a choice between paying much higher prices or reducing fertiliser application.

Russia–Ukraine. Russia remains a major exporter of nitrogen, phosphate and potash fertilisers. The war, sanctions, export restrictions and attacks on plants, ports and transport infrastructure have periodically tightened these supplies and forced importing countries to find alternative sources.

Iran–US and the Gulf. The Middle East is even more important for some fertiliser products. Gulf countries account for approximately 30–35% of global urea exports, 20–30% of ammonia and about 50% of sulphur exports. Sulphur is particularly important for phosphate fertilisers. The Hormuz disruption has therefore had an effect on both the production and transport of fertilisers. Plants in the Gulf have suffered production interruptions, and shipments of urea, ammonia and sulphur have been delayed or halted. Prices for fertilisers have gone up sharply, with urea prices rising by about 30–40% during periods of severe disruption. FAO has reported that 1.5–3 million tonnes of monthly fertiliser trade had been delayed by the disruption. The crucial effect is that the higher fertiliser prices today can translate into lower crop yields later. This makes fertiliser potentially more consequential for future harvests than the immediate effect of the energy shock itself.

 

Food and Grain Supplies

The two conflicts affect food supplies in different ways.

Russia–Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine are major suppliers of wheat, maize, barley, sunflower oil and other agricultural commodities. The war has disrupted farmland, ports, storage, processing facilities, vessels, and Black Sea shipping. Attacks on Black Sea infrastructure and shipping have intensified in 2026. Ukrainian agricultural exports have consequently fallen substantially in some periods, while attacks on Russian infrastructure have also affected grain and energy logistics.

Iran–US conflict. The Iran conflict initially affects food more indirectly. Its principal impact is through fuel, gas, fertiliser and shipping costs rather than a direct loss of major global grain production. Farmers facing unaffordable fertiliser may reduce application or switch to less fertiliser-intensive crops. The resulting reduction in yields could affect wheat, maize, rice and other crops in subsequent growing seasons.

The Compounding Effect. The two wars are affecting different links of the same agricultural chain at the same time. The key difference is that Russia–Ukraine has directly affected agricultural output and exports, while the Iran conflict has delivered a particularly severe energy and fertiliser shock. Together, however, they create a feedback loop in which higher energy costs make fertiliser more expensive, expensive fertiliser reduces agricultural input use, and reduced input use can eventually reduce food production.

 

Effect on India

India is on the receiving end of both aspects of this shock since its energy and fertiliser needs are largely met through imports, and at the same time it has a big agricultural sector that makes heavy use of these imports. It is reported that India obtains about 35% of its fertilisers from the Gulf. Fertiliser prices have increased significantly. In response, the government has increased its fertiliser subsidies and lowered fuel taxes, but this means that part of the external price shock is passed on to the public finances.

India does have an important buffer in the form of food stocks. Government warehouses held substantial quantities of wheat and rice, providing some protection against an immediate food shortage. However, this stockpile does not eliminate the longer-term problem of higher fertiliser, fuel and transport costs, particularly if weather conditions reduce domestic agricultural production.

 

Concluding Thoughts

The result of wars is a dual supply shock. The Russia–Ukraine war constrains important agricultural and energy flows through the Black Sea and Russian infrastructure, while the Iran conflict constrains energy and fertiliser flows through the Strait of Hormuz. The greatest longer-term concern is the fertiliser channel because today’s shortage or high prices can translate into lower harvests in subsequent growing seasons.

The principal risk is not necessarily that the world immediately runs out of food. The more significant risk is a sustained increase in the cost of producing, transporting and processing food.

The countries most exposed are those that are simultaneously dependent on imported fuel, fertiliser and food, particularly lower-income countries with limited fiscal capacity to subsidise these imports.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:-

Arita, S., Wang, M., & Glauber, J.  How fertilizer policies could exacerbate Hormuz price shocks. International Food Policy Research Institute.  (2026, May 22).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Global agrifood implications of the 2026 conflict in the Middle East: Impacts on energy and fertilizer trade, and food security. 2026

Glauber, J., & Arita, S. How are fertilizer markets coping with the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz? International Food Policy Research Institute. IFPRI article, 18 Sep 2026.

International Energy Agency. Oil market report – June 2026. (2026, June 17).

International Energy Agency. How global oil supplies have readjusted to help fill the huge gap left by the Strait of Hormuz shock. (2026, June 22).

Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Government of India. 15 vessels safely cross Strait of Hormuz; India’s fertilizer stocks set to rise. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2026, July 5).

Pal, B. D., Kumar, A., Sirohi, S., Sainath, B., Sharma, K., & K. V., P. (Iran war supply chain disruptions: Impacts on India’s economy. International Food Policy Research Institute.  2026, June 25).

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. From gas to grain: Fertilizer disruptions raise risks for food security and trade. UNCTAD. 30 Mar 26.

Welsh, C., Curtis, E., & Glauber, J. How do the latest Black Sea attacks affect global food security? Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2026, September 11).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. FAO Chief Economist warns of severe global food security risks from disruption to Strait of Hormuz trade corridor.  (2026, March 26).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses. 28 Apr 26.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Export prices of wheat, maize and rice generally increased in August 2026, despite weaker Black Sea quotations. 14 Sep 26.

804: PAKISTAN’S MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA: A TIGHTROPE WALK OR A STRATEGIC MASTER STROKE

 

On 11 April 2026, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defence confirmed the arrival of a massive Pakistani military contingent at its King Abdulaziz Air Base. Approximately 13,000 troops joined the 10,000 Pakistani personnel already stationed in the Kingdom.  This brings the total to over 23,000. Between 10 and 18 Pakistan Air Force fighter jets, support aircraft, and missile interceptors arrived alongside them. The last comparable Pakistani deployment to the Gulf was during the 1991 Gulf War. This military move is of consequential significance at a time when the Middle East is on fire.

 

Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the SMDA on 17 September 2025.  Previous cooperation between them was limited to military training, advisory roles, and limited support on security matters. The SMDA fundamentally changed the character of their relationship. It also has a collective security clause that suggests that “an attack on one country is considered an attack on both”. The recent deployment of Pakistani troops and fighter jets in Saudi Arabia marks the first major operational activation under the SDMA. It represents a significant escalation from earlier engagements between the two countries.

 

Pakistani Deployment. The deployment of PAF assets and ground forces suggests that the reality is considerably more serious than a symbolic gesture. The strategic logic of the deployment’s location is also noteworthy. King Abdulaziz Air Base is located in the heartland of Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure. Important oil infrastructure, i.e. the Abqaiq processing facility and the Ras Tanura terminal, is in this region. Reportedly, the missile interceptors were dispatched earlier following Iranian strikes on Gulf targets in March 2026. The phased deployment suggests that it is a deliberate, staged increase of Pakistan’s forces in the Kingdom. The air assets provide enhanced interception capability against the drone and missile threats that have characterised Iranian and Houthis’ offensive operations. The ground forces serve a dual purpose: deterring Houthi incursions from the south and freeing Saudi forces for higher-technology defensive and offensive operations.

 

Political Signalling. Some analysts still characterise the SMDA as primarily a political signal of solidarity. Pakistani officials have been careful with their framing. The forces are “not there to attack anyone.” The deployment is a form of defensive cooperation under an existing bilateral agreement. Saudi officials described it as aimed at “enhancing joint military coordination, raising operational readiness, and supporting security and stability at both the regional and international levels.” The language is measured. The military footprint is not.  This transforms Pakistan from a secondary security provider into a primary deterrent.

The Diplomatic Tightrope. What makes Pakistan’s position uniquely complex is what was happening in Islamabad at the same time. Even as Pakistani jets were landing in the Eastern Province, Pakistan was hosting direct US-Iran ceasefire negotiations in its capital. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, visited Riyadh and Tehran during this period. It indicates that Pakistan is trying to maintain both relationships simultaneously. Reuters reported that PAF jets provided a military escort for Iranian officials coming to Islamabad for the peace talks. Pakistan was, in the same week, escorting Iranian diplomats to safety and sending troops to Saudi Arabia against Iran. The diplomatic tightrope does not get more precarious than that.

 

Economic Dimension. Pakistan’s involvement cannot be understood without its economic context. Pakistan’s economy has been under severe stress. Gulf remittances are a structural pillar of its balance of payments. Saudi financial bailouts have repeatedly given Islamabad breathing room to prevent default. The troop deployment reflects a relationship that is simultaneously strategic, institutional, transactional, and above all, symbiotic. Pakistan is providing the military power and the associated nuclear umbrella. In return, Saudi Arabia would provide the financial support to keep Pakistan’s economy afloat. Concurrent with this military deployment, Saudi Arabia and Qatar pledged an additional $5 billion in financial support to Pakistan. The Jerusalem Post and Gulf analysts have described this bluntly as a “military repayment” system.

 

Regional Stakeholder. How the key actors read this deployment reveals the full complexity of what Pakistan has stepped into.

    • Saudi Arabia views the SMDA’s activation as long overdue. A formalisation of “Muslim brotherhood” solidarity and a critical component of strategic diversification at a moment when the widening conflict in West Asia has strained US reassurances. For Riyadh, Pakistani forces provide a tangible backstop that no amount of American diplomatic signalling can substitute.
    • Iran officially welcomed the SMDA when it was signed, labelling it as part of a “regional security system.” However, the circumstances for this deployment are different. A nuclear-armed state has deployed its doorstep, on the side of its principal regional adversary. The risk of Iranian miscalculation cannot be dismissed.
    • Israel faces more intricate repercussions. Pakistan’s presence constrains Iranian offensive options against Saudi targets. In some ways, it serves Israeli interests by restricting the opening of multiple fronts. But it also brings a nuclear-armed hostile state into the region. Israel would be watching the developments with sustained attention.
    • India is monitoring closely and quietly. The combat experience Pakistani forces will accumulate in a high-intensity multi-domain environment, the financial windfalls from Gulf support, and the deepening military-institutional ties with well-equipped Gulf partners. All of this has implications for India’s security calculus. The Line of Control is not the Eastern Province. But armies learn, adapt, and bring lessons home. India would be unwise to treat this deployment as a matter of purely West Asian concern.

 

Challenges. Pakistan’s military is already involved with the Afghan border, the Line of Control with India, and domestic counterterrorism operations.  Now, a major overseas deployment in an active conflict zone has been added to the commitments. Sustaining 23,000 personnel in the Gulf while maintaining domestic readiness is a significant challenge for resources and logistics. The escalation risk is also equally real. Pakistani forces are positioned in a high-readiness status region.  In this region, miscalculations have already produced multiple unintended engagements. If Iranian strikes resume against Saudi energy infrastructure, Pakistani personnel could be caught in the crossfire.  The SMDA’s collective defence clause obligates a legal and political response. Defensive cooperation can rapidly escalate into direct involvement.  Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. Its conventional forces in the Gulf operate under the implied umbrella of that deterrent. Every actor in the region is aware of this. It shapes calculations in ways that are difficult to model and impossible to predict.

 

Concluding Thoughts.

It is the first time since 1991 that Pakistan has committed forces at this scale to an active crisis zone outside its immediate neighbourhood. The SMDA has moved from paper to practice. A nuclear-armed state is now a frontline participant in the most volatile regional security environment on the planet.

Pakistan’s deployment to Saudi Arabia is either one of five things, or a combination of them.

    • Honouring of the treaty obligation.
    • Sustenance of financial relationship.
    • Diplomatic signalling.
    • Establishment of deterrence posture.
    • Acceptance of strategic risk.

The move could either strengthen deterrence and contribute to de-escalation or deepen polarisation and raise the risk of miscalculation. It will depend on decisions made in Tehran, Riyadh, Washington, and Islamabad in the weeks ahead.

What is already clear is that Pakistan has crossed a threshold (willingly or under duress). The coming months will determine whether that crossing was wise.

 

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References and credits

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to the respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References: –

  1. “Pakistan sends military force, jets to Saudi Arabia under 2025 defence pact”, Al Arabiya English, 11 Apr 26. https://english.alarabiya.net (or relevant article URL)
  1. “The Saudi defence ministry says military force from Pakistan reached King Abdulaziz Air Base” Arab News, 11 Apr 26. https://www.arabnews.com
  1. “Pakistan sends a military force to Saudi Arabia as part of a pact”, Bloomberg, 11 Apr 26. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-11/pakistan-sends-military-force-to-saudi-arabia-as-part-of-pact
  1. “Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi defence agreement”, Global Security Review, 03 Nov 25.

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement

  1. “Why did Pakistan deploy soldiers and fighter jets to Saudi Arabia?”, The New Arab, Apr 26. https://www.newarab.com/news/why-did-pakistan-deploy-soldiers-fighter-jets-saudi-arabia
  1. “US-Iran war: Pakistan-Saudi defence pact, Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement details”, NDTV, Apr 26. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-iran-war-pakistan-saudi-secret-defence-pact-strategic-mutual-defence-agreement-details-11355801
  1. “Pakistan sends fighter jets to Saudi Arabia under a mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 11 Apr 26. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-says-pakistan-sends-fighter-jets-kingdom-under-defence-pact-2026-04-11/
  1. “Saudi Arabia, nuclear-armed Pakistan sign mutual defence pact”, Reuters, 17 Sep 25. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/
  1. “Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement: Implications for India”, Vivekananda International Foundation, 30 Sep 26. https://www.vifindia.org/2025/september/30/Saudi-Arabia-Pakistan-Strategic-Mutual-Defence-Agreement
  1. “Pakistan’s dual role is that of a mediator and military ally”, WION, Apr 26. https://www.wionews.com/world/pakistan-saudi-smda-pact-us-iran-war-1776144006783

798: IRAN’S MOSAIC DEFENCE AND DISTRIBUTED COMMAND ARCHITECTURE

 

Iran’s Mosaic Defence doctrine is one of the most deliberately constructed asymmetric military strategies of the 21st century, and the ongoing US-Israel military campaign against Iran — Operation Epic Fury, launched February 28, 2026 — has provided its first real-time stress test against a peer-level adversary. The doctrine’s performance in the opening weeks of that conflict has validated decades of Iranian military planning and confounded Western expectations of rapid regime collapse.

Iran’s defence doctrine was shaped by two formative historical experiences: the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War and Israel’s intervention in Lebanon. Both anchored ballistic missiles and proxy networks are core instruments of Iranian strategy. But the formal doctrine crystallised from a more recent lesson. Iranian military planners studied US operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, concluding above all from the 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein’s centralised regime that highly centralised militaries collapse quickly once their leadership is struck. As Foreign Minister Araghchi put it: “We’ve had two decades to study defeats of the US military to our immediate east and west. Bombings in our capital have no impact on our ability to conduct war. Decentralised Mosaic Defence enables us to decide when — and how — war will end.”

 

Formalisation and Architecture

The doctrine was formalised in 2005 when the IRGC, under General Mohammad Jafari, announced the Mosaic Defence model: a decentralised command-and-control system restructured into 31 separate provincial commands. Each of Iran’s 31 provinces has its own IRGC headquarters, command structure, weapons stockpile, and intelligence capability — effectively a complete military system in miniature. “Every province is a mosaic, and the commanders have the ability and power to make decisions,” analyst Farzin Nadimi has noted. “So when they are cut off from their command in Tehran, they can still function as a cohesive military force.”

 

Under this model, the IRGC, regular army, missile units, naval assets, and the Basij militia form a distributed defence network. If one unit is destroyed, others continue operating independently. The architecture was designed against one specific adversary capability: the decapitation strike.

 

The Four Operational Pillars

Asymmetric Warfare and Cost Imposition. Rather than conventional force-on-force engagement, the doctrine imposes prohibitive costs through endurance — survive the initial shock, keep retaliating through multiple channels, and raise the costs of a prolonged campaign until continuation becomes politically untenable for the attacker.

Distributed Command with Pre-Delegated Authority. Iranian sources described how the Revolutionary Guards delegated authority far down the ranks and built “successor ladders” so units continue operating if commanders are killed. Each provincial command operates with overlapping chains of command and dispersed stockpiles — not just decentralisation but redundancy at every level. Provincial IRGC units can call upon Basij forces during crises. This enables a multi-level defence that is largely unfazed by decapitation strikes.

Missile Arsenal as Strategic Anchor. Iran’s ballistic missile capability is the backbone of the mosaic architecture. Distributed missile batteries across 31 provincial commands mean that neutralising Iran’s missile threat requires destroying 31 separate, geographically dispersed launch systems rather than a single centralised arsenal — an operation orders of magnitude more complex than a leadership strike.

The Axis of Resistance as Strategic Depth. National security is not limited to the protection of national territory; it rests on preventing confrontation from spilling over national borders. Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias, and Syrian proxy forces each represent distributed nodes of retaliatory capacity operating semi-independently of Tehran — a regional application of the same mosaic logic applied domestically. Acting upon nodes across the Middle East’s interconnected system of military bases, maritime chokepoints, and energy corridors can transform a localised confrontation into a crisis with global repercussions.

 

The 2026 Operational Test

The initial US-Israeli campaign followed the standard Western pattern. It aimed to create a systemic collapse by destroying command centres, communications nodes, and senior figures. The US campaign did not yield the desired results. On the contrary, it highlighted the fundamental characteristic of the Iranian system, i.e. its capacity to absorb strategic shock.

Rather than triggering disintegration, the loss of the decision-making center appears to have accelerated the activation of a resilience mechanism already embedded in Iranian doctrine. What has emerged is that the Iranian strategic model can be described as “war without a centre”.  The military capability is organised not around a single decision-making nucleus, but across an array of interconnected tactical centers.

The system seems to be working. The independent Iranian military units (somewhat isolated) are acting based on general instructions given to them in advance. They have responded to heavy bombardment by firing unprecedented barrages of ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones at Israel, US military and diplomatic facilities across the Middle East, and critical energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf.

 

Doctrinal Vulnerabilities

Mosaic Defence, however, does carry significant structural vulnerabilities.

  • Coordination Problem. Decentralisation enables resilience; however, it simultaneously creates coordination challenges. It becomes difficult to coordinate with the autonomous provincial units.
  • Strategic Coherence. Without a clear political direction, the doctrine designed for endurance risks prolonging the conflict, without achieving any meaningful strategic outcomes. Military persistence must eventually convert into political outcomes.
  • Dependency on Political Cohesion. The doctrine depends on public support and internal unity. Provincial commanders operating with pre-delegated authority must be politically reliable as well as militarily capable — a requirement that becomes more demanding as the human and economic costs of sustained conflict accumulate.
  • Escalation Unpredictability. Units acting on general instructions given in advance, without real-time central guidance, are inherently prone to escalation. The doctrine that gives Iran resilience also makes selective de-escalation difficult. These units may not be reachable for recall or restraint.

 

Strategic Implications

For US and Israeli Doctrine. The most significant implication is that the standard Western decapitation playbook, which worked against Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, did not work against Iran. Defeating mosaic defence requires not precision strikes on central nodes but sustained, comprehensive degradation of 31 independent provincial systems simultaneously.

For India’s Strategic Assessment of War Duration. The activation of Iran’s mosaic defence has direct implications for India. It implies that Hormuz closure is not a temporary measure, but a potentially sustained strategic instrument. India must plan for a prolonged, rather than brief, disruption scenario.

For India’s Structural Reorganisation. In terms of military doctrine, Iran’s architecture offers relevant insights for India’s distributed warfighting requirements. The concept of 31 self-contained provincial commands maps directly onto questions about India’s theatre command architecture. The lesson that decentralised command enables resilience is relevant to India’s two-front scenario planning.

For the Theory of Modern Warfare. The emergence of “war without a center” as an operational reality, rather than just a theoretical concept. It poses a fundamental challenge to the Western doctrine of rapid dominance. The assumption that power is concentrated in a single center, and that striking that center causes strategic paralysis has been disproven in real time. The broader implication is that the era of quick, decisive, decapitation-based military victories against a sophisticated adversary, who has studied and prepared specifically for such an approach, may be fundamentally over.

 

Analytical Perspective

Iran’s Mosaic Defence represents a genuinely innovative solution to a fundamental strategic problem—the problem of facing a technologically superior adversary by a militarily inferior state. The challenge is to survive the first strike and sustain the fight long enough to make the cost of continuation prohibitive for the attacker. The solution lies in distributing everything, pre-delegating authority, building redundancy at every level, and making the system function as a web rather than a hierarchy.

This doctrine’s greatest success is not operational but psychological. In the case of the war in Iran, it has converted Iran’s structural military inferiority into a manageable constraint. It has ensured that the adversary’s greatest advantages (i.e., precision, speed, and decapitation capability) did not translate into a rapid victory on which the entire campaign logic depended. Iran has prepared itself for a long war. Whether that long war serves Iran’s strategic interests better than a rapid defeat would have done is a question the doctrine itself cannot answer.

 

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References and credits

To all the online sites and channels.

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Disclaimer:

Information and data included in the blog are for educational & non-commercial purposes only and have been carefully adapted, excerpted, or edited from reliable and accurate sources. All copyrighted material belongs to respective owners and is provided only for wider dissemination.

 

 

References:

  1. Connell, M. (2010). Iran’s military doctrine. CNA Analysis and Solutions.
  1. Eisenstadt, M. (2011). The strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Religion, expediency, and soft power in an era of disruptive change. Middle East Journal, 65(4), 551–570.
  1. Golkar, S. (2015). Captive society: The Basij militia and social control in Iran. Columbia University Press.
  1. Jafari, M. (2005). Mosaic defence doctrine: IRGC restructuring framework [Internal IRGC policy document, as cited in open-source analyses].
  1. Nadimi, F. (2020). Iran’s evolving approach to asymmetric naval warfare: Strategy and capabilities in the Gulf. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
  1. Ostovar, A. (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Oxford University Press.
  1. Takeyh, R. (2009). Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the world in the age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford University Press.
  1. Ward, S. (2009). Immortal: A military history of Iran and its armed forces. Georgetown University Press.
  1. Pape, R. A. (1996). Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war. Cornell University Press.
  1. Reuters. (2024). Iran’s Revolutionary Guards delegate authority down the chain of command amid preparations for conflict. Reuters.

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